V.B. Justification of the War (11 Vols.)
   Internal Documents (9 Vols.)
3. The Eisenhower Administration: (4 Vols.)
UNITED STATES - VIETNAM RELATIONS
1945 - 1967

VIETNAM TASK FORCE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
V. B. 3.

JUSTIFICATION OF THE WAR

- INTERNAL COMMITMENTS -

The Eisenhower Administration, 1953 - 1960

BOOK III: Geneva Accords - 15 March 1956
### The Geneva Accords - 1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>165</td>
<td>The State Department explains the rationale of why the United States issued a unilateral declaration instead of signing the 1954 Accords on Indochina. Secretary Dulles was unwilling to even consider signing accords on Indochina of the type concluded at Geneva, and hence was not an alternative to issuing a unilateral declaration but was a substitute suggested by the French leaders. The declaration was based on the understandings of the 14 July Franco-American Six Point position paper. State Department Analysis - Geneva Declaration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>166</td>
<td>The NSC adopts the JCS recommendation that the possible use of ROK forces in Indochina be kept under review. Secretary of Defense Memorandum to JCS, 30 July 1954.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>167</td>
<td>Dulles reviews the occasions when French officials suggested U.S. armed intervention in Indochina and the parallel U.S. efforts to organize &quot;united action.&quot; The possibility of &quot;united action&quot; lapsed in mid-June 1954 with the French decision to obtain a cease-fire at Geneva. Dulles 689 to London, 3 August 1954.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>168</td>
<td>The CIA assesses the probable outlook in Indochina in the light of agreements at the Geneva Conference. The conclusions are: (1) that the communists will continue to pursue their objectives in South Vietnam by political, psychological and paramilitary means; (2) that if elections are held in 1956, the Viet Minh will win; (3) and that the events in Laos and Cambodia depend on the developments in Vietnam. National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 63-5-54, 3 August 1954.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>169</td>
<td>The French view of Diem Government is that it does not qualify on three major points: (1) fully representative of the population; (2) prepared to carry out land reform; and (3) prepared to depose Bao Dai. Diem is seen as valuable for his high moral character but his mandarin background precludes his qualifications on the three points. Paris 481 to Dulles, 4 August 1954.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170</td>
<td>The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that before the U.S. assume responsibility for training the Vietnamese Army that four preconditions be met: (1) &quot;it is absolutely essential that there be a reasonably strong, stable civil government in control,&quot; (2) each government concerned should formally request the U.S. to assume the responsibility; (3) arrangements should be made for</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

*TOP SECRET - Sensitive*
granting full independence and provide for phased withdrawal of French forces; and (4) the force structure, should be dictated by local military requirements.

JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 4 August 1954

Page 701

191. The Chief MAAG outlines his point of view of the U.S. part in the future of Vietnam. His mission is twofold: establish U.S. courses of action to ensure survival of Free Vietnam as a nation and develop Vietnam as an effective barrier to Communist expansion. Saigon 30214A, 6 August 1954

Page 703

192. The French have been lead to believe that Dulles made an offer of the use of atomic bombs at Dien Bien Phu and that Bidault was "much upset" by the offer and felt that they would have done no good tactically. There is concern that Bidault -- "ill, nervous, hypersensitive and bitter" might attempt to publicize his version and take credit for preventing the use of atom bombs as "suggested by the U.S." Paris 558 to Dulles, 9 August 1954

Page 705

193. Dulles has "no recollection whatever of the alleged offer" of atomic bombs to the French and indicates "it is incredible that I should have made the offer ... " Dulles 501 to Paris, 9 August 1954

Page 706

194. On the offer of atomic bombs, the French agree that there has been a complete misunderstanding, possibly based on language difficulties. On the day of Dulles, "alleged" offer, Bidault had been "ill, jittery, overwrought" and, even to the French staff, "incoherent." Paris 576 to Dulles, 10 August 1954

Page 708

195. The JCS review U.S. policy in the Far East - NSC 5429. They recommend that NSC 5429 be returned to the Planning Board for "exposition of U.S. objectives" and "delineation of broad courses of action" in the Far East. Extensive comments by the Army Chief of Staff on NSC 5429 ("It is not a comprehensive review of the entire problem...WE DO NOT HAVE EITHER TO APPEASE COMMUNIST CHINA OR TO DESTROY IT.") are included. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 11 August 1954

Page 709

196. The JCS comment on a draft State Department message for the French Prime Minister regarding U.S. policy toward Indochina. They feel the message should state clearly that the assumption of training responsibility in Vietnam by the U.S. is contingent on the preconditions stated in their 4 August memorandum (see Document 185). JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 12 August 1954

Page 714
197. Regarding...the assumption by the U.S. of the responsibility for training the Vietnamese Army, Secretary Wilson forwards the JCS view as representing the Defense Department position to Secretary Dulles. Secretary of Defense Letter to Secretary of State, 12 August 1954.............. 717

198. The JCS concur in the view that a statement of intent to conclude a treaty establishing a collective security arrangement in the Far East should be issued by the countries which intend to be treaty members. The JCS list the provisions which the treaty should incorporate. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 13 August 1954........... 719

199. Secretary Wilson expresses the Defense views on the draft "Southeast Asia Collective Security Treaty" which include the JCS position. In his view, the recent developments in Geneva and Indochina increases the urgency for a "comprehensive United States policy with respect to the Far East region as a whole." Secretary of Defense Letter to Secretary of State, 17 August 1954................. 725

200. Secretary Dulles replies to the JCS: 4 preconditions with the assertion that "one of the most efficient means of enabling the Vietnamese Government to become strong is to assist it in reorganizing the National Army and in training that army." Even though Vietnam could not meet the U.S. prerequisites, Dulles believes that strengthening the army was a prerequisite to political stability. Secretary of State Memorandum to Secretary of Defense, 18 August 1954......................... 728

201. The U.S. policy with respect to Southeast Asia provides for negotiating a collective security treaty, considers appropriate action in the event of local subversion, and outlines political and covert action. NSC 5429/2, 20 August 1954..................... 732

202. The President has approved the policy that henceforth aid to Indochina would be direct rather than through the medium of the French Government. Further, State feels the Government should respond affirmatively to Cambodia's request for assistance in training the Royal Cambodian Army. Secretary of State Letter to Secretary of Defense, 26 August 1954....................... 742

203. Australia welcomes establishment of SEATO and is prepared to make an increased military contribution to the defense of the area. Australian Aide-Memoire, 31 August 1954......................... 743
204. The Manila Conference delegate submits comment on the
SEATO treaty articles of special concern to Defense.
Among these are: "Article IV is the heart of the
treaty" -- and provides that aggression against any
member, or, by agreement, any nation in the area, would
be met by action in accordance with "constitutional
processes"; Article V establishes a council which pro-
vides for "machinery" to achieve Treaty objectives;
and Article VII provides that other nations may be
invited to accede to the Treaty. ISA Memorandum for
Secretary of Defense, 14 September 1954................. 746

205. Diem has not demonstrated the necessary ability to deal
with practical politics and administration. France,
appearing with no policy toward South Vietnam, has
failed to support Diem. Trends indicate enhanced
prospects of Communist control over the area. SNE
63-6-54, 15 September 1954.................. 751

206. Ambassador Heath goes on record with a strong criti-
cism of General O'Daniel's "impetuous action" in
contacting General Hinh concerning the political
crisis in Saigon. O'Daniel prefers Hinh to Diem and
rejects the exiling of Hinh to the United States as
requested by Diem. Ambassador Heath Letter to State,
16 September 1954.................. 753

207. The JCS see the Geneva cease-fire agreement as a major
obstacle to the introduction of adequate U.S. MAAG per-
sonnel and of additional arms and equipment. Further,
because of "uncertain capabilities of the French and
Vietnamese to retrieve, retain, and reorganize the
dispersed forces of Vietnam," U.S. support to the area
should be accomplished at "low priority." JCS Memorandum
for Secretary of Defense, 22 September 1954............. 756

208. The JCS recommend against the assignment of a training
mission to MAAG, Saigon in view of the unstable politi-
cal situation in South Vietnam. JCS Memorandum to
Secretary of Defense, 22 September 1954............. 759

209. Total tonnage of MDAP material delivered to Indochina
since December, 1950, is 737,000 tons. Prior to termi-
nation of hostilities, there were 500,000 tons of equip-
ment and 20,000 vehicles in North Vietnam. As of
13 September, there are 150,000 tons of equipment to
be evacuated from North Vietnam. Military Assistance
Memorandum for ISA, 24 September 1954................. 761
210. The U.S. and France agree to support Diem in the establishment of a strong, anti-Communist nationalist government. The five key elements recognized which can provide a chance of success are: Bao Dai, General Hinh and the National army, and the three sects. The Binh Xuyen sect, which controls the police and is tied to Bao Dai, is to be isolated from Bao Dai and their strength minimized.

TOSEC 9, 30 September 1954

211. Secretary Dulles feels that U.S. policy on the magnitude of force levels and costs for Vietnam should be based on NSC 5429/2 which provides for internal security forces under SEATO: "...it is imperative that the United States Government prepare a firm position on the size of forces we consider a minimum level to assure the internal security of Indochina." Dulles Letter to Wilson, 11 October 1954

212. Defense forwards Secretary Dulles letter (Document 204, page 746) to JCS and requests the JCS to reconsider their previous estimates (Document 202, page 744) in light of the more recent views of Dulles. ISA Memorandum for JCS, 14 October 1954

213. The JCS, in reply to the Secretary of State's letter of 11 October (Document 210, page 765), persist in their view that the U.S. should not participate in the training of Vietnamese forces. However, if "political considerations are overriding," then the JCS agree to assignment of a training mission to MAAG Saigon "with safeguards against French interference." JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 19 October 1954

214. Dulles reports on a conversation with Mendes-France on the critical situation in Vietnam. The French position is that plans should be laid for another government structure in the event of a Diem failure. They stress the importance of utilizing the "thread of legitimacy deriving from Bao Dai." Dulles requests the State Department estimate on the political situation.

DUTCH 5, 20 October 1954

215. A new approach to leadership training and "cross-fertilization between Western and Asiatic ideas" is proposed in a psychological operations concept entitled "Militant Liberty." The implementation of "Militant Liberty" -- a concept which "motivates indigenous people to work toward a common goal of individual freedom" -- is proposed on a test basis in Indochina as a joint military-CIA venture. Defense Memo for the CIA (Draft), 20 October 1954
216. The State Department's estimate of the political situation is that Hinh holds a veto power over Diem; "jockeying for power and struggle for cabinet positions is resulting in paralyzing impasse"; French reference to "another structure of government" implies a "hankering to reestablish a political system" which might involve direct colonial-type controls by France; and, unless Diem receives U.S.-French support, his chances of success appear slight. Paris TELUL 11 NIAC, 21 October 1954.

217. This message contains the policy of the U.S. Government and instructions to the Ambassador and Chief of MAAG in Saigon necessary to carry out the provisions of NSC 5129/2 pertaining to training of Vietnamese armed forces. Draft Joint State-Defense Message, 21 October 1954.

218. The GCH draft recommendations on training in Vietnam outline the U.S. role in assisting the reorganization and training of the Vietnamese armed forces and specifies the coordination required between the Ambassador and Chief, MAAG. The question of ultimate size of the Vietnamese forces and U.S. support is left for "later determination." NSC 218th Meeting, 22 October 1954.

219. The Report of the Van Fleet Mission to the Far East is discussed with President Eisenhower. General Van Fleet's views are "somewhat different from present policies." As Van Fleet states the problem: "The problem before us is the failure of U.S. leadership in the Far East...the future will reveal other prices we must pay for the free world defeat in Indochina." White House Memorandum for General Bonesteel, 25 October 1954.

220. Diem is insisting on getting rid of General Hinh. Eisenhower's letter to Diem is being interpreted as superseding Washington agreements, that Diem has "full rein" without meeting the precondition of "forming a strong and stable government." The President's letter can also be exploited by the Viet Minh and is causing the French concern. State Memorandum of Conversation, 26 October 1954.

221. Secretary Dulles forwards the main points of General Collins' recommendations regarding force levels in Vietnam. In summary, the points are: (1) it would be disastrous if the French Expeditionary Corps (FEC) were withdrawn prematurely; (2) the U.S. should continue to subsidize the FEC; (3) the Vietnamese Army should be...
down to 77,000 and under Vietnamese command by July 1955; (4) the U.S. should assume training responsibility by 1 January 1955; and (5) the French are agreeable to a slow build-up of MAAG. Dulles Memorandum for the President, 17 November 1954.

222. The French Ambassador is informed by the Foa that, subject to agreement, the U.S. contemplates $100 million support for the FEC in Indochina for CY 1955. The Defense Department has "never agreed to the original position paper," which is based on General Collins' recommendations, without details of his calculations. IsA Memorandum for Record, 24 November 1954.

223. Senator Mansfield states his conclusions based on General Collins' analysis of the Vietnam situation: (1) prospects for Diem "look very dim," elections in 1956 would probably favor the communists; (2) the U.S. should continue to support Vietnam as long as possible; (3) he sees no alternative to Diem; (4) he is certain refugees, Catholic bishops and church officials would oppose replacement of Diem; (5) Paris should urge Bao Dai cease his interference and support Diem; (6) and Diem should be encouraged to compromise on issues. State Memorandum of Conversation, 7 December 1954.

224. The French Government is considering the decision to accelerate withdrawal of the FEC and evacuation of civilians as a direct result of the U.S. decision to provide only one-third the amount requested for maintenance of the FEC in 1955. Paris 2488 to Dulles, 9 December 1954.

225. Diem "passes the buck" of convincing the sect leaders not to oppose the appointment of Dr. Quat as Defense Minister to the U.S. Collins is convinced that Diem and his brothers, Luyen and Nhu, are afraid of Quat or any strong man in control of the armed forces since with "spineless General Ty" as Chief of Staff, Diem has effectively seized control of the army. Further, Collins comments on the alternatives to Diem Government; though the alternative of gradual withdrawal from Vietnam "is least desirable, in all honesty, and in view of what I have observed here to date it is possible this may be the only sound solution." Collins (Saigon) 2250 to Dulles, 13 December 1954.

226. The Defense Department reviews the military aid situation in Indochina including the value of NDAP shipments ($1,085 million) and losses of equipment at Dien
Bien Phu ($1.2 million) which included 8 tanks, 24 howitzers, and 15,000 small arms. Defense Letter to Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 14 December 1954........ 818

227. Collins is convinced that "Diem does not have the capacity to unify divided factions in Vietnam" and unless decisive action or dramatic leadership galvanizes the country into unified action "this country will be lost to communism. "Apparently, the only Vietnamese who might be competent...is Bao Dai."

It is recommended that the U.S. not assume responsibility for training on 1 January 1955, or give direct military aid. Collins 2303 for Dulles, 16 December 1954................................. 820

228. Ambassador Heath suggests that General Collins' recommendations ignore the basic factor that withholding aid from Diem would assist a communist takeover. Dulles has analyzed our situation in Vietnam as a "time buying operation" and Heath recommends continued support of Diem in spite of a "Bao Dai solution." The fear that $300 million plus our national prestige would be lost in a gamble is a legitimate one, but withholding our support would "have a far worse effect." Heath Memorandum to FE, 17 December 1954........ 824

229. Tripartite discussions on Indochina are summarized. To Secretary Dulles desire to continue strong support of Diem, Ely indicates that he and Collins have exerted pressure without result and were now convinced that it was hopeless to expect anything of Diem. Ely feels that he and Collins must decide now "whether Diem was really the man capable of national union."

Four points are agreed upon: (1) support Diem, (2) study alternatives, (3) investigate timing of replacement, and (4) (added by Dulles) how much more U.S. investment should be made in Indochina if it is decided there is no good alternative to Diem. Paris 2601 to State, 19 December 1954................................. 826

230. The President approves NSC 5429/4 as amended and adopted by the Council as NSC 5429/5. This statement on current U.S. policy in the Far East deals with the primary problem of the threat to U.S. security resulting from communist expansion in China, Korea, and North Vietnam. NSC 5429/5, 22 December 1954............ 835

231. Dulles spells out guidelines for future U.S. actions in Indochina: (1) we must create such a situation
that the Viet Minh can take over only by internal violence; (2) investment in Vietnam is justified even if only to buy time, we must be flexible and proceed carefully by stages; (3) "we have no choice but to continue our aid to Vietnam and support of Diem"; (4) Bao Dai's return would not solve the problem; (5) revitalization of National army is hope for an improved security condition; (5) and "something should be done on our side" to exploit land reform issue. Dulles 2535 to Collins (Saigon), 24 December 1954

232. Collins refutes most of the comments of Ely and Mendes made at the tripartite discussion and is disturbed over some of the suggestions and attitudes of Mendes and Eden. He feels that he should be in Washington in January if the NSC is to re-evaluate U.S. policy to avoid misunderstandings. Collins 2455 to Dulles, 25 December 1954

233. Secretary Dulles decides that the U.S. should proceed as scheduled and "take the plunge" and begin direct aid to Vietnam on 1 January and move ahead on MAAG negotiations in Cambodia. Dulles feels that the JCS prerequisite on eliminating the French from Cambodia is "too legalistic and unrealistic." State Memorandum for the Record, 29 December 1954
In light of the unstable situation in South Vietnam and conflicting views between General Collins and the State Department, Secretary Wilson requests the JCS to "reconsider" U.S. military programs in Southeast Asia. Secretary of Defense Memorandum for JCS, 5 January 1955.

The JCS provide additional courses of action in Vietnam to the Secretary of Defense. Specifically, (1) to continue aid; (2) to unilaterally institute an "advisory system"; (3) if (1) and (2) fail, to deploy unilaterally or with SEATO; (4) or to withdraw all U.S. support from South Vietnam and "concentrate on saving the remainder of Southeast Asia." JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 21 January 1955.

General J. Lawton Collins reports on the situation in South Vietnam. The major factors which will affect the outcome of U.S. efforts are: (1) Viet Minh strength and intentions; (2) French attitude and intentions; (3) sects attitudes and intentions; (4) Vietnamese armed forces loyalties; (5) free Vietnam economy, and (6) Diem's popular support. There is no guarantee that Vietnam will remain free with U.S. aid -- but without it, "Vietnam will surely be lost to communism." Memorandum for the National Security Council, 24 January 1955.


The JCS recommend a concept and plans for the implementation, if necessary, of Article IV,1., of the Manila Pact (SEACDT). The primary objective is deterrence of "overt aggression by China or other Communist nations." The concept relies on development of indigenous forces and readiness to retaliate with U.S. power on the aggressor. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 11 February 1955.

This memorandum describes the Department of Defense contribution to and participation in the Bangkok Conference on SEACDT. DOD Memorandum, forwarded 29 March 1955.

The U.S. proposal on elections is based on Eden's plan at Berlin, i.e., Free Vietnam will insist to the Viet Minh that no discussions on the type, issues, or other factors of elections are possible unless the Viet Minh accept the safeguards spelled out. Dulles 4361 to Saigon, 6 April 1955.
241. General Collins submits a seven step recommendation which centers on getting rid of Diem and reorganizing the government structure. Collins 4448 to Dulles, 9 April 1955........ 894

242. Diem exists by reason of U.S. support despite French reluctance. If the French view prevails, "removal of Diem... may well be interpreted in Vietnam and Asia as an example of U.S. paying lip service to nationalist cause, and then forsaking a true nationalist leader when 'colonial interests' put enough pressure on us." Dulles 4438 to Saigon, 9 Apr 55.... 907

243. Bao Dai recommends that the U.S. agree with the French to create a "Supreme Council" or "Council of Elders" to govern in place of Diem. The Binh Xuyen could have been used in the common effort if "Diem had not bungled matters." Bao Dai cannot rule for Diem by decree and considers Diem's strength as a "mockery." Paris 4356 to Dulles, 9 Apr 55..... 910

244. Ely disagrees with the U.S. on maintaining Diem in office. The worsening situation is attributed to Diem by the French and "only by surgery, that is removal of Diem, can the country be saved." Ely feels that if Diem is retained, he could not be the responsible French representative or remain in Saigon. Saigon 4661 to Dulles (Excerpts) 19 Apr 55......................................... 912

245. Diem is seen as a barrier to forming an interim government and the gap between him and other elements in the society is becoming wider. The U.S., however, warns Vietnamese leaders that if Diem is removed as a "sect victory" it would be "difficult to obtain popular support in the U.S. for continuation of U.S. aid." Saigon 4662 to Dulles, 20 Apr 55................................. 915

246. Diem announces to the U.S. his willingness to accept a coalition in the government but on his terms. This uncompromising attitude leads Collins to remark: "I see no alternative to the early replacement of Diem." Saigon 4663 to Dulles, 20 Apr 55................................. 918

247. Conclusions and recommendations are offered as a basis for future Department of Defense positions on the subject of South Vietnam. Key recommendations made are: to determine U.S. military action within the scope of SEACDT to prevent the loss of Southeast Asia as a result of the loss of South Vietnam, and to postpone indefinitely the elections proposed by Geneva Accords for Vietnam. ISA Letter to State Department, 22 Apr 55...... 923

Page XLI TOP SECRET - Sensitive
248. In a debriefing, General Collins is firmly convinced that it will be to the detriment of U.S. interests to continue to support Diem. ISA Memorandum, 25 April 1955. 937

249. The U.S. tentatively proposes to maintain full support to Diem until an alternative supported by Bao Dai is developed. Dulles 4757 to Saigon, 27 April 1955. 941

250. The State Department is being forced to take a strong stand for Diem. Senator Mansfield is a strong backer of Diem and if Diem is forced out, there will be "real difficulties on the Hill." K.T. Young Memorandum for Robertson, 30 April 1955. 945

251. Bao Dai registers strong complaints against U.S. support of Diem. U.S. ineffect which allowed the present civil strife, and against U.S. failure to urge Diem to go to France. Diem, in Bao Dai's opinion, is a "psychopath who wishes to martyrize himself." Paris 4746 to Dulles, 30 April 1955. 948

252. It is predicted that the success of Diem against the Binh Xuyen, Bao Dai, the French and General Vy has created a potentially revolutionary situation in Vietnam and, given U.S. support and French acquiescence, Diem is expected to stabilize the situation in Saigon. SNIE 63.1-2/1-55, 2 May 1955. 955

253. Tripartite discussions again reveal basic disagreement. The French conclude: "Diem is a bad choice...without him some solution might be possible but with him there is none...What would you say if we France were to retire entirely from Indochina..." SECTO 8, 8 May 1955. 959

254. The French are increasingly bitter toward Diem and convinced he must go. Steps are suggested to reconstitute a joint Franco-American approach to the situation. Among these are steps to reduce the French garrison in Saigon, replace Ely, and form a course of action after the crisis is over which persuades Diem to reorganize his government or else get rid of him. Saigon 5074 to Dulles, 8 May 1955. 967

255. The JCS reject both alternatives suggested by Dulles as solutions to the Vietnam problem. The JCS recommend that Dulles be advised that Diem shows the most promise for achieving internal stability, that the U.S. cannot guarantee security of French nationals, and that U.S. actions under SEATO could possibly replace FEC presence. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 9 May 1955. 971
256. A move to deal with Diem to protect French civilians in order to get the French to withdraw "would clearly disengage us from the taint of colonialism..."
   General Bonesteel Memorandum, 9 May 1955

257. The recommendations of the report of the Military Staff Planners Conference, SEACDT and the recommended JCS actions are summarized. The basic report is omitted. See Document 257, page
   JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 2 June 1955

258. The NSC recommends and President Eisenhower approves that NSC recommendations as to U.S. policy on all Vietnam elections are not required and that in the event of renewal of Communist hostilities U.S. policy would be governed by NSC 5429/5. Memorandum for the NSC (NSC 1415), 13 June 1955

259. A summary of those portions of the Report of the Staff Planners Conference which have political significance are forwarded to the Secretary of State. The parts summarized concern terms of reference for military advisors organization to SEACDT, measures for improving defensive effectiveness through mutual aid and self-help, signal communications, and future organizational structure. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 1 July 1955

260. In probable developments before July 1956, North Vietnam (DRV), though confronted by serious economic problems, will consolidate its control north of the 17th parallel. The DRV army has increased in strength but will probably not attack Laos before mid-1956. Tactics are likely to include activation of guerrilla units in South Vietnam and their reinforcement by infiltration from the North. NIE 63.1-55, 19 July 1955

261. The consequences of selected U.S. courses of action are estimated in the event of Viet Minh aggression against South Vietnam. While overt aggression is unlikely, U.S. efforts at undertaking other steps to convince the Viet Minh that aggression will be met with intervention are expected to render overt aggression even less likely. Failure to intervene however, could signal an expanded Communist Chinese effort in Asia. SHIE 63.1-5-55, 13 September 1955
262: The JCS assess the implications of U.S. military operations to repulse and punish overt Viet Minh aggression or to destroy Viet Minh forces and take control of North Vietnam in the event of renewed hostilities. Secretary of Defense Memorandum for NSC, 15 September 1955................................................. 1001

263. The State Department relates the political actions necessary under a deterrent strategy and in a situation of overt Viet Minh aggression. In either situation, the U.S. has to provide substantial economic assistance. State Department Draft Study, 6 October 1955................................................. 1016

264. The Staff Planners conclude that the successful defense of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia is wholly dependent on timely deployment of SEATO forces, an unlikely event, or on the use of nuclear weapons to reduce force requirements. Other conclusions and recommendations are made which deal with overt attacks, combating subversion, logistics, and psychological warfare. SEACDT Military Staff Planners Conference, 16 November 1955................................................. 1020

265. Asian members of SEATO are pressuring for a "permanent SEATO Council and Military Staff organization." The U.S. position to avoid such a commitment is rapidly becoming untenable. The Asian signatories to SEACDT are losing faith in SEATO as a deterrent for communist expansion. ISA Memorandum for Secretary of Navy, 16 December 1955................................................. 1043
266. ISA proposes a letter be sent to Secretary Dulles requesting additional U.S. personnel be sent to Vietnam to protect against vast losses of NDAP equipment and to arrange with the French for implementing the Collins-Ely agreement. Secretary of Defense Letter to Secretary of State, 31 January 1956.  

267. The position of the government of South Vietnam is appreciably stronger than it was a year, or even six months ago. New crises are expected in 1956, in view of the CHICOM request for reconvening Geneva, the absence of election prospects, and increased opposition to Diem. Intelligence Brief No. 1876, 7 February 1956.  

268. The President approves the statement on basic national security policy which has as its objective the preservation of U.S. security. The basic threat is posed by hostile policies and power of the Soviet-Communist Bloc; and the basic problem is to meet and reduce the threat without undermining the fundamental U.S. institutions or economy. NSC 5602/1, 15 March 1956.
WHY THE UNITED STATES ISSUED A UNILATERAL DECLARATION INSTEAD OF SIGNING THE 1954 ACCORDS ON INDOCHINA

Secretary of State Dulles was utterly unwilling to consider signing accords on Indochina of the type concluded at Geneva in 1954. Signing of the Accords, therefore, was never an alternative in his mind, to issuing a unilateral declaration. On the contrary, the unilateral declaration was a substitute, suggested by the desperate French leaders as the most that they could obtain from the United States, for a partial or complete American withdrawal from the Geneva proceedings and for disassociation from the Indochina settlement.

To understand the American position at the time of the Accords, it is necessary to trace the evolution of our policy from the time, in 1953, when Dulles reacted negatively to suggestions for negotiations on the Indochina problem. Dulles told the French at that time that negotiations with no other alternative usually ended in capitulation. Then in 1954, after joining reluctantly in the four-power decision to hold the Geneva talks on Indochina, he pressed hard for action to strengthen the Western hand—above all, for swift establishment of a coalition to meet the Communist threat in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the United States limited its role in the Indochina talks to that of an "interested" nation, as distinct from the role of a belligerent or of a principal in the negotiations, and it determined to dissociate itself from any disadvantageous solution. The United States battled British inclinations to accept a solution involving the partition of Vietnam and, in the instructions to the American Delegate, Under Secretary Walter Bedell Smith, said that it would approve no armistice or other agreement which would have the effect of "subverting the existing lawful governments ... or of permanently impairing their territorial integrity or of placing in jeopardy the forces of the French Union in Indochina." Beyond this, when the Geneva conferes turned to the discussion of control machinery for an Indochina settlement, Dulles rejected the idea of American participation in a guarantee of the settlement because, as he put it, this would commit the United States to sustaining Communist domination of territory and thus would cut across "our basic principles for dealing with the communist world". (This was presumably a reference to the Republican goal of "liberating" the captive nations of Eastern Europe.)
As the Geneva Conference proceeded, however, Secretary Dulles somewhat eased his opposition to a solution involving partition. As early as June 9 he agreed with Smith that the deteriorating military situation might lead to de facto partition, though he wanted the United States to try to avoid being identified with such a result. Later he told Foreign Secretary Eden that it would be difficult for the United States to guarantee a Communist success in north Vietnam or anywhere else but that it could perhaps acquiesce in a settlement which it disliked but would not upset by force. Accordingly, the United States and Britain informed France in a joint message that they would "respect" an armistice agreement meeting seven specified criteria, including the preservation of "at least the southern half of Vietnam, and if possible an enclave in the Delta".

Fearing that a settlement would be reached which did not meet the seven criteria listed in the Anglo-American message, the United States in July contemplated the alternatives of completely withdrawing from the Conference or of participating in lower key and with a lower level of representation (i.e., with Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson as the top American Delegate instead of Under Secretary Smith). Explaining the American position, Dulles told Eden and Mendes-France that the United States could not be put in the position of apparently approving the sale of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia into Communist captivity in a settlement which would be portrayed as a second Yalta. At the same time, he said, the United States did not question France's right to exercise its own judgment and did not wish to put itself in the position of seeming to pass "moral judgment upon French action" or of disassociating itself from the settlement "at a moment and under circumstances which might be unnecessarily dramatic."

