THE Sanatsugâtiya is, like the Bhagavadgîtâ, one of the numerous episodes of the Mahâbhârata ¹. It is true, that it has never commanded anything like that unbounded veneration which has always been paid in India to the Bhagavadgîtâ. Still it is sometimes studied even in our days, and it has had the high distinction of being commented on by the great leader of the modern Vedântic school—Sâṅkarârâśârya ². The Sanatsugâtiya purports to be a dialogue mainly between Sanatsugâta on the one side and Dhrîtarâshâra on the other. Sanatsugâta, from whom it takes its name, is said to be identical with Sanatkumâra, a name not unfamiliar to students of our Upanishad literature. And Dhrîtarâshâra is the old father of those Kauravas who formed one of the belligerent parties in the bellum plusquam civile which is recorded in the Mahâbhârata. The connexion of this particular episode with the main current of the narrative of that epos is one of the loosest possible character—much looser, for instance, than that of the Bhagavadgîtâ. As regards the latter, it can fairly be contended that it is in accordance with poetical justice for Arûna to feel despondent and unwilling to engage in battle, after actual sight of 'teachers, fathers, sons,' and all the rest of them, arrayed in opposition to him; and that therefore it was necessary for the poet to adduce some specific explanation as to how Arûna was ultimately enabled to get over such natural scruples. But as regards the Sanatsugâtiya, even such a contention as this

¹ Mahâbhârata, Udyoga Parvan, Adhyâya 41-46.  
² Mâdhava[râśârya, in speaking of Saṅkara's works, describes him as having commented on the Sanatsugâtiya, which is 'far from evil (persons)' [asatsudûram]. Saṅkara-vigaya, chapter VI, stanza 62.
can have no place. **For this is how the matter stands.** In the course of the negotiations for an amicable arrangement\(^1\) between the Pândavas and the Kauravas, Saṅgīyā, on one occasion, came back to Dhrītarāṣṭra with a message from the Pândavas. When he saw Dhrītarāṣṭra, however, he said that he would deliver the message in the public assembly of the Kauravas the next morning, and went away after pronouncing a severe censure on Dhrītarāṣṭra for his conduct. The suspense thus caused was a source of much vexation to the old man, and so he sent for Vidura, in order, as he expresses it, that Vidura might by his discourse assuage the fire that was raging within him. Vidura accordingly appears, and enters upon an elaborate prelection concerning matters spiritual, or, perhaps, more accurately quasi-spiritual, and at the outset of the Sanatsugātiya he is supposed to have reached a stage where, as being born a Śūdra, he hesitates to proceed. After some discussion of this point, between Vidura and Dhrītarāṣṭra, it is determined to call in the aid of Sanatsugāta, to explain the spiritual topics which Vidura felt a delicacy in dealing with; and Sanatsugāta is accordingly introduced on the scene in a way not unusual in our epic and purānic literature, viz. by Vidura engaging in some mystic process of meditation, in response to which Sanatsugāta appears. He is received then with all due formalities, and after he has had some rest, as our poem takes care to note, he is catechised by Dhrītarāṣṭra; and with one or two exceptions, all the verses which constitute the Sanatsugātiya are Sanatsugāta’s answers to Dhrītarāṣṭra’s questions\(^2\).

This brief statement of the scheme of this part of the Mahābhārata shows, as already pointed out, that the connexion of the Sanatsugātiya with the central story of that epic is very loose indeed; and that it might have been entirely omitted without occasioning any æsthetical or other defect. And therefore, although there is nothing positive

---

\(^1\) See p. 3 supra.

\(^2\) After this dialogue is over, the dawn breaks, and Dhrītarāṣṭra and the Kaurava princes meet in general assembly.
tending to prove the Sanatsugâtiya to be a later addition to the original epos, still the misgivings which are often entertained upon such points may well, in this case, be stronger than in the case of the Bhagavadgîtâ. The text, too, of the Sanatsugâtiya is not preserved in nearly so satisfactory a condition as that of the Gîtâ. I have had before me, in settling my text, the editions of the Mahâbhârata respectively printed and published at Bombay¹, Calcutta, and Madras, and three MSS., one of which was most kindly and readily placed at my disposal by my friend Professor Râmkrishna Gopal Bhândârkar; the second by another friend, Professor Âbâgi Vishnu Kâthavaic; and the third was a copy made for me at Sâgar in the Central Provinces, through the good offices of a third friend, Mr. Vâman Mahâdeva Kolhatkar. The copy lent me by Professor Bhândârkar comes from Puâna, and that lent by Professor Kâthavaic also from Puâna. This last, as well as the Sâgar copy, and the edition printed at Madras, contains the commentary of Saṅkarâkârya. And the text I have adopted is that which is indicated by the commentary as the text which its author had before him. But the several copies of the commentary differ so much from one another, that it is still a matter of some doubt with me, whether I have got accurately the text which Saṅkara commented upon. For instance, the Sâgar copy entirely omits chapter V, while the other copies not only give the text of that chapter, but also a commentary upon it which calls itself Saṅkarâkârya’s commentary². Again, take the stanzas which stand within brackets at pp. 167, 168³ of our translation. There is in none of the copies we have, any commentary of Saṅkarâkârya on them. And yet the stanzas exist in the text of the Mahâbhârata as given in those copies which do contain Saṅkara’s commentary. The matter is evidently one for further investigation. I have not, however, thought it

¹ This contains Nilakantha’s commentary, but his text avowedly includes the text of Saṅkara, and verses and readings contained in more modern copies.
² The commentary on the sixth chapter, however, takes up the thread from the end of the fourth chapter.
³ See p. 182, where one of the lines recurs.
absolutely necessary to make such an investigation for the purposes of the present translation. But to be on the safe side, I have retained in the translation everything which is to be found in those copies of the Sanatsugātiya which also contain Saṅkara's commentary. As to other stanzas—and there are some of this description—which other MSS. or commentators vouch for, but of which no trace is to be found in the MSS. containing Saṅkara's commentary\(^1\); I have simply omitted them.

These facts show that, in the case of the Sānatsugātiya, the materials for a trustworthy historical account of the work are not of a very satisfactory character. The materials for ascertaining its date and position in Sanskrit literature are, indeed, so scanty, that poor as we have seen the materials for the Bhagavadgītā to be, they must be called superlatively rich as compared with those we have now to deal with. As regards external evidence on the points now alluded to, the first and almost the last fact falling under that head, is the fact of the work being quoted from and commented upon by Saṅkarākārya. In his commentary on the Svetāsvatara-upanishad\(^2\), Saṅkara cites the passage about the flamingo at p. 189, introducing it with the words, 'And in the Sanatsugātiya also.' In the same\(^3\) commentary some other passages from the Sanatsugātiya are also quoted, but without naming the work except as a Smṛti, and mixing up together verses from different parts of the work.

This is really all the external evidence, that I am aware of, touching the date of the Sanatsugātiya. There is, however, one other point, which it is desirable to notice, though not, perhaps, so much because it is of any very great value in itself, as because it may hereafter become useful, should further research into the Mahābhārata and other works yield the requisite information. There are, then, eight stanzas in the thirty-sixth, thirty-seventh, thirty-ninth, and fortieth chapters of the Udyoga Parvan of the Mahābhā-

---

\(^1\) See note 1, p. 137.

\(^2\) P. 283.

\(^3\) P. 252. See, too, Sarfraka Bhāshya, p. 818.
rata (the Sanatsugâtiya commencing at the forty-first chapter), seven of which are quoted in the Pâñkatantra, and the eighth in the Mahâbhâshya of Patañjali. Of course, it almost goes without saying, that neither the Pâñkatantra nor the Mahâbhâshya mentions the source from which they derive the verses in question. But I do not think it unallowable to make the provisional assumption, that they were derived from the Mahâbhârata, so long as we cannot produce any other, and more likely, source. It is true, that Professor Weber has, in another connexion, impugned the cogency of this argument. He seems to think, that the probability—in the case he was actually dealing with—of the Râmâyana having borrowed from the Mahâbhâshya, is quite as strong as the probability of the Mahâbhâshya having borrowed from the Râmâyana. And doubtless, he would by parity of reason contend, in the case before us, that the probabilities, as between the Mahâbhârata on the one hand, and the Mahâbhâshya and the Pâñkatantra on the other, bear the same mutual relation. I cannot accept this view. I am not now concerned to discuss the merits of the conclusion in support of which Professor Weber has advanced this argument. I am only considering, how far it affects the question now before us. And as to that question, I may say, that the Pâñkatantra expressly introduces the stanzas now under consideration with some such expression as, 'For it has been said,' indicating clearly that it was there quoting the words of another. And so, too, does the Mahâbhâshya,

---


2 Udyoga Parvan, chap. XXXVIII, st. 1, and Mahâbhâshya VI, 1-4, p. 35 (Bâñâras ed.)

3 See Indian Antiquary IV, 247. The parallel from Mâdhava which Professor Weber adduces is quite inconclusive, and as far as it goes appears to me to militate against the Professor's own view.

4 I may, however, admit at once, that I ought not to have expressed myself as strongly as I did in the note which Professor Weber criticises.

5 See p. 203 infra.
where the passage we refer to runs as follows: ‘(It is) laid down, (that there is) a sin in one of tender age not rising to receive (an elderly person), and (that there is) merit in rising to receive. How? Thus, “The life-winds of a youth depart upwards, when an elderly man approaches (him). By rising to receive (him), and salutation, he obtains them again.”’ It appears to me, that the indications of this being a quotation in the Bhâshya are very strong. But apart from that, I do demur to the proposition, that the probabilities are equal, of a work like the Mahâbhârata or Râmâyana borrowing a verse from the Mahâbhâshya, and vice versa. It appears to me perfectly plain, I own, that the probability of a grammatical work like the Bhâshya borrowing a verse from a standard work like the Bhârata or Râmâyana for purposes of illustration is very much the stronger of the two. And this, quite independently of any inquiry as to whether the Bhâshya does or does not show other indications of acquaintance with the Bhârata or the Râmâyana.

If these arguments are correct, it seems to me that they carry us thus far in our present investigation—namely, that we may now say, that we have reason to believe some parts, at all events, of the thirty-sixth, thirty-seventh, thirty-eighth, and fortieth chapters of the Udyoga Parvan of the Mahâbhârata to have probably been in existence prior to the sixth century A.C.¹; and that some parts of the thirty-seventh chapter were probably extant in the time of Patañgali, viz. the second century B.C.² Now, internal evidence does not yield any indications tending to show that the several chapters here referred to must have been prior in time to the chapters composing the Sanatsugâtiya, which come so soon after them in the Mahâbhârata. On the contrary, it is not too much to maintain, that to a certain extent the style and language of the Sanatsugâtiya is, if anything, rather indicative of its priority in time over the five chapters immediately preceding it. And, therefore, so far as this argument goes, it enables us—provisionally only, it must be

¹ See p. 29 supra.
² See p. 33 supra.
remembered—to fix the second century B.C. as a terminus ad quem for the date of the Sanatsugâtiya.

This is all the external evidence available for a discussion of the question—when the Sanatsugâtiya was composed. We now turn to the internal evidence. Standing by itself, internal evidence is not, in my opinion, of much cogency in any case. Still in ascertaining, as best we can, the history of our ancient literature, even this species of evidence is not to be despised; it must only be used and received with caution. Under this head, then, we may note first the persons who are supposed to take part in the dialogue. Sanatsugâta—Sanatkumâra—as already pointed out, is a name already familiar to the readers of one of our older Upanishads—the Khândogya. Dhritarâshtra is not known in the Upanishads, but he is an important personage in the epic literature. And it is to be remarked, that his character as disclosed in the Sanatsugâtiya is not at all similar to that which has attached itself to his name, alike in the later literature of our country, and in that popular opinion which was probably formed by this later literature. In the dialogue before us, he figures as an earnest inquirer after truth; he is described as the ‘talented king Dhritarâshtra;’ and is addressed by Sanatsugâta as, ‘O acute sir! ‘O learned person!’ True it is, that Nilakantha in one place, as we have noticed in our note there, endeavours to bring out the later view of Dhritarâshtra’s character; but it seems to me that that endeavour, based as it is on a forced and far-fetched interpretation of a single word in our poem, is an unsuccessful one. None of the questions, which Dhritarâshtra puts to Sanatsugâta in the course of their dialogue, indicates the avaricious old man who wished to deprive his innocent nephews of their just rights in the interests of his own wicked and misguided sons. They rather indicate the bona fide student of spiritual lore, and thus point to what is, perhaps, an earlier view of Dhritarâshtra’s character.

