1. THE CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERSHIP MADE A GRAVE ERROR BY NOT RECOGNIZING THE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES TAKING PLACE IN THE WORLD. THE MEASURES TAKEN BY THE SOVIETS IN RECENT MONTHS, CULMINATING IN THE AUGUST DECISION TO INVADE CZECHOSLOVAKIA, CAN ONLY BE UNDERSTOOD IF ONE CONSIDERS THESE GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS. THESE DEVELOPMENTS INCLUDE THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES' MOVES TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR POSITION DURING THE PAST FEW YEARS, THEIR CONSTANTLY INCREASING STRENGTH, AND THEIR ABILITY FURTHER TO EXPLOIT THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. THE SOCIALIST
CAMP, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAS SUFFERED VARIOUS DEFEATS, PARTICULARLY AMONG THE COMMunist MOVEMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA, AFRICA AND ASIA. IN THESE AREAS THE SOVIET POSITION HAS BEEN WEAKENED THROUGH THE EFFORTS OF THE CHINESE AS WELL AS THE BOURGEOIS AND NATIONALIST PARTIES IN THESE CONTINENTS. MOSCOW IS SAID TO BE REASSESSING ITS GENERAL POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR THE FUTURE AS WELL AS THE TACTICS TO BE FOLLOWED IN DEALING WITH THE CAPITALIST WEST.

2. THIS REASSESSMENT WILL RESULT IN A SHARPER CPSU ATTITUDE, EVEN THOUGH THIS MAY DECREASE SOVIET INFLUENCE AMONG THE LABOR MOVEMENTS IN THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES, LOSSES WHICH WOULD BE BALANCED BY A STRONGER SOCIALIST CAMP. CZECHOSLOVAKIA IS STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT TO THE USSR. THE SOVIETS WILL NOT PERMIT THE CAPITALIST BORDERS TO MOVE SEVERAL HUNDRED KILOMETERS CLOSER TO THE USSR, NOR WILL THEY TOLERATE UNCERTAIN REGIMES IN THE USSR'S BUFFER STATES.

3. THE USSR'S MAIN INTEREST, HOWEVER, IS IN ASIA, AND RELATIONS WITH CHINA WILL HAVE TO BE NORMALIZED SOMEHOW. BY ADOPTING A FIRM POLICY AND A HARDENED ATTITUDE, CONDITIONS MAY BE CREATED WHICH WOULD ALLOW AN AGREEMENT WITH CHINA. TRENDS IN THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES CAN BE EXPECTED TO BE UNFAVORABLE TO THE USSR. MOSCOW CANNOT RELY UPON THE WESTERN COMMUNIST PARTIES TO SEIZE POWER.
4. On the other hand, the unity of the socialist camp must be strengthened, and its status as an entity (including China) must be stabilized. The current variations in interests, policies and groupings among the communist countries are considered intolerable.

5. **COMMENT:** This information may reflect the Soviet official's personal opinion or be based on views expressed by leading officials in the USSR. In any case, Moscow is clearly submitting its policies to a basic reassessment in respect to its relations with communist parties and countries in the socialist camp as well as with the capitalist world. Other Soviet officials have said the Soviets believe the invasion of Czechoslovakia will be forgotten in time, that the strong anti-Soviet sentiment throughout the world will diminish and that everything will ultimately be settled according to Moscow's wishes. For this reason they do not want to carry out any accelerated measures in Czechoslovakia but prefer to move slowly. This policy seems to have been followed with respect to the negotiations with Czechoslovak Premier Oldrich Cernik during his visit to Moscow in September. Not only was he deferentially treated, but, in addition to awarding some economic concessions, the Soviets implied a willingness
TO COMPENSATE CZECHOSLOVAKIA FOR THE DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE SOVIET INVASION IN THE AMOUNT OF 300 MILLION RUBLES AND TO INCREASE ECONOMIC AID TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA DURING THE NEXT THREE YEARS, POSSIBLY TO INCLUDE A HARD CURRENCY LOAN OF 500 MILLION DOLLARS. THE DETAILS WERE NOT DISCUSSED, HOWEVER, AND THE IMPLIED AID OFFERS WERE OBVIOUSLY A TACTICAL MOVE BY THE SOVIETS TO TIE CZECHOSLOVAKIA ECONOMICALLY TO THE USSR AND TO WIN OVER THE CZECHOSLOVAK NEGOTIATORS DURING THE TALKS. 

FROM A RELIABLE SOURCE WHICH REPORTED THAT CERNIK TOLD SOME SENIOR CZECHOSLOVAK JOURNALISTS DURING AN OFF-THE-RECORD BRIEFING THAT DURING THE MID-SEPTEMBER TALKS IN MOSCOW THE SOVIETS HAD FLATLY REFUSED A CZECHOSLOVAK REQUEST FOR A 400-500 MILLION DOLLAR LOAN. CERNIK WAS ALSO REPORTED TO HAVE TOLD THE JOURNALISTS THAT THE SOVIETS HAD PLACED AN EMBARGO ON THE SALE BY CZECHOSLOVAKIA OF SOVIET CRUDE AND REFINED OIL TO THE WEST. 

6. DISSEM: NONE.