Mendes-France, however, fervently urged that Dulles or Smith head the American Delegation even at the risk of having to disavow the settlement. All he asked, he said, was that the United States make a unilateral statement that it would take action if the Communists broke a settlement based on the seven points. Dulles felt that such a statement would pose no problem. He agreed to a Franco-American Position Paper, in which the British concurred, incorporating the understanding that if a settlement were reached which the United States could respect, then the United States would express its position "unilaterally or in association only with non-Communist states". It was on the basis of the understandings in the Position Paper that the United States issued its unilateral declaration on July 21, 1954.

Attached hereto is an Annex which summarizes the six points in the Franco-American Position Paper.

P/HP:ESCotrell:eln 4-14-65
1. France and the Associated States were the countries primarily interested in the Genoa Conference, while the chief interest of the United States was that of a friendly nation which desired to help in arriving at a just settlement.

2. France believed that a settlement based on the seven points, acceptable both to itself and to the Associated States, could be obtained; the United States was prepared to "respect" these terms, but France would neither ask nor expect this Government to respect terms which in its judgment "materially" differed, and the United States might publicly dissociate itself from a different settlement.

3. If the United States could respect a settlement, its position would be expressed "unilaterally or in association only with non-Communist states in terms which apply to the situation the principles of non-use of force ... in Articles 2 (4) and (6) of the Charter of the United Nations."

4. The United States would "seek, with other interested nations, a collective defense association designed to preserve, against direct and indirect aggression, the integrity of the non-Communist areas of Southeast Asia following any settlement."

5. If there were no settlement, the two countries would "consult together on the measures to be taken", and the United States could take the question to the United Nations if it so desired.

6. France reaffirmed the "principle of independence for the Associated States in equal and voluntary association as members of the French Union".
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
   THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
   THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
   THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Possible Use of ROK Forces in Indochina

1. At its meeting on 22 July 1954, the National Security Council (NSC Action No. 1178) adopted the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concurred in by the Secretary of Defense, that the present U. S. policy with respect to the possible use of ROK forces in Indochina (NSC Action No. 1054-b) not be changed at this time, but be kept under review in the light of future developments.

2. The above action, as approved by the President, is transmitted for your general information.

SIGNATURE AUTHENTICATED BY:

LESLIE R. KYLE, 1st Lt, AGC
Correspondence Control Section
Office of the Administrative Secretary

cc: ASD (International Security Affairs) (2)
    Director, Office of Special Operations

Signed

C. E. WILSON
SENT TO: Amembassy LONDON 689 PRIORITY
Rpt Amembassy PARIS 438 PRIORITY

EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

Following is text of statement mentioned in immediately preceding cabled:

QTE French Requests Involving Possible United States Belligerency in Indochina

The United States had made clear that it would take a grave view of open Chinese Communist aggression in Indochina.

[Here come quotes from Eisenhower's speech of April 16, 1953 and Dulles' speech of September 2, 1953]

That latter statement had been made after prior discussion with the French Ambassador in Washington.

However, the foregoing statements, while they were intended to, and did in fact, deter open military aggression by Communist China in Indochina, did not fully meet the French preoccupations, as the situation developed in relation to Dien Bien Phu.

1. On March 23, 1953, General Ely, French Chief-of-Staff, called upon Secretary of State Dulles to express appreciation for the sympathetic
reception which he had had in this country in discussing the military problems of Indochina. In the course of the conversation, General Ely raised specifically the question of whether if MIGs from Communist China were to intervene in the battle of Dien Bien Phu, United States air power would in turn intervene to protect the French aircraft which were supplying Dien Bien Phu and which would be helpless against MIGs. The Secretary of State stated that he could not give, at once a definitive answer to so serious a question. However, he pointed out that before the United States intervened as a belligerent, it would doubtless wish to take into account all relevant factors including the fact that such intervention could not be looked upon as an isolated act. Any such armed intervention would commit the prestige of the United States and would require it to follow through to a military success. This in turn involved political as well as military factors and called for a partnership understanding on the part of those concerned, which among other things should insure the patriotic participation of the local population and their effective military mobilization and training.

General Ely's request was not pursued and there was not, in fact, any air intervention from Communist China.

2. During the night of April 4, 1954, at Paris, the French Prime Minister and French Minister of Foreign Affairs asked United States Ambassador Dillon to meet with them and they expressed to him their opinion that immediate armed intervention at Dien Bien Phu by United States carrier-based aircraft would be
necessary to save that situation.

The United States Ambassador at once reported this opinion to the Department of State and Secretary Dulles immediately replied through the United States Ambassador substantially as follows:

"As I personally explained to General Ely at a conference at which Admiral Radford was present, it would not be possible for the United States to become a belligerent in Indochina without a full political understanding with France and other countries. In addition, it would be necessary that Congress should act. I have confirmed this position with the President. The Executive is prepared to consider united action in Indochina. However, such action is impossible except on a coalition basis which would include active participation of British Commonwealth countries, in view of their great stake in Malaya, Australia, and New Zealand."

3. On April 23, 1954, during the course of a NATO Ministerial Council meeting in Paris, attended by Secretary of State Dulles, the French Foreign Minister showed Secretary Dulles a military report from Indochina which stated that it might be necessary to seek a cease fire unless there were immediate and massive air support by the United States, which it was thought might still save Dien Bien Phu.

The next day, April 24, Secretary Dulles, after consulting on military aspects with Admiral Radford, the United States Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who
was then in Paris, advised the French Foreign Minister substantially as follows:

"We have considered this matter most carefully."

"The situation with regard to our participation is the same as when I spoke with you on April 14. Under the circumstances, we should first need Congressional authorization for any such war action. This cannot be obtained in a matter of hours, nor do I think it can be obtained at all unless it is within the framework of a political understanding which would include other nations directly and vitally interested in Southeast Asia.

"I may add that I have received military advice which indicates that at this stage even a massive air attack will not assure the lifting of the siege of Dien Bien Phu."

The foregoing are the three occasions when French officials suggested United States armed intervention in Indochina.

United States Parallel Efforts for "United Action"

During this March-June 1954 period, the United States was seeking to develop the possibilities of collective action in the Southeast Asia area, on a basis which would fairly reflect the free world interests which were involved.

Here come quotes from public speeches:

intensification

With the intensification of the Communist effort following the Berlin decision of February 18, 1954, it seemed to the United States more than ever important to develop a united front as a counterweight to the probability of intensified effort.
of the Communist Vietminh, and increased material support to them from Communist China.

The following are steps by the United States in pursuance of this policy:

1. On March 23, 1954, Secretary Dulles met with the House Foreign Affairs Committee and discussed the desirability of publicly calling for united action in the Southeast Asia area. He invited and received suggestions from the Committee members in this respect. Thereupon, under the direction of the President, he drafted a statement on this subject which he then discussed with various Senators of both Parties. He then showed the proposed draft to the Ambassadors of certain other countries principally involved and learned that their governments, without committal, saw no objection to the proposed statement. The statement was then incorporated in a speech in New York on March 29. In that speech the Secretary of State reviewed the threatening situation in Indochina and noted the steps which the United States had taken to assist in the situation. He cited the President's view (April 16, 1953) that the Korean armistice would be a fraud if it merely released aggressive armies for attack elsewhere and recalled his statement (September 2, 1953) "that if Red China sent its own army into Indochina that would result in grave consequences which might not be confined to Indochina." The Secretary went on to say that

"Under the conditions of today the imposition of Southeast Asia of the political system of Communist Russia and its Chinese Communist
ally, by whatever means, would be a grave threat to the whole of the free community. The United States feels that that possibility should not be passively accepted, but should be met by united action. This might involve serious risks. But these risks are far less than those which will face us a few years from now, if we dare not be resolute today."

2. Upon his return from New York, the Secretary of State thereupon conferred further and on a broader basis with Ambassadors of countries which might be interested in "united action" to save Southeast Asia from Communist domination.
3. On April 3, 1954, the Secretary of State and Admiral Radford met with a group of Congressional leaders to review the situation in Indochina and the possible course of United States action with respect to it. It was the sense of the meeting that the United States should not intervene alone but should attempt to secure the cooperation of other free nations concerned in Southeast Asia, and that if such cooperation could be assured, it was probable that the United States Congress would authorize United States participation in such "united action."

4. On April 4, 1954, the President met during the evening at the White House with a group of his advisers, following which communication was made to the Governments of the United Kingdom and of France inviting their prompt cooperation in organizing "united action" in relation to Indochina and Southeast Asia. This led to invitations from the British and French Governments to Secretary of State Dulles to come personally to London and Paris respectively to discuss the matter.

5. Between April 4 to 9, 1954, the Secretary of State and other high State Department officers consulted in Washington with the diplomatic representatives of Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Other Asia governments were kept informed.

The Governments of Thailand and of the Philippines promptly indicated their willingness to join in united action in Indochina and other Ambassadors...
6. On April 10, 1954, Secretary of State Dulles left for London and Paris for direct personal discussions with the British and French Governments. On April 13, 1954, at London, after conferences with Mr. Anthony Eden, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and with Prime Minister Churchill, Secretary Dulles and Mr. Eden issued a joint statement which said:

"Accordingly, we are ready to take part, with the other countries principally concerned, in an examination of the possibility of establishing a collective defense within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, to assure the peace, security and freedom of Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific.

"It is our hope that the Geneva Conference will lead to the restoration of peace in Indochina. We believe that the prospect of establishing a unity of defensive purpose throughout Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific will contribute to an honorable peace in Indochina."

7. On April 13 Secretary Dulles went to Paris and after discussions during that day and the next with the French President of the Council and with the French Foreign Minister, a joint statement was issued which said among other things:
Conference in relation to Indochina were clearer.

should be taken to organize "mutual action" until the outcome of the Geneva

the United States and to the House of Commons. It is clear that no concrete steps

E. Escalation. The Government of the United Kingdom expected to

with the British Government felt that it was premature to hold such a meeting.

however, the British Ambassador informed the Secretary of State

secure the peace, security and freedom of Southeast Asia and the Western

the collective defense within the framework of the UN, while Vietnam, Thailand, and the

Proposed that the diplomatic representatives of Laos, Cambodia, the

B. Following the return of Secretary of State Dulles to the United States,

Australasia, East Pakistan, Laos, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and

in the presence of key, in pursuance of the understanding at the Foreign

essence the peace, security and freedom of this area.

Within the framework of the United Nations Charter, a collective defense in

with other interested nations, we will examine the possibility of establishing

the entire area of Southeast Asia and of the Western Pacific. In close association

enhances the security of the United States immediately affected, also enhances

We recognize that the purpose of the war in Indochina, which
11. On May 8, 1954, the Geneva Conference held its first plenary session on Indochina.

12. At this point, the French Government indicated that it would like to discuss comprehensively with the United States Government the political and military conditions which would enable the United States to intervene militarily in Indochina. The French Government was thereupon promptly advised through the United States Ambassador in Paris (May 11, 1954) that the President would be disposed to ask Congress for authority to use the armed forces of the United States in the area to support friendly and recognized governments against aggression or armed subversion promoted from without, provided certain conditions were met. The conditions then defined were subsequently summarized by Secretary Dulles in his June 11, 1954, address at Los Angeles as follows:

"(1) an invitation from the present lawful authorities; (2) clear assurances of complete independence to Laos, Cambodia, and Viet-Nam; (3) evidence of concern by the United Nations; (4) a joining in the collective effort of some of the other nations of the area; and (5) assurance that France will not itself withdraw from the battle until it is won."

With reference to (5), the precise United States suggestion was that the French Government should not withdraw its forces during the period of the "united action", so that the forces from the United States -- which it
was then thought would be principally but not exclusively air and sea forces --
and forces from other participating countries, would be supplementary to, and
not in substitution for, the existing forces in the area.

13. On the basis of the foregoing, there occurred discussions at Paris;
as to which other interested governments were kept generally informed by the
United States.

14. The possibility of "united action" in the fighting in Indochina lapsed
with the June 20, 1954, decision of the French Government to obtain a cease-
fire in Indochina, a result which was arrived at by the Geneva Conference
agreements of July 20; 21, 1954. UNQTE

(EEFVEDDAMCRRX)

[Signature]

[Tuelles]

[Signature]

[Belles]
SECRET

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NIE 63-5-54

POST-GENEVA OUTLOOK IN INDOCHINA

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff

Concorded in by the INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE on 3 August 1954. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; The Director of Intelligence, AEC, and the Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
POST-GENEVA OUTLOOK IN INDOCHINA

THE PROBLEM

To assess the probable outlook in Indochina in the light of the agreements reached at the Geneva conference.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The signing of the agreements at Geneva has accorded international recognition to Communist military and political power in Indochina and has given that power a defined geographic base.

2. We believe that the Communists will not give up their objective of securing control of all Indochina but will, without violating the armistice to the extent of launching an armed invasion to the south or west, pursue their objective by political, psychological, and paramilitary means.

3. We believe the Communists will consolidate control over North Vietnam with little difficulty. Present indications are that the Viet Minh will pursue a moderate political program, which together with its strong military posture, will be calculated to make that regime appeal to the nationalist feelings of the Vietnamese population generally. It is possible, however, that the Viet Minh may find it desirable or necessary to adopt a strongly repressive domestic program which would diminish its appeal in South Vietnam. In any event, from its new territorial base, the Viet Minh will intensify Communist activities throughout Indochina.

4. Although it is possible that the French and Vietnamese, even with firm support from the US and other powers, may be able to establish a strong regime in South Vietnam, we believe that the chances for this development are poor and, moreover, that the situation is more likely to continue to deteriorate progressively over the next year. It is even possible that, at some time during the next two years, the South Vietnam Government could be taken over by elements that would seek unification with the North even at the expense of Communist domination. If the scheduled national elections are held in July 1956, and if the Viet Minh does not prejudice its political prospects, the Viet Minh will almost certainly win.

5. The ability of the Laotian Government to retain control in Laos will depend upon developments in South Vietnam, and upon the receipt of French military and other assistance. Even with such assistance, however, Laos will be faced by a growing Communist threat which might result in the overthrow of the present government through subversion or elections, and in any case would be greatly intensified if all
Vietnam were to fall under Communist control.

6. We believe that if adequate outside assistance is made available, the Cambodian Government will probably increase its effectiveness and the effectiveness of its internal security forces and will be able to suppress Communist guerrilla activity and to counter Communist political activity. The situation in Cambodia would probably deteriorate, however, if a Communist government should emerge in Laos or South Vietnam.

DISCUSSION

1. THE CURRENT SITUATION

General

7. The signing of the agreements at Geneva has ended large-scale warfare in Indochina and has affirmed the independence of Laos and Cambodia. It has, on the other hand, accorded international recognition to Communist military and political power in Indochina and has given that power a defined geographic base. Finally, the agreements have dealt a blow to the prestige of the Western Powers and particularly of France.

North Vietnam

8. The Viet Minh has emerged from Geneva with international recognition and with greatly enhanced power and prestige in Indochina. The Viet Minh leaders, while admitting that their ultimate objectives may have been temporarily compromised “for the sake of peace,” are acclaiming the agreements as denoting a major victory and ensuring the eventual reunification of all Vietnam under Communist aegis. Ho Chi-Minh is generally regarded as the man who liberated Tonkin from 70 years of French rule. The Viet Minh has initiated a program to absorb presently French-controlled areas in the Tonkin Delta.

South Vietnam

9. In South Vietnam, the agreements and the fact of the imposed partition have engendered an atmosphere of frustration and disillusionment, which has been compounded by widespread uncertainty as to French and US intentions. The present political leadership appears to retain the passive support of the more important nationalist organizations and individuals. However, the government’s already weak administrative base has been further dislocated, and it has only uncertain assurances of continued outside military and financial support. Mutual jealousies and a lack of a single policy continue to divide Vietnamese politicians. Moreover, certain pro-French elements are seeking the overthrow of the Diem government with the apparent support of French colonial interests anxious to retain their control.

10. The North Vietnam population is somewhat greater than the South Vietnam population and, in any event, the loss of the Tonkin Delta has deprived South Vietnam of the most energetic and nationalist segment of the population. Although South Vietnam has the capability for agricultural self-sufficiency, the principal industrial establishments and fuel and mineral resources are located in North Vietnam.

11. Provided that the terms of the cease-fire agreement are observed, the combined French-Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam now have the capability of maintaining internal security.

Laos

12. The relatively stable internal situation in Laos, which in the past has depended upon French support, remains essentially unchanged. The Laotian Army is poorly armed and trained and, without the support of French forces and advisers, does not have the capability to maintain internal security. Moreover, “Pathet Lao” Communists continue to have de facto control of two northern
provinces adjoining the Communist-controlled areas of Northern Vietnam. Furthermore, the Geneva agreements give members of the "Pathet Lao" movement freedom of political action throughout Laos.

Cambodia

13. The internal Cambodian situation, except for sharp political rivalries among leading Cambodians, is at present relatively stable. Non-Communist dissidence appears to have abated and the principal dissident leader, Son Ngoc Thanh, no longer poses any real threat to the government. The King retains widespread popular support for having obtained a large degree of effective independence from the French and for having safeguarded Cambodia's integrity at Geneva. Although the Communists are permitted freedom of political action in Cambodia, they have only a minimum appeal. The Cambodian forces, although somewhat weakened by the withdrawal of French forces, have the capability of dealing with current Communist subversive action.

II. OUTLOOK IN INDOCHINA

General Considerations

14. The Geneva agreements, although precise and detailed concerning the time and place of troop redeployments and related matters, are imprecise about matters pertaining to future military aid and training. Moreover, the agreements are vague with respect to political matters. Details on the implementation of national elections are left for the interested parties to determine. Except for such influence as may be exerted by the presence of supervisory teams from India, Canada, and Poland, there is no provision for forcing the parties concerned to implement or adhere to the agreements.

15. The course of future developments will be determined less by the Geneva agreements than by the relative capabilities and actions of the Communist and non-Communist entities in Indochina, and of interested outside powers.

16. Communist policy. Communist willingness to reach agreement for an armistice in Indochina, at a time when prolongation of the conflict could have produced a steadily deteriorating situation in Indochina, was probably derived in substantial part from the Communist estimate that: (a) an effort to win a total military victory in Indochina might precipitate US military intervention, and (b) the objective of gaining political control over all Indochina could be achieved as a result of the armistice agreement. The Communists also apparently believed that an attitude of "reasonableness" and the acceptance of an armistice in Indochina would contribute to the realization of their objective to undermine western efforts to develop an effective military coalition. They probably consider, therefore, that a deliberate resumption of large-scale military operations from their zone in the north would negate the political and psychological advantages the Communists have gained by negotiating a settlement and could involve grave risk of expanded war.

17. In the light of these considerations, we believe that the broad outlines of Communist policy in Indochina will be to: (a) refrain from deliberately taking major military action to break the armistice agreement while seeking to gain every advantage in the implementation of the agreements; (b) consolidate the Communist political, military, and economic position in North Vietnam; (c) conduct intensive political warfare against non-Communist Indochinese governments and people; (d) work for the ultimate removal of all Western influence, particularly French and US, from Indochina; and (e) emphasize and exploit issues in Indochina which will create and intensify divisions among non-Communist countries. In sum, we believe that the Communists will not give up their objective of securing control of all Indochina but will, without violating the armistice to the extent of launching an armed invasion to the south or west, pursue their objective by political, psychological, and paramilitary means.

18. French policy. It is impossible at this time to predict even the broad outlines of French policy in Indochina. The following appear to be the main alternatives:
a. Grant of complete political independence to the Indochina states, accompanied by an attempt to organize strong political regimes in those states. We believe that the French might be persuaded to adopt this policy by strong US–UK pressure, together with economic and military assistance to France and a guarantee of the defense of the free areas of Indochina against further Communist military attack.

b. Continuation of French Union ties with the non-Communist Indochinese states, with indirect French political controls and French economic domination. We believe that French policy may proceed along these lines if the French estimate that: (1) the Communists will follow a conciliatory policy in Indochina; (2) the non-Communist leadership will offer very little difficulty; and (3) the US and UK will not exert pressure toward a grant of full independence to the Indochinese states.

c. Some form of agreement with the Viet Minh providing for expediting elections and achieving a unification of Vietnam. The French might be inclined to follow this line if the Viet Minh held out promises of the maintenance of French economic and cultural interests, and of the continuance of some form of association of the unified Vietnamese state with France.

d. Withdrawal of all French military, administrative, and economic support from Indochina. We believe that this would occur only in the event of a hopeless deterioration of political, military, and economic conditions in the area.

19. International policies. The political survival of the Indochinese states is endangered not only by the threat of external Communist attack and internal Communist subversion, but also by their own inherent inexperience, immaturity, and weakness. We believe that without outside support the Indochinese states cannot become strong enough to withstand Communist pressures. The course of developments in Indochina will be largely influenced by the attitudes and policies of other powers. In general, we believe that in the absence of firm support from the US, the non-Communist states of Indochina cannot long remain non-Communist. If they are given opportunity, guidance, and material help in building national states, they may be able to attain viability. We believe that the energy and resourcefulness necessary for this achievement will not arise spontaneously among the non-Communist Indochinese but will have to be sponsored and nurtured from without.

Outlook in Indochina

20. Outlook in North Vietnam. Communist activities in North Vietnam will be concentrated upon consolidation of Communist control, with their efforts in this respect probably appearing moderate at the outset. The Viet Minh will probably emphasize social and economic reforms and the participation of all political, economic, and religious groups in state activity. At the same time, Viet Minh cadres will establish themselves throughout the Delta, will begin the process of neutralizing all effective opposition groups, will undertake the usual Communist program of popular indoctrination, and will prepare for the election scheduled in July 1956. We believe the Communists will be able to achieve the consolidation of North Vietnam with little difficulty.

21. We believe that the Viet Minh will continue to develop their armed forces. Although the armistice provisions forbid the Viet Minh from increasing their supply of arms, we believe they will covertly strengthen and possibly expand their armed forces with Chinese Communist aid. Viet Minh forces will almost certainly continue to receive training in China.

22. Thus established firmly in North Vietnam, the Viet Minh regime will probably retain and may increase its symbolic attraction as the base of Vietnamese national independence. Its methods of consolidating control will probably continue for some time to be moderate, and, its internal program together with its military power, will be calculated to make the regime attractive to the remaining peoples of Indochina. It is possible, however, that the Viet Minh may find it desirable or necessary...
to adopt a strongly repressive domestic program which would prejudice its psychological appeal and political prospects. Barring such repressive Viet Minh policies, the unification issue will continue to be exploited to Communist advantage throughout Vietnam. Meanwhile, the Viet Minh regime will continue to strengthen the Communist underground apparatus in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, aware that significant Communist gains in any one of these countries will strengthen the Communist movement in the others. It will seek to develop strong overt Communist political groups where possible and will generally use all available means towards the eventual unification of the country under Communist control.

23. Outlook in South Vietnam. We believe that the Viet Minh will seek to retain sizeable military and political assets in South Vietnam. Although the agreements provide for the removal to the north of all Viet Minh forces, many of the regular and irregular Viet Minh soldiers now in the south are natives of the area, and large numbers of them will probably cache their arms and remain in South Vietnam. In addition, Viet Minh administrative cadres have been in firm control of several large areas in central and south Vietnam for several years. These cadres will probably remain in place. French and Vietnamese efforts to deal with "stay-behind" military and administrative units and personnel will be greatly hampered by armistice provisions guaranteeing the security of pre-armistice dissidents from reprisals.

24. The severe problem of establishing and maintaining security in South Vietnam will probably be increased by certain provisions of the Geneva agreements which prohibit the import of arms and military equipment, except as replacements, and the introduction of additional foreign military personnel, the establishment of new military bases, and military alliances. These provisions limit the development of a Vietnamese national army to such numbers as may be equipped by stocks evacuated from Tonkin, plus stocks now held in Saigon. However, in the last analysis, Vietnamese security will be determined by the degree of French protection and assistance in the development of a national army, the energy with which the Vietnamese themselves attack the problem, and by the will of the non-Communist powers to provide South Vietnam with effective guarantees.

25. In addition to the activities of stay-behind military and administrative groups, the Viet Minh will make a major effort to discredit any South Vietnam administration, and to exacerbate French-Vietnamese relations, and appeal to the feeling for national unification which will almost certainly continue strong among the South Vietnamese population. The Communist goal will be to cause the collapse of any non-Communist efforts to stabilize the situation in South Vietnam, and thus to leave North Vietnam the only visible foundation on which to re-establish Vietnamese unity. French and anti-Communist Vietnamese efforts to counter the Viet Minh unity appeal and Communist subversive activities will be complicated at the outset by the strong resentment of Vietnamese nationalists over the partitioning of Vietnam and the abandoning of Tonkin to Communist control. It may be difficult to convince many Vietnamese troops, political leaders, and administrative personnel in Tonkin to go south, let alone to assist actively in the development of an effective administration in South Vietnam.

26. Developments in South Vietnam will also depend in large part on French courses of action. Prospects for stability in South Vietnam would be considerably enhanced if the French acted swiftly to insure Vietnam full independence and to encourage strong nationalist leadership. If this were done, anti-French nationalist activity might be lessened. With French military and economic assistance — backed by US aid — the Vietnamese could proceed to develop gradually an effective security force, local government organization, and a long-range program for economic and social reform. Nevertheless, it will be very difficult for the French to furnish the degree of assistance which will be required without at the same time reviving anti-French feeling to the point of endangering the whole effort.
SECRET

27. On the basis of the evidence we have at this early date, however, we believe that a favorable development of the situation in South Vietnam is unlikely. Unless Mendés-France is able to overcome the force of French traditional interests and emotions which have in the past governed the implementation of policy in Indochina, we do not believe there will be the dramatic transformation in French policy necessary to win the active loyalty and support of the local population for a South Vietnam Government. At the present time, it appears more likely that the situation will deteriorate in South Vietnam and that the withdrawal from Tonkin will involve recriminations, distrust, and possibly violence. There will be delays in the development of effective administration in the south; the French military will probably be forced to retain a large measure of control for reasons of "security"; and efforts by French colonial interests to develop a puppet Cochinchina state will persist. It is even possible that at some point, during the next two years the South Vietnam Government could be taken over by elements that would seek unification with the Viet Minh in the North even at the expense of Communist domination. Even if "If the scheduled national elections are held in July 1956, and if the Viet Minh does not prejudice its political prospects, the Viet Minh will almost certainly win,"

28. In the interim, Viet Minh propaganda will find ample opportunities to influence Vietnamese attitudes. Within a year, Viet Minh stay-behind units will probably be active politically, and possibly involved in open guerrilla fighting. In these circumstances, the French will probably be able to maintain their "presence" in South Vietnam through mid-1956, but their influence will probably become increasingly restricted to major cities and the perimeters of military installations and bases. The French might be willing to resolve this situation by an arrangement with the Communists which seemed to offer a chance of saving some remnant of the French economic and cultural position in Vietnam. Such an arrangement might include an agreement to hold early elections, even with the virtual certainty of Viet Minh victory. Only if such an arrangement proved impossible, and the situation deteriorated to the point of hopelessness, would the French withdraw completely from the country.

Outlook in Laos

29. Providing the French maintain the 5,000 troops in Laos which the Geneva agreements permit them, and continue to develop the Laotian forces, the Royal Laotian Government should be able to improve its security forces and, excluding the two northern provinces, to deal with isolated, small-scale Communist guerrilla actions. Also, providing the Laotians continue to receive French and US technical and financial assistance, they probably will be able to maintain an adequate government administration. There is nothing in the Geneva agreements to prevent Laos from becoming a member of a defense arrangement so long as no foreign troops other than specified French personnel are based in Laos.

30. However, if the French for any reason decide not to maintain their troops nor to continue military training in Laos, it will be impossible for the non-Communist powers to provide effective aid to the Laotians without altering the Geneva agreement. At the same time, Laos will be faced with a growing Lao movement, strengthened by support from the Viet Minh, may result in the overthrow of the present government through subversion or elections. Finally, further successes for the Viet Minh in Vietnam will have an immediate adverse effect on the situation in Laos.

Outlook in Cambodia

31. We believe that the Communists, in withdrawing organized units from Cambodia, will leave behind organizers, guerrilla leaders, and weapons. Initially, the Communists will probably minimize guerrilla action in order to concentrate on building their political potential in Cambodia.

32. Providing the withdrawal of the Communists is substantially in accord with the agree-
ment, the development of stability in Cambodia during the next year or so will depend largely on two interrelated factors: (a) the ability of the Cambodians to develop effective government and internal security forces; and (b) the ability of the Cambodians to obtain external technical and financial assistance. There is no prohibition in the Geneva agreements against Cambodia's obtaining outside assistance to develop its defense forces or on joining a defensive alliance, providing the latter is in consonance with the UN Charter and that no foreign troops are based in Cambodia in the absence of a threat to Cambodian security. If adequate outside assistance is made available, the Cambodians will probably increase the effectiveness both of their government and their internal security forces, and will be able to suppress Communist guerrilla activity and to counter Communist political activity. The efforts of the Cambodians to strengthen their position would probably be more energetic if their independence were guaranteed by some regional defense arrangement. The situation in Cambodia would deteriorate gravely, however, if a Communist government should emerge in Laos or South Vietnam.
During weekend conversation with La Chambre, I had opportunity for full and frank discussion regarding his views of Diem government. La Chambre feels future Vietnamese Government must:


2. Be prepared to initiate and carry out agricultural reform (redistribution of land) very promptly, and

3. Be prepared to depose Bao Dai and create a republic when appropriate during coming months. He feels that Diem government does not (repeat not) qualify on any of these three points but also feels that Diem is valuable for his high moral character and should definitely be a member of any future Vietnamese Government if Diem should be successful in making his peace with the sects in the south and should obtain their support. La Chambre said there would be no (repeat no) objection to his staying on as Prime Minister, provided he would also act on points 2 and 3 above. La Chambre said his information was that Diem would not (repeat not) be able to obtain the cooperation and support of the populace of South Vietnam, and that, because of his Mandarin background, would oppose both agricultural reform and the deposition of Bao Dai. Therefore, La Chambre feels that a new government will be required if there is to be any chance of winning the coming election. La Chambre said that he favored Tan as the head of the new government and hoped that Diem would stay on as Minister of the Interior to control the police or as Minister of Defense. La Chambre also hopes that Bui Loc will join the new government as he would be helpful when the time came to depose Bao Dai.