1 See Hall’s Sâňkhyaśāstra, preface, pp. 14, 15.
2 P. 151, note 2.
3 Nilakantha himself, however, treats Dhritarâshtra’s question later on as showing that he had attained indifference to worldly concerns. That question does not occur in Sâṅkara’s text, but is given at p. 158 infra.
If we look next to the general style of this poem, we find that it has none of that elaboration which marks what I have called the age of Kāvyas and Nātakas. The remarks on this topic in the Introduction to the Gitā apply pretty accurately to this work also. We observe here the same paucity of long-drawn compounds, the same absence of merely ornamental adjectives, the same absence of figures and tropes; in one word, the same directness and simplicity of style. Furthermore, there is a somewhat greater want of finish about the syntax of our poem than there is even in the Gitā. Such constructions as we find inter alia at chapter II, stanza 2, or 25, or at chapter III, stanza 14, or chapter IV, stanza 12, or in the early verses of the last chapter, indicate a period in the history of the language, when probably the regulations of syntax were not quite thoroughly established in practice.

If we turn to the metre of the poem, an analogous phenomenon strikes us there. Similar irregularities in the collocation of long and short syllables, similar superfluities and deficiencies of syllables, meet us in the Sanatsugātiya and the Bhagavadgitā. And in the former work, as in the latter, the irregularities are less observable in the Anushṭubh than in the other metres used. Probably the explanation, apart from the great elasticity of that metre, is that the Anushṭubh had been more used, and had in consequence become comparatively more settled in its scheme even in practical composition.

Looking now more particularly to the language of the work before us, we find one word to be of most frequent occurrence, namely, the word vai, which we have rendered 'verily.' It is not a common word in the later literature, while in the Upanishad literature we meet with great frequency, not merely vai, but the words, which I think are cognate with it, vā and vāva. The former word, indeed,
appears to me to stand in some passages of the Upanishads for vai by euphonic alterations. Thus in the passage tvam và aham asmi bhagavo devate, aham vai tvam asi, it is difficult not to suppose that the và of the first part of the sentence is the same word as the vai of the second part, only altered according to the rules of Sandhi in Sanskrit.

A second point of similarity between the language of the Upanishads and that of the Sanatsugâtiya is to be found in the phrase, 'He who knows this becomes immortal.' This sentence, or one of like signification, is, as is well known, of common occurrence in the Upanishads and in the Brâhmaṇas. In the Bhagavadgîtâ, the verses towards the end, which come after Krishnâ’s summing-up of his instruction, seem to be of a somewhat analogous, though in some respects different, nature. And in the Purânas we meet sometimes with elaborate passages extolling the merits of a particular rite, or a particular pilgrimage, and so forth. This form of the Phalâsruti, as it is called, appears to have been developed in process of time from the minute germ existing in the Brâhmaṇas and the Upanishads. In the Sanatsugâtiya, however, we are almost at the beginning of those developments; indeed, the form before us is identically the same as that which we see in the works where it is first met with. It is a short sentence, which, though complete in itself, still appears merely at the end of another passage, and almost as a part of such other passage.

There is one other point of a kindred nature which it may be well to notice here. As in the Gîtâ, so in the Sanatsugâtiya, we meet with a considerable number of words used in senses not familiar in the later literature. They are collected in the Index of Sanskrit words in this volume; but a few remarks on some of them will not, it is thought, be entirely out of place here. The word mārga 1—in the sense of ‘worldly life’—is rather remarkable. Saṅkara renders it by ‘the path of samsâra’ or worldly life. And he quotes as a parallel the passage from the Kâlandogya-

1 I give no references here, as they can be found in the Index of Sanskrit words at the end of this volume.
upanishad which speaks of returning to the ‘path.’ There, however, Saṅkara explains it to mean the ‘path by which the self returns to worldly life,’ namely, from space to the wind and so forth into vegetables, and food, ultimately appearing as a foetus. Another remarkable word is ‘varga,’ which occurs twice in the Sanatsugātīya. Saṅkara and Nilakantha differ in their explanations of it, and Nilakantha indeed gives two different meanings to the word in the two passages where it occurs. We may also refer here specially to utsa, ṛitvig, and matvā. In Boehtlingk and Roth’s Lexicon the only passages cited under ‘utsa’ are from Vedic works, except two respectively from Susruta and the Dasakumāra-Karita. One passage, however, there cited, viz. Viṣṇuḥ pade paramadhva utsaḥ, is plainly the original of the passage we are now considering. As to ṛitvig in the sense it bears here, we see, I think, what was the earlier signification of that word before it settled down into the somewhat technical meaning in which it is now familiar. And matvā in the sense of ‘meditating upon’ is to be found in the Upanishads, but not, I think, in any work of the classical literature. These words, therefore, seem to indicate that the Sanatsugātīya was composed at a stage in the development of the Sanskrit language which is a good deal earlier than the stage which we see completely reached in the classical literature.

Coming now to the matter of the Sanatsugātīya, it appears to me, that we there see indications pointing in a general way to the same conclusion as that which we have here arrived at. There is, in the first place, a looseness and want of rigid system in the mode of handling the subject, similar to that which we have already observed upon as characterising the Bhagavadgītā. There is no obvious bond of connexion joining together the various subjects discussed, nor are those subjects themselves treated after any very scientific or rigorous method. Again, if the fourth chapter is a genuine part of the Sanatsugātīya, we have an elaborate repetition in one part, of what has been said in another part of the work, with only a few variations in words, and
perhaps fewer still in signification. As, however, I am not at present prepared to stand finally by the genuineness of that chapter, I do not consider it desirable to further labour this argument than to point out, that similar repetitions, on a smaller scale, perhaps, are not uncommon in our older literature.

Coming now to the manner in which the Vedas are spoken of in the work before us, there are, we find, one or two noteworthy circumstances proper to be considered here. In the first place, we have the reference to the four Vedas together with Ākhyānas as the fifth Veda. This is in conformity with the old tradition recorded in the various works to which we have referred in our note on the passage. The mention of the Atharva-veda, which is implied in this passage, and expressly contained in another, might be regarded as some mark of a modern age. But without dwelling upon the fact, that the Atharva-veda, though probably modern as compared with the other Vedas, is still old enough to date some centuries before the Christian era, it must suffice to draw attention here to the fact that the Kândogya-upanishad mentions that Veda, and it is not here argued that the Sanatsugâtiya is older than the Kândogya-upanishad. We have next to consider the reference to the Sâman hymns as 'vimala,' or pure. The point involved in this reference has been already sufficiently discussed in the Introduction to the Gitâ; and it is not necessary here to say more than that, of the two classes of works we have there made, the Sanatsugâtiya appears from the passage under discussion to rank itself with the class which is prior in date.

The estimate of the value of the Vedas which is implied in the Sanatsugâtiya appears to coincide very nearly with that which we have shown to be the estimate implied in the Bhagavadgîtâ. The Vedas are not here cast aside as useless any more than they are in the Bhagavadgîtâ. For, I do not think the word Anrikas which occurs in one passage of the work can be regarded really as referring to those
who entirely reject the Vedic revelation. But without going as far as that, the Sanatsugātiya seems certainly to join the Bhagavadgītā in its protest against those men of extreme views, who could see nothing beyond the rites and ceremonies taught in the Vedas. A study of the Vedas is, indeed, insisted on in sundry passages of the Sanatsugātiya. But it is equally maintained, that the performance of the ceremonies laid down in the Vedas is not the true means of final emancipation. It is maintained, that action done with any desire is a cause of bondage to worldly life; that the gods themselves are ordinary creatures who have reached a certain high position owing to the practice of the duties of Brahma-kārins, but that they are not only not superior to, but are really under the control of, the man who has acquired the true knowledge of the universal self. On all these points, we have opinions expressed in the Sanatsugātiya, which conclusively establish an identity of doctrine as between the Upanishads and the Bhagavadgītā on the one hand, and the Sanatsugātiya on the other. Lastly, we have an explicit statement, that the mere study of Vedic texts avails nothing, and that sin is not to be got rid of by one who merely ‘studies the Rīk and the Yagus texts, and the Sāma-veda.’ It is not necessary to repeat here the chronological deductions which may be based upon this relation between the Sanatsugātiya and the Vedas. We have already argued in the Introduction to the Bhagavadgītā, that such a relation points to a period of Indian religious history prior to the great movement of Gautama Buddha.

There is, however, this difference, perhaps, to be noted between the Gitā and the Sanatsugātiya—namely, that the latter work seems to afford more certain indications of the recognition, at the date of its composition, of a Gṛhakānda as distinguished from a Karmakānda in the Vedas, than, we have seen, are contained in the Bhagavadgītā. The passage, for instance, which speaks of the K'handas as

\[\text{1 Cf. p. 16 supra.} \quad \text{2 Cf. pp. 25, 26.} \quad \text{3 P. 17.}\]
referring 'of themselves' to the Brahman, and the passage which refers to an understanding of the Brahman by means of the Vedas, according to the principle of the moon and the branch—these seem rather to point to a portion of the Vedas which was regarded as giving instruction in true knowledge, as distinguished from merely laying down various sacrifices and ceremonials for special purposes. In fact, in one passage we have the germ of the whole Vedântic theory as afterwards settled. For there we are told, that sacrifices and penances are laid down as the preliminary steps towards the acquisition of true knowledge. By those sacrifices one is purified of one's sins, and then acquires a knowledge of the supreme self as described in the Vedas—which, I apprehend, must mean the Upanishads.

There is but one other point on which we need say anything further. And that is connected with the definition of a Brâhmaṇa. That definition appears to me, to point to an earlier stage in religious progress than is indicated in Âpastamba and Manu. The true Brâhmaṇa is he who is attached to the Brahman. Perhaps, this marks some little advance beyond the more general doctrine of the Gitâ, but it is still very far short of the petrified doctrine. if I may so call it, of the later law-givers. The Brâhmaṇa has not yet degenerated into the mere receiver of fees and presents, but is still in possession of the truth.

We thus see, that the external and internal evidence bearing upon the question of the position of the Sanatsu-

gâtiya in Sanskrit literature, seems to point to nearly the same period and place for it as for the Bhagavadgitâ. It is plain enough, that the evidence under both heads is extremely scanty and meagre. But such as it is, it appears to us to justify a provisional conclusion, that the Sanatsu-
gâtiya dates from a period prior to the rise of Buddhism, and forms part of that same movement in the religious history of ancient India of which the Gitâ is another embodiment. More than this, we are not at present in a position to assert. To this extent, the evidence enables us, I think, to go. And we accordingly hold, that unless
other and further evidence requires a reversal of this judgment, the Sanatsugatiya may be treated as a work nearly contemporary with the Bhagavadgita, and occupying generally the same point of view.

One word, finally, about the translation. As stated already, the text adopted is that which appears to have been before Saṅkarākārya. And the translation follows mainly his interpretations in his commentary. Sometimes we have followed Nilakantha, whose commentary has been consulted as well as a very incorrect copy of another commentary by one Sarvagīna Nārāyana, contained in the MS. from Puna lent me by Professor Bhāndārkar. In some places even the commentators have failed to clear up obscurities, and there we have given the best translation we could suggest, indicating the difficulties. There has been an endeavour made here, as in the case of the Bhagavadgita, to keep the translation as close and faithful to the text as the exigencies of the English language permitted. The exegetical notes are mostly taken from the commentaries, even where the name of the commentator is not specified; while the references to parallel passages have been collected, mostly by myself, in the same way as in the case of the Bhagavadgita.
Chapter I.

Dhrītarāṣṭrā said:

If, O Vidura! there is anything not (yet) said by you in (your) discourse, then do impart it to me who wish to hear, for you have spoken marvellous (things).

Vidura said:

O Dhrītarāṣṭrā! the ancient youth Sanatsugāta, (otherwise called) Sanātana, who declared that death exists not—he, O descendant of Bharata! the best of all talented men, will explain all the doubts of your mind, both those (which are) secret, and those openly declared.

Dhrītarāṣṭrā said:

What, do you not yourself know more about this (subject), that Sanātana should explain (it) to me? Explain (it) yourself, O Vidura! if there is any remnant of intelligence (left) in you.

---

1 So Nīlakantha. Saṅkara says Sanatsugāta is Sanatkumāra, and the component parts of the name he paraphrases by ‘born from Brahman.’ For Sanātana, see Brahmāṇḍaśāstra, p. 506, and note 1, p. 141 supra.

2 I.e. relating to subjects which may be freely discussed by all, and those which may not. Nīlakantha adopts a different reading, which he interprets to mean ‘doctrines exoteric and esoteric,’ e.g. self-restraint, &c., and the acquisition of mystic power, &c., respectively. The expression ‘doubts of the mind’ occurs, however, further on.
Vidura said:

I am born of a Sūdra womb, and do not like to say more than what (I have said). But the intelligence of that youth, I believe to be eternal. He who has come of a Brāhmaṇa womb, even though he may proclaim a great mystery, does not thereby become liable to the censure of the gods. Therefore do I say this to you.

Dhṛtarāṣṭra said:

Do you, O Vidura! speak to the ancient Sanātana for me, so that there may be a meeting even here, between (myself in) this body (and him).

Vaiśampāyana said:

(Then) Vidura meditated on that sage whose vows are laudable. And he, too, O descendant of Bharata! knowing of such meditation, made his appearance. And he, too, received him with the ceremonies prescribed in the ordinances. After he had been comfortably seated, and had taken rest, Vidura then spoke to him: 'Venerable sir! there is some doubt in Dhṛtarāṣṭra's mind, which cannot

---

1 I.e., I suppose, never-failing, and such as can deal with all sorts of topics. Sanatkumāra, it need scarcely be stated, is the teacher of Nārada in the famous dialogue in the Khāndogypa

nishad, p. 473.