Regarding timing, there apparently is nothing immediate in the air. La Chambre plans to spend September in Indochina and wants to look situation over there before any action is taken.

La Chambre feels Diem will be helpful during evacuation of the north and will help to get refugees to move to the south. My own guess is that there will be no (repeat no) change until November at the earliest. I also assume that if change is decided
INCOMING TELEGRAM

TOP SECRET

-2- 481, August 4, noon, from Paris ON 1346.

upon at that time it will be effectuated by Bao Dai. La Chambre specifically said that there could be no (repeat no) action on the deposition of Bao Dai until a broadly based government supported by all factions had been established in Southern Vietnam.

DILLON

MAM: HER/5
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: U.S. Assumption of Training Responsibilities in Indochina

1. It has been recommended by the Chief MAAG Indochina that the United States assume responsibility for the training of the Vietnamese Army. There are indications that both the Vietnamese and the Cambodian governments may request that the United States assume responsibility for training their forces as part of any U.S. effort to check further expansion of Communist influence in Indochina.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered this question and recommend that before the United States assumes responsibility for training the forces of any of the Associated States certain preconditions which are essential to the success of this effort be met. They include the following:

a. From the military point of view it is absolutely essential that there be a reasonably strong, stable civil government in control. It is hopeless to expect a U.S. military training mission to achieve success unless the nation concerned is able effectively to perform those governmental functions essential to the successful raising and maintenance of armed forces, to include the provision of adequate facilities, drafting and processing of personnel, pay of troops, etc. Unless the foregoing conditions prevail, a U.S. training mission would lack the authority and governmental support essential to the successful accomplishment of its mission.

b. The government of each of the Associated States concerned should formally request that the United States assume responsibility for training their forces and providing the military equipment, financial assistance, and political advice necessary to insure internal stability.

c. Arrangements should be made with the French granting full independence to the Associated States and providing for the phased, orderly withdrawal of French
forces, French officials, and French advisors from
Indochina in order to provide motivation and a sound
basis for the establishment of national armed forces.
The United States from the beginning should insist on
dealing directly with the governments of the respective
Associated States, completely independent of French
participation or control.

d. The size and composition of the forces of each
of the Associated States should be dictated by the
local military requirements and the over-all U.S.
interests.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you approve
the foregoing position, and inform the Department of State
of the views of the Department of Defense concerning the
assumption by the United States of training responsibilities
in Indochina.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

N. P. WILKING
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force.
Have prepared study here our point of view US part future Vietnam including estimate situation and concept operation in substance following:

Mission: Establish political psychological, military, economic courses action for adoption by US to insure Free Vietnam survival as nation. Develop Vietnam as effective barrier continued Communist expansion as nation.

Concept operation depends fulfilling following primary conditions:

- Financial material and personnel support by US as required; successful execution this program and open cooperation French Government; Vietnamese acceptance US assistance; active support US program within Free Vietnam means.

With indispensable support defined above, concept embrace US advisors and operation agencies assist Free Vietnam all echelons and in all functional activities. Generally, every key Free Vietnam official and government agency will alongside one or more US specialists for steering in discharge responsibilities, all with French concurrence.

MSC establish national policies, et cetera, US Embassy Saigon implementing agency through country team, US Embassy Saigon, GHQ under command of Ambassador for direction activities required under this plan. Following tasks be accomplished:

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

-2- MG 3024 A, August 8 (Army Message), from Saigon.

US political psychological actions re SE Asia produce strong positive support from nations having primary interest SE Asia. Develop strong democratic state oriented toward West. By persuading Government Vietnam to announce complete independence, and for French to announce date of withdrawal of French forces and date Vietnam becomes entirely free. Detailed implementation above included in plan.

B. Military establish sound realistic modern system national military service. Specialists from US selective service employed this effort. Evaluate and establish sound personal policies. Establish national intelligence agency and other intelligence programs all fields. Study and reorganize Defense Ministry and Armed Forces. Establish for each military service streamlined and highly effective training organization to include staff training and field training agencies, develop division training camps, RTC, et cetera. Logistics development. Signal development. Budget and fiscal development. Develop independent Vietnam army of divisional-sized units.

C. Naval and air establish sound economic program to provide for realistic development resources including rebuilding railroads, developing highway system, agrarian reforms, housing construction, schools, development sanitation and hygiene.

We believe such plan last resort solution on salvaging remaining Vietnam and offer it for consideration in formulation US policy for SE Asia. Ambassador concurs. Ambassador generally concurs with objectives above outline and with my analysis situation. He approves entire report as a timely, useful initial plan, although he has reservation as to some of methods proposed, as he doubts necessity of US to become quite so far involved in operation of this government except on military training side. Comment: I feel this is war in every sense. Wartime methods, therefore, are in order all fields until emergency passed.

SMS:BD
New information which has just come to my attention makes me feel that it is imperative to obtain concurrence or acquiescence of Schumann and Bidault prior to publication of statement on Indochina. When Joyce showed proposed statement to Margerie, Margerie commented that the record seemed to be accurate as far as it went but that it omitted all mention of your offer of atomic bombs to Bidault. He said you had made this offer to Bidault during a private conversation which took place during an intermission of one of the formal talks at the Quai d'Orsay, which were held during your visit here on route to Geneva.

Joyce asked Margerie if this "offer" was not perhaps merely a speculation as to whether atomic bombs could be useful at Dien Bien Phu. Margerie said "No". He further said that Bidault told him and La Tournelle about your offer immediately after he finished talking with you and that Bidault had the distinct impression that you were suggesting the use of atomic bombs which were to be given by the US to the French. According to Margerie Bidault was much upset about this offer and felt that the use of atomic bombs would have done no good tactically and would have lost all support for the West throughout Asia. Our judgment is that Margerie fears that if Bidault should feel that publication of the statement as drafted placed him in unfavorable light and indicated that he favored continuation of the fighting and was not doing his best to obtain a settlement, he might respond by publicizing his version of the conversation regarding atom bombs and might attempt to take credit for having prevented their use after it had been suggested by us. I would hope to avoid any such eventuality by prior clearance of statement with Schumann and Bidault.

I do not believe that Bidault would resort to any such irresponsible tactic which would damage interests of free world and prestige of US but we must nevertheless bear in mind that he is ill, nervous hypersensitive and bitter.
EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

Am totally mystified by your 558. Have no recollection whatever of alleged offer, our notes of conversation do not reflect mention of subject, and it is incredible that I should have made offer since the law categorically forbids it as was indeed well known not only to me but to Bidault because it had been discussed at NATO meetings.

I recall that at the restricted NATO meeting on 23 April 1954 I made a statement on U.S. policy concerning use of atomic weapons, in the course of which among other things I said QTE Such weapons must now be treated as fact having become conventional UNQTE. I am wondering whether what Bidault reported was not in fact what I had said at the restricted NATO Council meeting.

See no objection to your showing statement confidentially to Schumann but we must not get maneuvered into a position where the President and I cannot respond to a Congressional request unless this is also approved by foreign governments.

Under the parliamentary system, both British and French Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers are subjected to interrogations by Parliament.

S JFDulles:ma

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

S JFDulles
and make answers to questions. What we propose here is our counterpart of that system. We naturally want to act with courtesy and consideration and avoid public controversy but we must not give others veto power over our relations with Congress and the public.

DULLES
TO: Secretary of State

No: 576, August 10, 7 p.m.

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY SECRETARY.

At my direction, Joyce saw Margerie today and conveyed to him substance of first two paragraphs of DEPTEL 501. He also told Margerie that he felt it was obvious that there had been a complete misunderstanding by Bidault, possibly based on language difficulties.

Margerie said that he fully agreed that there must have been such a misunderstanding. He added that he remembered April 23 very well because on that day Bidault had been ill, jittery, overwrought, and at his very worst. Margerie added that on that day Bidault had been "incoherent" to members of his own top staff. Therefore, he very readily understood how such a misunderstanding could have come about on that particular day.

Margerie said that he was very grateful that this subject had been cleared up and hoped that knowledge of this misunderstanding would be kept strictly limited. He said that he would undertake to see Bidault personally and straighten him out on this subject.

I remember Bidault's condition on that day very well myself and I am sure that it is the complete explanation for his otherwise incomprehensible misunderstanding.

I hope to be able to show statement to Schumann tomorrow. I will emphasize to him that this is being done merely as a courtesy.

In view of tense parliamentary situation here, I thoroughly agree with Parodi and Margerie that publication of statement should be postponed until after EOC debate.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Review of U.S. Policy in the Far East - NSC 5429

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their views with respect to a draft statement of policy prepared by the National Security Council Planning Board titled "Review of U.S. Policy in the Far East" (NSC 5429), which is scheduled for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on 12 August 1954.

2. In their memorandum for you dated 9 April 1954, subject "U.S. Strategy for Developing a Position of Military Strength in the Far East (NSC Action No. 1029-b)", the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the United States formulate a comprehensive policy in which the Far East is viewed as a strategic entity and which would provide definitive direction for the development of a position of military strength in the Far East. NSC 5429 lacks a statement of United States objectives with respect to the area as a whole and broad courses of action for the achievement of such objectives, and hence does not constitute a comprehensive statement of policy as envisaged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that NSC 5429 be returned to the Planning Board with appropriate guidance for derivation and exposition of U.S. objectives in the Far East and delineation of broad courses of action directed toward their attainment.

4. Specific comments of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force and the Commandant of the Marine Corps on the material included in NSC 5429 follow:

   "a. We concur in the view of the Defense, JCS, and OIM Members of the Planning Board, contained in the footnote on page 3 of the draft, that U.S. policy with regard to China should be considered and determined first, and that the policy with regard to the peripheral areas should be established in light of this determination."
We recommend, therefore, that when NSC 5429 is prepared in final form, Section IV, COMMUNIST CHINA, be brought forward and redesignated Section I. However, for convenient reference, we have addressed our comments to the sections of the paper in their present order.

"b. The following detailed comments are addressed to the bracketed phrases and alternative courses of action set forth in the draft statement of policy, as well as to amendments and additions which are deemed desirable. (Changes are indicated in the usual manner.)

"(1) Page 3, subparagraph 1 c and page 4, paragraph 5. No preference is expressed with respect to including or omitting the bracketed phraseology.

"(2) Page 5, subparagraph 7 a. Alternative A is favored.

REASON: It is considered that the treaty should provide for the prompt and positive application of retaliatory measures against Communist China if it is determined that Communist China is a source of armed aggression, either direct or indirect. Any more limited provision would not constitute an adequate response to the aggression.

"(3) Page 6, paragraph 8. Alternative B is considered preferable.

"(4) Page 7, subparagraph 9 f. Amend to read as follows:

'f. Continue to exploit opportunities to further U.S. long-range objectives toward uniting Vietnam under a democratic form of government.'

"(5) Page 7, subparagraph 9 g. Delete both alternatives.

REASON: In light of subparagraph 9 f, a further statement on this subject is considered unnecessary.

"(6) Page 8, subparagraph 10 d. Stationing of token forces in or around Thailand is not favored. Accordingly it is recommended that Alternative B be rejected. While there is no objection to Alternative A, the necessity for its inclusion in a statement of policy with respect to Thailand is not apparent, since the visits of United States forces to friendly countries is a routine and well-established custom.

"(7) Pages 9 through 11, paragraphs 12, 13, 14, and 15. Among the four statements of alternative courses of action with respect to Communist China adoption of Alternative C (paragraph 14), amended to read as follows, is favored:
14. Reduce the relative power of Communist China in Asia even at the risk of, but without deliberately provoking, war:

'a. (1) React with force, if necessary and advantageous, to expansion and subversion recognizable as such, supported and supplied by Communist China.

'(2) React with immediate, positive, armed force against any belligerent move by Communist China.

'b. Increase efforts to develop the political, economic and military strength of non-Communist Asian countries, including the progressive development of the military strength of Japan, to the point where she can provide for her own national defense and, in time, contribute to the collective defense of the Far East.

'c, d, and e. Same as 13 c, d, and e.'

REASONS: (1) Alternatives A and B would provide that the United States resort to armed action only in the event that Communist China itself committed armed aggression. Such a policy would be inadequate to cope with indirect aggression which experience indicates will be the most probable form of Chinese Communist aggression in the general area of Southeast Asia in the near future. It should be the objective of United States policy to block the further expansion of Communist China regardless of the methods by which such expansion is attempted.

(2) The proposed policy contained in Alternative D is considered to be extreme. It could hardly be expected that such a policy would receive the support of our major Allies. If adopted, it would require that the United States, in common prudence, now embark upon a major expansion of military forces, and take such other steps as are necessary to place the United States in a position to conduct large-scale military actions in the Far East. In short, the proposed policy is considered to be provocative and one which inherently would greatly increase the risk of general war.

(3) The objective set forth in Alternative C, as amended above, is consistent with previously expressed views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It states a definite goal and provides for a positive approach to the problem of reducing
the threat of further Chinese Communist expansion in Asia. It would provide the basis for action against indirect aggression which is lacking in both Alternatives A and B, while avoiding the more extreme measures, with their greatly enhanced risks, contained in Alternative D. Within the content of broader policies with respect to the world-wide threat of Soviet Communism, the steady and consistent application of the courses of action set forth in this alternative hold promise of achieving results advantageous to the security position of the Free World."

5. The comments of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army on NSC 5429 follow:

"a. NSC 5429 addresses itself specifically to only the most fundamental aspects of the problem in the Far East, namely: the off-shore island chain; general political and economic measures in the Far East; negotiation of a Southeast Asia security treaty; action in the event of local subversion; policy with respect to Indochina, Thailand, Indonesia and Communist China. It is not a comprehensive review of the entire problem.

"b. Moreover, the problem confronting us in the Far East cannot be stated, except in relation to and as an element in a United States foreign policy of global scope.

"c. While I do not suggest just what such global policy should be, it seems axiomatic to me that one principal OBJECTIVE therein should be to split Communist China from the Soviet Bloc. Quite aside from the great moral issue involved in the deliberate precipitation of general war the converse of this thesis is equally applicable. From the purely military point of view we must not, by our own act, deliberately provoke war against the combined power of the Soviet Bloc and Communist China, since to do so would be to choose a war against the most potentially powerful enemy coalition with a strong probability of losing the active support of some of our present Allies. This situation would have the most dangerous possible military consequences. We may well find ourselves in such a war, but it should NOT be our choice without having FIRST, taken every feasible step to increase our readiness to meet an explosion into general war, and SECOND, having mapped out and begun an approach to the OBJECTIVE stated above."
"d. The execution of no one of the four alternative courses of action with respect to Communist China would properly serve U.S. long-range interests, nor discharge the responsibility which the American people have to mankind for leadership of the Free World. There are elements in each of these courses, which combined, could constitute a preferable and proper course of action. WE DO NOT HAVE EITHER TO APPREHEND COMMUNIST CHINA (ALTERNATIVE "A") OR TO DESTROY IT (ALTERNATIVE "D").

"e. In deciding upon a course of action, the first and basic need, which I think NCE 162/2 does not meet, is for a statement in a single document of a U.S. foreign policy on a global basis, with the principal OBJECTIVES listed. Assuming that one of these would be the one stated in paragraph "c" above, it does not follow that its attainment requires the destruction of the military power of Communist China. In fact, I would regard the destruction of such military power as minimal to the long-range interests of the U.S. It would result in the creation of a power vacuum into which but one other nation could move, namely Soviet Russia.

"f. If then we accept the objective of splitting Red China and the USSR, the statesmanlike approach would seem to be to bring Red China to a realization that its long-range benefits derive from friendliness with America, not the USSR, which casts acquisitive eyes on its territory and resources; that these benefits could reasonably be expected in time, if Red China would mend its ways, abjure its offensively aggressive actions toward the West; and take steps to remove the stigma of 'aggressor' with which it is now branded. The adoption of such a course of action and the employment of such measures dictate the necessity of the prompt strengthening of our military capabilities in order that American diplomacy may have that essential military support without which it cannot hope to succeed."

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

CHIEF OF STAFF, United States Air Force.

M. F. THIMING
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Message to the French Prime Minister

1. This memorandum is in response to the memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 11 August 1954, which requested the comments and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to a Department of State draft of a proposed message to the Prime Minister of France regarding United States policy toward Indochina.

2. In their memorandum to you dated 4 August 1954, subject: "U.S. Assumption of Training Responsibilities in Indochina", the Joint Chiefs of Staff set forth certain conditions which they considered should be met before the United States assumes responsibility for training the forces of the Associated States. Particularly pertinent to the consideration of the proposed message are two preconditions which, in substance, prescribed:

   a. The existence of a reasonably strong, stable government capable of performing those functions essential to the successful raising and maintenance of its armed forces; and

   b. The granting by France of full independence to the Associated States and arrangements for the eventual phased withdrawal of French forces, officials and advisers from Indochina, in order to provide motivation and a sound basis for the establishment of national armed forces.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that neither of the above conditions can be said to exist now. The tenure of the present government in Vietnam appears to be in doubt and subject to final determination by the French as to the eventual composition of that government. Until this matter has been definitely resolved, the strength and stability of the Vietnam Government will hardly be such as to hold promise of providing the firm
direction required for the raising and maintenance of armed forces. Unless a reasonably stable government is established, the United States training mission would lack authority and governmental support essential to the successful accomplishment of its mission.

4. While the French Government has announced its intention to grant independence to the Associated States, it has not announced a plan for the scheduled relinquishment of French authority or for the withdrawal of French officials from Indochina affairs. The residual responsibility and authority, if any, to be retained by the French Government, particularly with respect to the control to be exercised over the armed forces of the Associated States, has not yet been made clear. If, in fact, the French were to retain a degree of authority and direction in the organization and training of the indigenous forces, the United States training mission would be prevented from discharging its responsibilities completely independent of French participation and control.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that the proposed message is not an unqualified commitment to furnish military aid or to provide training assistance to the Associated States. They are in accord with the stated purpose of the message, to reassure both the French and Associated States Governments of the United States intention to assist in preventing an eventual Communist take-over in Indochina. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the proposed message should state in clearer terms that the final United States decision as to the extent of military aid and the assumption of responsibility for training will be contingent upon the establishment of the prerequisite conditions discussed in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 above. As presently worded, the proposed message might convey to the French that U.S. decisions with respect to these matters have already been taken, without definite French commitments as to their intentions. Further, the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that the message should be more specific with regard to the United States desire that its representatives deal directly with the Governments of the Associated States and that all United States military material aid should eventually be given directly to the Associated States rather than through the French Government.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the substance of the foregoing views be transmitted to the
Department of State with the request that they be adequately reflected in any message to the Government of France, at this time, regarding the furnishing of military aid to the Associated States or to the assumption of training responsibilities by the United States in Indochina, and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be given an opportunity to review the amended message.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

M. B. Ridgway,
General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.
Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Chief of MACV, Indochina, has recommended that the United States assume responsibility for the training of the Vietnamese Army. As you know, representatives of the Governments of all three Associated States have, in their contacts with United States officials in Indochina, asked for United States assistance in training the indigenous forces of these States.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered this question and have recommended that, before the United States undertakes the training of forces of any of the Associated States, certain preconditions essential to the success of such an effort be met. As stated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, these preconditions include:

"From the military point of view it is absolutely essential that there be a reasonably strong, stable civil government in control. It is hopeless to expect a U.S. military training mission to achieve success unless the nation concerned is able effectively to perform those governmental functions essential to the successful raising and maintenance of armed forces, to include the provision of adequate facilities, drafting and processing of personnel, pay of troops, etc. Unless the foregoing conditions prevail, a U.S. training mission would lack the authority and governmental support essential to the successful accomplishment of its mission.

"The government of each of the Associated States concerned should formally request that the United States assume responsibility for training their forces and providing the military equipment, financial assistance, and political advice necessary to insure internal stability.

"Arrangements should be made with the French granting full independence to the Associated States and providing for the phased, orderly withdrawal of French forces, French officials, and French advisors from Indochina in order to provide motivation and a sound basis for the establishment of national armed forces. The United States from the beginning should insist on dealing directly with the governments of the respective Associated States, completely independent of French participation or control."
"The size and composition of the forces of each of the Associated States should be dictated by the local military requirements and the over-all U.S. interests."

I am in general agreement with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which represent the current Department of Defense position on this subject.

A point additional to those made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is that international interpretation of the cease-fire agreement may in any event impose limitations on the extent of military training, as well as end-item assistance, that could be undertaken by the United States in Indochina.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

The Honorable
The Secretary of State
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Report of Joint UK-US Study Group on Southeast Asia

1. In response to your memorandum dated 22 July 1954, subject as above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their views, in the light of the new situation created by the recent developments in Indochina, concerning the proposed negotiation of a regional collective security treaty for the Far East. In addition to the report of the Joint UK-US Study Group on Southeast Asia and the Draft Treaty submitted by the U.S. member of the Study Group, consideration has been given to the documents furnished by memorandums by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) dated 22 July 1954 and 2 August 1954, both on the subject: "Southeast Asian Collective Defense Organization."

2. Reference is made to the previously expressed views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the Far East region, as set forth in their memorandum for you dated 9 April 1954, subject: "United States Strategy for Developing a Position of Military Strength in the Far East (HSC Section No. 1029-b)." In that memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stressed the need for a comprehensive policy for the Far East which would view that region as a strategic entity and which would provide definitive direction for the development of a position of military strength in that region. Cognizance was taken of the fact that, in their aggregate, current policies addressed to individual countries or segments of the general area make it clear that the United States, from the standpoint of its security interests, attaches major importance to the Far East area and would be prepared to react with military force against an armed aggression by the USSR or Communist China in that region.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed the opinion that our Far Eastern policy should be directed toward achieving the following objectives:
"a. Development of the purpose and capability of the non-
Communist countries of the Far East to act collectively and
effectively in opposing the threat of aggressive Communism.

"b. Eventual establishment of a comprehensive regional
security arrangement among the non-Communist countries of the
Far East, with which the United States, the United Kingdom,
and possibly France, would be associated.

c. Reduction of the power and influence of the USSR in the
Far East, initially through the containment and reduction of
the relative power position of Communist China, and ultimately
the detachment of China from the area of Soviet Communist
control."

4. In proposing courses of action for the accomplishment of
these objectives, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that
the United States (a) be prepared to prevent further territorial
expansion by the Chinese Communists, (b) retain freedom of action
to apply counteraction, as appropriate, against the source of
any aggression, and (c) foster a system of treaties which would
lead eventually to a comprehensive and cohesive security arrange-
ment in the Far East area.

5. At the time these views were expressed, France was main-
taining a position of considerable military strength in Indo-
china, and the Associated States were counted among those
countries which could make a substantial contribution to the
aggregate of non-Communist military strength in the general
area. As the result of the Geneva agreement, the military
position of France and the Associated States is considerably
altered. There is some evidence that France intends to with-
draw the bulk of her ground forces from Indochina, leaving
behind only a token force to conduct training of the armies
of the Associated States. It is now unlikely that the pre-
viously anticipated military potential of the Associated States
can be realized. Additionally, the Communists have now gained
a psychological and military victory of far-reaching effect,
have substantially augmented their manpower, have acquired im-
portant new food resources, and have expanded the territory
under their military control. These altered conditions do
not change the basic objectives which our security interests
require that we seek in the Far East, but they do have a con-
siderable influence upon the measures required for the achieve-
ment of those objectives.
6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the recent developments in Geneva and Indochina, considered in conjunction with the general retrograde trend within the Western bloc, serve to increase the urgency of the need for a comprehensive United States policy with respect to the Far East region as a whole, in order to give direction, cohesiveness, and greater effectiveness to the political and military actions which must now be taken to prevent the loss of the remainder of Southeast Asia to Communist control. It is considered that until the United States formulates and adopts such an over-all policy we shall be severely handicapped in any negotiations for the establishment of a collective defense in the general area of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. Before the provisions of an acceptable security treaty can be finally drafted, it would appear necessary that certain basic decisions be made with respect to how far the United States is willing to go, in concert with all or certain of the non-Communist nations having interests in the Far East or, if necessary, unilaterally, in opposing further Communist accretions in the area under consideration.

7. Similarly, basic decisions would appear to be requisite to the adoption of interim courses of action designed to check the momentum created by recent Communist successes, and to provide for coordinated action pending the formalization of a collective security arrangement for the Far East region.

8. Viewing the immediate problem of treaty negotiations within this context, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that the United States was publicly committed to the sponsoring and support of a collective security arrangement for Southeast Asia even before the collapse of the French effort in Indochina, but they have serious misgivings concerning the military provisions of such a pact lest they imply commitments which the United States would not be able to meet. Failure to satisfy the expectations of the signatories in the matter of military aid could, in turn, result in the alienation of friendly governments rather than the acquisition of new allies.

9. Subject to the comments set forth below, some of which are made by way of emphasis of points in the reports of the UK-US Study Group, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are in general agreement with the position taken by the United States side of the Group. The real evaluation of the product of the Study Group will, of course, depend upon the manner in which the differences in the United States and United Kingdom positions are resolved.
10. It is the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that a Southeast Asia defense treaty should incorporate provisions responsive to the following considerations having military aspects.

a. The clear purpose of the treaty should be to form a collective security arrangement to deter and, if possible, prevent any further extension of Communist control, by whatever means, within the general area of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific.

b. The initial membership should be limited to those nations willing to join in the type of organization which can be effective in accomplishing the purpose set forth in (a) above.

c. The treaty should provide for the future accession of other powers having interests in the Far East which may subsequently desire to join. (It is considered that the pact should ultimately include Japan, Korea, and possibly Nationalist China.)

d. There should be no built-in power of veto. The treaty provisions should permit concerted action by a lesser number than the total of the signatory nations in the event that the political or territorial integrity of any signatory is threatened by Communist aggression in any form.

e. Careful consideration should be given to the practicability and desirability of providing voting machinery in the governing council which would preclude the possibility that, at some time in the future when the membership is expanded, a bloc of "neutrals" or a British Commonwealth bloc could exercise a controlling voice.

f. The treaty should establish the moral justification and provide the political framework and necessary machinery within which and by which any act of overt Communist aggression could be met by prompt military counteraction, not excluding military action against the real source of the aggression.
g. Paragraph 2, Article III, of the Draft Security Treaty is addressed to indirect aggression, the most likely and insidious form of Communist aggression. The treaty should specifically provide that any further extension of Communist control through infiltration or subversion, or through any other indirect means, should, as in the case of overt aggression, be met by prompt and appropriate counteraction.

h. It should be made clear in the preliminary negotiations and in the provisions of the treaty itself that no commitment by the United States to support the raising, equipping, and maintenance of indigenous forces and/or to deploy United States forces in such strengths as to provide for an effective defense of all of the national territory of each signatory is implied or intended. Military aid by the United States to the Southeast Asian countries who are members of the pact should be limited to that necessary to permit the countries concerned to raise, equip, and maintain military forces as necessary to insure internal stability, to contribute toward a reasonably effective opposition to any attempted invasion, and to instill national confidence.

i. It should be made equally clear that the treaty would not commit the United States to a large-scale program of economic aid to the signatory countries in lieu of military aid since, in the final analysis, funds for economic aid must come from the total amount of money available for the national security programs of the United States.

II. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in the view that, having in mind the length of time required for a treaty to be negotiated and ratified, an interim statement of intent to conclude a treaty establishing a collective security arrangement in the Far East should be issued jointly by those countries which intend to become founder members of such a treaty. The draft statement of intent furnished to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment by the memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) dated 2 August 1954, is considered to be satisfactory from the military point of view. It is suggested, however, that it would be prudent to withhold any formal declaration of intent until substantial agreement has been reached with the United Kingdom as to the principal provisions of a treaty.
12. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in the opinion that the security treaty itself should be drafted by a working group representing all of the probable initial signatories. Subject to the comments contained hereinbefore, the informal and unofficial first United States draft, furnished by your memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated 22 July 1954, is considered to be satisfactory as a point of departure. However, several of the technical points raised by the United Kingdom side of the Study Group appear to merit favorable consideration.

13. It would appear desirable to keep the Japanese Government advised as to the progress of treaty negotiations.

14. It is recommended that the foregoing views be given due consideration in the formulation of the Department of Defense position in connection with further negotiations concerning a collective security organization for the general area of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific.

15. It is requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be afforded additional opportunities, as appropriate, to submit comments concerning the draft treaty in the course of its development.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/

M. B. RIDGWAY,
General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.
Dear Mr. Secretary:

I refer to the Draft Southeast Asia Collective Security Treaty, copies of which were made available to the Department of Defense by the Department of State. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed their views on the draft submitted by the United States member of the Joint US-UK Study Group on Indochina. The comments of the Department of Defense are made in light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in consideration of a revised version of the draft Treaty contained in SEAP U-2/1, dated 5 August 1954.

The Department of Defense considers that the revised draft Treaty is generally satisfactory subject to the following comments:

a. In order to strengthen provisions of the Treaty which permit protection to be extended to countries of the area not participating in the Treaty, the word "general" before "area of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific" should be added in paragraph four of the preamble as well as in paragraph one of Article IV.

b. The Department of Defense believes that in further negotiations, both preliminary and at the time of the meeting of the Ministers, it should be made clear that no commitments by the United States to support the raising, equipping, and maintenance of indigenous forces and/or to deploy United States forces in such strengths as to provide for an effective defense of all of the national territory of each signatory is implied or intended. Military aid by the United States to the Southeast Asian countries who are members of the pact would be limited to that necessary to permit the countries concerned to raise, equip, and maintain military forces as necessary to insure internal stability, to provide a reasonably effective opposition to any attempted invasions, and to instill national confidence. This is consistent with the views expressed at our meeting on 24 July 1954, and in your message No. 589 to London dated 29 July 1954.

c. It should equally be made clear that the treaty would not commit the United States to a large-scale program of economic aid to the signatory countries in lieu of military aid since, in the final analysis, funds for economic aid must come from the total amount of money available for the national security programs of the United States.

SecDef Cont. No. TS-0194
d. It is the view of the Department of Defense that if the Treaty is ultimately to result in the development of effective collective strength to halt further Communist control in the general area of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific, those nations in the area which are potentially capable of making a substantial military contribution, i.e., Japan, Korea, and possibly Nationalist China, should eventually be permitted to subscribe to the Treaty if they so desire. Accordingly, this point should be made clear to the other signatories in the negotiations leading to the signing of the Treaty.

The Department of Defense considers that it would be premature and undesirable to discuss, either at the meeting of Ministers or before, the formation of an organization associating the military representatives of the participating nations. The Council and the political machinery of the Treaty should be established first. This could be followed by the creation of military machinery necessary to make the Treaty effective. In the view of this Department such military coordination should be similar to the ANZUS arrangements.

It is recognized that it is not feasible to include in the Treaty itself details relating to implementation of the provisions by the Parties. However, the Department of Defense strongly urges that in the formulation of implementing procedures by the Council, the United States take a position in support of permitting concerted action by a lesser number than the total of the signatory nations in the event that the political or territorial integrity of any signatory is threatened by Communist aggression in any form. In addition, careful consideration should be given to the practicability and desirability of providing voting machinery in the Council which would preclude the possibility that, at some time in the future when the membership is expanded, a bloc of " neutrals" or a British Commonwealth bloc could exercise a controlling voice.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed the opinion, with which I fully concur, that the recent developments in Geneva and Indochina, considered in conjunction with the general retrograde trend within the Western Bloc, serve to increase the urgency of the need for a comprehensive United States policy with respect to the Far East region as a whole. This is necessary in order to give direction, cohesiveness, and greater effectiveness to the political and military actions which must now be taken to prevent the loss of the remainder of Southeast Asia to Communist control. It is considered that until the United States formulates and adopts such an over-all policy we shall be severely handicapped in any negotiations for the establishment of a collective
defense in the general area of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. It would appear necessary that certain basic decisions be made with respect to how far the United States is willing to go in concert with all or certain of the non-Communist nations having interests in the Far East or, if necessary, unilaterally, in opposing further Communist accretions in the area under consideration.

Sincerely yours,

Signed/C.E. Wilson

The Honorable

The Secretary of State

cc: Sec/State
JCS
OMA (L/Col Alden)
Army CS (L/Col Queenin)
Mr. Sullivan

Cys 1&2 - State
3- JCS
4- Mr. Sullivan
5- OMA (LCol Alden)
6- Army CS LCol Queenin
7&8- OSD files
9- R&C, 10-Chron, 11-Holdback

LtCol JEDwen/mlc/16Aug54
OPMA/Rm2D836/Ext 79258
Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have received your letter of August 12, 1954, setting forth the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on requests from the Governments of the Associated States of Indochina for United States assistance in training the indigenous forces of these states. The Joint Chiefs of Staff established four preconditions for United States participation in such a training program and you added the further consideration that an international interpretation of the cease-fire agreement may in any event impose limitations on the extent of military training, as well as end item assistance, that could be undertaken by the United States in Indochina.

The first precondition of the Joint Chiefs is that there be a reasonably strong, stable civil government in control of the Indochinese states requesting United States assistance. This condition applies to the Government of Cambodia which is strong, stable and enjoys the whole-hearted loyalty of the population. A similar situation likewise exists in Laos but there, because of the restrictive terms of the cease-fire agreement and likewise because the Laotian Government has never made a request for U.S. training assistance, the problem does not arise. In the case of Free Viet Nam, the civil government, which has been under the presidency of Mr. Ngo Dinh Diem for only slightly more than a month, is far from strong or stable. However, we are currently perfecting measures which may assist that Government rapidly to increase the effectiveness of its administration. I should like to point out that one of the most efficient means of enabling the Vietnamese Government to become strong is to assist it in reorganizing the National Army and in training that army. This, of course, the familiar hen-and-egg argument as to which comes first but I would respectfully submit that the U.S. could profitably undertake two courses of action in Free Viet Nam:

The Honorable
Charles E. Wilson,
Secretary of Defense.
Viet Nam: one, to strengthen the government by means of a political and economic nature and the other, to bolster that government by strengthening the army which supports it.

The second precondition established by the Joint Chiefs is that the Governments of the Associated States should formally request that the U.S. assume responsibility for training their forces and providing military equipment. As indicated above the Government of Laos has made no such request and does not contemplate one. However, the Government of Viet Nam, in a letter from Prime Minister Prince Buu Loo to the American Charge d'Affaires dated June 28, 1954, did request that MAAG Saigon participate in troop training and requested U.S. assistance in providing adequate armament and in financing a proposed expanded troop base. In the case of Cambodia, the Cambodian Minister of National Defense, General Nhek Tioulong, in a letter dated May 20, 1954, addressed to General John W. O'Donnell, Chief of MAAG Saigon, stated that the Royal Khmer Government was anxious to complete plans to set up in the minimum of time three divisions according to the methods of accelerated instruction used in Korea, on condition that the U.S. Government assured the Cambodian Government of indispensable financial and materiel support.

The third precondition of the Joint Chiefs calls for arrangements with the French guaranteeing full independence to the Associated States and providing for the phased withdrawal of French forces, French officials, and French advisors from Indochina in order to provide motivation and a sound basis for the establishment of National armed forces.

The case of Laos may be set aside since Laos has not requested U.S. assistance and under the terms of its military agreement with France is required to look to France for aid in training and other purposes. Furthermore, under the terms of the cease-fire agreement Laos is estopped from introducing foreign military personnel other than "a specified number of French military personnel required for the training of the Laotian National Army."

In the case of Cambodia, de facto full independence already exists. Likewise during 1953 and early 1954 command of the Royal Khmer Army was handed over to the King of Cambodia and French forces have been entirely withdrawn from Cambodian soil. There is a minimum of French advisors still attached to the Royal Khmer Army.

In the case of Viet Nam, practically the entire French Expeditionary Corps still remains in that country. It would be militarily disastrous to demand the withdrawal of French forces from Free Viet Nam before the creation...
creation of a new National Army. However, as seen from this Department, there would seem to be no insuperable objection to the U.S. undertaking a training program for the Vietnamese National Army while at the same time the French forces commence a gradual phasing out from that theater.

As for the point you raised regarding the limitations of the Geneva settlement, in the view of this Department there is a limitation on the degree to which the Vietnamese armed forces can be increased. However, in my opinion, there is no provision of the cease-fire agreement regarding Viet Nam which would prevent the existing MAAG Saigon from undertaking a training mission or which would impede MAAG Saigon from rotating existing personnel to bring in number for number new personnel especially versed in military training.

In the case of Cambodia there is no obstacle whatever to the setting up of a U.S. training mission. The cease-fire agreement affecting Cambodia provides in Chapter III Article 7 that the Royal Government of Cambodia will not solicit foreign aid in war materiel, personnel or instructors except for the purpose of effective defense of the territory. This latter clause makes it entirely possible for the Cambodian Government to request a foreign training mission and for the U.S., if it so desires, to provide such a mission. In the opinion of this Department, it would be most helpful to the furtherance of our national policy in Indochina if the U.S. should reply affirmatively to the letter of the Defense Minister cited above, and it is recommended that the Joint Chiefs give their consent to the establishment of a MAAG/Phnom Penh which would provide both training and logistical assistance to the Royal Khmer Army. The Department of State likewise feels that sympathetic consideration should be given to the establishment of a training mission in MAAG Saigon to assist in the development of an effective Vietnamese National Army.

Sincerely yours,

/s/
John Foster Dulles
STATEMENT OF POLICY
by the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on

REVIEW OF U.S. POLICY IN THE FAR EAST

PREFACE

Consequences of the Geneva Conference

Communist successes in Indochina, culminating in the
agreement reached at the Geneva Conference, have produced the
following significant consequences which jeopardize the
security interests of the U.S. in the Far East and increase
Communist strength there:

a. Regardless of the fate of South Vietnam, Laos,
and Cambodiana, the Communists have secured possession of
an advance salient in Vietnam from which military and
non-military pressures can be mounted against adjacent
and more remote non-Communist areas.

b. The loss of prestige in Asia suffered by the
U.S. as a backer of the French and the Bao Dai Government
will raise further doubts in Asia concerning U.S. leader-
ship and the ability of the U.S. to check the further
expansion of Communism in Asia. Furthermore, U.S.
prestige will inescapably be associated with subsequent
developments in Southeast Asia.

c. By adopting an appearance of moderation at
Geneva and taking credit for the cessation of hostilities
in Indochina, the Communists will be in a better position
to exploit their political strategy of imputing to the
United States motives of extremism, belligerency, and
opposition to co-existence seeking thereby to alienate
the U.S. from its allies. The Communists thus have a
basis for sharply accentuating their "peace propaganda"
and "peace program" in Asia in an attempt to allay fears
of Communist expansionist policy and to establish closer
relations with the nations of free Asia.
d. The Communists have increased their military and political prestige in Asia and their capacity for expanding Communist influence by exploiting political and economic weakness and instability in the countries of free Asia without resort to armed attack.

e. The loss of Southeast Asia would imperil retention of Japan as a key element in the off-shore island chain.
COURSES OF ACTION

I. COMMUNIST CHINA*

1. Reduce the power of Communist China in Asia even at the risk of, but without deliberately provoking, war:
   a. (1) React with force, if necessary and advantageous, to expansion and subversion recognizable as such, supported and supplied by Communist China.
   
   (2) React with immediate, positive, armed force against any belligerent move by Communist China.

   b. Increase efforts to develop the political, economic and military strength of non-Communist Asian countries, including the progressive development of the military strength of Japan to the point where she can provide for her own national defense and, in time, contribute to the collective defense of the Far East.

   c. Maintain political and economic pressures against Communist China, including the existing embargo and support for Chinese Nationalist harassing actions.

   d. Support the Chinese National Government on Formosa as the Government of China and the representative of China in all UN agencies.

   e. Create internal division in the Chinese Communist regime and impair Sino-Soviet relations by all feasible overt and covert means.

* Section I is to be considered as a basis for further consideration in the light of a review by the Secretary of State and report to the Council within approximately one month.
II. THE OFF-SHORE ISLAND CHAIN

2. The United States must maintain the security and increase the strength of the Pacific off-shore island chain (Japan, Ryukyus, Formosa, Philippines, Australia and New Zealand) as an element essential to U.S. security. To this end:

   a. Initiate and support appropriate measures which will contribute to strengthening the economy of Japan, its internal political stability and its ties with the free world.

   b. Increase the military strength of Japan and the Philippines, improve the effectiveness of existing military strength of the Republic of Korea and of Formosa, and continue participation in ANZUS.

   c. Provide related economic assistance to the local governments in those cases where the agreed level of indigenous military strength is beyond the capacity of the local economy to support.

   d. Encourage the conditions which will make possible the formation of, and be prepared to participate in, a Western Pacific collective defense arrangement, including the Philippines, Japan, the Republic of China, and the Republic of Korea, eventually linked with the Southeast Asia security structure and ANZUS.

   e. Intensify covert and psychological actions to strengthen the orientation of these countries toward the free world.
III. GENERAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MEASURES IN THE FAR EAST*

3. Encourage the prompt organization of an economic grouping by the maximum number of free Asian states, including Japan and as many of the Colombo Powers as possible, based on self-help and mutual aid, and the participation and support (including substantial financial assistance) of the U. S. and other appropriate Western countries through which, by united action, these free Asian states will be enabled more effectively to achieve the economic and social strength needed to maintain their independence.

4. Take all feasible measures to increase the opportunities of free Asian countries for trade with each other and with other free world countries.

5. Provide technical assistance to help develop political stability and economic health.

6. Develop and make more effective information, cultural, education and exchange programs for the countries concerned.

* See also Annex B to NSC 5429.
IV. SOUTHEAST ASIA

7. General. The U. S. must protect its position and restore its prestige in the Far East by a new initiative in Southeast Asia, where the situation must be stabilized as soon as possible to prevent further losses to Communism through (1) creeping expansion and subversion, or (2) overt aggression.

8. Security Treaty. Negotiate a Southeast Asia security treaty with the UK, Australia, New Zealand, France, the Philippines, Thailand and, as appropriate, other free South and Southeast Asian countries willing to participate, which would:

a. Commit each member to treat an armed attack on the agreed area (including Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam) as dangerous to its own peace, safety and vital interests, and to act promptly to meet the common danger in accordance with its own constitutional processes.

b. Provide so far as possible a legal basis to the President to order attack on Communist China in the event it commits such armed aggression which endangers the peace, safety and vital interests of the United States.

c. Ensure that, in such event, other nations would be obligated in accordance with the treaty to support such U. S. action.

d. Not limit U. S. freedom to use nuclear weapons, or involve a U. S. commitment for local defense or for stationing U. S. forces in Southeast Asia.

The U. S. would continue to provide limited military assistance and training missions, wherever possible, to the states of Southeast Asia in order to bolster their will to fight, to stabilize legal governments, and to assist them in controlling subversion.

9. Action in the Event of Local Subversion. If requested by a legitimate local government which requires assistance to defeat local Communist subversion or rebellion not constituting armed attack, the U. S. should view such a situation so gravely that, in addition to giving all possible covert and overt support within Executive Branch authority, the President should at once consider requesting Congressional authority to take appropriate action, which might if necessary
and feasible include the use of U. S. military forces either locally or against the external source of such subversion or rebellion (including Communist China if determined to be the source).

10. Indochina: Political and Covert Action.

a. Make every possible effort, not openly inconsistent with the U. S. position as to the armistice agreements, to defeat Communist subversion and influence, to maintain and support friendly non-Communist governments in Cambodia and Laos, to maintain a friendly non-Communist South Vietnam, and to prevent a Communist victory through all-Vietnam elections.

b. Urge that the French promptly recognize and deal with Cambodia, Laos and free Vietnam as independent sovereign nations.

c. Strengthen U. S. representation and deal directly, wherever advantageous to the U. S., with the governments of Cambodia, Laos and free Vietnam.

d. Working through the French only insofar as necessary, assist Cambodia, Laos and free Vietnam to maintain (1) military forces necessary for internal security and (2) economic conditions conducive to the maintenance and strength of non-Communist regimes and comparing favorably with those in adjacent Communist areas.

e. Aid emigration from North Vietnam and resettlement of peoples unwilling to remain under Communist rule.

f. Exploit available means to make more difficult the control by the Viet Minh of North Vietnam.

g. Exploit available means to prevent North Vietnam from becoming permanently incorporated in the Soviet bloc, using as feasible and desirable consular relations and non-strategic trade.

h. Conduct covert operations on a large and effective scale in support of the foregoing policies.
11. Thailand:

a. Provide military assistance sufficient to increase the strength of indigenous forces, thereby helping to control local subversion, and to make easier clear identification of instances of overt aggression.

b. Provide economic assistance conducive to the maintenance and strength of a non-Communist regime.

c. Concentrate efforts on developing Thailand as a support of U. S. objectives in the area and as the focal point of U. S. covert and psychological operations in Southeast Asia.

12. Indonesia. Reaffirm existing policy in NSC 171/1, subject to:

a. In lieu of paragraph 19 substitute "Continue efforts to influence Indonesian government officials to oppose Communist infiltration and subversion."

b. In lieu of paragraph 21 substitute "Take appropriate actions to strengthen friendly relations between Indonesia and the United States."
ANNEX A

FAR EAST

Proposed Assistance Programmed for FY 1954 - FY 1955
(Millions of Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>MILITARY</th>
<th>ECONOMIC</th>
<th>OTHER D</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>MILITARY</th>
<th>ECONOMIC</th>
<th>OTHER D</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FY 1954</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FY 1955</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1,093.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,118.5</td>
<td>1,108.5</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>1,133.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formosa</td>
<td>326.0</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>408.3</td>
<td>108.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>174.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>102.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>105.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>320.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>326.0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>252.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>258.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaya</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>1,551.3</td>
<td>442.1</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>2,017.1</td>
<td>1,346.1</td>
<td>348.4</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>1,728.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FY 1954 and FY 1955 TOTAL - $3,745.3

   b) Funds which might become available from the sale of U. S. surplus agricultural commodities are not included.
   c) Direct U. S. Department of Defense expenditures in the area, which have an important effect on the economy of each country are in addition to the above programmed amounts.
FOOTNOTES:

a) "Economic" includes Economic Assistance and Mutual Defense Support.

b) "Other" includes Technical Assistance, Information Services and Educational Exchange.

c) This amount includes: Mutual Defense Assistance - $348 million and Direct Forces Support - $745 million.

d) This amount was programmed prior to the Indochina Armistice as: Mutual Defense Assistance - $308 million and Direct Forces Support - $800 million. A similar amount has been requested of the Congress for support of U.S. policy in the general area.

e) The Technical Assistance for Burma was terminated on June 30, 1954 when the deliveries made from contracts placed in prior years were completed. The termination was made at the request of the Burmese Government.

f) This amount includes: Mutual Defense Assistance - $296 million and Direct Forces Support - $30 million.

g) This amount includes: Mutual Defense Assistance - $83 million and Direct Forces Support - $25 million.

h) This does not include material already transferred or to be transferred from the Department of Defense FECOM Reserve. As of March 31, 1954, material with a replacement value of $400 million was earmarked for transfer.

i) This amount is to be financed by sales proceeds under Section 550 of the Mutual Security Act of 1953, as amended.

j) This figure represents only the costs for training Koreans in the U.S. The bulk of U.S. assistance to Korea is provided directly by the Department of Defense through Defense appropriations. Such direct military assistance, not included in the figures above, were approximately $500 million in FY 1954 and should be approximately $400 million in FY 1955.
k) This amount represents all funds expended under the Korean Relief and Rehabilitation Program.

l) This amount includes both Economic and Technical Assistance for this year.

m) A $25 million U.S. commitment to Thailand is in addition to these figures and will have to be financed by a transfer from other programs in the area.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 26, 1954

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As you are aware, the President has approved a policy message to the Prime Minister of France indicating that henceforth the United States would provide such aid as it deems necessary for the three states of Indochina directly, rather than through the medium of the French Government.

The Cambodian Government, on May 20, 1954, officially requested the assistance of the United States in training the Royal Cambodian Army according to the accelerated methods of instruction used in Korea with the objective of forming three divisions in the shortest possible time. To date no response has been made by this Government to the Government of Cambodia.

The Department of State feels in the national interest that this Government should respond affirmatively to the Cambodian request and recommends that a bilateral agreement be negotiated with Cambodia for the establishment of a Military Assistance Advisory Group which would likewise have a training function.

It is understood that the present Chief of MAC, Saigon has undertaken preliminary study of the requirements for a SAC/Phnom Penh. If you concur in the recommendation of this Department, it would be our intention to authorize the new American Ambassador to Cambodia officially to inform His Majesty, the King of Cambodia, of our intention to accede to the Cambodian request and promptly to negotiate a MAC bilateral agreement. If the Department of Defense agrees in this proposed line of policy and has special considerations which it desires should be incorporated in the proposed bilateral agreement, I shall be grateful for your courtesy in indicating the main heads of agreement which would be desired by the Department of Defense.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]
Acting Secretary

The Honorable
Charles E. Wilson,
Secretary of Defense.
MESSAGE
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFFCOMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

STATE SECRET
PRIORITY
PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED
CONSULT CRYPTOCENTER BEFORE DECLASSIFYING
NO UNCLAS REPLY OR REF IF DIG IS QUOTED

FROM: SECRETARY OF STATE FROM (FE) MR WADDELL
TO: OSD WASH DC FOR ADMIRAL DAVIS OR MR SULLIVAN
NR: UNNUMBERED 3118052 AUG 54

Sent Manila 819 rpted info London 1204 Paris 7619
Canberra 170.

Manila.

Following for your information text Aide Memoire delivered Department August 31 by Australian Embassy:

Verbatim text.

"1. The Australian Government has welcomed the establishment of SEATO on the assumption that it would provide a firm basis for military planning in the area and a means whereby preparations could be made to cope with direct or indirect Communist aggression. The Australian Government has given public assurances that if such an organization is established it is prepared to make an increased military contribution to the defence of the area.

"2. This policy was laid down at a time when the United States Government was calling for the urgent establishment of a defence organization in Southeast Asia and appeared to be willing to participate fully in it. The Australian Government is therefore considerably disturbed at recent reports which appear to indicate that the United States does not now contemplate that any concrete military functions should be carried out by the organization set up under the treaty. If this should turn out to be the case, then the value of the proposed treaty to Australia would be drastically diminished. The difficulties with which the United States Government would be faced at the present time in making precise commitments under SEATO are fully understood. At the same time the Australian Government feels there is a real danger that the present United States attitude might lead to a treaty without 'teeth' of any kind, or to a treaty into which it would be very difficult to put any 'teeth' subsequently.

"3. It would also appear that, at a time when United States policy regarding the military functions of the DA IN 81950

(1 Sep 54)
organization has undergone a change, the United States view also seems to have hardened that the treaty should be aimed specifically at Communism. In these circumstances it seems that Australia might get the worst of both worlds. On the one hand Australia would be criticized in Asia for joining an organization which would be dominated by great non-Asian powers and which would be criticised as constituting a provocation to the Chinese, while on the other hand Australia would obtain no reassurance that additional military protection would be given to an area which is strategically vital to Australia. It will be appreciated moreover that such a treaty would involve the Australian Government in considerable embarrassment domestically. The Australian Government would be attacked for subscribing to a treaty which seemed valueless, and there would be a danger that present public support for an expanded Australian defence effort would be dissipated. The Prime Minister recently impressed Parliament that the present situation in Southeast Asia called for an international arrangement in the region under which all parties would be ready to undertake commitment. Australia's willingness to undertake such commitments in peacetime represents a real innovation in Australian policy.

"4. In some respects the effect of present American thinking about SEATO is to provide little more than a commitment to act in the event of Communist aggression, without any effective understandings among the Allies as to what that action should be.

"5. It is the Australian Government's earnest hope that the United States Government will agree to the establishment of effective military machinery under the proposed organization and will themselves participate in planning for the defence of the area. To this end Australia will press for inclusion in the text of the treaty of a specific undertaking that parties would 'concert their military planning'. The Australian Government hopes that the United States Government will be able to accept this.

"6. The Australian Government fully appreciates the difficulties involved (partly for security reasons) in detailed military planning among seven or eight nations. But the Australian Government considers that close contacts among, and joint military planning by, The United States, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand are essential. The latest American position, as presently understood, could give Australia less than the already existing Five Power Staff Agency; and the future even of this organization seems in
doubt in view of its virtual suspension at the request of the United States.

"7. Like the United States, the Australian Government also contemplates economic activity being conducted outside SEATO. But a SEATO which is competent to discuss all these things should exercise this function at any rate to some extent, even though effective work in some directions may be done by smaller groups and possibly outside SEATO. Consequently in the Australian Government's opinion, regular and fairly frequent meetings of SEATO representatives are needed, and would be expected by Australian public opinion."

End verbatim text.

Departments comments follow.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Report on the Manila Conference

As Department of Defense representative on the U.S. Delegation to the Manila Conference (6-9 September 1954) I submit for your information the attached text of a Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Tab A) as approved by the Conference, together with comments relating to aspects of the Treaty of special concern to the Department of Defense.

General Comment

As you know, the Manila Conference convened following Communist military achievements in Indo-China and political and psychological sacrifices at Geneva. Against this background the effort of the Manila Conference to construct a collective defense arrangement for Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific was directed in large measure to recovering from the psychological blow thus administered to the Free World. Much of what was said at the Conference bore witness to the prevalence of psychological objectives in the thinking of the participating States. In a real sense, the Treaty that emerged at Manila is a response to the Geneva Agreements.

The participating delegations placed great emphasis on the effect the wording of the Treaty would have, not only on the Communists, but also on their domestic populations. Thus the Treaty is a document that speaks to many audiences; it supports self-determination of peoples, self-government and independence in deference to Asian nationalism; it provides for economic and technical cooperation as an inducement to present Asian "neutralist" countries to associate themselves with the Treaty; it permits the accession of other States, thus avoiding the charge that the Treaty members form an exclusive club with aggressive designs "against" other States; it describes the Treaty area so as to exclude for the present Formosa, Japan, and Korea, States toward which the Treaty members hold differing policies. These elements of the Treaty attest to the importance the member States place on the effect of the document upon their respective publics. At the same time these elements give the Treaty the character of a collective defense arrangement in more than a purely military sense. The success that the Treaty may have in enhancing the defense of the area will therefore have to be judged in light of the fact that it has psychological and economic as well as military objectives.

NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
With respect to the military aspects of the Treaty, most of the participating States, notably the Philippines and Thailand, urged provisions that would explicitly commit the Treaty Parties to take military action in event of aggression in the Treaty area. The commitment of the United States to such action, of course, was the purpose of those urgings. Much was said about the desirability of the NATO as opposed to the allegedly weaker ANZUS formula. Most of the participating States argued that explicit commitments to take action were necessary if the Treaty was to have the desired deterrent effect on the Communists.

The United States was faced in this issue, I believe, with the dilemma of attempting to attain two objectives that were not completely compatible; on the one hand there was a desire to place the Communists on notice as clearly as possible that further aggression in the area would meet with effective collective counter-action. Such unequivocal notification would tend to enhance the psychological effect of the Treaty on the Free World and the deterrent effect on the Communists. Yet on the other hand, in spite of the greater psychological effect that a strongly worded Treaty might have, the attainment of this objective was necessarily limited by the extent to which the United States, in its own interest, could undertake advance military commitments under the Treaty in restriction of its freedom of action. A further limitation was the fact that the United States can commit itself to take military action only in accordance with its Constitutional procedures. Thus, opposed to the objective of maximum psychological effect was the necessity that the United States retain essential freedom of action, and avoid treaty commitments that were inconsistent with Constitutional requirements and therefore prejudicial to support for ratification of the Treaty by the Senate.

The Treaty as it stands agreed is in effect a reconciliation of these conflicting objectives. At the moment it serves more a psychological than a military purpose. The area is no better prepared than before to cope with Communist aggression. As time goes on, however, the Treaty can provide a nucleus for coordinated defense, and may rally presently uncommitted States to the non-Communist side.

**Military Aspects of the Treaty**

You may recall that following the work of the Joint U.S.-U.K. Study Group which met from 7 to 17 July 1954 in Washington to lay the groundwork for the Treaty, the Department of State prepared a draft which served as the basis for discussions among the United States and other interested Governments. This draft was referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment on 22 July 1954. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, submitted to you on 13 August 1954, formed the basis of your letter of 17 August 1954 to the Secretary of State. This letter, together with a letter of 19 August 1954 from Acting Secretary Anderson to Mr. Robert Murphy on the subject of military machinery under the Treaty, contained
the basic positions of this Department with respect to the Treaty, and guided Department of Defense representatives on the U.S. Delegation to the Manila Conference in discussions in the Eight Power Working Group and in the Conference itself.

The following provisions of the Treaty are of special concern to the Department of Defense:

1. Article IV is the heart of the Treaty, and generally follows the wording previously used in the Philippine, Korean, and ANZUS Treaties. It provides that "Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." Secretary Dulles pointed out during the Conference that the wording of the North Atlantic Treaty, which speaks of an attack on one as an attack on all, nevertheless provides that the Parties will act in accordance with their constitutional processes. He persuaded the Conference that the final agreed wording of Article IV would be better received by the Senate, would tend to minimize debate, and would facilitate ratification by the United States.

The Article further provides that the Parties shall consult immediately on measures of common defense if, in the opinion of any of the Parties, any Party in the treaty area is threatened by other than armed attack. This brings Communist aggression in the form of subversion and coup d'etat within the purview of the Treaty.

2. Article V establishes a Council to consider matters concerning the implementation of the Treaty. During the sessions of the Working Group it became evident that some countries would propose wording calling for the establishment of military machinery, possibly along NATO lines. Recalling the position of this Department that military participation should be consultative along lines of the ANZUS arrangement rather than permanent and formal as in NATO, the Defense Representative in the Working Group, Mr. C. A. Sullivan, in a message to Defense (SEATO No. 1, 2 September 1954) proposed that consideration be given to the inclusion of the following wording after the first sentence of Article IV: "To this end the Parties to the Treaty will consult with regard to military planning as required by the situation in the area." Shortly thereafter the Australian delegation proposed the following addition to Article V: "The Council shall set up such subsidiary machinery as may be necessary to achieve the military and other objectives of the Treaty." Since the Australian proposal involved an open ended commitment, this Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed it and accepted the wording suggested by the Defense representative. The Department of State agreed, and instructed the U.S. Delegation to support incorporation of this wording in Article IV (TOSEC 25, 3 September 1954).
In the course of negotiation on this point the U.S. Delegation persuaded the Australian Delegation to accept a modification of its language removing reference to "machinery" and injecting the concept of consultation as the situation may require, as favored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and this Department. The U.S. Delegation on its part, accepted the placing of the amendment in Article V, and secured agreement of the Conference to wording which in substance reflected the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defense views. Secretary Dulles, with my advice, succeeded in causing deletion of reference to "periodic" or "regular" consultation as several delegations at one stage proposed. The amendment in Article V as finally approved reads: "The Council shall provide for consultation with regard to military and any other planning as the situation obtaining in the treaty area may from time to time require."