2 Vaiśampāyana is the narrator of the grand story of which pieces like the present form parts.

3 The reading is sometimes different, so as to mean 'of rigid vows,' as at Gitā, p. 61 supra.

4 The pronouns here are too numerous. Does 'he' here refer to Dhṛtarāṣṭra? Vidura seems more likely, though the express mention of him in the next sentence might be treated as pointing the other way.
be explained by me. Do you be pleased to explain (it) to him. Hearing it (explained), this lord of men may cross beyond all misery, so that gain and loss, (what is) agreeable and (what is) odious, old age and death, fear and vindictiveness, hunger and thirst, frenzy and worldly greatness, disgust and also laziness, desire and wrath, ruin and prosperity, may not trouble him.'

CHAPTER II.

Vaisampayana said:

Then the talented king, Dhritarashtra, bowed to those words uttered by Vidura, and, in a secluded place, interrogated Sanatsugata regarding the highest knowledge, wishing to become (a) high-souled (man).

Dhritarashtra said:

O Sanatsugata! which of the two is correct, your teaching, about which I have heard, that death exists not, or that the gods and demons practised

---

1 Comp. Gitā passim; disgust, scil. that resulting from a general dissatisfaction with everything. As to 'ruin and prosperity,' Nilakantha adds, 'and their causes, sin and merit.'

2 Literally 'respected.' Nilakantha says it means 'rejoiced over,' for Dhritarashtra thought, that in spite of his treachery he was safe, as death was taught by Sanatsugata to have no existence.

3 I.e. free from the presence of ignorant and vulgar people.

Cf. Gitā, p. 68 supra.

4 I.e. knowledge concerning the supreme Self.

5 Saṅkara's construction seems different, but is not quite clear. He says, 'wishing to become—Brahman—the meaning is wishing to acquire the self lost through ignorance.'

6 I.e. imparted to your pupils, Saṅkara adds, 'heard,' scil. from Vidura.

7 The construction is imperfect, but the sense is clear. Is your
the life of Brahmārins, for freedom from death?

Sanatsugāta said:

'Some (say), that freedom from death (results) from action; and others that death exists not. Hear me explain (this), O king! have no misgiving about it. Both truths, O Kshatriya! have been current from the beginning. The wise maintain what (is called) delusion (to be) death. I verily call heedlessness death, and likewise I call freedom from heedlessness immortality. Through heedlessness, verily, were the demons vanquished; and through freedom view correct, or the view involved in the practice of gods and demons?

1 See Gītā, p. 69 supra; Kathopanishad, p. 102; Prasna, p. 162. As to the gods being afraid of death, see Khāndogya, p. 50; and Nṛṣīmha Tāpīṇ, p. 32; and as to gods and demons practising the life of Brahmārins, see Khāndogya, p. 571; and cf. Brīhad-āranyaka, p. 964.

2 I.e. action prescribed in the Vedas.

3 I.e. as to how I shall be able to reconcile the seeming contradiction between the 'two truths.'

4 I.e. of creation.

5 Sanatsugāta says he differs from 'the wise;' delusion = thinking the not-self to be the self; heedlessness = falling off from one's natural condition as the Brahman—which is the cause of delusion (Śaṅkara). See p. 153 infra; Katha, p. 152; and Taittiriya-upanishad, p. 80.

6 Śaṅkara suggests that demons might mean creatures attached to worldly objects; and gods those who are pleased in their own self; and he cites a stanza in support of this suggestion. The allusion, however, seems to be plainly to the story at Khāndogya, p. 571 seq., where the idea and expression of 'being vanquished' also occurs (p. 583). That word Śaṅkara interprets in connexion with his suggested interpretation to mean 'are born in lower species.' See Khāndogya, p. 585, and Maitri, p. 211, about asuras or demons. It is interesting to note that in the Introduction to the Mahābhāshya, there is an allusion to a story of the 'demons' being 'vanquished' in consequence of their grammatical blunders.
from heedlessness the gods attained to the Brahman. Death, verily, does not devour living creatures like a tiger; for, indeed, his form is not to be perceived. Some¹ say that death is different from this, (named) Yama, who dwells in the self²; the (practice of the) life of Brahmakārins (being) immortality. That god governs his kingdom in the world of the Pitrīs, (being) good to the good, and not good to (those who are) not good. That death, (or) heedlessness, develops in men as desire, and afterwards as wrath, and in the shape of delusion³. And then travelling in devious paths⁴ through egoism, one does not attain to union⁵ with the self. Those who are deluded by it⁶, and who remain under its influence, depart from this (world), and there again fall down⁷. Then the deities⁸ gather around them. And then he undergoes death after death⁹. Being attached to the fruit of action, on action presenting itself, they follow after it¹⁰, and do not cross

¹ Those deluded by worldly objects; 'this' means 'heedlessness.'
² Sāṅkara cites a stanza from Manu, which says that king Yama Vaivasvata dwells in the heart of every one. Cf. Aitareya-upanishad, p. 187. The following clause he understands to contain two epithets of Yama, meaning 'immortal, and intent on the Brahman.' I follow Nīlakantha, but not very confidently.
³ Cf. Gītā, p. 57. Here we have the developments, the varying forms, of death or heedlessness.
⁴ I.e. paths contrary to Śrutis and Smṛtis.
⁵ Concentration of mind on the self or Brahman.
⁶ I.e. the egoism spoken of before.
⁷ I.e. to this mortal world. Cf. Gītā, p. 84, and Brhadāranyaka, pp. 855, 856. There = from the next world. Sāṅkara says, 'having lived there.'
beyond death. And the embodied (self), in consequence of not understanding union\(^1\) with the real entity, proceeds on all hands\(^2\) with attachment to enjoyments. That\(^3\), verily, is the great source of delusion to the senses; for by contact\(^4\) with unreal entities, his migrations\(^5\) are (rendered) inevitable; because having his inner self contaminated by contact with unreal entities, he devotes himself to objects of sense on all sides, pondering on them (only). (That) pondering, verily, first ruins\(^6\) him; and soon afterwards desire and wrath, after attacking him. These\(^7\) lead children to death. But sensible men cross beyond death by their good sense. He who pondering (on the self) destroys\(^8\) (the) fugitive (objects of sense), not even thinking of them through contempt (for them), and who being possessed of knowledge destroys desires in this way, becomes, as it were, the death of death (itself), and swallows (it) up\(^9\). The being who

---

\(^1\) I.e. its identity with the Brahman.

\(^2\) I.e. in various forms of life, Нилаканта.

\(^3\) The going about in search of enjoyments.

\(^4\) The contact leads to pondering on them, and that to desire, &c., as described further on.

\(^5\) Through various lives. Birth and death are certain for him.

\(^6\) I.e. causes oblivion of his real nature, Saṅkara. Cf. the whole train of cause and effect at Gītā, p. 50 supra.

\(^7\) I.e. the pondering, desire, wrath, &c. As to 'children,' cf. Katha, pp. 96 and 123, where bāla is contrasted with dhīra, as here. The 'good sense' is of help in withstanding the temptations of worldly objects.

\(^8\) Destroys = abandons; pondering, just before this, is rendered by Saṅkara to mean 'thinking of the objects as transient, impure;' &c.

\(^9\) Saṅkara cites on this a stanza of unknown authorship, which says, 'The learned and clever man who knows the self, and by discrimination destroys all objects of sense, is said to be the death of death.' See too p. 178 infra.
pursues desires, is destroyed (in pursuing) after the desires. But casting away desires, a being gets rid of all taint whatever. This body, void of enlightenment, seems (to be) a hell for (all) beings. Those who are avaricious run about, going headlong to a ditch. A man, O Kshatriya! who contemns everything else learns nothing. To him (the body is) like a tiger made of straw. And this internal self (joined to) delusion and fear in consequence of wrath and avarice, within your body,—that verily is death. Understanding death to be thus produced, and adhering to knowledge, one is not afraid of death in this (world). In his province death is destroyed, as a mortal (is destroyed) on arriving in the province of death.

Dhṛtarāṣṭra said:

The good, eternal, and most holy worlds, which

1. On this Nilakantha quotes these lines, 'The antelope, elephant, butterfly, bee, and fish—these five are destroyed by the five,' i.e. the five objects of sense, sound, &c. See Sānti Parvan (Moksha Dharma), chap. 174, st. 45.
2. I.e. misery, Nilakantha; merit or sin, Saṅkara.
3. I.e. void of discrimination between the real and unreal, Nilakantha; result of ignorance, Saṅkara. 'A hell, as being full of filth,' says Saṅkara, 'such as phlegm, blood, excretions.' Cf. Maitrī, p. 48.
4. As blind men groping about fall into a ditch, so do these, Saṅkara.
5. I.e. other than the sensuous objects he loves; 'learns nothing' about the supreme Self which he disregards.
6. Useless for any good purpose.
8. As being ruinous to oneself. Saṅkara compares Gītā, p. 68.
9. Cf. also Taittiriya-upanishad, p. 103, and see Brhadāraṇyaka, p. 61.
10. I.e. heedlessness and its developments as stated.
11. Saṅkara cites on this Taittiriya-upanishad, p. 78.
12. Such as Satyaloka, &c.
are mentioned (as attainable) by the twice-born by means of worship\(^1\), those, say the Vedas, are the highest aim\(^2\). How is it, then, that one who understands this does not resort to action?

Sanatsug\(\acute{\text{a}}\)ta said:

(Thinking) so, an ignorant man does resort to action. The Vedas likewise do lay down various benefits\(^3\) (for him). But that\(^4\) (man) comes not hither\(^5\). (Becoming) the supreme self\(^6\), he attains the supreme, by the (right) path destroying the wrong paths\(^7\).

Dhṛitārāshṭra said:

Who\(^8\) is it that constrains this unborn primeval (self), if it is (itself) all this severally\(^9\)? And what

---

\(^1\) Gyatisha/oma, Arvamedha, and other rites.
\(^2\) As leading to final emancipation.
\(^3\) I.e. objects for which various ceremonies (or ‘actions’) should be performed.
\(^4\) I.e. the man of knowledge.
\(^6\) Knowing the supreme self is identical with becoming the supreme self, Munḍaka, p. 323.
\(^7\) I.e. getting rid of the paths which keep one away from the Brahman by means of contemplation of the Brahman, &c. Nīlakantha renders ‘right path’ to mean the Sushumnā passage by which the soul proceeds to final emancipation, see Khāndoga, p. 570; Katha, p. 157.
\(^8\) Saṅkara says: ‘Having shown that true death is heedlessness, and having shown that heedlessness in its forms of anger &c. is the cause of all evil, and having also shown that death is destroyed by true knowledge, and having shown further that heaven &c. are really not man’s highest goal; the author has also implied the unity of the supreme and individual self. On that arises a doubt, which is stated in this passage.’
\(^9\) All this=all the developments of the Brahman, i.e. space, wind, fire, water, earth, vegetation, food, living creatures; see Taittirīyopanishad, p. 68.
has it to do, or what is its unhappiness\(^1\)? Tell me all that accurately, O learned person!

Sanatsugâta said:

There is great danger\(^2\) in attributing distinctions to it. The everlasting\(^3\) (principles) exist by connexion with the beginningless\(^4\) (principle). So that his greatness is not lost at all\(^5\), and beings exist by connexion with the beginningless\(^4\) (principle). That which is the real—the supreme Being\(^6\)—is eternal. He creates the universe by means of changes\(^7\), for such is his power held to be; and for such connexions of things the Vedas are (authority)\(^8\).

---

1 What is the purpose of its existence, and what misery does it undergo on entering the course of worldly life?

2 'The danger,' says Saṅkara, 'is that of contravening Vedic texts such as "I am the Brahman," "Thou art that," &c.' May it not rather be that pointed out at Kathopanishad, p. 129, viz. never attaining final emancipation? Cf. also Nrisimha Tâpinî, p. 223.

3 The individual selves, Saṅkara. Nature or mâyâ.

4 The appearance of degradation to an inferior state being delusive.

5 The original word implies the possession of aśvarya, dharma, yasas, srî, vairâgya, moksha. See Svetâtvatara, p. 329 (where the list is slightly different). For another definition, see Maitrī, p. 6 (gloss).

6 See note 9, p. 156.

7 Saṅkara says: 'The question of Dhṛtarâshtra having suggested a difference between two principles, one of which constrains, and the other of which is constrained, the answer is—Such a difference ought not to be alleged, as it involves "danger." Then the question arises, How is the difference, which does appear, to be explained? The reply is, It is due to the beginningless principle—delusion or ignorance. The next sentence shows that the universe as it appears is also a result of delusion.' Nilakantha says expressly, changes = delusion. He renders the original which we have translated by 'beginningless' first, to mean 'collection of objects of enjoyments.' Saṅkara's explanation seems tautological as regards the words 'connexion with the beginningless,' which occur twice in the above. Nil-
Dhritarāshtra said:

Since some practise piety in this world, and some likewise practise impiety in this world; is the piety destroyed by the sin, or else does the piety destroy sin?