3. Article VII provides that other States may be invited to accede to the Treaty by unanimous agreement of the Parties. Although the agreement of all the Parties to the inclusion of Nationalist China, Japan, or Korea is presently unlikely, such a possibility is not precluded.

4. Similarly, Article VIII, in defining the "treaty area", provides that the Parties by unanimous agreement can include other States in the treaty area or otherwise change the treaty area. The "treaty area" is defined as "the general area of Southeast Asia, including also the entire territories of the Asian Parties, and the general area of the Southwest Pacific not including the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude." This wording brings West Pakistan under protection of the Treaty even though it is not in Southeast Asia. The word "general" permits an eventual broadening of the treaty area.

5. All participating States except the United States supported exclusion of the word "Communist" from the Treaty. The U.S. draft originally referred to "Communist aggression" in the preamble and in Article IV. The chief reason advanced by the other signatories for the deletion was the desire of most of the Parties that the Treaty cover any kind of aggression in the area. Pakistan, for example, wished that the Treaty would apply to possible aggression by India. The United States position was that the United States could not properly say that any aggression in Southeast Asia would endanger its own peace and safety, and that it could accept the obligations of Article IV only in respect to Communist aggression. For this reason the United States attached an "understanding" to the Treaty in this sense. All other participants accepted the Treaty with the U.S. "understanding".

6. At French suggestion specific reference to Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam was removed from the text of the Treaty, but these States are covered by the provisions of the Treaty in a separate Protocol (Tab B). The French felt that this method of extending the application of the Treaty to the Associated States was less likely to be construed as a violation of the spirit of the Geneva Agreements.
7. I also attach for your perusal copies of the opening and concluding addresses of Secretary Dulles at the Conference (Tabs C and D).

Implementation of the Treaty

It can be expected that several of the participating States will shortly urge that an interim Council meet pending the time the Treaty is ratified and goes into effect. There is a general desire to keep up the momentum established at Manila. In such an event the subject of consultations with regard to military planning as referred to in Article V will undoubtedly arise. This is a subject to which we are giving additional thought with a view to developing further details of a U.S. position.

Conclusion

I believe the Manila Conference accomplished the objective expected of it from the United States point of view. In my judgment our Defense representation in the U.S. Delegation succeeded in its efforts to insure that the Treaty is consistent in its military implications with the positions taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by this Department.

I should like to pay tribute to the brilliant work of Secretary Dulles, Herman Phleger, and Douglas MacArthur II. These men carried the principal burdens of the negotiations with forcefulness and intelligence, and advanced the interests of the United States by their efforts.

A. C. Davis
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)
SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 63-6-54
CURRENT TRENDS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 15 September 1954. Concurring were the Special Assistant Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC and the Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
CURRENT TRENDS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

ESTIMATE

1. Since assuming office Premier Diem has been confronted with the usual problems of inefficiency, disunity, and corruption in Vietnamese politics and with the extraordinary problems of a mass evacuation of the Northern population and the hostility of many French officials. Despite his qualities of honesty and zeal, he has not yet demonstrated the necessary ability to deal with practical problems of politics and administration. Lacking an organized political machine and finding control of the Army in the hands of an uncooperative chief of staff, Diem’s freedom of action has been severely circumscribed.

2. The French Government appears to have no definite policy toward South Vietnam. While the French Government has not openly opposed the Diem Government, France has failed to support Diem and there is no evidence that the French are prepared to carry out a policy based on unreserved support for Vietnamese independence and nationalism. Accordingly, close cooperation between the French and Vietnamese governments, essential for the survival of South Vietnam, has been lacking and French motives have become more suspect.

3. Although little real progress has been made under Diem’s administration in dealing with pressing political, military, and social problems, he still retains considerable unorganized popular support, particularly among Catholic elements of South Vietnam. He has also made some progress in reaching agreement with the powerful Cochin China sects.

4. At the moment the Diem Government is threatened by the insubordination of General Hinh, the politically ambitious Chief of Staff whom Diem has discharged. It does not now appear that the present struggle between Diem and Hinh will degenerate into civil strife. In fact Diem now appears to be making some headway in his efforts to control or exile Hinh, either of which would enhance his prestige and remove an obstacle to the strengthening of his government.

5. Bao Dai has remained in France and apparently is refraining from direct participation in political affairs in South Vietnam. His prestige among Vietnamese nationalists has been considerably lessened by his apathy toward the fate of his country. We believe that if Bao Dai were now to return to Vietnam, he would almost certainly become a center of political intrigue and would further complicate an already complex and confused situation and weaken rather than strengthen the ability of South Vietnam to achieve political stability.

6. Trends in South Vietnam since the end of the Geneva Conference have enhanced the prospects of an eventual extension of Communist control over the area by means short of large-scale military attacks. Although Diem’s government will probably survive the present crisis of Hinh’s insubordination, and may achieve greater strength and popular support, it will continue to be threatened by Vietminh activity, and hampered by French indecision. Diem appears to be the only figure now on the political scene behind whom genuine nationalist support can be mobilized. However, his ability to create a government that could reverse the current trend in South Vietnam depends at a minimum on an early and convincing demonstration by the French of their wholehearted support.
Dear Walter:

I believe that it is necessary to make a matter of record a more detailed account of the recent impetuous action of General O'Daniel reported in Embassy telegrams 981 and 987 of September 13, 1954. This is a matter which I do not wish broached with Defense, no matter how informally. I am convinced that I can handle the situation here.

In this current political crisis involving the struggle between President Diem and General Hinh, General O'Daniel has quite understandably been deeply concerned. He has taken the position that, while he recognizes the faults and shortcomings of General Hinh, he still believes him to be the best soldier available to the Vietnamese to head up their National Army. This is not the view of General By or his most experienced and objective observers who see General Vy as preferable because of his character and experience, although lacking in Hinh's vivacity of intelligence. At the same time, being a man of action himself, General O'Daniel is impatient with the hesitancy and weakness of the Diem Government. It is not my purpose to comment upon these views, which are held in some measure by the Embassy as well. The problem arises in the General's tendency to believe that all matters can be portrayed in sharp black and white and can be solved by forthright and direct action. General O'Daniel is handicapped by his own straightforwardness and honesty of character, which make him an easy target for those who wish to take him in, and by an unfortunate impression that he is a master of tact and guile.

The situation in question developed following an informal meeting held in the Embassy on Sunday morning, September 12, when I discussed the current political crisis which had reached a particularly delicate point with members of the Embassy staff, representatives of another government agency, and General O'Daniel. The General was impatient to take action and, convinced as he was by General Hinh's disingenuous protestations...

The Honorable Walter S. Robertson
Assistant Secretary of State for
Far Eastern Affairs

Department of State
Washington, D.C.
that he had no personal political ambitions, believed that Diem and Hinh could be brought together very easily. I agreed that, while ideally the solution might be for Diem and Hinh to bury their differences, the matter was a little more difficult and I believed that at this moment neither I nor others should get in touch with Hinh. Before undertaking anything of this sort, it would be necessary for me to see Diem, which I did not plan to do until the following day. It had been clear for some time that General O'Daniel was eager to take a hand in the problem and he had previously offered "to be anybody's messenger" should the need arise. This knowledge was one of the reasons that I stated definitely that no one should see Hinh at this time.

Unfortunately, despite my admonition, General O'Daniel, accompanied by his aide, went that afternoon to call on General Hinh at General Hinh's house and had a two-hour conversation with him concerning the political crisis. This conversation was reported in summary in my telegram 981. In essence, it appears that General O'Daniel inquired as to Hinh's attitude toward the President and as to his personal political ambitions and received the usual story from Hinh depicting himself a loyal, patriotic soldier without political ambitions and only too ready to cooperate with the President. It would appear clear, as has been indicated by O'Daniel himself, that O'Daniel then suggested that, since Hinh felt that way, he should convey such a message to Diem in the hope that the matter could be set right by a clear understanding and differences between the two men thus be settled. Hinh made a telephone call immediately in O'Daniel's presence to the Secretary of State for Defense Chan, who promised to convey Hinh's message to the President. It is probable also that O'Daniel discussed, at least in general terms, his own solution for the Hinh-Diem conflict, which included the promotion of Hinh away from direct command of the army and placing him in the presidential palace as the supreme military adviser to the President.

O'Daniel's intentions in this action which he took were certainly good. The fact remains, however, that he took this action in direct contravention of my instructions, indulging his tendency to take matters into his own hands and to mix into political situations without proper clearance from the Chief of Mission.

This is not the first time that O'Daniel has taken hasty direct action himself with regard to a political problem. When difficulties began to shape up between Diem and Hinh and I had received a request from Diem to look into the possibility of having General Hinh invited to the United States in order to remove him from the scene while the President established his
authority over the National Army, I discussed the matter with O'Daniel. General O'Daniel was very much opposed to the idea of replacing Hinh and to this manner of doing it. He expressed himself as preferring Hinh to Diem, should he have to make a choice between the two men.

Following our conversation, and without indicating his intentions to me, General O'Daniel went to see Hinh and, as he put it, "sounded him out" on his attitude toward Diem and on whether or not he would consider visiting the United States at this time. General O'Daniel returned to tell me that he was convinced of the sincerity and patriotism of Hinh and of his willingness to cooperate loyally with the President. O'Daniel also said that Hinh would not consider visiting the United States at this time. This incident was reported in my telegram 706 of August 24.

Following his most recent two-hour conversation with Hinh, O'Daniel immediately tried to get in touch with me to report. As I was absent at a special church service, he gave an account of his conversation with Hinh to Counselor Kidder. The following day, September 13, I showed to O'Daniel the draft of a telegram which I had prepared reporting this matter in detail to the Department. O'Daniel insisted that he had not heard my instructions and upon this assurance I destroyed the telegram. It is possible that O'Daniel actually did not hear my instructions, as at the time he may well have been immersed in his own single-minded thoughts. General Trapnell, who preceded General O'Daniel as Chief of MAAG, remarked to me at one time that the latter seldom listened when he was told something, particularly if he had any scheme or idea of his own in mind.

My relations with O'Daniel have been excellent and I expect them to continue to be so. O'Daniel normally works in friendly and respectful cooperation; I believe that he will not again in the immediate future indulge in political free-wheeling, but in the long run his impetuous temperament, which drives him to take action even in situations where action is inadvisable, will probably reassert itself. It is for this reason that I wish to be on record in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Donald R. Heath

TOP SECRET

755
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Retention and Development of Forces in Indochina

1. In response to a memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 10 September 1954, subject as above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit the following views and recommendations.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the provisions of the Geneva Armistice Agreement and the latest National Security Council policies for the Southeast Asia area.

3. The restrictions imposed by the Geneva Armistice Agreement on Cambodia are minor and can be overcome to a degree sufficient to carry out generally the U.S. national policies in that area. The restrictions on Laos are major and permit training, assistance and supervision by French instructors only. In Vietnam the cease fire agreement constitutes a major obstacle to the introduction of adequate US MAAG personnel and of additional arms and equipment.

4. Although the French have not submitted for U.S. study any plans they may have for withdrawal of French forces from Indochina, some informal and general information has been obtained as to their present intentions. Based upon this information and taking into account the estimated capabilities of the three nations of the Associated States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that those forces listed in the Appendix hereto should be retained or developed in Vietnam and Cambodia. The estimated costs thereof, listed in the Appendix hereto must be reexamined in view of the lack of data related to condition and quantities of equipment and clothing, quantities of ICC, ammunition and arms to be reissued by the French.

5. Under the terms of the Geneva Armistice Agreement the training of Laotian armed forces may be conducted by French personnel only. However military equipment can be furnished in specified quantities for the defense of Laos through the French.
6. The development of the proposed forces for Viet Nam and Cambodia will require extensive and detailed training which will extend over a period of 3 to 5 years. The French should relinquish over-all command of the Armed Forces of Viet Nam as rapidly as possible with complete removal of forces when the Vietnamese are capable of exercising command of an effective force. The Vietnamese capability along these lines should be developed by intensive training and by progressive promotion of Vietnamese officers to posts in command of larger units and to positions of increased responsibility.

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that prior to the assumption of support of the forces of the state of South Viet Nam, a definite agreement should be obtained from the French Government with respect to the timing of their programmed phased withdrawal. The phasing out by the French should be correlated with the ability of the Vietnamese to take over this responsibility from the French, and at the same time assume command.

8. Although introduction of military equipment into Viet Nam above the levels existing at the time of signing the Geneva Armistice Agreement is prohibited, it is estimated that sufficient materiel is available in Viet Nam from that which was previously delivered to Indochina for the French Union Forces. The primary problem pertaining to materiel would be to insure that the French, while executing their phased withdrawal from Indochina, leave in Indochina the materiel and equipment required, insofar as available, for the use of the Viet Nam Armed Forces. It should also be emphasized that this materiel and equipment should be left in good operating condition.

9. The supply of items such as pay, food, uniforms, and POL, should be furnished by the Associated States to the maximum extent of their capabilities. However, it is fully recognized that, due to economic conditions in the associated states, they would require extensive support concerning these items. Such support as may be supplied by the United States should be furnished out of Mutual Security funds administered by Foreign Operations Administration.

10. Indochina is an important part of Southeast Asia and merits limited U.S. support in implementation of national policy in that area. The United States is supporting military programs in this area, which possess a capability of producing effective military forces. In view of the uncertain capabilities of the French and Vietnamese to retrieve, retain, and
reorganize the dispersed forces of Vietnam, it may be several years before an effective military force will exist. Therefore, U.S. military support to that area, including the training and equipping of forces, should be accomplished at low priority and not at the expense of other U.S. military programs and should not be permitted to impair the development through MDA programs of effective and reliable allied forces elsewhere.

11. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff note with concern the unstable political situation presently existing within the state of South Viet Nam, and, accordingly, consider that this is not a propitious time to further indicate United States intentions with respect to the support and training of Vietnamese forces.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(Signed)

ARTHUR RADFORD,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure:
Appendix
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: U.S. Assumption of Training Responsibilities in Indochina.

1. This memorandum is in response to the memorandum by the Acting Secretary of Defense, dated 31 August 1954, which requested the comments and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the State Department views on establishing a MAAG in Cambodia and a training mission in MAAG, Saigon. It also responds to the memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) dated 15 September 1954 which transmitted additional State Department views on Cambodia to be considered in connection with the memorandum of 31 August 1954, and to the memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), subject: "Training for the National Police Force of Vietnam," dated 21 September 1954.

2. In their memorandum for you dated 4 August 1954, subject as above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff set forth certain conditions which they considered should be met before the United States assumes responsibility for training of the Armed Force of the Associated States. In their memorandum for you, dated 12 August 1954, subject: "Message to the French Prime Minister" the Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterated two of these preconditions in their recommendations concerning the proposed message to the Prime Minister of France. From a military point of view, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that all of the previously expressed preconditions are still valid and desire to point out that conditions in South Vietnam fall short of meeting these preconditions. In the light of Presidential approval of the message to the Prime Minister of France and in light of Presidential approval of Sections II, III, and IV of NSC 5429/2, the Joint Chiefs of Staff offer no further objection in the establishment of a MAAG in Cambodia. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff note with concern the unstable political situation presently existing within the state of South Vietnam, and
accordingly consider that this is not a propitious time to further indicate United States intentions with respect to the support and training of either the Vietnamese regular or police forces. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend against the assignment of a training mission to MAAG, Saigon.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that special provisions of the bilateral agreement between the United States and Cambodia provide that all French advisors ultimately be withdrawn in order that the United States may deal directly with the Government of Cambodia, completely independent of French participation or control. The Joint Chiefs of Staff further recommend that no commitment be made at this time as to the size or composition of armed forces to be trained and supported, nor to the size and composition of the proposed MAAG in Cambodia, until further study can be given to these matters.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/

ARTHUR RADFORD,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (RSA)

SUBJECT: Evacuation of Equipment from North Viet-Nam

1. a. As reported by the Chief, MAC Indochina, the total tonnage of MACP material delivered to Indochina since the beginning of the program in December 1950 is 737,000 tons. In addition to the above, there has been an estimated 174,000 tons of military supplies (MACP) delivered. The above tonnages were delivered by water and a small additional amount estimated at 10,000 tons was delivered by air. This indicates a total of approximately 921,000 tons of military equipment delivered.

b. These tonnages were delivered into Indochina as a whole, with the majority going into Viet-Nam (North and South) and some going into Cambodia and Laos. It cannot be accurately ascertained as to the exact percentage of equipment going into the various areas, but based on the disposition of equipment at the end of hostilities, it is estimated that at least fifty per cent (50%) or 460,500 tons went into North Viet-Nam.

2. a. We were informed by the Chief, MAC Indochina, prior to the termination of hostilities, that there were approximately 500,000 tons of equipment and 20,000 vehicles in North Viet-Nam. This tonnage estimate was broken down roughly as follows:

   Equipment in Depot Stocks    250,000 Tons
   Equipment in the hands of forces    250,000 Tons

It is concluded that the above totals of equipment held by the French and native forces represented the total equipment located in North Viet-Nam, and therefore was provided from both MACP and French sources.
b. This figure was later refined to the following:

- Equipment in Depot Stocks 217,000 Tons
- Equipment in the hands of forces 220,000 Tons
- Total 437,000 Tons

3. These supplies may be broken down into three major categories as follows:

a. General supplies and equipment in depots.

b. Military supplies of all types in the hands of combat forces, service forces, naval bases, and air bases.

c. Vehicles of all types—most of which are probably in the hands of troops.

4. a. Our latest complete situation report (received weekly) from the Attache in Saigon on the evacuation from North Viet-Nam is dated 15 September and indicates the following evacuation as of that date:

- Equipment moved from depots 47,000 Tons
- Vehicles moved 4,136

b. It is assumed that the tonnages referred to above as having been evacuated were tonnages of equipment from depots.

c. Based on the figures in paragraph 2 above, this leaves to be evacuated 450,000 Tons of equipment broken down as follows:

- Equipment in Depot Stocks 200,000 Tons
- Equipment in the hands of forces 250,000 Tons

d. Some military units have been evacuated from the North and according to French procedure the equipment would be evacuated with the units. This amount of equipment evacuated has not been reported.
6. In summary, the situation as of 13 September is as follows:

(a) Equipment to be evacuated
   Equipment in Depot Stocks 200,000 Tons
   Equipment in the hands of forces 250,000 Tons

(b) The 250,000 tons of equipment in the hands of
   troops is broken down as follows:
   - Combat troops 76,000 Tons
   - All other - Army service units,
     Navy and Air bases 174,000 Tons

5. Attention is again invited to the fact that the tonnages
   listed above represent the total amount of material and equipment
   in the hands of the French Union and native forces and include
   not only NDAP furnished equipment but also all equipment furnished
   by France and the Associated States.

6. Attention is further invited to the attached two messages
   from (a) Admiral Stump, Commander-in-Chief Pacific (Tab A); and
   (b) Lieutenant General O’Daniel, Chief, NDAP Indochina (Tab B).
   Both of these officers indicate that they consider the status of
   evacuation of equipment to be progressing satisfactorily and are
   not measuring with respect to the overall evacuation problem
   from North Viet-Nam.

7. Reference is made to the data contained in paragraphs 1
   and 2 above as it applies to the approximate amount of NDAP
   material that may be in North Viet-Nam. It can be assumed that
   between twenty per cent (20%) and fifty per cent (50%) of the
   250,000 tons would be ammunition and gasoline which are items
   having a very high rate of consumption. Therefore, assuming that
   approximately 200,000 tons represent the ammunition and gasoline
   consumption and bottle leases of equipment, it can be estimated
   that approximately 250,000 to 260,000 tons of the equipment in
   North Viet-Nam had its source from the USA Program.
6. a. The French have informed General O'Daniel that the equipment in the hands of French Union Forces will be evacuated with the forces as they are withdrawn from North Viet-Nam. Also, the French do not report the tonnages of organizational equipment that are evacuated with the forces. Therefore, in the future the tonnages of equipment in the hands of troops will not be included in reports, and instead the number of French Union Forces to be evacuated will be substituted.

b. Latest reports indicate that 54,451 troops have been evacuated from North Viet-Nam, which is approximately twenty-four per cent (24%) of the total number to be evacuated.

(Signed) G. G. STEWART

G. G. STEWART
Major General, U. S. Army
Director, Office of Military Assistance

2 Inch
1. Tab A - Navy Msg 2375
   (21 Sep)
2. Tab B - DA III-66234
   (22 Sep)

Prep: Col Creme/run/24 Sep 54  Mr Horton  Col Clayman
   22 870 OMA/OSD 76560
Re XX... preceding telegram.

Follows text of message which approved by US and French delegations for transmittal to respective missions SAIGON.

QUOTE: In French-US discussions here, we and French have reached conclusion we should support Diem in establishment and maintenance of a strong, anti-Communist and nationalist government. To this end France and the US will both urge all anti-Communist elements in Viet-Nam to cooperate fully with the government of Ngo Dinh Diem.

We recognize five key elements which, can provide a stable anti-Communist nationalist government under Diem's leadership with chance of success: Bao Dai, Hinh and national army and three sects.

As a result of our discussions we are giving consideration to action along the following lines and desire your comments:

The problems relating to Chief of State will require further consideration when the Government of Viet-Nam is consolidated. Under present circumstances further demands should be made jointly or separately to Bao Dai emphasizing the consequences in terms of US and French support of failure on his part to act in such a way as to strengthen Ngo Diem...
Government. French and United States representatives in Saigon, who should be given a broad delegation of powers for this purpose, should encourage Diem to support our actions re Bao Dai with appropriate measures within the competence of the Vietnamese Government.

With respect to General Hinh, it is essential that Chief Staff obey orders given by civil authority. However, at same time, it must difficult to find a replacement for him. Consequently, demarches should be made to General Hinh and to President Diem towards a reconciliation. It would be emphasized that France and the United States are firmly supporting President Diem and that once his position is consolidated and only then should extensive program designed to develop the national army under General Hinh could be undertaken.

There remains the problem of who would be Minister of Defense over Hinh. In the future, relations with Hinh as Chief of Staff, should be limited to purely military matters in an effort to discourage him from entering into political affairs.

The sects play an essential role in their respective territories but have limited importance on a national scale. The sects have maintained flexible positions with regard to Diem, Viet Minh, Bao Dai, France and the United States. It is of vital importance that France and the United States maintain a carefully coordinated strategy towards the sects. The sects should be informed of the intent of the United States and France with regard to support for Diem. Diem might be advised to attempt to influence the sects through his handling of integration of their forces into the national army and through his ability to grant them administrative control.

766
over areas being evacuated by Viet Minh. The representatives in Vietnam of France and the United States should be given the broadest possible delegation of powers to determine coordinated positions in these matters.

With specific regard to Binh Xuyen, recognized that whatever their unsatisfactory and undesirable qualities may be, their position of power should not be underestimated particularly as they control the police, are closely tied in with Bao Dai, and in the past have been responsible for extensive terrorist activity in Saigon.

Therefore, our course of action should be to seek to isolate the Binh Xuyen particularly from Bao Dai and to minimize their power and influence through strengthening the national army as a counter. This can only be achieved progressively. At the present time it seems necessary to associate them with the government, which might in the long run be the best method to be in a position to control them. UNQUOTE.

As noted in paragraph above, Saigon comments requested regarding specific means by which we could carry out courses of action included above text.

French Delegation requests text above included within quotes be given Daridan with explanation this sent by US channels their request for his comments.

SMITH

ACTING

767

TOP SECRET
Classification
Dear Mr. Secretary:

With reference to the enclosures from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in your letter of September 29, there are several important political and policy aspects of both the manpower and cost estimates of force goals for the Associated States totalling about $356,400,000, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff reservations on the support and training of Vietnamese Forces.

With respect to the magnitude of force levels and costs for Viet-Nam and Cambodia, I believe that United States policy should be based on HSC 5429/2, which envisages the maintenance in Indochina of forces necessary to assure the internal security of the area, and on the arrangements concluded on June 8 to deter aggression in Southeast Asia. The concepts underlying the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty should make the maintenance of relatively large ground forces unnecessary in the Associated States, since the military establishment of a single state within such a collective security group need not be so large as would be required if that nation had to act alone to defend its security against external aggression. It seems to me that the mission of the Vietnamese National Armed Forces should be to provide internal security. The manpower and cost estimates in the JCS attachment would seem to be excessive in the above context.

From the political viewpoint some armed forces are necessary. If adequately trained and equipped they would give the people of Free Viet-Nam some assurance of internal security and provide the Government of Free Viet-Nam with an increased sense of stability. This would produce definite political and psychological advantages and would help fulfill the objectives of HSC 5429/2. I would appreciate having your views as to the forces we should contemplate to carry out this policy as well as the amount of funds we should devote to this purpose.

With respect to the question of U.S. support and training for the Vietnamese forces there are two political aspects: purpose and timing. Effective execution of HSC policy on U.S. support for such forces can have a significant bearing on the political objective of creating a stable, capable anti-Communist government in Viet-Nam, and in assisting it in carrying out a vigorous internal program with Congressional approval. One effective way to strengthen the Vietnamese Government is to assist in the reorganizing and training of its armed forces, as I noted in my letter to you of August 10, 1954. This point was again referred to in the Acting Secretary’s letter of September 7, 1954, to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. In addition to budgetary support, a direct means of helping to create and maintain political stability will be by appropriate participation of the U.S. DOD in the planning, developing and training of Vietnamese security forces. The Department of State is aware of the risks.

The Honorable
Charles E. Wilson
Secretary of Defense
difficulties and impediments in any such program of U.S. training and assistance for Vietnamized forces. Nevertheless, within these difficulties and limitations, I feel there are many reasons to consider a vigorous, imaginative, and effective program for planning, developing, and training Vietnamized security forces both in Viet-Nam and perhaps even in nearby countries or in the United States itself. We could substantially influence the development of political, as well as military, stability in free Viet-Nam if we had such a training project with Vietnamized forces. The provision of direct budgetary support to these forces would have far less impact if the United States chooses any participation in training these forces.

Then there is the question of timing regarding the degree of political stability which the Joint Chiefs of Staff raised in their memorandum of September 22, 1955. I believe that potential political developments now warrant your consideration of the necessary preliminary steps for working out an appropriate U.S. training function for Vietnamized security forces.

With respect to these considerations regarding force goals and training in Viet-Nam, we need to take some decisions promptly to enable us to respond to the Cambodian, Vietnamese, and French Governments concerning financial and other support for their forces in Indo-China.

The President has signed a letter to the Prime Minister of Viet-Nam authorizing the American Ambassador to Viet-Nam to examine with him an intelligent program of direct American aid to assist Viet-Nam. A similar letter has already been delivered to the King of Cambodia. In the meantime the Vietnamese Government has submitted a note to this Government stating that it is considering increasing the Vietnamese army to a total force of 250,000 men in order to "guarantee the internal and external security of the country" and requesting United States assistance in this endeavor. The French Finance Minister in his recent talks in Washington, expressed a desire for U.S. financial support for the French Expeditionary Corps in Indo-China, which the French contemplate retaining at an average strength of about 150,000 men during 1955. The United States representatives indicated that we would strive to give some indication to the French Government of our thinking on these matters by December 1, 1955. The plans of the French and the Vietnamese both seem to me to be beyond what the United States should consider feasible to support for maintaining the security of free Indo-China at this time.

In view of the political considerations and the requirements of timing, it is imperative that the United States Government prepare a firm position on the size of the forces we consider a minimum level to secure the internal security of Indo-China. This position will also have to include the amount of money we will be prepared to make available for this purpose, and the steps we will be willing to take to assist in the training and formation of these forces. It occurs to me that we cannot realistically enter into discussions with the other governments concerned until we have made this determination. I would therefore also appreciate your views on how best we should proceed in making this determination.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Governor Stassen.

Sincerely yours,

[/]

John Foster Dulles

763

TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Development and Training of Indigenous Forces in Indochina

1. There is attached a letter from the Secretary of State which refers to two memoranda from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 22 September 1954, on the subjects: "Retention and Development of Forces in Indochina" and "U.S. Assumption of Training Responsibilities in Indochina." These memoranda were made available to the Department of State by a letter from the Secretary of Defense, dated 28 September 1954.

2. In the attached letter Secretary Dulles raises two related aspects of the military situation in Indochina: force levels of indigenous forces, and U.S. training responsibilities for Vietnamese forces. He points out certain political considerations which he feels affect both these subjects.

3. In the light of the views expressed in this latest letter from the Secretary of State, it is requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit their comments and recommendations with respect to the levels of forces that should be developed in Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia, including their concept of the objectives of such forces from the U.S. military point of view and an estimate of the annual operating cost of training and maintaining such forces.

4. It is further requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit their comments and recommendations concerning a U.S. commitment to train Vietnamese forces, in the light of the considerations pointed out by the Secretary of State in his letter. In view of the special emphasis placed on an urgent determination of a U.S. course of action toward the training question at a meeting of the Operations Coordinating Board on 13 October, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this subject are requested as a matter of high priority.

Signed -

H. Struve Hensel

cc: OMA
Cy 1, 2, 3, JCS
Cy 4 OMA
Cy 5 Green, 6 Pink OSD
Cy 7 Blue R&G Cy 8 OIMA
Cy 9 Yellow

TOP SECRET

In Reply Refer to I-15504:

Oct 14, 1954

I 15504
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Development and Training of Indigenous Forces in Indochina

1. This memorandum is in response to a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (NEA), dated 14 October 1954, subject as above.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reconsidered the recommendations contained in their memorandum for you, dated 22 September 1954, on the subjects, "Retention and Development of Forces in Indochina" and "U.S. Assumption of Training Responsibilities in Indochina." In the light of the most recent comments of the Secretary of State.

3. The justification for forces in excess of those necessary for internal security is as follows:

a. The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty does not provide for specific military force commitments. It does provide for consultation and military planning and for action in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each party in the case of an attack against any party to the Treaty. It also provides for consultation among the parties in the case of a threat to the inviolability or integrity of the territory or to the sovereignty or political independence of any party to the Treaty. By a special protocol the parties to the Treaty unanimously made these terms applicable to Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.

b. NSC 152/2 envisages reliance on indigenous ground forces to the maximum extent possible. Considerable numbers of Viet Minh guerrillas and sympathizers are known to be or suspected of being within the territory of Free Vietnam and the government of Vietnam has
announced an intention of requesting the phased withdrawal of the French forces by 1956. This would result in a complete military vacuum unless the Vietnamese are adequately prepared to take over progressively as the French withdraw.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the ultimate objectives of the military forces of the Associated States should be:

VIETNAM - To attain and maintain internal security and to deter Viet Minh aggression by a limited defense of the Geneva Armistice demarcation line.

CAMBODIA - To maintain internal security and provide for a limited defense of the country.

Laos - To maintain insofar as possible internal security. (It is recognized that Laos does not have the capability to defend against overt aggression.)

5. The Vietnamese and Cambodian forces considered as the minimum required ultimately to carry out the above objectives are as contained in the memorandum for you by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 22 September 1956, subject: "Retention and Development of Forces in Indochina." These forces should be developed in phased increments dependent upon continued resistance to Communist encroachment by the Governments of Vietnam and Cambodia consistent with:

g. French willingness to accept U.S. training responsibility.

b. Capability of the Associated States to develop effective and reliable forces.

c. The ability of a limited U.S. MAC to conduct training.

d. The continued availability of MAC funds without detriment to other programs.

The estimated cost of training and maintaining these forces is also contained in the same memorandum. Under the terms of the Geneva Armistice Agreement, the introduction of foreign military personnel into Laos is limited to specified
J

*J

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*
considerations are overriding, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would agree to the assignment of a training mission to MACV, Saigon, with safeguards against French interference with the U.S. training effort.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

[Signature]

ARTHUR RADFORD,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
From: Paris

To: Secretary of State

No: DULTE 5, October 21, 3 p.m.

NIGCT

Sent department DULTE 5, Repeated Information Saigon 209

EYES ONLY ACTING SECRETARY FROM SECRETARY.

SAIGON EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR.

During and after dinner tonight with Mendes-France, we discussed Indochina. I said our recent reports indicated disturbing internal situation South Vietnam. Mendes-France agreed situation serious, but said understandable we should now be at psychological low point following armistice. He was also firm regarding importance giving Diem every chance. He went on, however, to say that plans should be laid for "another structure of government" which could be produced in event Diem failure. In response my question, he was unclear as to meaning his phrase and indicated he had no other local political figure in mind as possible replacement Diem. He stressed, however, importance of utilizing thinig legitimacy deriving from Bao Dai, although he was frank in discussing latter's failures and spoke of necessity keeping him off front of stage.

At conclusion conversation, Mendes-France indicated desire before my departure to discuss situation South Vietnam and what we might do about it at greater length. In anticipation such further talk, I would appreciate receiving urgently Department's latest estimate political developments.

DULLES

HJH

Note: Mr. Gleyesteen (SS) notified 10-20-54 10:35 p.m. EM
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Action in Indochina

1. No one is more aware than you that the neutralist world, now weighing the course of the future, will eventually make a choice between Communism and freedom. The ultimate fate of the free portion of Indochina will become a critical element in that choice for the vast millions living in the uncommitted regions of Asia and the Middle East. The loss of the rest of Indochina in consequence of the 1956 elections or otherwise, would inevitably sway many of these millions to Communism. Aside from its political aspects, this trend could be militarily disastrous to the U.S. strategic position in the Far East. If another free world debacle in Indochina materializes, as every intelligence estimate predicts, the U.S. military position in the Western Pacific could be jeopardized.

2. You are, of course, aware of the many current proposals for political, economic, and military programs designed to check the spread of Communist influence to South Vietnam. The Chief of MAC, Indochina has asked repeatedly for a governmental decision to enable the U.S. to begin the training of native armies in South Vietnam and Cambodia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have hesitated to concur in General O'Daniel's recommendation just as they hesitated to recommend participation in the Indochina war while it was in progress because the political situation has so deteriorated that the indigenous support, required to make any military efforts successful, seemed doubtful of attainment. I understand that decisions on certain economic programs are being withheld for a similar reason.
3. In any assessment of the situation in Indochina, it seems obvious that the superiority of Communist political leadership in that area has not been accidental. The Communists have always recognized the necessity for preparing and training leadership cadres in the areas they have marked out for subversive operations. In Indochina, the French opposition to the legitimate nationalist aspirations of the Vietnamese has aided skilled, indoctrinated Communist personnel in carrying out their plans. On the other hand, the lack of a basis for understanding between the indigenous people in Indochina and the French has been one of the primary reasons for the free world's failure in Indochina. We have hesitated to face up to making decisions regarding proposals for Indochina because we are not confident that we can defeat the Communist at their own game. The methods we have tried to reach the minds of the actual and potential pro-freedom leaders in Indochina have not been successful. We have not succeeded in making our objectives in Indochina appear desirable to the people there in terms of their own interests, problems and ambitions. A new approach to leadership training and cross fertilization between Western and Asiatic ideas in the Indochina area is necessary. Because the 1956 elections set an absolute deadline to our efforts we must seek for psychological progress that see their results in months rather than years.

4. In this connection, a psychological operations concept entitled "Militant Liberty" which has recently come to my personal attention seems to possess the ingredients we are groping for. "Militant Liberty" is a concept which was successfully tested in Philippine battles against the "Huk." "Militant Liberty" motivates indigenous people to work toward a common goal of individual freedom by presenting to them the principles of freedom, clearly stated, in a manner which can be vigorously propagated and faithfully supported. The concept of "Militant Liberty" provides a clear statement of freedom expressed
in language that men anywhere can understand in a short period of time.

"Militant Liberty" stimulates the peoples of countries threatened by Communism to act to achieve the objectives of freedom through self-expression, proper organization and progressive action.

5. Many competent people qualified to render judgment have been impressed with the merit and value of the "Militant Liberty" approach. As I see it, the potential success "Militant Liberty" could achieve in Indochina is so great that our joint efforts should be devoted to getting it underway with least possible delay. I should like to suggest that Mr. Erich, who is a consultant to the Joint Subsidiary Plans Division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, be made available to brief you and members of your immediate staff in the near future. There is attached herewith (Tab A) a comprehensive paper setting forth the concept.

6. The heart of any plan to implement "Militant Liberty" is the progressive training of groups of indigenous personnel in an understanding of the meaning of a free society to the individual and the individual's responsibilities in creating and maintaining such a society. If the concept of "Militant Liberty" were tested in Indochina, indigenous personnel would have to be trained from among the military as well as the civilian elements of Vietnamese society. If a significant military training program were instituted, the induction-training-discharge cycle provides ready access to indigenous personnel who could play an important role in a revitalization of Vietnam both during their period of military service and subsequently after they had returned to civilian life. For this reason, as well as to insure unity of effort, the implementation of "Militant Liberty" on a test basis in Indochina should, I believe, be accomplished on a joint military-CIA basis. I am enclosing an outline form (Tab B) the draft of a plan which can be further developed for joint execution by your agency and COMPAC.
7. The armed forces are in a position to support the purely military aspects of this program. As the draft plan suggests, however, the necessity exists for considerable parallel action in the civilian community in South Vietnam. It is my hope that once you have had an opportunity to understand the concept behind "Militant Liberty" you will be in a position to assist in underwriting substantially the remaining elements of an integrated operational plan.

d. It is my firm conviction that "Militant Liberty" offers us the means for which we have been searching to galvanize the Vietnamese into taking the action they must take if they are to remain free. I trust, once you have had the opportunity to become acquainted with "Militant Liberty", that you also will see as much value in it.
EYES ONLY SECRETARY FROM ACTING SECRETARY

EYES ONLY HEATH

DUITE 5.

For your ready reference we quote paragraph 4 of the September 29 Minute of Understanding:

QUOTE With respect to Viet-Nam, the representatives of France and the United States agree that their respective governments support Ngo Dinh Diem in the establishment and maintenance of a strong, anti-Communist and nationalist government. To this end France and the United States will urge all anti-Communist elements in Viet-Nam cooperate fully with Government of Ngo Dinh Diem in order counter vigorously the Viet Minh and build a strong free Viet-Nam UNQUOTE.

Brief estimate political situation South Viet-Nam follows:

1. While General Minh's threat to execute military coup seems to have been averted, Minh and his associates Xuan and Bay Vien continued hold virtual veto power over Diem and his government. Prolongation of crisis leads to inevitable deterioration of government's position and prospects, even if it is no longer menaced by violent overthrow.

We do not repeat not feel that sufficient effort has yet been made to carry
carry out above quoted U.S.-French agreement. While Ely seems to have attempted honestly carry out this agreement, fact that many French elements have never accepted Diem solution must have weakened Ely's efforts and encouraged Hînh camarilla in its recalcitrance. Paren In this connection see Paris 1665 UNHAREN. We remain of opinion that military personalities now opposing Diem are more susceptible to French pressure and influence than any other similarly powerful elements in Viet-Nam.

Broad government of national union around Diem has not been achieved. Until the current civil-military-sect conflict is resolved any successor Prime Minister would be faced with substantially similar problem with which he might be even less prejudicial able to cope than Diem, except on conditions prejudicial to establishment of government of integrity.

2. Current jockeying for power and struggle for cabinet positions is resulting in paralyzing impasse. Positive moves are necessary by France and the U.S. if this impasse is to be broken. We remain convinced that if anything is to be saved in Viet-Nam we cannot sacrifice indispensable qualities of honesty, incorruptibility and nationalism represented more conspicuously at this moment by Diem than by anyone else.

3. Mendes-France's use of term QUOTE another structure of government UNQUOTE suggests French hankering to reestablish political system similar to that of 1946 Cochinchinese Republic, founded on police and military power to be exercised by such figures as Tan and Hînh. In addition to such pro-French figures, system might involve direct colonial-type controls by French. Such a formula in French eyes would have advantage of facilitating elimination of Bao Dai and non-Cochinchinese elements like Diem. A development of this sort in our view would create conditions in South
South Viet-Nam analogous to those which ended by delivering to Viet Minh northern half of Viet-Nam, even though it might in the short run restore internal order.

4-5. We agree with Mendes-France's feeling that perpetuation of Bao Dai in present role preserves thread of legality. We believe however that when some legislative body can take over from him his present appointive powers the time will have come to remove him from the scene.

5-6. OSS on October 20 approved initiation military training program by MAAG Saigon to be undertaken soonest with personnel and other resources now available there. Necessary instructions to MAAG and Embassy now in process. We hope this step, together with delivery of President's letter to Diem, will strengthen Diem in his relations both with French and other Vietnamese.

6-7. In summary, unless Diem receives unreserved U.S. and French support, his chances of success appear slight. With such support, his chances are probably better than even repeat even.
Immediately following this note is a draft Joint State-Defense cable on the above subject. This cable carries out the gist of the JCS decision of 20 October. It is being acted on this evening by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Erskine will undertake to get Mr. Wilson's approval of the JCS action first thing Friday morning and to communicate Mr. Wilson's reaction to Adm. Radford prior to the NSC meeting. Mr. Hoover, who has agreed not to send the message until final Defense clearance is obtained, will probably seek Defense concurrence in the cable at the NSC meeting in connection with his report on Indochina.

Unless the JCS or Mr. Wilson have some objection which it is not now expected (Adm. Radford will know in the morning), it is suggested that you concur in the dispatch of the cable as written.
TO: Embassy SAIGON

JOINT STATE-DEFENSE MESSAGE TO US AMBASSADOR SAIGON AND CHIEF OF US
MAAG SAIGON

The following message contains the policy of the US Government and your
instructions necessary to carry out paragraphs 10-a and 10-3, Part IV of
NSC 5429/2.

PART I  US Governmental Policy

(1) It is US Govt. policy to support the Government of Free Vietnam
under the Premiership of Ngo Dinh Diem and to assist that Government initially
(a) to promote internal security and political stability in Free Vietnam,
(b) to establish and maintain control by that Government throughout the
territory of Free Vietnam, and (c) effectively to counteract Viet Minh
infiltration and paramilitary activities south of the 17th Parallel.

(2) For these purposes and utilizing existing Vietnamese armed forces,
it is the policy of the US Govt. that all appropriate agencies and MAAG Saigon
should immediately develop and initiate with the Vietnamese Government a
program for training that number of Vietnamese armed forces necessary to carry
out the above missions. US agencies now agree no efforts should be spared in finding ways to begin and carry out such a program in the shortest possible time. The use of areas outside of Vietnam and various means of increasing US training personnel should be exploited to the fullest.

(3) The initial target will be the reorganization and training of those armed forces required for the internal security and support of the legal Government of Free Vietnam. The ultimate objective and the composition of US support of Vietnamese forces required to achieve these or other longer range objectives is presently under study by the appropriate US Govt. agencies.

(4) It is fully recognized that, to be effective, US MAAG Saigon must have adequate authority, responsibility, augmented strength, and full support from Vietnamese and French authorities. The activities and functions of MAAG Saigon must be carried out without interference by, but with appropriate coordination and assistance from French authorities.
PART II INSTRUCTIONS FOR MAAG SAIGON

(1) In implementation of this policy, US MAAG Saigon immediately will:

(a) Assist in the reorganization of the Vietnamese armed forces and provide such training and support as will contribute to the maintenance of the legal government of Vietnam on a broad national basis and under the Premiership of Ngo Dinh Diem.

(b) Seek initially the reorganization and training of those Vietnamese armed forces required for internal security and the support of the legal government.

(c) Develop immediately and take initial steps to implement with the Government of Free Vietnam a program for the training of those Vietnamese forces necessary to counteract Viet Minh infiltration and paramilitary activities.
(a) Continue to coordinate closely with the US Ambassador to ensure that these activities are consistent with the policies of the United States regarding the legal government of Free Vietnam.

(2) In view of the critical international implications of this program, the major decisions to be taken in Washington, and the continuing review of the longer range implications, it is requested that US MAAG report regularly and make recommendations concerning all significant developments affecting this program.

PART III INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE AMBASSADOR, SAIGON

(1) You are requested to undertake the necessary discussions and negotiations with the Government of Free Vietnam and local French authorities to obtain agreements (a) ensuring US MAAG Saigon will have the necessary authority, responsibility and freedom of action to carry out the above program; and (b) assuring the cooperation, coordination and assistance from Vietnamese and French authorities and personnel at all levels in Free Vietnam.

(2) You will immediately consult with Chief MAAG to formulate the detailed agreements and assurances which MAAG requires.
(1) You are requested to inform French Government of these instructions and to seek its agreement immediately to authorize General Ely to conclude the necessary agreements with the US Ambassador Saigon and Chief MAIG to implement the above program.

FYI the Department of State is immediately undertaking to obtain appropriate understanding and means of augmenting the MAIG strength.

October 21, 1954.
State-Mr. Young; Defense-Mr. Godel; Mr. Sullivan; OSS-Mr. Staats, Mr. MacDonald.
ITEM 4 (For Information)

INDOCHINA

1. This will be an oral report on the subject by the Chairman of the CCB, Herbert Hoover, Jr., or someone designated by him. It will probably include a summary of the recent U.S.-French discussions on Indochina as well as of the current situation there.

2. The CCB, at its 6 October meeting, requested its special Working Group on Indochina to prepare a program of economic and military aid to the three Associated States to include both direct aid and aid to be granted in coordination with the French, these aid programs to be based on the tentative force goals developed by the JCS. This program is now being developed. The JCS recommended force goals are attached as TAB A; State comments thereon as TAB B.

3. At its meeting of 13 October, the OCB agreed that State and Defense, as a matter of urgency, should develop guidance on U.S. training of Free Vietnamese forces for approval by the Board at its meeting on 20 October. Mr. Cutler has expressed considerable concern at OCB meetings over the failure on the part of the U.S. to get a military training program underway in Vietnam. The JCS, however, have been dubious regarding this sort of U.S. military involvement in Indochina because of the unstable political situation and the limitations on the size of the MAAG imposed by the Geneva Agreement and recommended against such training unless political considerations were overriding (see TABS C and D). At the OCB meeting of 20 October, State said political considerations are, in fact, overriding and the OCB is, we understand, directing immediate commencement of U.S. military training in Vietnam. The OCB's draft recommendations are at TAB E.

4. This OCB action may have broken the log-jam of inactivity regarding Vietnam which has gripped the U.S. Government since Geneva. However, there are many other possible psychological and political action programs which may deserve a try in a real effort to keep free Indochina from being assimilated by the Communists. Therefore, continued, streamlined efforts by the Departments and Agencies concerned, given highest priority, seem necessary.

RECOMMENDATIONS

5. It is recommended that you suggest that the Council:

   a. Discuss whether the current U.S. approach to the problems of Indochina is yet fully adequate to achieve our objectives there.

   b. Reaffirm its belief that the development and implementation of effective programs with regard to Indochina be given highest priority attention within the Departments and Agencies concerned and that the present action machinery be streamlined to the extent possible.
Draft Recommendations for OSS on Training in Viet Nam

The OSS today took the following position on this matter in order to carry out paragraphs 10-a and 10-d of Part IV of ESC 5429/2:

1) It is necessary for US MAC/ Saigon to be authorized immediately to undertake the functions of providing military advice and training as appropriate to Vietnamese forces at all levels for the development and maintenance of internal security. Within its capabilities, US MAC/Saigon should assist in the reorganization of the Vietnamese armed forces and give them such training and support as required to sustain the legal government of Vietnam.

2) The training and advisory activities of US MAC/Saigon should be closely coordinated with the Ambassador to assure that military advice and training support the policies of the United States regarding the maintenance of a legal Vietnamese Government having a broad base of national union and under the premiership of Mr. Ngo Dinh Diem.

3) Utilizing existing Vietnamese Armed Forces the appropriate agencies of the US Government and existing US MAC/Saigon should develop immediately and take initial steps to execute with the Vietnamese Government a plan for training minimum Vietnamese security forces necessary to counteract Viet Minh infiltration and paramilitary activities. The mission of such forces should be to enable the Government of Free Viet Nam to establish and maintain its control throughout that territory. No efforts should be spared in finding ways to begin and carry out such training in the shortest possible time. The use of areas outside of Viet Nen and various means of increasing US training personnel should be exploited.
4) This training should be carried out without interference from but with appropriate coordination and assistance from French military authorities.

5) The initial target will be the reorganization and training of the minimum armed forces required for internal security in support of a legal government. The question of ultimate total size and U.S. support of Vietnamese forces will be left for later determination.

6) The State Department will undertake to obtain from the Vietnamese and French Governments the necessary agreements as to adequate authority, responsibility, and augmented strength of the US MACV/Saigon.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 25, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DOWN
GENERAL HOMESTEAD

As you know, the President has asked me to summarize, as briefly and as objectively as I can, the "Policy and General Observations" part of the von Moltke Report, at the Council Meeting on October 23.

For your use in briefing the Secretary, I enclose my draft of such a summary.

This summary is not for distribution. The attached copy is intended only for you and the Secretary.

[Signature]

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT

ATTACHMENT
In reply refer to I-7466

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: The Van Fleet Report on His Mission to the Far East

Mr. Cutler has asked me to advice you that he has discussed briefly with the President the Van Fleet Report. He feels that the broad views of General Van Fleet should be made known to the members of the National Security Council, even though they may be somewhat different from present policies, in order that it cannot be said in the future that the views of such a distinguished person who is very familiar with the Far East were not considered in reviewing U. S. policy toward the Far East. Therefore, Mr. Cutler intends to give the NSC a very brief presentation of General Van Fleet’s views in connection with the discussion of the Far East, scheduled for the meeting on Thursday, 29 October.

SIGNED

C. H. BONESTEEL, III
Brigadier General, United States Army
Defence Member, NSC Planning Board

cc: ASD (Controller)
    Director, OFIA
    Director, CMA

Blue - RSC Files
Yellow - Stayback

CHBonesteel/mm/22 Oct 54
CASSD(18A) 25840 73101

CONFIDENTIAL
REPORT OF THE VAN FLEET MISSION TO THE FAR EAST

SUMMARY OF GENERAL AND POLICY OBSERVATIONS

Chapter 5 - United States Position in the Far East: An Appreciation

1. The Problem: The problem before us is the failure of U.S. leadership in the Far East. In the light of enormous communist gains in Korea and Indochina, and the generally deteriorating situation throughout the area, the national security policies we have been following are pointing towards ultimate defeat. We must exercise necessary leadership and develop appropriate policies for that role.

2. The Enemy's Design: So long as the Chinese Communist regime exists, it will not abandon its goal of conquest, or dominance of East and Southeast Asia. For the next several years, Communist China is a greater menace to the Free World than the Soviet Union itself.

3. Implementation of the Design: Since the end of World War II, the Chinese Communist regime has waged a relentless war against the free world, specifically the United States. The conquest of China, Korea and Indochina have been stages. Geneva is but a first installment. It appears certain that Communist China will press on towards the objective of controlling all of Southeast Asia. Her further aggressive aims have been publicly announced ("liberation" of Formosa -- Ho Chi Minh's intention to take over all Vietnam). Communist China regards the Korean armistice only as a deferral of the ultimate aim of control of all Korea.

4. The Common Enemy: The common enemy in the Far East is Communist China, aided and abetted by Soviet Russia. Communist China has pursued a middle course -- pushing forward her program of conquest, but never to the point of precipitating unlimited war with the U.S. We, by our actions and inactions, have transformed a once weak communist regime into a world power. Peace with freedom cannot be restored to Asia as long as the Chinese Communist regime continues to exist. Unless we stop her now, the results will be catastrophic and we will be forced to intervene eventually anyway to restore the balance.

5. Implications of Free World Defeat: Further defeats could lead to a chain reaction and loss of the whole area, including India, to the Communist orbit -- or its neutralization. Communist control of Asia would be an important step towards control of Europe.

"We must recognize that the defeat we . . . have suffered in Indochina is merely a part of the price we are paying for weakness in Korea -- for the Red Chinese victories in Korea that our self-imposed limitations forced on our commanders, for an armistice that relieved Red China of the strains of war . . . The future will reveal other prices we must pay for the free world defeat in Indochina."
"Toward the last stages of the war in Indochina, those who opposed intervention . . . expounded the principle that two conditions were necessary to justify our intervention: First, that the local government must exercise effective control; and second, that the local population must be friendly to the United States. In reality, this principle is largely a paraphrase of the position developed in the State Department's 'China White Paper' . . . to explain our failure to prevent the loss of the mainland of China to the Communists. Moreover, it must be pointed out that it is a very dangerous doctrine that invites explanations for future failures and defeats. Its greatest danger is that it overlooks a prime responsibility of leadership, i.e., to strive to create conditions favorable for positive action."

6. Defeat Unnecessary: --Our defeat is unnecessary. There are large indigenous material and human resources in the area which can be developed and harnessed in the event of hostilities with Red China. Twice we let slip the "decisive strategic opportunity" of subtracting Communist China from the Soviet orbit, and thus beginning the rollback of Communist power in Korea and Indochina. When Chinese communist aggression starts again, as it undoubtedly will, we must be prepared to strike back and seize that strategic opportunity.

7. Free World Assets: Considered separately, the problems of Korea, Formosa, Japan and the Philippines appear insoluble except through ultimate defeat; for these countries are in the line of march for communist conquest. On the other hand, considered as a regional area, linked to U.S. influence and power, they have assets of great present value, and even greater potential value. General Van Fleet then analyzes the actual and potential strengths of these countries, emphasizing the role they might play in a united offensive with the U.S. against Communist China.

8. Failure of Leadership: Despite the real and potential free world strength in Asia, we have continued to suffer one defeat after another. Our failure in the Far East is one of leadership; it is a failure to consolidate Free World resources of the Far East and make of those consolidated resources an instrument of Free World power and influence. We have failed to create conditions for the development of a strong, friendly role by Japan. We have failed to solve the Japanese-Korean problem. We have failed to solve the Japan-Philippines reparations problem. Our technical assistance and economic aid programs have been inadequate. Our educational and exchange programs have been weak and inadequate. Above all, we have failed to develop for ourselves a firm policy for the Far East, to decide what sort of a position we wish to build there. Under our present national security policies in the Far East, we are in no position to solve the dilemma, save by compromise built on compromise. Equally, we cannot redress the balance in Asia if we give Britain and France a veto over our policies in the area.
9. Halting the Shrinkage in the Free World: We are doomed to ultimate defeat in the Far East if we continue to be precluded from taking strong action. If the shrinkage of the free world is to be halted, we must begin the rollback of communist power. We must exert constant pressure against China to undermine her position. In the event of Communist assault on Formosa, we should take the offensive against China proper. Communist attack on the offshore islands would present us the opportunity of destroying a large part of the Chinese Communist air strength, and furnish the occasion for the start of the rollback which might profitably begin with the recapture of Hainan. American opinion will support such a strong policy in Asia.

Chapter 6. Observations of the Chief of Mission

10. This policy would have two aspects to be concurrently followed: 
   1) defensively, the development of increasing strength and stability in East Asia, (2) the maintenance of continuous pressures against the Communist apparatus. A regional, multi-national organization, integrating the assets of the nations in question, will insure the phased development of military, political and economic strengths. In particular,

"Under the conditions extant today, Formosa represents an asset which transcends considerations of pure defense. It constitutes the most important springboard for the projection of all manner of operations against the Chinese Communist mainland. It is the potential rallying point for the totality of non-communist Chinese in Asia, under a liberal political platform which could have a profound appeal to the Chinese masses. It houses a vehemently anti-communist government which could contribute significantly to a regional organization designed to solidify the free nations of Asia as a prerequisite to action calculated to undermine and weaken the Communist bloc."

Chapter 7 - Explanation of Approach to Survey

11. "Cursory examination revealed that there were no positive and consistent United States policy statements... with respect to East Asia and its component countries. Similarly lacking were clear and unmistakable prime military missions for the forces of the several countries... Consequently, certain hypothetical policies were established in order to secure a quantitative measure of the forces required for the support thereof." The first envisages an intermediate policy designed to develop increasing strength among the free nations of Asia while maintaining pressures to undermine and weaken Asian communist regimes and being prepared to exploit by offensive action the situations created by such pressures. This policy, he states, is geared to the announced intentions of the Administration, although not adequately reflected in current national security policies. The second policy considers preventive war. The third policy considers a distinctly defensive posture.
General Van Fleet's analysis and recommendations as to the mission, size and composition of military forces for East Asian countries are apparently based primarily upon the first assumed policy, as illustrated by General Van Fleet's statement of the general mission of the expanded and improved East Asia indigenous forces stated in his "Summary of Recommendations on the Area as a Whole":

1. Maintenance of internal security;
2. Defense against external aggression;
3. Exertion of constant pressure against the Communist enemy;
4. Exploitation of opportunities arising from the cumulative effects of constant pressure against the enemy, and
5. Development of an adequate base for maximum mobilization in the event of war with Communist China or a general war.
TOP SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: October 26, 1954

Copy No.--of--copies reproduced in O/C/R

SUBJECT: Indochina.

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary
The French Ambassador
Mr. Tyler, WE

AMBASSADOR BONNET called on the Secretary at his own request. He said that he had not been instructed to make a demarche but had come on his own initiative to express his misgivings and deep anxiety with regard to the course of events in Indochina. He said that the information he had received officially, and in personal communications from General SLY, led him to feel that the chances of DIEN succeeding in forming a government of national unity and of acquiring authority were very slight.

He said that General SLY, in whom he had unbounded confidence, had done everything he could to bring about a settlement of the DIEN-HINH quarrel. He had succeeded in obtaining from HINH the undertaking that he would limit himself entirely to military affairs and would stay away from politics. He had brought HINH to the point where he had agreed that he would take orders from DIEN. However DIEN had on his part been adamant and is insisting on getting rid of HINH. This deadlock has created a dangerous situation in which some of the younger officers behind HINH are beginning to agitate to the point where the possibility of civil disorder cannot be excluded. Should this happen, the French Expeditionary Force would in no circumstances go into action against Vietnamese troops but would only look toward its own security.

The Ambassador commented in a rueful tone that "France now had everyone against her in Indochina." He said that the President's letter to DIEN had created a sensation in Saigon and was being interpreted as superseding the
Washington agreements, by which Ambassador Heath need no longer consider himself bound. It was felt that the President's letter had given Diem full rein without requiring of him as a preliminary condition that he should first succeed in forming a strong and stable government, even though this preliminary condition had been part of the basis of the Washington agreements.

A further aspect of the President's letter which is giving the French concern is the way which the Viet Minh could make of this step in relation to the Armistice agreement. The Ambassador said that the Viet Minh would doubtless wish to exploit this possibility, especially if the situation were to deteriorate further. In addition to the French Expeditionary Force now located in Southern Viet Nam, there was the matter of the troops in Haiphong, which were not to be evacuated until May 1955. All this added up to a very delicate situation, potentially dangerous and of uncertain prospects. The Ambassador said that in all good faith, and despite the best will in the world to make the Diem experiment work, the outlook seemed to be deteriorating rapidly. He was also concerned by what seemed to him to be a lack of Franco-American coordination with regard to the course of action to be taken in Indochina and said he hoped it would be possible for us to consult each other again more closely, and bring our positions together.

The Secretary said that he was giving the situation in Indochina the greatest attention, and he agreed that it was a difficult and delicate problem. He pointed out that Diem needed all the support that he could get from every quarter and that it was not enough to say that one was going to support Diem but that he hadn't much chance. The support must be positive and continuous in order to be effective. The Secretary said that he had had a talk with Premier Mendès-France in Paris on Indochina and that he would shortly be sending him a message about the situation there.
November 17, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: General Collins' Recommendations Regarding Military Force Levels in Viet-Nam

General Collins has submitted a report and his recommendations regarding force levels in Viet-Nam. A breakdown of the proposed forces as recommended is attached as Tab A.