Sanatsugāta said:

Whichever he adheres to, the man of understanding always destroys both by means of knowledge; (that is) settled. Likewise, in the other case, the embodied (self) obtains merit; and to such a one sin (also) accrues; (that too is) settled. Departing (from this world), he enjoys by his actions both (kinds of) fruit, which are not enduring—of actions (which are) pure, and of (those which are) sinful. The man of understanding casts aside sin by piety in this (world), for know that his piety is more powerful. Those Brāhmaṇas, in whom there is emulation about (their) piety, as there is in strong men about (their) strength, after departing from this world, become glorious in heaven. And

\[\text{Sanatsugāta's is not quite clear. May the expression on the second occasion mean, that the connexion by which beings are stated before to exist has had no beginning—has existed from eternity? The translation should then run thus: 'And beings exist by a connexion which had no beginning;' (see Sāriraka Bhāṣhya, p. 494.)}\]

Connexions of things = creation of universe by his power.

1 E.g. Agnishāma, &c., Śaṅkara.
2 I.e. impiety or piety, sin or merit.
3 In Srutis and Smṛtis, which Śaṅkara quotes. Kṛtkandogya, p. 622; Mundaka, p. 309; Brhādāranyaka, p. 911. See, too, Maitrif, p. 131.
4 Of the man devoid of knowledge.
5 Cf. Gitā, p. 76, and Brhādāranyaka, p. 636.
6 See p. 164, note 9 infra.
7 The feeling of one's own superiority over others in piety.
8 'In the shape of Nakshatras,' says Śaṅkara, which is not quite intelligible. See Kṛtkandogya, p. 258, and Anugītā infra, p. 240.
to those in whom there is no emulation about (their) piety, that (piety) is a means of (acquiring) knowledge. Such Brāhmaṇas released from this (world), go to the heaven which is free from the threefold source of pain. People who understand the Vedas call his conduct good. (But) people closely connected, as well as strangers, do not pay much regard to him. Wherever he may believe food and drink for a Brāhmaṇa to exist in abundance, like water on grass in the autumn, there would he live and not be vexed. (To him) only that person is good, and no other (as a companion), who does nothing in excess, and who occasions fear and injury to a taciturn man. And his food is acceptable to the good, who does not vex the self of a taciturn man, and who does not destroy the property of a Brāhmaṇa. A Brāhmaṇa should hold, that living in the midst of kinsmen, his actions should be always unknown; and he should not

---

1 According to the Vedāntic theory, the acts of piety purify the inner man, and are thus a stepping-stone to knowledge. See Introduction, p. 147 supra. Cf. Gītā, p. 122; and Brīhadāraṇyaka, p. 899.

2 I.e. physical, mental, and such as is caused by superhuman agency. This is Saṅkara's explanation. It is somewhat far-fetched, but I can find none better. Cf. Gītā, p. 49. And see also Brīhadāraṇyaka, p. 876, and the commentary of Saṅkara there with Ānandagiri's gloss.

3 E.g. wife, children, &c.

4 I.e. vexed as to how his livelihood is to be earned, &c.

5 Excess, e.g. too much obsequiousness towards a 'taciturn man,' owing to his holiness, &c. Taciturn man = ascetic. Injury = disrespect, &c. Perhaps the protest against worldliness is here carried to an extreme. Saṅkara cites Manu as a parallel, 'A Brāhmaṇa should be afraid of (worldly) respect as of poison.'

6 E.g. the Kusa grass, deerskin, &c., mentioned at Gītā, p. 68.

7 I.e. he should not parade his actions. Saṅkara compares Vasiṣṭha and a Vedic text. See, too, the quotation at Taitt.Āraṇ. p. 902.
think¹ (about them). What Brâhmaṇa ought to think of the inner self, which is void of symbols², immovable, pure, and free from all pairs of opposites, in this way³? What sin is not committed by that thief, who steals away his own self⁴, who regards his self as one thing, when it is a different thing. The far-seeing Brâhmaṇa, who knows the Brahman, is not wearied ⁵, he receives nothing ⁶; he is honoured, free from trouble ⁷, and wise, but acts as if he was not wise ⁸. As dogs eat what is vomited, so do they, enjoying their own bravery⁹, eat what is vomited, always with disaster (to themselves). Those twice-born persons, who are not

¹ Cf. Gîtâ, p. 103. Saṅkara suggests an alternative explanation of this stanza, which will make it mean that one performing the operations of the senses, should devote oneself nevertheless to the unknown principle, and not consider the senses to be the self.

² I. e. beyond the reach of inference; 'subtle,' says Saṅkara. Cf. Svetāsvatara, p. 364; Brâhadâranyaka, p. 855; Maitrî, p. 182; and Kaṭha, p. 149, where Saṅkara suggests a somewhat different meaning. As to immovable, cf. Ísa, p. 10, and Gîtâ, p. 104. Saṅkara renders it by 'void of activity;' and pure he paraphrases by 'free from ignorance and other taints.'

³ It is difficult to say what 'in this way' refers to. Saṅkara renders it by 'as possessing qualities appertaining to the two kinds of body.' On Saṅkara's suggested meaning of the stanza preceding (see note 1), it would refer to the confusion of the senses with the self.

⁴ Such a person is called a destroyer of his own self at Īsopaniṣhad, p. 9.

⁵ I. e. by the troubles of worldly life.

⁶ Cf. 'without belongings' at Gîtâ, p. 128.

⁷ Anger and other obstacles to concentration of mind.


⁹ I. e. singing the praises of their own greatness and worth, instead of keeping their 'conduct unknown.'
first\(^1\) in respect of human wealth, but who are first in the Vedas\(^2\), are unconquerable, not to be shaken\(^3\); they should be understood to be forms of the Brahmā. Whosoever may in this (world) know all the gods—doers of favours—he is not equal to a Brāhma, (nor even) he\(^5\) for whom he exerts himself. The man who makes no efforts\(^6\), and is respected, does not, being respected, think himself respected\(^7\), nor does he become vexed in consequence of disrespect. One who is respected\(^8\) should think it to be a natural operation of people, like their opening or closing of the eyelids, that the learned respect him in this world. One who is not respected should think, that the deluded people who do not understand piety, and who are devoid of (knowledge of) the world and the Śastra, will never respect one who is worthy of respect. Respect and taciturnity\(^9\), verily, never dwell together; for this world is (the field) for respect, the next for taciturnity, as is understood\(^10\). For worldly wealth dwells in the

1 Highly esteemed for or strongly attached to, Śaṅkara. Human wealth = wife, offspring, property, &c. Cf. Khandogya, p. 319; Brhadāraṇyaka, p. 262.
2 I. e. veracity and other duties taught by the Vedas.
3 'They need not nought,' says Nilakantha.
4 I. e. may sacrifice to them, Śaṅkara.
5 Not even the deity to whom the sacrifice is offered is equal to one who knows the Brahmā. Cf. Taittiriya, p. 23, and Anugītā, p. 250.
6 I. e. one who is 'taciturn,' and does not parade his greatness.
7 He does not care for the respect shown him.
8 Because he knows the Brahmā.
9 I. e. restraint of all senses, not of speech only. For the contrast compare that between sreya and preya at Kātha, p. 92.
10 I. e. by all men of understanding. Śaṅkara's rendering is different: 'The next, which is known as Tad, is for taciturnity.' He cites for this Gītā, p. 120.
sphere of respect\(^1\), and that, too, is an obstacle\(^2\). While the Brahmic wealth\(^3\), O Kshatriya! is difficult to be attained by any one devoid of knowledge. The ways (to it) are stated by the good to be of various descriptions, and difficult to reach—truth, straightforwardness, modesty\(^4\), restraint (of senses), purity, knowledge, which are the six impediments (in the way) of respect and delusion.

**Chapter III.**

Dhrūtarāśhtra said:

Who possesses this taciturnity\(^5\), and which of the two\(^6\) is taciturnity? Describe, O learned person! the condition of taciturnity here. Does a learned man reach taciturnity\(^7\) by taciturnity? And how, O sage! do they practise taciturnity in this world?

\(^1\) I.e. they both follow on devotion to worldly life.

\(^2\) I.e. in the way to final emancipation.

\(^3\) The enjoyment of supreme felicity, Brahmānanda (Saṅkara); the greatness consisting of a knowledge of Rik, Yāgus, Sāman, and the substance of their teaching, which is worthy of a Brāhmaṇa (Nīlakantā). See, too, Anugīta, p. 232.

\(^4\) Modesty = being ashamed of doing wrong; restraint (of senses) = mental restraint; and purity is both internal and external,—Saṅkara; knowledge is, of course, knowledge of the Brahman.

\(^5\) I.e. that spoken of in the last chapter.

\(^6\) Viz. mere silence, or the contemplation of the self after restraining all the senses. In the Brīhadāranyaka-upanishad, Saṅkara (p. 605) renders the original word, mauna, to mean, 'The fruit of the destruction of the consciousness of anything other than the self.' And his commentator makes it clearer thus: 'The conviction in the mind that one is the self—the supreme Brahman—and that there is nothing else existing but oneself.'

\(^7\) I.e. the highest seat—the Brahman; for mind, sense, &c. are all non-existent there. Cf. Kaṭha, p. 151, and Maitrī, p. 161.
Sanatsugâta said:

Since the Vedas, together with the mind, fail to attain to him, hence (is he) taciturnity—he about whom the words of the Vedas were uttered, and who, O king! shines forth as consubstantial with them.

Dhrñtarâshtra said:

Does the twice-born person who studies the Rik and the Yagus texts, and the Sâma-veda, committing sinful (acts), become tainted, or does he not become tainted?

Sanatsugâta said:

Not the Sâman texts, nor yet the Rik texts, nor the Yagus texts save him, O acute sir! from sinful

---

2 'Taciturnity is his name,' says Nâlakantha.
3 Or, says Sañkara, 'who is the author of the Vedas.'
4 I.e. 'with the Vedas,' says Nâlakantha, Om, the quintessence of the Vedas, being a name of the Brahman (as to which cf. Gîtâ, p. 79, and Maitrî, p. 84). Sañkara takes the whole expression to mean gÂtîrîmaya, consisting of light. Nâlakantha says this stanza answers the five following questions put in the stanza preceding, viz. of what use is taciturnity? which of the two is taciturnity? &c., as above. The first four questions are answered by the first two lines of this stanza—the substance of the answer being, that the use of taciturnity is to attain the seat which is not to be grasped even by the mind, that taciturnity includes both restraint of mind and of the external senses. By means of such restraint, the external and internal worlds cease to be perceived as existing, and the highest goal is attained.
5 This question arises naturally enough on Nâlakantha's interpretation of the preceding stanza, the meaning of which is in substance that the Vedas cannot grasp the Brahman fully, but they are of use towards a rudimentary comprehension of it, as is said further on, see p. 172 infra.
6 Cf. Svetârvatara-upanishad, p. 339; see, too, Nrisimha Tâpinî, pp. 87-98.
action. I do not tell you an untruth. The Khandas do not save a sinful deceitful man who behaves deceitfully. At the time of the termination (of his life), the Khandas abandon him, as birds who have got wings (abandon their) nest.

Dhritarashtra said:

If, O acute sir! the Vedas are not able to save one who understands the Vedas, then whence is this eternal talk of the Brâhmanas?

Sanatsugâta said:

O you of great glory! this universe becomes manifest through his special forms—names and the rest. The Vedas proclaim (his form) after describing (it) well, and (they also) state his difference from the universe. For that are this penance and sacrifice prescribed. By these a learned man acquires merit, and afterwards destroying sin by merit, he has his self illuminated by knowledge. By knowledge the learned man attains

---

1 I. e. one who parades his piety.
2 I. e. hypocritically.
3 I. c. do not rise to his memory—Nilakantha, citing Gita, p. 78 supra.
4 Scil. about the veneration due to one who has studied the Vedas—Nilakantha, citing one or two passages in point.
5 The universe consists of names and forms, the reality being the Brahman only. Cf. Khândogya, p. 407 seq.
6 Saṅkara refers to Taittiriya-upanishad, p. 68; Khândogya, p. 596 seq. &c.
7 Saṅkara takes this to mean sages, who, according to him, state the difference. He quotes Parâsara for this.
8 I. e. the Brahman, that is to say, for attaining to it. Penance=āndrâyasa and other observances; sacrifice=gyotish/oma, &c.
the self. But, on the other hand, one who wishes for the fruit—heaven—takes with him all that he has done in this (world), enjoys it in the next, and then returns to the path (of this world). Penance is performed in this world; the fruit is enjoyed elsewhere. But the penance of Brāhmaṇas is further developed; that of others remains only as much (as when first performed).

Dhṛtarāṣṭra said:

How does the pure penance become developed and well developed? O Sanatsugāta! tell (me) how I should understand that, O Lord!