In summary, the main points of his report are as follows:

1. It would be disastrous if the French Expeditionary Corps were withdrawn prematurely since otherwise Viet-Nam could be overrun by an enemy attack before the Manila Pact Powers could act.

2. The United States should continue to subsidize the French Expeditionary Corps during calendar year 1955, at least to the degree of one hundred million dollars, to encourage the French to retain sufficient forces. (The current rate of U.S. subsidy is four hundred million annually).

3. The Vietnamese National Army, now totaling 170,000 should be reduced by July 1955 to 77,000. It should be placed under Vietnamese command and control by that date. It would be organized into six divisions, three of which would be field elements designed to reinforce the balance of the Army which would be stationed in regimental and battalion garrisons throughout the provinces. A small Air Force and Navy is provided for. The cost to the U.S. would be two hundred million dollars annually. (This is less than current costs).
4. The United States should assume training responsibility for the Viet-Nam National Army by January 1, 1956 with French cooperation and utilizing French trainers.

5. General Ely, the French Commander, is agreeable to a slow build-up of our MAAG for training purposes.

/s/
John Foster Dulles

Enclosure:

Tab A - Recommended Force Levels - Viet-Nam.
AID TO FRANCE RE INDOCHINA

At a meeting held today at 3:00 P.M., FOA Administrator Stassen told French Ambassador Bonnet that the United States would contemplate, subject to an agreement being reached between Generals Collins and Ely, and subject to discussions with certain Congressional leaders, the following future aid to France with respect to Indochina:

(a) The sum of 100 million dollars for support of the French Expeditionary Corps during the calendar year 1955, Any counterpart French francs accruing after January 1, 1955 from any U. S. aid with respect to Indochina would be applied in discharge of this commitment if such commitment is actually made. Likewise, any savings effected as indicated in Subdivision (b) below in expenditures of the 1954 budget programs would be applied against this commitment if and when made and not be an addition to it.

(b) The programmed 1954 budget expenditures in respect to the French Expeditionary Corps would be continued but would only cover supplies, equipment, etc., actually sent to Indochina on or prior to December 31, 1955. As stated above, if this arrangement resulted in any savings below the original 785 million dollars programmed for this French budget support, such savings would be first applied against the foregoing 100 million dollar commitment and not be made available to the French in addition thereto.

I had had no notice of this meeting prior to 2:00 P.M., today when I arrived at the airport on return from New York City where I attended the Navy League Dinner last night. The time of my return was dictated by the fact that I was traveling by commercial transport and no seats were available until the 12:20 P.M. plane from New York City. The notice of the meeting to the Defense Department as distinguished from me personally
was not received until 1:00 P.M. today. Both Stassen's office and the State Department disclaim responsibility for the lack of notice, but Willing of State indicated to me over the telephone that the meeting was known to the State Department since last Saturday.

Orally at the meeting, I stated that the Department of Defense had had any opportunity to check the details of the 100 million dollars mentioned for FEC support during the calendar year 1955. Through pencilled notes, I informed Stassen while he was talking that the Department of Defense had never agreed to the original position paper in that respect which was based on a recommendation from General Collins without any details showing the basis of his calculations. In addition, such notes made clear to Stassen that I had called Livingston Merchant on Monday, November 22, and asked him whether and when any meeting would be held with the French on the subject of financial aid to the FEC and otherwise in Indochina, stating that Defense had some ideas it would like to present. I told Mr. Merchant that I did not feel it was Defense's job to get in touch with the French that I assumed State would take the lead in that respect and that State would get in touch with Defense so that we might compare notes before any meeting. Mr. Merchant agreed with that position but did not at that time mention the fact that any meeting was scheduled with the French for Wednesday, November 24.

Ambassador Bonnet at the meeting indicated that the 100 million dollar support for the FEC during calendar year 1955 was far below the amounts which the French had expected to receive from the United States in that respect and that if the United States remained firm at that figure, General Ely would probably have to make a substantial revision in his estimates as to the numbers of men in the FEC to be retained in Indochina. Ambassador Bonnet stated that he would communicate Stassen's statements to the French Government and that it would probably take some days before any reply could be made. Stassen endeavored rather briefly to argue with Bonnet that 100 million dollars would be sufficient in the absence of any war activity, pointing out that only 256 million dollars had been utilized by the FEC (based on bills received to date) under the Laniel-Navarre Plan which required much greater activity on the part of the FEC. Bonnet replied that all of the bills are not yet in and that while he could not make any calculations, he was confident that the 100 million dollars would not meet the current Ely program with respect to the FEC.
During the meeting I examined the piece of paper from which Stassen was reading. It was a single sheet which I had never seen before and on it was indicated that certain details had been received from Collins with respect to his 100 million dollar calculation for the FEC during calendar 1955. I have never seen such details and do not know whether they have been made available to my office. Furthermore, the typewritten portion of such sheet stated that no budget support would be granted to supplies, equipment, etc. not received in Indochina without specifying any limiting date. The idea of a limiting date in this respect of December 31, 1955 was inserted in pencil.

After the meeting, I complained to Stassen about our lack of notice of the 3:00 P.M. meeting today. He replied that he personally had not received any longer notice than I had and that the entire commitment as phrased was based on the Dulles desire to communicate as promptly as possible to the French that their expectations of receiving budget support in the amount of $300 million for calendar year 1955 were without foundation and that the 100 million dollar commitment as made was based on the recommendation from General Collins. I replied that I was fully aware that Secretary Dulles did not want to give the French a valid excuse for pulling out of Indochina completely and leaving the problem in our hands without the French available to bear any responsibility, but that Defense had not agreed, insofar as I knew, to the original position paper on this subject and had accepted the Collins recommendation of $100 million subject to an opportunity to check the basis of his calculations. I further explained that I had told the State Department (I believe it was Livingston Merchant, but it might have been Nolting) during the Mendes-France and Dulles talks that I believed we should express any statements made about 100 million dollars for the FEC as a maximum and give the impression that it might be reduced. Such was not done by Stassen and apparently my expression of opinion had never been communicated to him.

I further made the point that Defense had a substantial interest in these matters, that Defense approval should be sought in advance of any discussions with the French or at least Defense be given an opportunity to express its opinion and that any meeting scheduled should only be after adequate
notice to Defense. Stassen agreed with such a proposition as being reasonable and sound and stated that he did not know how the slip had occurred with respect to today but that he would look into the matter.
TOP SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: December 7, 1954

SUBJECT: Vietnam and Southeast Asia

PARTICIPANTS: Senator Mike Mansfield
              Assistant Secretary Walter S. Robertson
              Assistant Secretary Thurlow B. Morton
              Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr.

COPIES TO: S
            H
            FE
            WE
            HD
            OLX (2)
            G

At the Secretary's request Mr. Robertson, Mr. Morton and Mr. Young went to see Senator Mansfield this morning with respect to General Collins' analysis of the situation in Vietnam (Saigon's 2108 of December 6). Mr. Robertson explained to Senator Mansfield that the Secretary had a summary of this telegram early this morning and had asked that it be brought to Senator Mansfield's attention so that the State Department might have the benefit of his reaction and advice.

After reading the telegram and discussing various points Senator Mansfield stated his conclusions as follows:

1. The prospects for helping Diem strengthen and uphold South Vietnam look very dim given the best of circumstances. Any elections in 1956 will probably favor the Communists.

2. Nevertheless, the United States should continue to exert its efforts and use its resources, even if it will cost a lot, to hold Vietnam as long as possible. Any other course would have a disastrous effect on Cambodia, Laos and Southeast Asia. The Senator strongly opposed the idea of abandoning our effort in Vietnam. That course of action would lead to the absorption of Cambodia and Laos by the Communists.

3. Therefore,
3. Therefore, he felt we should continue to do whatever was possible to support the government of Diem. Senator Mansfield sees no alternative Prime Minister. While recognizing Diem's weaknesses as an administrator and manager, Senator Mansfield feels we ought to continue to back Diem, strongly encourage him to make Dr. Quat Minister of Defense immediately, and urge Diem to delegate as much as possible of the day-to-day operations of the government to others. Senator Mansfield was of the opinion that General Collins' time limit of two to three weeks was playing with "political dynamite" because it was giving Diem such an awfully short time in which to show results or be replaced.

4. With respect to Mr. Robertson's point that the French would subject the Secretary to great pressure on immediately finding a replacement for Diem, Senator Mansfield took the strong position that this line of action would only confound the already great difficulties in Vietnam. It would add much confusion, take time, and probably increase the divisions within Vietnam beyond what they are today. Senator Mansfield was certain the refugees and many of the Catholic bishops and church officials would oppose the replacement of Diem. The Senator felt that Diem represented that small hope there may be in building something in Vietnam. He was against relinquishing even the small chance we have with Diem for some unknown and untried combination.

5. Senator Mansfield agreed with General Collins' recommendation that Embassy Paris urge Bao Dai to cease the long distance wirepulling from the Riviera and to give Bao complete backing and initiative to run the government without interference from Bao Dai. Senator Mansfield strongly urged that it was so important to get this idea across to Bao Dai that Ambassador Dillon himself should make the approach assuming the publicity of such a meeting could be kept to a minimum. The Senator also felt very strongly that Bao Dai should not return to Vietnam.

6. In addition to the above, Senator Mansfield said that Dr. Quat in his opinion was an able man who could do much to help bring the army under control and into loyal support of the government. He hoped Diem would appoint Quat right away. The Senator said that the remarkable aspect of Diem was unlike most of the Vietnamese, he really was honest, incorruptible and a devoutly dedicated nationalist as well. However, the Senator expressed the personal view that in politics one often has to make some compromises in order to get results. He thought that Diem should be encouraged not only to delegate responsibilities to trusted and capable ministers, but should also give in to a certain amount of compromise. The Senator suggested that Dr. Fishel would probably be the best person to work out with Diem the problem of delegation and political adjustments. It was clear that the Senator had great confidence in Dr. Fishel. He hoped that the Department and the Embassy would give the latter full leeway and since he appears to have the complete confidence of Diem. On Mr. Robertson's point
that the French and the British would continue to push very hard for
Tam, Senator Mansfield was firmly opposed to our accepting Tam or
exerting any pressure at all on Diem to include Tam in his cabinet.
Senator Mansfield agreed with Mr. Robertson that to do so would compromise
the cabinet and provide the Communists with a ready made argument for
charging the Diem government with being a puppet of the old colonial
regime.
REDEPTEL 2083 (SAIGON 2328).

BELIEVE EMBTELS 2433 AND 2434, DECEMBER 8 ANSWER IN GENERAL TERMS REFERENCE TELEGRAM. OUR VIEWS NUMBERED QUESTIONS REFERENCE TELEGRAM FOLLOW:

1. ANSWERED BY EMBTEL 2433.

2. ANSWERED BY OUR COMMENT FINAL PARAGRAPH 2433.

3. QUESTION OF BUDGET PRESENTATION, BY WHICH WE UNDERSTAND YOU MEAN THE MATTER OF TIMING, OF COURSE INTENSIFIED PRESSURE REACH DECISIONS BY JANUARY 15, BUT IS NOT AT ROOT OF BASIC PROBLEM, AS INDICATED PARAGRAPH ONE EMBTEL 2433, FRENCH GOVERNMENT ALREADY CONSIDERING DECISION ACCELERATE WITHDRAWAL EXPEDITIONARY CORPS AND PROBLEMS RELATED THERETO, INCLUDING CIVILIAN EVACUATION, AS DIRECT RESULT UNITED STATES DECISION PROVIDE ONLY ONE-THIRD AMOUNT REQUESTED FOR MAINTENANCE F.E.C. IN 1955.

4. WE BELIEVE FRENCH FOR MOST PART SINCERELY CONVINCED THAT UNLESS EITHER DIEN GOVERNMENT PROFOUNDLY MODIFIED AND STRENGTHENED OR ALTERNATIVE STRONG GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED BY SOME TIME DURING JANUARY AT LATEST, VIETMINH EROSION IN SOUTH VIETNAM WILL HAVE PROCEEDED TO POINT WHERE VIETMINH CAN REASONABLY EXPECT TO BECOME PRINCIPAL FORCE PRESENT IN SOUTH BY TIME JULY 1956 ELECTIONS. HOWEVER, WE WISH REFER THIS CONTEXT OUR COMMENTS EMBTEL 2083 REGARDING FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES INVOLVED VIETNAMESE SITUATION WHICH WE FEEL TRANSCEND AND TEND AGGRAVATE MORE IMMEDIATE, THOUGH CRITICAL, PROBLEM ACHIEVING POLITICAL STABILITY SOUTH VIETNAM.

5. WE DO
-2- 2448, DECEMBER 9, 3 P.M., FROM PARIS

5. WE DO NOT BELIEVE FRENCH DECISION ACCELERATE WITHDRAWAL EXPEDITIONARY CORPS VIETNAM AND TO EVACUATE THOSE FRENCH CIVILIANS AND VIETNAMESE WHO WISH LEAVE AS RESULT THEREOF, WILL AFFECT APPRECIABLY FRENCH ACTIVITIES LAOS AND CAMBODIA, OR FRENCH DESIRE TO MAINTAIN ITS INFLUENCE MAXIMUM LEVELS THOSE TWO COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY-ECONOMICAL AND CULTURAL FIELDS, SO LONG AS IT APPEARS REASONABLY CERTAIN CAMBODIAN AND LAO BORDERS ARE TO BE HELD BY FORCE IF NECESSARY-AGAINST POSSIBLE FUTURE INTENSIFICATION VIETMINH PENETRATION.

DILLON

LMS/32
FROM: Saigon
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 2250, December 13, 7 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF THREE)

PART I

Recent developments current situation follow:

1. Relations with French:

(A) Earlier this week Ely was on verge of signing minute of understanding on organization and training of Vietnamese armed forces. Now French have come up with new amendments requiring US respect Ely's responsibilities "under Geneva accords" and including long new "protocol" with several references to Geneva. Whether these new proposals come from Ely's legal staff or Paris I do not (repeat not) know, but inclined believe latter since Ely agreed to resolve few remaining minor points directly with me and since he has said several times that Paris political circles would have to be satisfied. I intend refuse accept any reference to Geneva accord or make any further concessions reference O'Daniel's full responsibility for training under Ely's broad direction.

(B) Interview with Sainteny, to which Ely and his officers continue to refer with Cafrerin, appears reinforce view that our relations with French in Indochina may remain less clear-cut than Ely wishes and has given me to believe they are

2. Latest developments re Quat:

811 (A)
A) Since Luyen's return from Paris, his open opposition to Quat has undermined Diem's decision to appoint Quat Minister of Defense. On 11 December Diem informed Fishel as follows: six of seven cabinet members consulted by Diem have voiced strong opposition to Quat. Generals Phuong (Cao Dai) and Soai (Hoa Hao) have declared they will withdraw from government and threaten open rebellion if Quat appointed. Because of location Hoa Hao territory, Diem purports to fear General Soai might cut off rice supply of Saigon-Cholon, block road and waterway traffic through coastal areas and to Saigon, make war in Hoa Hao areas against national army which in present condition could not (repeat not) handle situation. Diem fears also comparable action might be taken by Cao Dai forces, including possible moves against government in Saigon and vicinity.

B) Diem told Fishel that he had informed Phuong and Soai that Americans wanted Quat as Defense Minister. The Generals replied, "a responsible American should speak for the Americans." Hence Diem asked Fishel to transmit these "facts" to me, saying if I or "some other person" can convince Phuong and Soai not (repeat not) oppose actively the appointment, Diem will appoint Quat at once. (A neat passing of the buck, we must admit). If sect leaders persist in their opposition, Diem says he would be inclined raise present Deputy Minh to Defense Minister and give him full authority and responsibility over armed forces.

C) I am quite convinced that Diem and brothers Luyen and Nhu are afraid to turn over control of armed forces to Quat or any other strong man. They may also fear Quat as potential successor to Diem and hence are doing everything they can to keep him out of any post in government. With General Minh fired and General Ty replaced as Chief of Staff by spineless General Ty, Diem has fairly effectively seized control of army. I doubt Diem would delegate real authority to Minh, but would retain meddling hand on details to detriment O'Daniel's training mission and effective development of armed forces.

D) Through Colonel Lansdale's group and CAS, I am canvassing attitude of sect leaders and genuineness of their alleged threats. Depending on Lansdale's findings, I will consider (1) proposing to Ely a direct US-French approach to General Soai, who Quat has said will bow to French pressure; (2) having Lansdale suggest to Soai that with Quat in defense all rice for armed forces would be purchased from Hoa Hao (this was hint dropped some time ago by Quat as means of buying off Hoa Hao); (3) sending emissaries to Soai, Phuong and Cao Dai Pope (Pham Cong Tan) making clear that any rebellion would lead to withdrawal all American aid and inevitable victory for Ho Chi Minh who would certainly not (repeat not) tolerate private empires of Hoa Hao or Cao Dai. 

E) I realize disadvantages of forcing Diem to accept "American choice"
TOP SECRET

-3- 2250, December 13, 7 p.m., from Saigon

choice" of Quat. However acceptance of status Quo, with Minh elevated to Defense Ministry and sects reinforced in veto power over government, is simply postponing evil day of reckoning as to when, if ever, Diem will assert type of leadership that can unify this country and give it chance of competing with hard, effective, unified control of Ho Chi Minh. Such a delaying action would appear to be justified only if we are preparing way for alternatives, as indicated in part II.

3. Resolution of Phan

KIDDER

BJC

(#) Omission, correction to follow.
FROM: Saigon
TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2250, December 13, 7 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF THREE)

Rang-Pahn Thiet affair:
Compromise solution in matter of rebellious officers has been found and is apparently satisfactory to army command and Prime Minister.

4. Army Chief of Staff and Inspector General:
At midnight 12-13 December Generals Vy and Ty took office as Inspector General and Chief of staff Vietnam armed forces, respectively. Details of Vy's duties not yet known.

5. Diem's declaration of confidence in Army:
December 13 Diem published declaration expressing confidence in Army and calling on all ranks to join with people in building free, independent Vietnam.

Postscript.

6. Re paragraph 1 (A) above: Ely and I this morning signed minute of understanding on development and training of autonomous Vietnam armed forces and agreed to wording of separate explanatory memorandum for record to accompany it. Final text of minute is based on our draft and I consider it wholly satisfactory. Texts follow by separate message.

7. Re paragraph 2 above: Ely and I agree this morning to take further steps to secure Quat's appointment. Ely discounts possibility sects will revolt if such appointment made. Ely said he would at once see Generals Phuong and Soai and inform them both French and Americans support Quat's appointment. Ely said he has little influence over Cao Dai Pope and recommended I see him. Ely will also intervene with Deputy Defense Minister Minh and ask him to remain three to six months as Quat's deputy.
-2 2250, December 13, 7 p.m., from Saigon (SECTION 2 OF 3) ON 5891

PART II.

Possible alternatives to Diem Government:

1. As I see it, we have 3 possible courses of action in Vietnam:
   (A) Continue support of Diem Government.
   (B) Support establishment of another government which may be able to save situation.
   (C) Gradually withdraw support from Vietnam.

2. (A) Difficulties and risk of support Diem have been covered in EMBTEL 2108 and PART I this message and other cables. Recent accomplishments have been minor considering magnitude of task ahead. Favorable developments include:
    (1) Diem made first anti-Communist appeal to people 16 November.
    (2) Dinh-Hinh feud has been resolved, for present at least.
    (3) Diem made trip to South Cochin China to observe work by Army in its rehabilitation program.
    (4) Phan Rang-Phan Thiet affair has been compromised.
    (5) Vy and Ty have taken their new offices.
    (6) 13 December Diem issued proclamation expressing confidence in the Army and calling on it to unite with people in the fight against Communism.

   (B) Realize abandonment of Diem would embarrass US in view our public support present government. However, if it proves necessary, believe such embarrassment would prove insignificant compared to blow to anti-Communism in Asia and throughout world if US-supported free Vietnam were lost to Communism. I believe it would be better to take slight loss of prestige in near future while time to attempt other solution remains, rather than continue support Diem should failure appear relatively certain. We have not reached this point, though I have grave misgivings re Diem's chances of success.

3. In view of possibility that Diem will fail to rally unified support of army in fight against Communism, believe we should consider other solutions. Two alternatives (neither of which is too promising, but each of which should be considered in event of Diem's failure) are suggested:

(A) Have
TOP SECRET

SECTION 3 - 2250, December 13, 7 p.m., from Saigon. (SECTION 2 OF 3).

(A) Have Bao Dai name Quat to replace Diem as President of Council. Quat is able, forceful and resourceful and though obstacles to his success exist, if given chance, he might succeed where Diem failed. Whether the various selfish groups in the country would give him that chance is question. He is northerner, has only slight political following and, as indicated in PART I, faces considerable opposition. With complete confidence and support of Bao Dai, however, he might succeed; without it he would surely fail.

(B) (1) Second alternative is to have Bao Dai return to Vietnam under "state of emergency" conditions, assume Presidency of Council and rally entire nation to unified action. What is needed here more than anything else is leader who can fire imagination and patriotism of people and instill in them determination to fight for freedom of Vietnam. Bao Dai may be last possible candidate for this task.

(2) I have been impressed with influence Bao Dai still exercises over leaders Vietnam. All leaders continue to refer to him as "His Majesty" and most regard him as the real source of authority Vietnam.

(3) To overcome obstacles, dramatize return and establish self as leader of Vietnam, Bao Dai could take steps such as:

(A) Turning over some of his holdings to government for distribution to peasants as step toward agrarian reform;

(B) Form an "emergency" cabinet including best available Vietnamese -- Quat, Diem, others;

(C) Announcing withdrawal French military forces by some specific date;

(D) Issuing temporary democratic charter to guide government during emergency;

(G) Convening a representative assembly;

(H) Calling for a constituent assembly.

6. Though course

RAW/VHD

KIDDER

TOP SECRET
FROM: Saigon
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 2250, December 13 (SECTION THREE OF THREE)

SENT DEPARTMENT 2250, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 706, PHNOM PENH, VIENTIANE UNNUMBERED

1-C (gradual withdrawal from Vietnam) is least desirable, in all honesty and in view of what I have observed here to date it is possible this may be only sound solution. Should this be necessary, it may be wise to concentrate effort on saving Laos-Cambodia-Thailand-Burma-India line -- if possible with latter's active support. Realize Department has probably given consideration to some such alternative. I will not presume to advise steps to be taken at this time, other than suggest that we attempt persuade India recognize Governments Laos and Cambodia soonest.

7. Summation: (a) At present I am highly dubious of Diem's ability to succeed but prefer to reserve final judgment till early part of January; (b) alternatives to support of Diem should be thoroughly explored within US Government.

8. Recommendations: (a) US continue to support Diem at Paris; (b) not consider alternatives paragraph 1-B with French until after I have communicated my final judgment to Department.

KIDDER

Action Assigned to:

Action Taken:

Date of Action:

Action Code: Symbol:

Name of Officer:

Direction to DoR:

81
SECRET

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

Refer to: I=16,521
C-R I-8270 (Unc1) Dec 14 1954

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Secretary of Defense has requested that I reply to your letter of 17 November 1954 to the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration requesting a report on the military aid situation in Indochina.

The facts of the military aid situation in Indochina insofar as the Department of Defense is involved follow:

a. The value of MDAP shipments to Indochina (in millions of dollars), including value of equipment furnished from excess U. S. stocks, as of 31 October 1954, is:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regular MDAP</td>
<td>$1,085.5</td>
<td>$764.2</td>
<td>$154.3</td>
<td>$167.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Military Support</td>
<td>948.0</td>
<td>633.1</td>
<td>151.7</td>
<td>163.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Use</td>
<td>123.7</td>
<td>117.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. No official reports of losses of armament and equipment have been released by the French. However, it is estimated by U. S. officials that the following items of equipment, valued at approximately $1.2 million, fell into Viet Minh hands at Dien Bien Phu.

- 8 M-24 Tanks
- 4 155mm Howitzer Guns
- 20 105mm Howitzer Guns
- 30 81mm & 120mm Mortars
- 12 75mm Recoilless Rifles
- 150 Machine Guns
- 15,000 Small Arms

In addition to the equipment lost at Dien Bien Phu, small quantities of small arms, machine guns, ammunition and personal troop equipment have been captured by the Viet Minh during the prolonged military operations in Indochina.
c. The Department of Defense has not supplied any fixed assets north of the 17th parallel.

d. Since the signing of the Geneva Agreement, all shipments of materiel to Indochina have ceased except those items required to alleviate suffering, prevent disease, and assist in the evacuation from North Vietnam.

e. The Department of Defense plans to initiate direct aid to Vietnam and Cambodia on 1 January 1955. The details of the military plans and MDA programs to implement such plans are under active study and development by appropriate agencies of the U.S. Government. There are no plans to give military aid to Laos at this time because under the terms of the Geneva Agreement, no U.S. military advisors are admitted in the country. The form of the aid for the two Associated States is to be concentrated on training a force capable of maintaining internal security and to eventually develop an army capable of fighting a delaying action in case of invasion from the North. It is hoped that the French Expeditionary Corps will remain in the area until native troops can be trained to replace them.

f. Negotiations with the French are being conducted at this time with the view of returning to U.S. custody all materiel no longer required in Indochina.

g. When the Geneva Agreement was signed, there were 211,000 long tons of MDA materiel in French depots north of the 17th parallel. As of 20 November 1954, over 50% of this equipment had been evacuated. Fifteen-hundred long tons per day is the target for evacuating the above materiel. The daily averages of evacuation to date indicate that the French are more than meeting this target and it is estimated that all depot stocks will be evacuated from the North by 1 March 1956 and returned to depots in the South. Equipment issued to the various military units is evacuated with the units. The materiel in the South is being inventoried and upon completion, a determination will be made as to the equipment that is no longer required for operations in Indochina. Materiel that is not required will be returned to the custody of the U.S. for distribution to other areas. As an indication of the thoroughness of the French evacuation of military equipment, all pierced-steel planking used on airfield runways and taxiways have been dismantled and shipped to the South.

Sincerely yours,

Signed: H. STRUVE HENSEL

Honorable Alexander Wiley
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate

COPY
FROM: Saigon
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 2303, December 16, 7 p.m.

PRIORITY
SEMI NIACT PARIS 724; PRIORITY DEPARTMENT 2303
DEPARTMENT PASS DEFENSE EYES ONLY HENSEL, DAVIS AND JCS
DEPARTMENT EYES ONLY ACTING SECRETARY AND ROBERTSON
PARIS EYES ONLY SECRETARY STATE, SECRETARY DEFENSE AND RADFORD
FROM COLLINS

Re EMBTELS 1830, 2108, 2250, Department 2285 (paragraph 8) repeated Paris 602, 665, 706, 717.

1. Decision of Diem not to appoint Quat Defense Minister is final development that convinces me that Diem does not have the capacity to unify divided factions in Vietnam, and that unless some such action is taken as indicated in paragraph 7 below, this country will be lost to communism. Reasons for Diem's decision probably compounded of (1) unwillingness to delegate control of Vietnam armed forces to any strong man; (2) fear of Quat as potential successor; (3) opposition of sects; (4) influence of brothers Luyen and Nhu; (5) desire to retain Minh in government.

2. Whatever the reasons, the failure to utilize Quat epitomizes lack of unity among Vietnamese and lack of decisive leadership on part of Diem. Minh refused to submerge his personal ambitions, even for a few months transition period under Quat or anyone else. Luyen again demonstrated his ability to cause Diem to reverse a decision already taken (Diem had told me prior to Luyen's return from Paris that he would appoint Quat). The veto power of the sects over any changes in the government that are likely to result in a weakening of their private domains has been confirmed. Another strong positive man, Quat, has been blocked from having a hand in reorganizing and controlling the armed forces. And all of these negative results have required a month of lengthy discussions, evasions of basic issues.
and wasted opportunities.

3. Minh is a good man, though young and inexperienced. O'Daniel feels that if Diem delegates full authority to Minh, the latter may be able to heal wounds of Diem-Hinh, Ty-Vy, Phan Rang-Phan Thiet affairs and bring stability and sanity to government-army relationships. But it is highly doubtful to me that Minh, or anyone else under present conditions, can create a single, cohesive national army from the five separate forces now existing—the Cao Daist, Hoa Hao, Binh Xuyen, national guard, and the present national army. With anticipated opposition from the sects and some from Diem himself who is loath to disband his own private force (national guard), it will take stronger leadership from Diem and Minh than either has shown to date to reduce and amalgamate these forces.

4. What is true of the armed forces is likely to be true in the resettlement of refugees and land reform. When I told Diem recently that our FOA people were having difficulty in getting down to business with the Vietnam agriculture officials, Diem reminded me that the Minister of agriculture is a Hoa Hao and the Hoa Hao are fearful of the effect of land reform on their extensive control of rice lands. Government officials hesitate to place refugees on French-owned rice lands or in the French-owned rubber plantations. And so on, one excuse for inaction after another.

5. Fact is that of the fine program of reforms announced by Diem in September, no definite progress has been achieved in converting words into deeds in any field.

6. I had hoped Diem would broaden and strengthen his cabinet by addition of Quat and perhaps even Bay Vien. Latter, despite his lurid past, has demonstrated organizing ability and his recently indicated desire to become "honorable" and to assist government. With Quat in government, Quat might have done much gradually to get sects in line and through his practical political ability have injected some flexibility and drive, both of which are now woefully lacking. At same time Quat might have acquired greater stature in public eye which might later have rendered him more eligible for higher post if later found necessary replace Diem. Unfortunately, this was probably deduced by brother Luyen and Diem also. I feel sure that fear of Quat's ability is at root of sects and Diem's opposition.