Sanatsugāta said:

This penance, free from sin, is called pure; and this pure penance becomes developed and well developed, not otherwise. All this, O Kshatriya!

---

1 Cf. Svetāsvatara, p. 327; Mundaka, p. 323.
2 So Saṅkara. Nilakantha takes the original word to mean 'the group of the senses,' and the whole phrase to mean 'enjoyments of sense.' Nilakantha is supported by a passage further on, p. 167. But as to 'those who wish for heaven,' cf. Gitā, pp. 48-84.
3 I.e. in the form of merit, &c.
4 Cf. Gitā, p. 84.
6 I am not quite sure about the meaning of the original here. Rādhia, which I have rendered 'developed,' Nilakantha understands to mean 'what is performed merely for show.' What has been rendered 'well developed' in the text, Nilakantha takes to mean 'performed from some desire,' &c.
7 Anger, desire, &c.
8 The original is kevala. Nilakantha says it is so called as being a means of kaivalya, 'final emancipation.'
9 I.e. not that which is not free from sin, which latter is not developed at all.
10 All objects of enjoyment, Nilakantha.
has for its root that penance about which you question me. By penance, those conversant with the Vedas attained immortality, after departing from this world.

Dhṛtarāṣṭra said:

I have heard about penance free from sin, O Sanatsugāta! Tell me what is the sin (connected) with penance, so that I may understand the eternal mystery.

Sanatsugāta said:

The twelve beginning with wrath, and likewise the seven cruelties, are the defects (connected) with it; and there are (stated) in the Sāstras twelve merits (connected) with it, beginning with knowledge, which are known to the twice-born, and may be developed. Wrath, desire, avarice, delusion, craving, mercilessness, censoriousness, vanity, grief, attachment, envy, reviling others—these twelve should always be avoided by a man of high quali-

2 I. e. Brahma-vidyā, or science of the Brahman, Nilakanṭha; the Brahman itself, Saṅkara.
3 I. e. lust.
4 Want of discrimination between right and wrong.
5 Desire to taste worldly objects.
6 For the loss of anything desired.
7 Desire to enjoy worldly objects. The difference between this and craving, according to Saṅkara, appears to be between merely tasting and continual enjoyment. According to Nilakanṭha, the former is a desire which is never contented; the latter is merely a general liking.
8 Impatience of other people's prosperity; censoriousness being the pointing out of flaws in other people’s merits; and reviling being an ignoring of the merits and merely abusing.
These, O king of kings! attend each and every man, wishing to find some opening, as a hunter (watches) animals. [Boastful, lustful, haughty, irascible, unsteady, one who does not protect (those dependent on him), these six sinful acts are performed by sinful men who are not afraid (even) in the midst of great danger.] One whose thoughts are (all) about enjoyments, who prospers by injuring (others), who repents of generosity, who is miserly, who is devoid of the power (of knowledge), who esteems the group (of the senses), who hates his wife—these seven, different (from those previously mentioned), are the seven forms of cruelty. Knowledge, truth, self-restraint, sacred learning, freedom from animosity (towards living beings), modesty, endurance, freedom from censoriousness, sacrifice, gift, courage—these are the twelve great observances of a Brâhmaṇa. Whoever is not devoid of these twelve can govern this whole world, and those who are

1 Scil. for attaining to the Brahman.
2 Some weak point by which they may attack a man.
3 Fickle in friendship, &c.
4 Such as a wife, &c.
5 Connected with this or the next world, Nīlācāntha. This and a stanza further on I place within brackets, as it is not quite certain whether Sâṅkara’s copy had them, though they are now in of our copies of the text with his commentary. See Introduction
7 See note 2, at page 165.
8 The wife having no other protector.
9 See note 4, at page 162.
10 Of pairs of opposites, such as heat and cold, &c.
11 Restraint of senses in presence of their objects.
12 Cf. Gita, pp. 69, 70.
13 Which are serviceable in attaining the highest goal.
possessed of three, two, or even one (of these) become, in (due) course, distinguished (for knowledge) and identified with the Brahman. [Self-restraint, abandonment, and freedom from heedlessness—on these depends immortality. And the talented Brāhmaṇas say that truth is chief over them.] Self-restraint has eighteen defects; if (any one of them is) committed, it is an obstacle (to self-restraint). They are thus stated. Untruthfulness, backbiting, thirst, antipathy (to all beings), darkness, repining, hatred of people, haughtiness, quarrelsomeness, injuring living creatures, reviling others, garrulity, vexation, want of endurance, want of courage, imperfection, sinful conduct, and slaughter. That is called self-restraint by the good, which is free from these defects. Frenzy has eighteen defects; and abandonment is of six kinds. The contraries of those which have been laid down are stated to be the defects of frenzy. Abandonment of six kinds is excellent. Of those six, the third is hard to achieve. With it one certainly crosses

1 The original is the word 'taciturnity' as at p. 162 supra.
2 Offering one's acts to God (Nilakanṭha), as to which cf. Gītā, p. 64. See also p. 182 infra for this stanza.
3 I. e. for objects of sense.
4 Ignorance.
5 Discontent even when one obtains much.
6 This is active; antipathy is passive only.
7 Of oneself, by brooding on evil. Cf. Tāttvīfya, p. 119. One copy of Saṅkara's commentary says this means 'thinking ill of others without cause.'
8 Of pairs of opposites.
9 Restraint of senses in presence of their objects.
10 I. e. of piety, knowledge, and indifference to worldly objects.
11 I. e. qualities which destroy it.
12 Scil. as defects of self-restraint, viz. untruthfulness, &c.
beyond all misery without distinction. That being achieved, (everything) is accomplished. The (first is the) giving away of sons and wealth to a deserving man who asks (for them); the second is gifts at Vedic ceremonies, and gifts at ceremonies laid down in the Smritis. The abandonment of desires, O king of kings! by means of indifference (to worldly objects) is laid down as the third. With these one should become free from heedlessness. That freedom from heedlessness, too, has eight characteristics, and is (a) great (merit). Truthfulness, concentration, absorbed contemplation, reflection, and also indifference (to worldly objects), not stealing, living the life of a Brahma-rarin, and

---

1 Scil. any distinction as to physical, mental, or that which is caused by superhuman agency.

2 Literally, ‘all is conquered.’ Everything that needs to be done is done. Cf. Ka/hapanishad, p. 155; Mundaka, p. 317.

3 Another interpretation of ishâpûrta is ‘offerings to gods, and offerings to the manes;’ a third ‘sacrifices, &c., and works of charity, such as digging tanks and wells;’ for a fourth, see Sañkara on Mundaka, p. 291.

4 Each of the three classes mentioned contains two sub-classes, and so the six are made up. It is not quite easy to see the two heads under the third class; but perhaps indifference, and the consequent abandonment of desire, may be the two intended. To indicate that, I have adopted the construction which takes the words ‘by means of indifference’ with abandonment, instead of with ‘gifts at Vedic ceremonies,’ &c. Sañkara seems to understand ‘giving away of wealth’ with the words ‘by means of indifference,’ and thus to constitute the second head under the third class. But he is not quite clear.

5 Concentration = fixing the mind continuously on some object, such as the being in the sun, &c.; contemplation is that in which one identifies oneself with the Brahman; reflection as to what one is, whence one comes, and so forth.

6 Sañkara says this may refer to the ‘stealing’ mentioned at p. 160. The life of a Brahma-rarin is here taken to mean con-
likewise freedom from all belongings. Thus have the defects of self-restraint been stated; one should avoid those defects. Freedom from (those) defects is freedom from heedlessness; and that, too, is deemed to have eight characteristics. Let truth be your (very) self, O king of kings! On truth all the worlds rest. Truth is said to be their main (principle). Immortality depends on truth. Getting rid of (these) defects, one should practise the observance of penance. This is the conduct prescribed by the Creator. Truth is the solemn vow of the good. The pure penance, which is free from these defects, and possessed of these characteristics, becomes developed, and well developed. I will state to you, in brief, O king of kings! what you ask of me. This (observance) is destructive of sin, and pure, and releases (one) from birth and death and old age. If one is free from the five senses, and also from the mind, O descendant of Bharata! also from (thoughts regarding) the past and the future, one becomes happy.

Dhritarâshâra said:

Some people make great boasts in consequence of (their knowing) the Vedas with the Âkhyânas as

tinence by the commentators, as also at Mundaka, p. 311 inter alia. See also Kândogya, p. 533.
1 Son; wife, home, &c.; as to which cf. Gîtâ, p. 103, and Nrisimha Tâpinê, p. 198, commentary.
2 The eight mentioned already.
3 Cf. Taitt. Ârau, p. 885.
4 Cf. Mundaka, p. 312; Sânti Parvan (Moksha), chap. 199, st. 64 seq. Immortality=final emancipation.
5 P. 165 supra.
6 Of penance, that is to say.
7 Cf. Gîtâ, p. 109 for the collocation.
8 Kathopanishad, p. 151; Maitri, p. 161. Saîkara seems to take the five and the senses separately; the five meaning the five classes of sensuous objects.
9 Past losses and future gains, Nilakantha.
the fifth; others, likewise, are (masters) of four Vedas; others, too, of three Vedas; others are (masters) of two Vedas, and of one Veda; and others of no Veda. Tell me which of these is the greatest, whom I may know (to be) a Brâhmaṇa.

Sanatsugâta said:

Through ignorance of the one Veda—the one truth—O king of kings! numerous Vedas came into existence. Some only adhere to the truth. The fancies of those who have fallen away from the truth are abortive, and through ignorance of the truth, ceremonies become amplified. One should understand a Brâhmaṇa, who (merely) reads much, to be a man of many words. Know him only to be the (true) Brâhmaṇa, who swerves not from the truth. O you who are the highest among men! the Kândas, indeed, refer of themselves to it. There-

1 Cf., as to this, Max Müller's Ancient Sanskrit Literature, p. 38 seq.; and Kândogya, pp. 164, 474, 493; Brîhadâranyaka, pp. 456, 687, 926; Maitri, p. 171; Nrisimha Tâpinâ, p. 105.
2 The original is ‘void of Riks.’ The commentators give no explanation. Does it mean those who abandon the karma-mârga? Heretics who reject all Vedas are scarcely likely to be referred to in this way. Nilakantha’s interpretation of all this is very different. See his gloss.
3 Saṅkara gives various interpretations of this. Perhaps the best is to take it as meaning knowledge. ‘The one knowledge—the one truth’—would then be like the famous text—Taittirîya, p. 56—‘The Brahman is truth, knowledge,’ &c.
4 For this phrase cf. Gîtâ, p. 73.
5 Those who do not understand the Brahman lose their natural power of obtaining what they wish, and so go in for various ceremonies for various special benefits. Cf. Kândogya, p. 541; Gîtâ, p. 47; and p. 184 infra.
7 Ibid p. 636.
8 Literally, ‘highest among bipeds,’ a rather unusual expression.
9 Nilakantha says, ‘The part of the Vedas which teaches the
fore, studying them, the learned persons who understand the Khandas, attain to the Veda, not that which is to be known. Among the Vedas, there is none which understands. By the unintelligent, one understands not the Veda, nor the object of knowledge. He who knows the Veda knows the object of knowledge. He who knows the object of knowledge knows not the truth. He who understands the Vedas understands also the object of knowledge; but that is not understood by the Vedas or by those who understand the Vedas. Still the Brâhmanas who understand the Vedas, understand the Veda by means of the Vedas. As the branch of a tree with regard to the part of a portion of the glorious one, so, they declare, are the Vedas with knowledge of the supreme is enough by itself for its purpose; it is not like the part about rites, &c., which rites must be performed before they serve any useful purpose. The Gâyânâkânda is enough by itself for understanding the Brahman. Sañkara compares Gitâ, p. 113, and Kaíha, p. 102.

1 The Veda=the Brahman, as above, cf. Svetásvatara, p. 372 and commentary; that which is to be known=the material world, which is a subject for human knowledge.

2 Scil. understands the Veda—the Brahman.

3 'The mind,' says Nilakantha; literally, 'that which is to be understood.'

4 Because a real knowledge of it requires a knowledge of the Brahman. As to the next clause cf. inter alia Khândogya, p. 384; Brâhadâranyaka, p. 450.

5 This is the converse of the last sentence, as to which cf. Brâhadâranyaka, p. 925.

6 The supreme.

7 The apparent contradiction is explained in the next sentence.

8 I. e. the moon. This refers to the well-known Šâkhândrayâya. As the small digit of the moon, which cannot be perceived by itself, is pointed out as being at the tip of a branch of a tree pointing towards the moon, so the Vedas are of use as pointing towards the Brahman, though inaccurately and imperfectly.
regard to the subject of understanding the supreme self. I understand him to be a Brâhmana who is ingenious, and explains¹ (Vedic texts). He who apprehends (those texts) thus ², does verily know that supreme (principle). One should not go in search of it among (things) antagonistic ³ to it at all. Not looking (for him there) one sees that Lord by means of the Veda ⁴. Remaining quiet, one should practise devotion, and should not even form a wish in the mind ⁵. To him the Brahman presents ⁶ itself, and directly afterwards he attains to the perfect ⁷ (one). By taciturnity ⁸, verily, does one become a sage; (one does) not (become) a sage by dwelling in a forest ⁹. And he is called the highest sage, who understands that indestructible (principle). One is called an analyser ¹⁰ (also) in consequence of

¹ Sceil. in the manner just indicated.
² As giving an idea of the Brahman. The first step to a knowledge of the Brahman is to 'hear' about it from Vedic texts. Cf. Brâhadâranyaka, p. 925.
³ Such as the body, the senses, &c., which must be distinguished as quite distinct from the self, though most often confounded with it.
⁴ Such passages, namely, as 'Thou art that, I am the Brahman,' &c.
⁵ About the objects of the senses.
⁷ Cf. Khândogya, p. 516. The Bhûman there is the same as the Bahu here, viz. the Brahman. Saṅkara says expressly in his comment on the Upanishad text, that Bahu and Bhûman, among other words, are synonyms.
⁸ Self-restraint, as explained before at p. 163.
⁹ Though this is not unimportant, as may be seen from the contrast between town and forest at Khândogya, p. 340. See also Maitrī, p. 100; Mundaka, p. 240. As to the 'highest sage,' see Brâhadâranyaka, p. 899, where the passage about 'sacrifice, gift, penance' should be compared with Gîtâ, p. 122.
¹⁰ The construction in the original is not quite clear. I understand the sense to be as follows: In the science of the soul, the
analysing all objects. The analysis (is) from that as the root; and as he makes (such an) analysis, hence is he so (called). The man who sees the worlds directly sees everything. A Brâhmaṇa, verily, adhering to the truth, understands it, and becomes omniscient. I say to you, O learned man! that adhering to knowledge and the rest in this way, one sees the Brahman, O Kshatriya! by means of a course (of study) in the Vedas.

Chapter IV.

Dhrita-râshtra said:

O Sanatsugâta! since you have spoken these words of highest significance, relating to the Brahman, and of numerous forms, give me that advice which is excellent, and difficult to obtain in the analyser (the word is the same as the word for grammarian) is he who analyses objects, not words merely. Now the true analysis of objects reduces them all to the Brahman (cf. Khândogya, p. 407; Brîhadâranyaka, p. 152); and the sage understands this, and makes the analysis accordingly, so he is rightly called an analyser.

1 This again is not clear, and the discrepancies of the MSS. make it more perplexing. The meaning, I take to be, that a man may perceive all material things, such as the worlds, Bhûr, &c. (as the commentators put it), but to be really omniscient, you must have knowledge of the truth—the Brahman. See Sabha Parvan, chapter V, stanza 7. And see, too, Brîhadâranyaka, p. 613.

2 P. 167 supra.

3 'Hearing the Vedântas—Upanishads,' &c., says Saṅkara. See note 2 supra, p. 173.

4 Does this mean referring to many aspects of the Brahman? Saṅkara merely says nânârûpâ. Nilakantha takes it differently, and as meaning that in which everything is elucidated; 'relating to the Brahman' Nilakantha takes to mean 'leading to the Brahman,' or 'instrument for attaining to the Brahman.'
midst of these created objects. Such is my request, O youth!

Sanatsugāta said:

This Brahman, O king! about which you question me with such perseverance, is not to be attained by anybody who is in a hurry. When the mind is absorbed in the understanding, then can that knowledge, which must be deeply pondered over, be attained by living the life of a Brahmaṇārin. For you are speaking of that primordial knowledge, which consists in the truth; which is obtained by the good by living the life of Brahmaṇārins; which being obtained, men cast off this mortal world; and which knowledge, verily, is to be invariably (found) in those who have been brought up under preceptors.

Dhrītarāṣṭra said:

Since that knowledge is capable of being truly acquired by living the life of a Brahmaṇārin, therefore tell me, O Brahmaṇa! of what description the life of a Brahmaṇārin is.

Sanatsugāta said:

Those who entering (as it were) the womb of a

1 In this material world, the highest knowledge is not to be got. Cf. Katha, p. 96.
2 I.e. withdrawn from objects and fixed on the self only. Cf. Gītā, p. 79, and Maitrī, p. 179, where, however, we have hrīd for buddhi.
3 Vīrokana and Indra do so according to the Khāṇḍogya, p. 570. See also Mundaka, p. 311.
4 The object of which is the primal Brahman.
5 Cf. Khāṇḍogya, p. 534; and Gītā, pp. 78, 79, and the passage from the Katha there cited.
6 Khāṇḍogya, pp. 264-459. 7 See Khāṇḍogya, p. 553 seq.
8 I.e. attending closely upon him; foetus=pupil.
preceptor, and becoming (as it were) a foetus, practise the life of Brāhmaṇars, become even in this world authors of Sāstras, and they repair to the highest truth after casting off (this) body. They subjugate desires here in this world, practising forbearance in pursuit of the Brahmic state; and with courage, they even here remove the self out of the body, like the soft fibres from the Muṇḍa. Father and mother, O descendant of Bharata! only form the body. But the birth obtained from the preceptor, that verily is true, and likewise immortal. He perfects (one), giving (one) immortality. Recognising what he has done (for one), one should not injure him. The disciple should always make obeisance to the preceptor; and, free from heedlessness, should always desire sacred instruction. When the pure man obtains knowledge by this same course of discipleship, that is the first quarter of his life as a Brāhmaṇar. As (is) his conduct

1. Learned, men of knowledge, Saṅkara.
2. The supreme, which is described as 'truth, knowledge,' &c. In our ancient works the truth often means the real.
5. Saṅkara cites Āpastamba (p. 111) in support of this, and Prasūtini- upanishad, p. 256. The consciousness of being one with the Brahman is a new birth. See, too, Mundaka, p. 282.
6. That birth is not merely delusive, and does not result in death.
7. Immortality or final emancipation is not to be achieved without knowledge, which can only be got from a preceptor. And one is not perfect without that immortality; one is limited by the conditions of human existence. See Nirukta (Roth's ed.), p. 41.
9. Stated at the beginning of this speech, Saṅkara.
always towards his preceptor, so likewise should he behave towards the preceptor’s wife, and so likewise should he act towards the preceptor’s son—(that) is said to be the second quarter. What one, recognising what the preceptor has done for one, and understanding the matter (taught), feels with a delighted heart regarding the preceptor—believing that one has been brought into existence by him—that is the third quarter of life as a Brahmaśārin. One should do what is agreeable to the preceptor, by means of one’s life and riches, and in deed, thought, and word—that is said to be the fourth quarter. (A disciple) obtains a quarter by time, so likewise a quarter by associating with the preceptor, he also obtains a quarter by means of his own energy; and then he attains to a quarter by means of the Sāstras. The life as a Brahmaśārin of that man, whose beauty consists in the twelve beginning with knowledge, and whose limbs are the other (qualifications mentioned), and who has

1 The meaning of the Vedic texts, &c., Saṅkara in one copy; the highest aim of man, according to another copy.
2 See note 5 on p. 176.
3 I keep the order of the original, though I do not translate quite literally; ‘thought and word’ should be literally ‘mind and speech.’ See, on the collocation, Gītā, p. 123 inter alia.
4 Time = maturity of understanding which comes by time; energy = intellectual power; Sāstras = consultation about Sāstras with fellow-students—Saṅkara, who adds that the order is not material as stated, and quotes a stanza which may be thus rendered, ‘The pupil receives a quarter from the preceptor, a quarter by his own talent; he receives a quarter by time; and a quarter through fellow-Brahmaśārins.
5 The body being disregarded, these qualities are attributed to the self in this way. For the twelve, see p. 167; the others are abandonment, truthfulness, &c., p. 169.
strength, bears fruit, they say, by association with a preceptor, in (the shape of) contact with that entity—the Brahman. Whatever wealth may come to a man who lives in this way, he should even pay that over to the preceptor. He would thus be adopting the conduct of the good which is of many merits; and the same conduct is (to be adopted) towards the preceptor’s son. Living thus, he prospers greatly on all sides in this world; he obtains sons and position; the quarters and sub-quarters shower (benefits) on him, and men pass their lives as Brahmaśārins under him. By this life as a Brahmaśārin, the divinities obtained their divinity. And the sages, too, became great by living the life of Brahmaśārins. By this same (means), too, the Apsarasas, together with the Gandharvas, achieved for themselves beautiful forms. And by this life as a Brahmaśārin, the sun illuminates (the universe). That man of knowledge, O king! who practising penance, may by penance pierce through or tear off his body, crosses beyond childhood by means of this (life as a Brahmaśārin), and at the time of the termination (of life) overcomes death. Those who understand this (life as a Brahmaśārin) attain to a

1 To observe the duties referred to, Saṅkara. But see, too, p. 167, note 6.


3 Cf. Khāndogya, p. 132.

4 ‘Wealth,’ says Nilakantha, as well as another commentator.


6 Nilakantha reads ‘vanquishes death.’ The meaning is, he reaches final emancipation. Cf. p. 154 supra.
condition like that of those who ask (for what they want) from the wish-granting stone, when they obtain the thing desired. By performing action, O Kshatriya! people conquer (for themselves only) perishable worlds. (But) the man of understanding attains by knowledge to the everlasting glory—for there is no other way to it.

Dhṛtarāṣṭra said:

Where a Brāhmaṇa possessed of knowledge, perceives it, does it appear as white, as red, or again as black, or again as grey or tawny? What is the colour of that immortal, indestructible goal?

Sanatsugāta said:

It appears not as white, as red, nor again as black, nor again as grey, nor tawny. It dwells not on earth, nor in the sky; nor does it bear a body in this ocean-like world. It is not in the stars, nor does it dwell in the lightning; nor is its form to be seen in the clouds, nor even in the air, nor in the deities; it is not to be seen in the moon, nor in the sun. It is not to be seen in Rīk texts, nor in

1 Called Kīntāmanī. The effect of Brahmakārya is that those who practise it can get what they desire.
2 Cf. Gītā, p. 76; Khândogya, p. 538; Mundāka, p. 279.
3 Cf. Svetāsvatara, p. 327.
4 Cf. Brīhadāraṇyaka, p. 877.
5 Cf. Kaṭha, p. 119; and Mundāka, p. 267. As to its not dwelling in earth, sky, &c., Śaṅkara refers to Khândogya, p. 518, as implying that.
6 Literally, 'it bears no water in the ocean.' 'Water' is said by the commentators to mean the five elements of which the body is composed. See Manu I, 5, and Khândogya, p. 330. In the Svetāsvatara it signifies mind (see p. 388). For ocean meaning world, or samsāra; cf. Aitareya-upanished, p. 182.
7 Here I do not render rūpa by colour, as before.
Yagus texts; nor yet in the Atharvan texts, nor in
the pure Sāman texts; nor yet, O king, in the
Rathantara or Brihadratha\(^1\) hymns. It is seen in
the self of a man of high vows\(^2\). It is invincible,
beyond darkness\(^3\), it comes forth from within\(^4\) at
the time of destruction. Its form is more minute
than the most minute (things), its form is larger even
than the mountains\(^5\). That is the support\(^6\) (of the
universe); that is immortal; (that is) all things
perceptible\(^7\). That is the Brahman, that is glory\(^8\).
From that all entities were produced\(^9\), in that they
are dissolved. All this shines forth as dwelling in it
in the form of light\(^10\). And it is perceived by means
of knowledge\(^11\) by one who understands the self;
on it depends this whole universe. Those who
understand this become immortal.

\(^1\) See Muir, Sanskrit Texts, vol. i, p. 16; Tāṇḍya-brāhmaṇa,
p. 838; Gītā, p. 90; and Kaushitaki, p. 21. Brihadratha=Brihat-
sāman (?).

\(^2\) The twelve great vows—knowledge, &c., mentioned above,
see p. 167. Nilakantha takes Mahāvra to refer to the sacrifice
of that name. It is described in the Aitareya Āranyaka.

\(^3\) See Gītā, p. 78, note 4.

\(^4\) Cf. Gītā, p. 82, and Ṛopanishad, p. 12.

\(^5\) See Gītā, p. 78, note 3.

\(^6\) Cf. Gītā, p. 113; Katha, p. 99.

\(^7\) So Nilakantha. The original word ordinarily means 'worlds.'

\(^8\) Cf. Svetāsvatara, p. 347.

\(^9\) Cf. the famous passage in the Taittirīya, p. 123: and also
Mundaka, p. 289.

\(^10\) The explanations of the commentators are not quite clear
as to the word ahaṇa, 'in the form of light.' Probably the meaning
is: The universe depends on the Brahman, and is, as it were, the
light of the Brahman. Saṅkara compares the passages referred to
at Gītā, p. 112, note 1.

\(^11\) 'Not by means of action,' says Saṅkara.
Grief and wrath, and avarice, desire, delusion, laziness, want of forgiveness, vanity, craving, friendship, censoriousness, and reviling others—these twelve great enormities are destructive of a man's life. These, O king of kings! attend on each and every man. Beset by these, a man, deluded in his understanding, acts sinfully. A man full of attachments, merciless, harsh (of speech), talkative, cherishing wrath in his heart, and boastful—these are the men of cruel qualities; (such) persons, even obtaining wealth, do not always enjoy (it). One

1 The whole of this chapter is wanting in one of our copies of Śaṅkara's commentary. In the copy published in the Mahābhārata (Madras edition) there is, however, this passage: 'Wrath &c. have been already explained, still there are some differences here and there, and those only are now explained.' The chapter is for the most part a repetition of what we have already had. For such repetitions cf. Brhadāraṇyaka, pp. 317–1016; 444–930. The same copy of Śaṅkara's commentary gives this general statement of the object of this and the next chapter: 'The course of study of the science of the Brahman, in which knowledge is the principal thing, and concentration of mind &c. are subsidiary, has been described. Now is described the course of study in which concentration of mind is principal, and knowledge subsidiary. The first mode consists in understanding the meaning of the word "you" by means of concentration of mind, and then identifying it with the Brahman by means of a study of the Upanishads; the second, in first intellectually understanding the identity of the individual self and Brahman, by such study of the Upanishads, and then realising the identity to consciousness by contemplation, &c. In both modes the fruit is the same, and the means are the same; and to show this, the merits and defects already stated are here again declared.' This explanation is verbatim the same in Nilakantha's commentary.

2 The original is 'pity,' which is explained to mean 'friendship' by Śaṅkara and Nilakantha.

3 'Owing to there being in it no enjoyment for the self,' says one
whose thoughts are fixed on enjoyments, who is partial, proud, boastful when he makes a gift, miserly, and devoid of power, who esteems the group (of the senses), and who hates (his) wife—thus have been stated the seven (classes of) cruel persons of sinful dispositions. Piety, and truthfulness, and penance, and self-restraint, freedom from animosity, modesty, endurance, freedom from censuriousness, liberality, sacred learning, courage, forgiveness—these are the twelve great observances of a Brâhmana. Whoever does not swerve from these twelve may govern this whole world. And one who is possessed of three, two, or even one, of these, must be understood to have nothing of his own.

Self-restraint, abandonment, freedom from delusion, on these immortality depends. These are possessed by those talented Brâhmânas to whom the Brahman is the principal (thing). A Brâhmana’s speaking ill of others, whether true or false, is not commended.

copy of Saṅkara’s commentary. Another reading, which is in the Madras edition and in Nilakantha, may be rendered, ‘even obtaining benefits, they do not respect one (from whom they obtain them).’

1 The commentary says the meaning is the same as that of the expression used in the corresponding place before, viz. one who prospers by injuring others.

2 One copy of Saṅkara’s commentary takes this to mean one who thinks the not-self to be the self. I adopt the other meaning, however, as agreeing with that of atimâñâ, which is the reading of some copies instead of abhimâñâ.

3 Nilakantha reads durbala and does not explain it. See p. 167.

4 One commentator says this means that he should not be supposed to have incurred the demerit of having any attachment to this world. Nilakantha says, he gives up everything in the pursuit of even one of these observances.

5 See p. 168.

6 I. e. the goal to be reached. The commentary takes Brahman to mean the Vedas, and the whole phrase to mean those who devote themselves to the performance of actions stated in the Vedas.
The men who act thus have their places in hell. Frenzy has eighteen defects—as already described here—hatred of men, factiousness\(^1\), censoriousness, untruthful speech, lust, wrath, want of self-control\(^2\), speaking ill of others, backbiting, mismanagement in business\(^3\), quarrelsomeness, animosity, troubling living creatures, want of forgiveness, delusion, flippancy, loss of reason\(^4\), censoriousness\(^5\); therefore a wise man should not be subject to frenzy, for it is always censured. Six characteristics should be understood as (belonging) to friendship—that one should rejoice at (anything) agreeable; and feel grieved at (anything) disagreeable; that with a pure heart one, when asked by a deserving (man), should give to him who asks what can\(^6\) certainly be given, (though it) may be beneficial to oneself, and even though it ought not to be asked, (namely) one's favourites, sons, wealth, and one's own wife; that one should not dwell there where one has bestowed (all one's) wealth, through a desire (to get a return for one's liberality); that one should enjoy

---

\(^1\) One copy of Śaṅkara's commentary says this means 'obstructing other people's acts of piety,' &c.

\(^2\) One copy of Śaṅkara's commentary says this means 'being given up to intoxicating drinks,' &c.; another copy says, 'doing another's bidding without thought.'

\(^3\) One copy says this means 'inattention to any work undertaken;' another renders the original by 'destruction of property, i.e. squandering it on dancers,' &c.

\(^4\) I. e. discrimination between right and wrong.

\(^5\) This seems to be some error, for 'censoriousness' has occurred before. But neither the texts nor the commentaries give any help to correct the error. Perhaps the latter is to be distinguished as referring to the habit, and the former only to sporadic acts, of censoriousness. These qualities, I presume, constitute frenzy; they are not the 'defects.'

\(^6\) I. e. where the power to give exists.
(the fruit of one's own) toils (only); and that one should forego one's own profit. Such a man, possessed of wealth, and possessed of merits, is a liberal man of the quality of goodness; such a one diverts the five elements from the five (senses). This pure penance, acquired out of desire by those who are fallen off from the truth, even though developed, leads upwards; since sacrifices are performed owing to a misapprehension of the truth. (The

---

1 Not a friend's.  2 For a friend.  3 See Gîtâ, p. 120.
4 The commentators take this to mean objects of sense, and they interpret 'elements' before to mean senses.
5 'Viz. the turning away of the senses from their objects,' says one copy of Saṅkara.
6 Scil. to enjoy the higher enjoyments of superior worlds.
7 I. e. to the higher worlds; it does not lead to emancipation here.
8 Cf. Mundaka, p. 277. I must own that I do not quite understand this passage, nor its explanation as given in the commentaries. I do not quite see what the penance here mentioned has to do with sacrifice, and yet the commentators seem to take the words 'since sacrifices,' &c., with what precedes them, not with what follows. Taking them, however, with what follows, it is difficult to explain the word 'since.' As far as I can understand the passage I take the sense of it to be as follows: The author having said that penance performed out of a particular motive does not lead to final emancipation, he then proceeds to point out that all 'action' or 'sacrifice' is due to an imperfect understanding of the truth (cf. p. 171 supra), being mostly due to some particular motive. Then he goes on to show the different classes of sacrifice, and finally points out that he who is free from desires is superior to one who is actuated by desires. The original for 'misapprehension' is āvas-bodha, which commonly means 'apprehension,' but Saṅkara finally makes it mean moha or 'delusion.' The original for truth is rendered by Nīlakantha to mean 'fancies.' Nīlakantha says that the sacrifice by the mind is the highest; that by speech, viz. Brahmayagña, Gapa, &c., is middling; and that by deed, viz. with clarified butter and other offerings, of the lowest class. 'Perfected by fancies' = one whose fancies are always fulfilled 'through a knowledge,' says Nīlakantha, 'of the Brahma as possessing qualities.'
sacrifices) of some are by the mind, of others by speech, and also by deed. The man void of fancies takes precedence over the man perfected by fancies,—especially among Brâhmanas\(^1\). And hear this further from me. One should teach this great and glorious\(^2\) (doctrine); (other doctrines) the wise call mere arrangements of words. On this concentration of mind\(^3\), all this\(^4\) depends. Those who know this become immortal. Not by meritorious action only, O king! does man conquer the truth\(^5\). One may offer offerings, or sacrifice. By that the child(-like man) does not cross beyond death; nor, O king! does he obtain happiness in his last moments\(^6\). One should practise devotion quietly, and should not be active even in mind\(^7\); and then one should avoid delight and wrath (resulting) from praise and censure\(^8\). I say to you, O learned person! that adhering to this\(^9\), one attains the Brahman and perceives it, O Kshatriya! by a course (of study) of the Vedas.

\(^{1}\) This also is far from clear. Should it be, ‘and a Brâhma more especially?’ This might be taken as referring to one who knows the Brahman as devoid of qualities, as Nilakantha does take it. But his construction is not quite clear.

\(^{2}\) As serviceable in attaining to ‘the glory,’ the Brahman; see p.180.

\(^{3}\) See note 1 at p. 181. As to ‘arrangements of words,’ cf. Maitri, p. 179.

\(^{4}\) ‘Everything,’ says one copy of Saṅkara’s commentary; ‘all that is good and desirable,’ says another.

\(^{5}\) Cf. inter alia, Mundāka, pp. 281–314.

\(^{6}\) For he has got to undergo migration from one life to another as the result of the action. Cf. Brhattāranyaka, p. 856; Mundāka, p. 278.

\(^{7}\) Cf. Gītā, p. 70.

\(^{8}\) Ibid. pp. 101–110.

\(^{9}\) I.e. the yoga or concentration of mind here described. This stanza, like many others in this chapter, occurs in chapter III with slight variations.
Chapter VI.

That pure\(^1\), great light\(^2\), which is radiant; that great glory\(^3\); that, verily, which the gods worship\(^4\); that by means of which the sun shines forth\(^5\)—that eternal divine being is perceived by devotees. From (that) pure (principle) the Brahman\(^6\) is produced; by (that) pure (principle) the Brahman is developed\(^7\); that pure (principle), not illumined among all radiant (bodies), is (itself) luminous and illuminates (them)\(^8\). That eternal divine being is perceived by devotees. The perfect is raised out of the perfect. It (being raised) out of the perfect is called the perfect. The perfect is withdrawn from the perfect, and the perfect only remains\(^9\). That eternal divine being is perceived by devotees.

---

1 Free from ignorance and other taints. See \textit{Katha}, p. 144.
2 Saṅkara compares \textit{Katha}, p. 142. See, too, \textit{Mundaka}, p. 303; and note 4 infra.
4 Saṅkara refers to \textit{Brhadāraṇyaka}, p. 887.
7 \textquote{In the form of Virāg}, says Saṅkara. As to these two, cf. \textit{Mundaka}, pp. 270–272; and Saṅkara’s and Ānandagiri’s notes there. See also \textit{Svetāvatara}, pp. 324, 325; and \textit{Nṛsiṃha Tāpinī}, pp. 233, 234; Colebrooke, \textit{Essays}, pp. 344, 368 (Madras reprint). The Virāg corresponds rather to the gross material world viewed as a whole; the Hiranyagarbha to the subtle elements similarly viewed, an earlier stage in the development. Cf. the \textit{Vedāntasāra}.
9 The individual self is part of the supreme (Gitā, p. 112); perfect = not limited by space, time, &c.; as being part of a thing perfect in its essence, the individual soul also is perfect. The individual self is withdrawn from the perfect, viz. the whole aggregate of body, senses, \\presided over by the self, and when so withdrawn it appears to be the pure self only. Cf. \textit{Brhadāraṇyaka}, p. 948.
(From the Brahman), the waters\(^1\) (are produced); and then from the waters, the gross body. In the space within that\(^2\), dwelt the two divine (principles). Both enveloping the quarters and sub-quarters, support earth and heaven\(^3\). That eternal divine being is perceived by devotees. The horse\(^4\) (like senses) lead towards heaven him, who is possessed of knowledge and divine, (who is) free from old age, and who stands on the wheel of this chariot (like body), which is transient, but the operations of which are imperishable\(^5\). That eternal divine being\(^6\) is perceived by devotees. His form has no parallel\(^7\); no one sees him with the eye\(^8\). Those who apprehend him by means of the understanding, and also the mind and heart, become immortal\(^9\). That eternal

\(\text{(Footnotes)}\)

\(^1\) 'The five elements,' says Sañkara, cf. Aitareya, p. 189; and for 'gross body,' the original is literally 'water;' see supra, p. 179, note 6; and see, too, Ṛpanishad, p. 11, and Svetāsvatara, p. 368, for different but kindred meanings.


\(^3\) The two principles between them pervade the universe, the individual self being connected with the material world, the other with heaven; 'divine' is, literally, 'the brilliant,' says Sañkara, who quotes Kalha, p. 305, as a parallel for the whole passage.

\(^4\) Cf. Kalha, p. 111; Mātrī, pp. 19-34; and Mahābhārata Strī Parvan, chap. VII, st. 13. Heaven = the Brahman here (see Brīhadāraṇyaka, p. 876); divine = not vulgar, or unrefined—Sañkara, who adds that though the senses generally lead one to sensuous objects, they do not do so when under the guidance of true knowledge.

\(^5\) The body is perishable, but action done by the self while in the body leaves its effect.

\(^6\) To whom, namely, the man of knowledge goes, as before stated.

\(^7\) Cf. Svetāsvatara, p. 347.

\(^8\) Cf. Kalha, p. 152, and comment there, where the eye is said to stand for all the senses.

\(^9\) Kalha, p. 149; Svetāsvatara, pp. 346-348, also p. 330 (should it be manishā there instead of manvīra?). The meanings of the three words are difficult to fix accurately. Sañkara varies in his interpre-
divine being is perceived by devotees. The currents of twelve collections, supported by the Deity, regulate the honey; and those who follow after it move about in (this) dangerous (world). That eternal divine being is perceived by devotees. The bee drinks that accumulated honey for half a month. The Lord created the oblation for all beings. That eternal divine being is perceived by devotees. Those who are devoid of wings, coming...

tions. Probably the meaning he gives here is the best. Mind and understanding have been explained at Gîtà, p. 57. The heart is the place within, where the self is said to be, and it may be taken as indicating the self, the meaning would then be—a direct consciousness in the self of its unity with the Supreme. See, too, Taitt. Âraṇ. p. 896.

1 The five organs of action, the five senses of perception, the mind and understanding make the twelve.

2 Each current has its own honey regularly distributed to it under the supervision of the Deity, the Supreme. Honey = material enjoyment. Cf. Kaśyapa, p. 126, where Saṅkara renders it by karmaphala, 'fruit of action.'


4 Bhramara, which the commentators interpret to mean 'one who is given to flying about—the individual self.'

5 I.e. in one life in respect of actions done in a previous life.

6 Saṅkara says this is in answer to a possible difficulty that action performed here cannot have its fruit in the next world, as the fruit is so far removed in time from the action. The answer is, The Lord, the Supreme, can effect this, and taking his existence into account there is no difficulty. Oblation = food, &c., Saṅkara. The meaning of the whole passage, which is not very clear, seems to be that the Lord has arranged things so that each being receives some of this honey, this food, which is the fruit of his own action. Then the question arises, Do these beings always continue taking the honey and 'migrating,' or are they ever released? That is answered by the following sentence.

7 'The wings of knowledge,' says Saṅkara, citing a Brāhmaṇa text, 'those, verily, who have knowledge are possessed of wings, those who are not possessed of knowledge are devoid of wings.'
 CHAPTER VI, 10. 189

to the Asvattha of golden leaves 1, there become possessed of wings, and fly away happily 2. That eternal divine being 3 is perceived by devotees. The upward life-wind swallows up the downward life-wind; the moon swallows up the upward life-wind; the sun swallows up the moon 1; and another 5 swallows up the sun. Moving about above the waters, the supreme self 6 does not raise one leg 7. (Should he raise) that, which is always 'performing sacrifices 8, there will be no death, no immortality 9. That eternal divine being 10 is perceived by devotees.

1 So, literally; Saṅkara explains 'golden' to mean 'beneficial and pleasant,' by a somewhat fanciful derivation of the word hiranya. He refers to Gītā, p. 111, about the leaves of the Asvattha. Nilakantha takes the leaves to be son, wife, &c., which are 'golden,' attractive at first sight. 'Coming to the Asvattha,' Saṅkara says, 'means being born as a Brāhmaṇa,' &c. 'Flying away' = obtaining final emancipation.

2 The 'selves' are compared to birds in the famous passage at Mūndaka, p. 306 (also Svetāsvatara, p. 337). See also Bṛhadāraṇyaka, p. 499.

3 Knowledge of whom leads to 'flying away happily.'

4 Cf. Kāntaloga, p. 441. Saṅkara says that the author here explains the yoga by which the Supreme is to be attained. As to the life-winds, cf. Gītā, p. 61. 'The moon,' says Saṅkara, 'means the mind, and the sun the understanding, as they are the respective deities of those organs' (cf. Bṛhadāraṇyaka, pp. 521-542, and Aitareya, p. 187, where, however, the sun is said to appertain to the eye).

5 I.e. the Brahman; the result is, one remains in the condition of being identified with the Brahman.

6 Literally, flamingo. Cf. Svetāsvatara, pp. 332, 367; see also p. 289; Maitri, p. 99; and the commentary on Svetāsvatara, p. 283.

7 Viz. the individual self, Saṅkara; that is, as it were, the bond of connexion between the Supreme and the world. Cf. Gītā, p. 112.

8 This is the meaning, though the word in the original is Rātgī, which in the later literature only means priest.

9 As the whole of the material world is dissolved, when the self is dissovered from the delusion which is the cause of it.

10 Viz. who moves about on the waters, as above stated.
The being which is the inner self, and which is of the size of a thumb\(^1\), is always migrating in consequence of the connexion with the subtle body\(^2\). The deluded ones do not perceive that praiseworthy lord, primeval and radiant, and possessed of creative power\(^3\). That eternal divine being is perceived by devotees. Leading mortals to destruction by their own action\(^4\), they conceal themselves like serpents in secret recesses\(^5\). The deluded men then become more deluded\(^6\). The enjoyments afforded by them cause delusion, and lead to worldly life\(^7\). That eternal divine being\(^8\) is perceived by devotees. This seems to be common to all mankind—whether possessed of resources\(^9\) or not possessed of resources—it is common to immortality and the other\(^10\). Those who are possessed (of them)\(^11\) attain there to the source of the honey\(^12\). That eternal divine being is perceived by devotees. They go,

---

\(^1\) Svetásvatara, pp. 330-355; Taitt. Árau, p. 858, and comments there.

\(^2\) The life-winds, the ten organs or senses, mind, and understanding. See the same word similarly interpreted at Svetásvatara, p. 306, and Sánkhya-sūtra III, 9.

\(^3\) According to Sáṅkara, he who makes the distinct entities, after entering into them; he alludes apparently to Kháñdogya, p. 497.

\(^4\) Namely, that of giving the poison of sensuous objects.

\(^5\) I.e. the eye, ear, &c., like the holes of serpents.

\(^6\) I.e. can appreciate nought but those sensuous objects.

\(^7\) One reading is, 'lead to danger' = which means 'to hell,' according to Nilakanṭha.

\(^8\) Scil. delusion about whom leads to 'danger' or 'worldly life.'

\(^9\) The quality of being one with the Brahman in essence.

\(^10\) Self-restraint, tranquillity, &c.

\(^11\) I.e. 'whether in the midst of worldly life, or in the state of perfect emancipation.'

\(^12\) Viz. the resources spoken of before.

Viz. the supreme Brahman. 'There' Sáṅkara takes to mean 'in the supreme abode of Vishnu.' See Introduction.
pervading both worlds by knowledge\(^1\). Then the Agnihotra though not performed is (as good as) performed \(^2\). Your (knowledge) of the Brahman, therefore, will not lead you to littleness \(^3\). Knowledge is (his) \(^4\) name. To that the talented ones attain. That eternal divine being is perceived by devotees. The self of this description absorbing the material cause \(^5\) becomes great. And the self of him who understands that being is not degraded here \(^6\). That eternal divine being is perceived by devotees. One should ever and always be doing good. (There is) no death, whence (can there be) immortality \(^7\)? The real and the unreal have both the same real (entity) as their basis. The source of the existent and the non-existent is but one \(^8\). That eternal divine being is perceived by devotees. The

\(^{1}\) Saṅkara does not explain this. Nilakanṭha says pervading= fully understanding; both worlds=the self and the not-self. Is the meaning something like that of the passage last cited by Saṅkara under Vedānta-sūtra IV, 2, 14?

\(^{2}\) He obtains the fruit of it, Saṅkara. See as to Agnihotra, Khindogya, p. 381 seq.; and Vedānta-sūtra IV, 1, 16.

\(^{3}\) I.e. this mortal world, as action &c. would do.

\(^{4}\) I.e. of one who understands himself to be the Brahman. See Aitareya-upanishad, p. 246.

\(^{5}\) Saṅkara says, ‘the cause in which all is absorbed.’ Cf. a similar, but not identical, meaning given to Vaisvānara at Khindogya, p. 264, and see Vedānta-sūtra I, 2, 24. Becomes great= becomes the Brahman, Saṅkara.

\(^{6}\) Even in this body, Saṅkara; degradation he takes to mean departure from the body, citing Brhadāranyaka, p. 540.

\(^{7}\) There is no worldly life with birth and death for one who does good, and thinks his self to be the Brahman; hence no emancipation from such life either.

\(^{8}\) The Brahman is the real, and on that the unreal material world is imagined. Cf. Taittirīya, p. 97, and Saṅkara’s comments there, which are of use in understanding this passage.
being who is the inner self, and who is of the size of a thumb, is not seen, being placed in the heart. He is unborn, is moving about day and night, without sloth. Meditating on him, a wise man remains placid. That eternal divine being is perceived by devotees. From him comes the wind; in him, likewise, is (everything) dissolved. From him (come) the fire and the moon; and from him comes life. That is the support (of the universe); that is immortal; that is all things perceptible; that is the Brahman, that glory. From that all entities were produced; and in that (they) are dissolved. That eternal divine being is perceived by devotees. The brilliant (Brahman) supports the two divine principles and the universe, earth and heaven, and the quarters. He from whom the rivers flow in (various) directions, from him were created the great oceans. That eternal divine being is perceived by devotees. Should one fly, even after furnishing oneself with thousands upon thousands of wings, and even though one should have the velocity of thought, one would never reach the end of the (great) cause. That eternal divine

1 Cf. Katha, pp. 130, 157; and Brihadâranyaka, p. 360.
3 Cf. Taittiriya, p. 67; Katha, p. 146; Mundaka, p. 293.
4 Katha, p. 298; Mundaka, p. 288.
6 See p. 180 supra.
7 ‘The individual soul, and God,’ say the commentators, the latter being distinct from the supreme self. ‘The universe,’ says Nilakantha, ‘means earth,’ &c., by which I suppose he means earth, heaven, quarters, mentioned directly afterwards.
8 Katha. p. 293.
9 This figure is implied in the Tapanishad, p. 10.
10 ‘Therefore it is endless,’ says Sankara; and as to this, cf. Taittiriya, p. 51.
being is perceived by devotees. His form dwells in the unperceived; and those whose understandings are very well refined perceive him. The talented man who has got rid (of affection and aversion) perceives (him) by the mind. Those who understand him become immortal. When one sees this self in all beings stationed in various places, what should one grieve for after that? The Brāhmaṇa has (as much interest) in all beings, as in a big reservoir of water, to which waters flow from all sides. I alone am your mother, father;

1 'In a sphere beyond the reach of perception,' says Saṅkara, who also quotes Kalāha, p. 149, or Svetāsvatara, p. 347, where the same line also occurs.

2 The original for understandings is sattva, which Saṅkara renders to mean antahkāranam. 'Refined,' he says, 'by sacrifices and other sanctifying operations.' In the Kalāha at p. 148 sattva is rendered by Saṅkara to mean buddhi—a common use of the word.

3 'As being,' says Saṅkara, 'identical with themselves.' It will be noted that the form of expression is slightly altered here. It is not 'those who understand this.'

4 I.e. in different aggregates of body, senses, &c. Cf. Gītā, pp. 104 and 124; also Kāndogya, pp. 475–551.

5 Cf. Brāhadāraṇyaka, p. 882; Saṅkara also refers to Isopanishad, p. 14.

6 The words are pretty nearly the same as at Gītā, p. 48. Saṅkara says, the Brāhmaṇa 'who has done all he need do' has no interest whatever in any being, as he has none in a big reservoir, and he cites Gītā, p. 54, in support of this. One copy of Saṅkara, however, differs from this; that runs thus: 'As a person who has done all he need do, has no interest in a big reservoir of water, so to a Brāhmaṇa who sees the self in all beings, there is no interest in all the actions laid down in the Vedas, &c.; as he has obtained everything by mere perception of the self.' Nīlakantha's reading is exactly the same as at Gītā, p. 48.

7 Saṅkara says that Sanatsugāta states here his own experiences, like Vāmadeva (about whom there is a reference at Brāhadāraṇyaka, p. 216) and others, to corroborate what he has already said. Cf. also Gītā, p. 83, as to the whole passage.
and I too am the son. And I am the self of all this—that which exists and that which does not exist. (I am) the aged grandfather of this, the father, and the son, O descendant of Bharata! You dwell in my self only. You are not mine, nor I (yours). The self only is my seat; the self too is (the source of) my birth. I am woven through and through (everything). And my seat is free from (the attacks of) old age. I am unborn, moving about day and night, without sloth. Knowing (me), verily, a wise man remains placid. More minute than an atom, possessed of a good mind, I am stationed within all beings. (The wise) know the father of all beings to be placed in the lotus—like heart of every one.

1 See Gitâ, p. 84. Nilakantha takes what exists to mean ‘present,’ and what does not exist to mean ‘past and future.’ Cf. Khândogya, p. 532.
2 See Gitâ, p. 82, where there is also a similar apparent contradiction.
3 Cf. Khândogya, p. 518.
4 That is to say he is ‘unborn,’ says Nilakantha. Saïkara seems to take ‘my’ with ‘seat’ only, and not with birth; for he says, ‘everything has its birth from the self.’
5 Cf. Mundâka, p. 298; Maitri, p. 84, and comment there.
7 See p. 192, note 2.
8 Cf. Gitâ, p. 78, and note 3 there.
9 I.e. a mind free from affection and aversion, hatred, &c., Saïkara.
10 Cf. Gitâ, p. 113, and note 3; and also Isopanishad, p. 12.
11 Khândogya, p. 528; and cf. Gitâ, p. 113.