7. After weighing all available evidence, I am now convinced that in face of the positive threat of Ho Chi Minh's regime, it will take decisive action and dramatic leadership from the Vietnamese themselves to save free Vietnam. Neither French nor Americans can substitute for such action and leadership. Apparently...
TOP SECRET  Not to be released without prior consent of Director S/S

3-22303, December 16, 7 p.m., from Saigon

the only Vietnamese who might be competent to galvanize the country into unified action is Bao Dai. Though I do not know the man, and realize his many disabilities, it is possible he might furnish the necessary impact if he were to return and take active direction of the government, whether he retained Diem or appointed Qui or someone else as Premier, or assumed the office himself. Almost all Vietnamese with whom I have talked, including Diem, look instinctively to Bao Dai as the ultimate source of authority. Of course, if we and the French were to support his return, specific conditions would have to stipulated in advance, generally as indicated in Part II, paragraph 35, EMTEL 2250. I realize also that Bao Dai’s return would furnish excellent propaganda material for the Communists, but if they don’t have such material in hand they will manufacture it anyway. So we should not permit this aspect to determine our course, after weighing all other factors.

8. I recognize that we must continue to support the Diem Government for some time at least. But I recommend that we not now consummate an agreement with the Vietnamese to assure on 1-January responsibility for training their forces or for giving direct military aid. We should continue to place American officers with staff of Vietnam army and aid in developing training plans and pacification plans. We should continue to talk with Vietnamese with a view to reaching common accord on size and composition of forces. But we should not commit formal agreements on training or support for specific force levels until a decision reached in Washington as to our ultimate policy.

Similar, planning should go on for initiation of direct military aid commencing 1 January, but we should not commit ourselves to any given volume of aid until US has adopted definitive policy with respect to Vietnam. Meanwhile I would strongly urge consideration of bringing Bao Dai back under one or other of the variants indicated in paragraph 6 above and paragraph 2 EMTEL 2250. (See also paragraph 5, EMTEL 2255, repeated Paris 717, for Eby’s view). Therefore my present recommendations are:

A. Continue to support Diem along present lines for short while longer but without committing US to specific aid programs;

B. Consider urgently, as possible alternative, the early return of Bao Dai;

C. If after short period of further test Diem Government fails to achieve substantial progressive action, and if return of Bao Dai is acceptable to US Government, to support his prompt return;

D. If return of Bao Dai is not acceptable to US Government, assuming Diem Government continues to demonstrate inability to unite free Vietnam behind an aggressive program, I recommend reevaluation.

TOP SECRET  Not to be released without prior consent
TOP SECRET

4-/#2303, December 16, 7 p.m., from Saigon

revaluation of our plans for assisting Southeast Asia with special attention to proposal contained in paragraph 6, Part II EMTEL 2250.

9. I am sorry to have to make such a discouraging report, but in all honesty I have to present to you my present convictions because of their possible effect on US 1956 budget about to be presented to Congress. Should it be determined that in view of the unsound situation in Vietnam the US should gradually withdraw its support from this country, then it would be necessary, in my opinion, to increase the aid to the French expeditionary corps so that it would remain strong enough during the next year to permit the US to withdraw essential equipment which might otherwise fall into Communist hands. It appears to me, therefore, that we should retain as much flexibility as possible with reference to financial aid for the FEC.

10. Conclusion: It is possible that by a month from now some radical improvement will have come about but I strongly doubt it. Meanwhile, I feel that we should make a sober reevaluation of the situation here before we commit over $300 million and our national prestige under current conditions. I will continue to carry on along same lines I have been following, but will await instructions while temporarily dragging feet, if necessary, with respect to definite commitments, as indicated in paragraph 8.

KIDDER

EL/1

Note: Passed Defense 12/16/54 11 p.m. AL
Office Memorandum  . UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: PE - Mr. Robertson

FROM: PSA - Ambassador Heath

DATE: December 17, 1954

SUBJECT: Comments on Saigon Telegram 2303

1. The situation in Viet-Nam at the time of General Collins' arrival on November 7 might be described as follows:

A. The French had lost a disastrous battle at Dien Bien Phu and that Communist military victory had been compounded by a humiliating diplomatic defeat for the Free World at Geneva. The Communists had achieved a level of international recognition and position through these developments far exceeding any previous status.

B. Ngo Dinh Diem took office on July 7. He was the first "Nationalist" to assume the Prime Ministership. He was anti-French, anti-Communist and personally honest. He is politically inept, stubborn and suspicious. In his four months of responsibility he had faced with massive opposition, including a rebellious Army Chief who allegedly was an unwitting tool of the Communists, active French opposition and many other discouraging factors.

C. There is every evidence that the French did not want Diem to succeed. Reluctant acceptance by La Chambre (September) and Mandes-France (November) of the U.S. thesis of support of Diem, principally because of the lack of a better qualified candidate, may have eased French pressures against him but did not result in full French support.

2. Since General Collins' arrival, the latter has attempted to achieve a rapid solution, at least partially based on the concept that Collins' mission is temporary and a settlement appeared called for by the time of his originally scheduled departure in mid-January. (Since extended). General Collins' recommendations are now based on the circumstances of a satisfactory settlement prior to January 1. If no solution is found, he recommends:

a. Continued support of Diem for a short period but without committing specific U.S. aid programs.

b. Recall of Bao Dai, if acceptable to U.S.

c. Revaluation of our plans for assisting Southeast Asia.

d. If the situation continues without substantial progressive action to withhold support to the Viet-Nam Army and to increase support of the French Expeditionary Corps while evacuating our MACV material.

3. In
3. In our view, General Collins' recommendations ignore the basic factor that we would assist a Communist takeover by a withholding of our aid, even if it must necessarily be given to a government which is less than perfect.

The Secretary has analyzed the situation as one in which we are conducting a time buying operation. If we withhold our support to Viet-Nam, it will be taken over sooner than if we extend smaller aid, at a figure of about a third of last year. In the meantime, we will proceed to do what we can to strengthen Cambodia, Laos and Thailand. This is my understanding of the Secretary's policy.

4. I recommend we inform the Secretary and General Collins that we recognize the dangers posed by the above policy, but that in the lack of more useful alternatives that we will continue to support Diem, because there is no one to take his place who would serve U.S. objectives any better. This includes the Bao Dai solution which is opposed by the facts of Bao Dai's lack of support in Viet-Nam and his past demonstrations of inability to govern. The fear that a fiscal commitment of over $300 million plus our national prestige would be lost in a gamble on the retention of Free Viet-Nam is a legitimate one, but the withholding of our support at this juncture would almost inevitably have a far worse effect.

Recommendation:

That the attached telegram be approved and sent:

Sec. 29-73 Paris (2486 Saigon)
Oct. 17/54. (75pg. 60) 12-1154)

(2) Sec. 8274 Paris (2487 Saigon)
Oct. 17/54. 751q. 60/12-1/54

FE:PSA:DR: Heath:rk

TOP SECRET
TRIPARTITE DISCUSSIONS ON INDOCHINA TOOK PLACE THIS AFTERNOON AT MATIGNON.

DULLES OPENED CONVERSATIONS BY GREETING ELY AND CITING APPRECIATION OF COOPERATION HE HAD SHOWN U.S. AUTHORITIES IN VIETNAM. ELY GAVE REPORT CURRENT SITUATION AT MENDES' SUGGESTION. HE SAID FIRST POINT TO BE CLEARED UP AFTER COLLINS ARRIVED WAS SETTLEMENT GOVERNMENT-NATIONAL ARMY CONFLICT. ACCOMPLISHED BY MEANS BAO DAI'S RECALL MINH. SECOND WAS TO TRY PREPARE PROGRAM FOR DIEM GOVERNMENT. THIS DONE BUT QUESTION NOW HOW TO GET DIEM ACCEPT FORMULA. THEIRS WAS HOW STRENGTHEN DIEM. ELY AND COLLINS TRIED INTRODUCE QUAT WHO IS BETTER POLITICIAN AND ADMINISTRATOR THAN DIEM INTO GOVERNMENT BUT SECTS AND DIEM balked. HE SAID ONLY SUGGESTION EVER ACCEPTED BY DIEM WAS APPOINTMENT MINH AS MINISTER DEFENSE.

MENDES INTERRUPTED TO MAKE TWO POINTS. FIRST THAT COLLINS AND ELY THOUGHT THAT MINISTRIES OF INTERIOR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE SHOULD BE COMBINED. BOTH OFFICES ARE CONCERNED WITH INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND IT IS UNNECESSARY SEPARATE THEM AT THIS TIME. DIEM HAD REFUSED THIS SUGGESTION TOO. SECOND POINT WAS THAT WORKING GROUPS HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED IN SAIGON TO SUGGEST REFORMS TO GOVERNMENT - BOTH ADMINISTRATIVE AND AGRARIAN. NOT A SINGLE REFORM SUGGESTED ACCEPTED BY DIEM. MENDES DESCRIBED DIEM'S APPROACH AS WHOLLY NEGATIVE. FRENCH GOVERNMENT NOW CONSIDERED THAT AS A RESULT OF TODAY'S TALKS STRONG APPROACH WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE TO DIEM.
-2- FROM PARIS, 23NO, DECEMBER 19, 4PM SECTION ONE OF TWO

SUGGESTIONS SHOULD BE PRECISE AND ENERGETIC. THERE WAS NO TIME LEFT TOO ALLOW FOR ANYTHING LESS. MENDES WISHED REAFFIRM HIS PAST AGREEMENT WITH SECRETARY'S THESIS THAT WE MUST DO OUR MAXIMUM TO PERMIT DIEM GOVERNMENT TO SUCCEED. NOW HE WISHED ADD THAT HE WAS NO LONGER SURE THAT EVEN MAXIMUM WOULD HELP. HE SAID WE MUST NOW HAVE ALTERNATE FORMULA IN MIND. WITHOUT VARYING FROM OUR STATED PURPOSE OF SUPPORTING DIEM GOVERNMENT AS LONG AS IT EXISTS WE MUST NOW PREPARE IN OUR MINDS FOR ALTERNATIVE.

SECRETARY REPLIED THAT HE RECOGNIZED TASK IN SOUTH VIETNAM WAS DIFFICULT ONE. DIFFICULT BECAUSE IT REQUIRED THAT GOVERNMENT BE BUILT OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES WITH LITTLE OR NOT EXPERIENCE. MOREOVER, THEY HAD TO BUILD IN TIME OF GREAT STRESS FOLLOWING MILITARY DEFEAT, TEMPORARY PARTITION AND WHILE THERE WAS GREAT INFLUX OF REFUGEES FROM NORTH. SECRETARY REGARDED BASIC FACTORS AS FAVORABLE, PEOPLE WERE OPPOSED TO COMMUNISM AND HAD GREAT NATURAL RESOURCES. THEY HAD EXPORTABLE SUPRPLUS. THEY RECEIVED GREATER AID FROM ABROAD THAN NORTH. BEGINNING OF JOINT FRANCO-U.S. TASK DIFFICULT, BUT SITUATION WAS MUCH IMPROVED NOW THAT THERE WAS FULL COOPERATION BETWEEN FRENCH AND AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. PROBLEM MUST NOT BE APPROACHED BETWEEN FRENCH AND AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. PROBLEM MUST NOT BE APPROACHED IN SPIRIT OF DEFEATISM. ONLY SERIOUS PROBLEM WE HAVE NOT YET SOLVED IS THAT OF INDIGENOUS LEADERSHIP. WE CANNOT EXPECT IT TO BE SOLVED IDEALLY BECAUSE THERE IS NO TRADITION AMONG INDIGENOUS PEOPLE FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT. WE MUST GET ALONG WITH SOMETHING LESS GOOD THAN BEST.

SECRETARY CONTINUED TO SAY THAT HE HAD NO RPT NO PERSONAL JUDGMENT OF PERSONALITIES INVOLVED, BUT OUR INDICATIONS WERE THAT DIEM WAS BEST MAN AVAILABLE IN SPITE OF FAILINGS. WE VISUALIZED CABINET WITH BROAD APPEAL AND AUTHORITY. THIS VISION HAS NOT RPT NOT BEEN REALIZED. DIEM APPEARS TO BE MAN CONSTITUTIONALLY INCAPABLE OF MAKING DECISIONS. US NOT RPT NOT COMMITTED TO DIEM IN ANY IRREVOCABLE SENSE. WE HAVE ACCEPTED HIM BECAUSE WE KNEW OF NO ONE BETTER. DEVELOPMENTS HAVE CONFIRMED OUR FEARS AS TO HIS LIMITATIONS BUT NO SUBSTITUTE FOR HIM HAS YET BEEN PROPOSED. THOSE SUGGESTED IN PAST VARIED FROM MONTH TO MONTH. NOW IT IS CLAIMED THAT ONLY BAO DAI CAN SAVE SITUATION. IF THAT IS CASE, THEN WE MUST INDEED BE DESPERATE. SECRETARY'S VIEW WE SHOULD CONTINUE BACK DIEM BUT EXERT MORE PRESSURE ON HIM TO
TOP SECRET

-3- FROM PARIS, 2601 DECEMBER 19, 4 PM SECTION ONE OF TWO

HIM TO MAKE CHANGES WE CONSIDER NECESSARY. SECRETARY FINISHED BY ASKING WHETHER ELY HAD, WITH COLLINS, ALREADY APPLIED MAXIMUM PRESSURES TO DIEM.

ELY REPLIED THEY HAD AND THAT BOTH WERE NOW VIRTUALLY CONVINCED THAT IT WAS HOPELESS TO EXPECT ANYTHING OF DIEM. NEVERTHELESS THEY CONTINUED PRESSURES. SECRETARY ASKED WHETHER DIEM HAD YE BEEN CONFRONTED WITH ULTIMATUM THAT UNLESS SUCH AND SUCH WERE DONE BY CERTAIN DATE OUR SUPPORT WOULD BE WITHDRAWN. ELY SAID HE HAD NOT RPT NOT. HE CHARACTERIZED DIEM AS EXTREMELY PIG-HEADED MAN WHO BECAME MORE SO UNDER PRESSURE. SECRETARY ASKED IF THIS MEANT THAT ULTIMATUM WOULD MAKE HIM MORE STUBBORN AND ELY REPLIED IT WOULD.

MENDES THEN PURSUED SUBJECT WITH ELY WHO STATED THAT HE FELT THAT TO EXERT TOO MUCH PRESSURE ON DIEM WAS NOT RPT NOT IN KEEPING WITH THE NEW INDEPENDENT STATUS OF VIETNAM AND THAT IN ANY CASE SUCH PRESSURE SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE EXERTED JOINTLY BUT SEPARATELY BY HIMSELF AND COLLINS. MOREOVER, HE DESCRIBED DIEM AS HAVING TENDENCY PLAY ONE MAN AGAINST OTHER IN TYPICAL ASIATIC STYLE AND THAT THIS WAS TO BE AVOIDED. HE COMMENTED ON DIEM'S OWN DIFFICULTIES, ESPECIALLY THOSE HE HAD HAD IN RECONCILING SECTS. PRINCIPAL QUESTION WAS TO DECIDE NOW WHETHER DIEM WAS REALLY MAN CAPABLE OF NATIONAL UNION. HE AND COLLINS MUST DECIDE THAT QUESTION.

SECRETARY STATED THAT HE WAS OPPOSED TO ISSUANCE ULTIMATUM UNTIL WE KNEW WHAT WE WOULD DO IF IT WERE REJECTED. AT THE MOMENT WE HAVE NOTHING ELSE TO OFFER, HE COMMENTED. MENDES RECOMMENDED THAT WE APPROACH BAO DAI BECAUSE OF HIS LEGAL POWERS AND USEFULNESS AND FACT THAT PRESUMABLY WOULD HAVE TO APPOINT ANY SUCCESSOR TO DIEM. HE HAD PROVEN IN HINH CASE THAT HE COULD BE USEFUL AND MENDES FELT THAT BAO DAI COULD AGAIN SERVE PURPOSE. HE COULD BE USED TO PUT ALTERNATE PLAN INTO EFFECT IF ULTIMATUM TO DIEM FAILED. SECRETARY COMMENTED THAT HE REALIZED THAT WE MUST BE PREPARED TO USE BAO DAI BUT FELT THAT WE MUST GO TO HIM PREPARED WITH OUR OWN IDEAS AND NOT RPT NOT SIMPLY TO ACCEPT HIS. MENDES AGREED BUT COMMENTED THAT BAO DAI'S PERSONAL POSITION HAD WEAKENED RECENTLY.

44694 TOP SECRET
IN SPITE OF THIS FACT, HE STILL REPRESENTED LEGALITY AND COULD SERVE IN FUTURE IF "LEGALITY" HAD TO BE PROVIDED TO ANY STEP WE WOULD WISH TO TAKE.

MENDES THEN SPOKE OF A PLAN FRENCH HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING. FIRST PHASE WAS TO ASK BAO DAI TO PLACE ON SPOT IN VIETNAM A REPRESENTATIVE WHO WOULD EXERCISE BAO DAI'S AUTHORITY. HE WOULD BE "DELEGATE" OR VICEROY. HE WOULD HAVE FULL AUTHORITY TO USE BAO DAI'S POWERS. USEFULNESS WOULD PERSIST EVEN IF DIEM SHOULD SUCCEED FOR HE COULD ACT AS SUPREME ARBITRATOR TO SETTLE SQUABBLIES.

MENDES SAID THAT FRENCH WERE NOW PREPARED TALK TO BAO DAI ALONG THESE LINES AND URGE HIM ESTABLISH VICEROY WITHOUT DELAY.

FRENCH ALSO PROPOSED APPROACH BAO DAI WITH VIEW REINFORCING PRESENT GOVT AND PREPARING LEGAL GROUNDS FOR NEW ONE IF IT SHOULD BE FOUND NECESSARY.

EDEN INTERVENED TO STATE THAT IN HIS OPINION IT WOULD BE MISTAKE FOR BAO DAI TO GO BACK NOW BUT BRITISH RECOGNIZED ADVANTAGE OF VIETNAMESE ROYAL TRADITION AND AGREED THAT "ROYAL COMMISSION" OF SOME SORT SHOULD BE SET UP AND MIGHT PROVE BE BEST WAY OUT.

HE INQUIRED ABOUT PERSONALITY AND USEFULNESS OF EMPRESS AND MENDES REPLIED THAT SHE WAS EXEMPLARY PERSON WHO COULD PROVE VERY USEFUL IN VIETNAM.

DILLON

ROW/32

Note: Mr. Allen (EUR) notified 2:45 pm 12/19/54 (FMH)
SECRETARY STATED THAT IN CONSIDERING VICEROY WE WERE ADVANCING INTO SECOND PROBLEM WITHOUT HAVING SOLVED FIRST. HE DID NOT EXPECT VICEROY BE ABLE DECIDE ON ALTERNATE TO DEEM AND TO SET UP MACHINERY TO IMPLEMENT OUR IDEAS. HE STATED THAT OUR JOB WAS TO CREATE MACHINERY. AT PRESENT TIME WE MUST CONCERN OURSELVES WITH PRESENT PROBLEM, NOT WITH NEW INTRIGUES. HE ASKED MENDES WHAT HIS ADVISERS HAD SUGGESTED AS ALTERNATIVE. MENDES REPLIED NO RPT NO ONE SPECIFICALLY AS YET BUT THAT HE PREFERRED ALLOW ELY SPEAK ON THIS SUBJECT.

ELY REPLIED THAT HE WAS MORE CONCERNED WITH CURRENT PROBLEMS OF DIEM GOVT THAN WITH QUESTION OF POSSIBLE NEW GOVT. ONLY CERTAINTY IS THAT NO RPT NO MORE TIME CAN BE WASTED. ELY MENTIONED HUÜ, TAM AND QUAT AS AMONG MANY PERSONALITIES WHO MIGHT BE USED. MENDES ASKED IF THERE WAS NO RPT NO PREFERENCE. ELY SAID NOT RPT NOT YET. SECRETARY ASKED WHAT WAS WRONG BETWEEN QUAT AND SECTS AND ELY REPLIED THAT IT WAS RESULT OF AN OLD FEUD DATING FROM TIME QUAT WAS MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND HAD TRIED ABOLISH SECTS PRIVATE ARMIES. MENDES ASKED IF THERE WAS NO RPT NO GOOD PROVINCIAL GOVT AND ELY REPLIED NOT RPT NOT SUFFICIENTLY GOOD TAKE ON RATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES.

SECRETARY WENT ON TO SAY THAT WE MUST EXHAUST ALL OUR PRESSURES ON DIEM.
-2- FROM PARIS, 2601 DECEMBER 19, 4PM SECTION TWO OF TWO

ON DIEM TO GET THINGS DONE BEFORE CONSIDERING ALTERNATE SOLUTIONS. RADFORD WILL BE IN SAIGON DEC 22 TO REPORT RESULT OUR CONVERSATIONS TO COLLINS. SECRETARY AGREED WE MUST EXPLORE ALL POSSIBILITIES BUT WARNED THAT MERE FACT WE WERE DOING SO WAS SUFFICIENT TO UNDERMINE PRESENT GOVT. HE ASKED MENDES NOT TO THINK WE HAD OBSTINATELY CLOSED OUR MINDS TO POSSIBLE ALTERNATE SOLUTION. WE HAD NOT RPT NOT BUT OUR INVESTIGATION OF ALTERNATE MUST BE DONE ON CAREFUL BASIS AND WE MUST FOR RESENT SUPPORT DIEM.

MENDES AGREED, TO SUMMARIZE HE HAD THREE MAIN POINTS: FIRST, SUPPORT DIEM; SECOND, TO STUDY ALTERNATIVES. COLLINS AND ELY SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO EXPLORE FURTHER POSSIBILITIES INCLUDING BAO DAI WITH GREATEST DISCRETION. SECRETARY THEN RETURNED TO VICEROY QUESTION ASKING IF PROPOSED MAN WOULD BE INDEPENDENT OR DEPENDENT ON BAO DAI. MENDES STATED HE WOULD BE INDEPENDENT BUT WOULD DERIVE LEGALITY FROM BAO DAI. QUESTION WOULD BE STUDIED FURTHER AND FRENCH PROPOSAL PASSED ON TO COLLINS AND ELY FOR STUDY.

MENDES' THIRD POINT WAS THAT ELY AND COLLINS SHOULD BE REQUESTED INVESTIGATE MATTER OF TIMING. HOW MUCH FURTHER DELAY CAN BE TOLERATED? MENDES ASKED? WE MUST SET DEADLINE. THE GENERALS MUST COME TO CONCLUSION ON TWO AND THREE AND MAKE PRECISE RECOMMENDATIONS TO US SO THAT WE CAN TAKE NECESSARY DECISIONS.

SECRETARY AGREED BUT STATED THAT FOURTH POINT MUST BE ADDED. IT IS THAT IF US SHOULD DECIDE THAT THERE IS NO RPT NO GOOD ALTERNATIVE TO DIEM WE WILL HAVE TO CONSIDER HOW MUCH MORE INVESTMENT WE WILL BE PREPARED TO MAKE IN INDOCHINA. OUR POLICY WOULD HAVE TO BE REAPPRAISED. CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, PARTICULARLY THE TWO FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEES, LED BY MANSFIELD AND RICHARDS, WERE INTENSELY INTERESTED IN PROBLEM AND WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSULTED. THEY BOTH HAD STRONG FEELINGS. MANSFIELD BELIEVES IN DIEM. SECRETARY WAS NOT RPT NOT FULLY COGNIZANT WITH RICHARDS' OPINIONS BUT THOUGHT HE DID TOO. SECRETARY BELIEVED THAT EVEN SLIGHT CHANCE OF SUCCESS IN VIETNAM WAS WORTH CONSIDERABLE INVESTMENT. US HAD ALSO TO THINK OF WHAT HAPPENED IN ADJACENT COUNTRIES — IN CAMBODIA, LAOS, THAILAND AND MALAYA. US SITUATION WAS DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF FRENCH.
TOP SECRET

-3- FROM PARIS, 2631 DECEMBER 19, 4PM SECTION TWO OF TWO

OF FRENCH. FRENCH HAD AN INVESTMENT IN LIVES AND PROPERTY IN VIETNAM WHILE OURS INVOLVED EFFECT THAT FATE OF VIETNAM WOULD HAVE ON REST OF SOUTH EAST ASIA. SECRETARY CLOSED BY STATING THAT HE ACCEPTED MENDES' THREE POINTS WITH ADDITION OF HIS OWN FOURTH.

MENDES REPLIED THAT HE SYMPATHIZED WITH US PROBLEM BUT TRUSTED THAT WE WOULD NOT RPT NOT ARRIVE AT NEGATIVE CONCLUSION. HE URGED THAT US AND FRANCE KEEP IN TOUCH AT ALL TIMES. EVEN IF US SHOULD ARRIVE AT NEGATIVE POSITION, FRANCE WOULD NOT RPT NOT RENOUNCE HOPE.

EDEN STATED HE AGREED AND FELT THAT EVEN ADDITIONAL SINGLE YEAR OF SUSTAINED EFFORT WOULD HELP EVERYWHERE AND THAT WE MUST TRY AND KEEP UP THE FIGHT IN ORDER TO GIVE CONFIDENCE TO OTHERS IN AREA. THIS ENDED MAIN PART OF INDOCHINA DISCUSSIONS.

MENDES THEN SAID THAT HE WISHED TO RAISE QUESTION OF LETTER SENT BY VIET MINH TO EDEN AND MOLOTOV AS CO-CHAIRMEN OF GENEVA CONFERENCE. IT COMPLAINED ABOUT VIOLATIONS OF GENEVA AGREEMENT BY FRENCH AND VIETNAMESE GOVT. HE SAID THAT SOME OF VIET MINH COMPLAINTS "WERE NOT RPT NOT UNFOUNDED". WHOLE MATTER CONSTITUTED DELICATE QUESTION FOR ICC WOULD BE SEIZED OF IT AND IT WOULD PROVE DIFFICULT, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW SENSITIVITY OF INDIANS ON ICC. MENDES BELIEVED WE MUST EXERT ALL OUR EFFORTS TO CONVINCE SOUTH NOT RPT NOT TO VIOLATE GENEVA AGREEMENTS. VIETNAMESE POSITION HAD BEEN THAT THEY WERE NOT RPT NOT SIGNATORIES. THIS MIGHT PROVE USEFUL TO US LATER AS LEGAL POSITION BUT FOR PRESENT BELIEVED SOUTH MUST BE PERSUADED TO ABIDE BY GENEVA TERMS.

EDEN STATED HE HAD REJECTED LETTER EXPLAINING THAT ATTEMPT TO DELIVER IT HAD BEEN MADE IN MOSCOW. MENDES CORRECTED EDEN'S MEMORY BY STATING THAT LETTER HAD BEEN REPORTED BY BRITISH CONSUL IN HANOI. HE DESCRIBED LETTER AS NOT RPT NOT BEING IMPORTANT IN ITSELF -- A PROPAGANDA INSTRUMENT --- BUT THAT IT INDICATED START OF POLITICAL OFFENSIVE BY VIET MINH.

RELATED PROBLEM WAS SAFEGUARDING OF PUBLIC UTILITY SERVICES IN HAIPHONG.

TOP SECRET

832
IN HAIPHONG, VIETNAMESE GOVT HAD BEEN BREAKING GENEVA AGREEMENTS ON THIS SCORE AS WELL. VIET MINH HAD COMPLAINED AND JUSTIFIABLY.

ANOTHER DIFFICULT PROBLEM WITH REGARD TO GENEVA WAS TRAINING OF VIETNAMESE OFFICERS. HE WOULD BE PLEASED TO KNOW US POSITION ON INTRODUCING NEW MILITARY ADVISERS INTO INDOCHINA AND POSSIBLE CONFLICT WITH GENEVA AGREEMENT.

SECRETARY STATED THAT ALTHOUGH WE WERE ROTATING MAAG PERSONNEL, WE WERE NOT RPT NOT INCREASING IT. RADFORD CONFIRMED. ELY STATED THAT COLLINS-ELY AGREEMENT ON TRAINING REMAINED WITHIN FRAMEWORK GENEVA ACCORDS. MENDES STATED THAT QUESTION WAS LEGAL ONE; ROTATION PERMITTED UNDER TERMS GENEVA BUT CAN TRAINING OFFICERS BE SUBSTITUTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL? WAS IT VIOLATION OF ACCORDS TO SUBSTITUTE OFFICERS FOR NON-COMS, ETC.? MENDES SAID THAT FRENCH GOVT WOULD HAVE TO STUDY TEXT OF COLLINS-ELY AGREEMENT CAREFULLY FROM LEGAL POINT OF VIEW TO ENSURE THAT IT FULLY ACCORDED WITH ARMISTICE AND REQUESTED US DO SAME. HE SAID THIS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT AS VM HAD ALREADY OFFICIALY PROTESTED TO ICC RE US ASSUMPTION OF TRAINING RESPONSIBILITY. SECRETARY EXPRESSED GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH PRINCIPLE THAT GENEVA ACCORDS SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE BROKEN BUT STATED THAT OUR INTERPRETATION OF THEM MUST NOT RPT NOT BE SO REFINED THAT WE REFUSE TO SUBSTITUTE X FOR Y IF Y IS ILL OR LESS COMPETENT THAN X. MENDES AGREED AND SAID THAT IN LAST ANALYSIS PEOPLE WHO MUST BE PLEASED ARE ICC. HE ASKED THAT BRITISH MAINTAIN THEIR CONTACTS WITH INDIANS AND CANADIANS, WHICH EDEN AGREED TO DO. GENERAL DISCUSSION ENSUED ON QUESTION VIET MINH PROTESTS ON VIOLATION OF GENEVA ACCORDS AND SECRETARY CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT IT WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE IF WE WERE TO FIND OURSELVES ON DEFENSIVE IN THIS MATTER IN LIGHT OF SMUGGLING OF MILITARY MATERIAL INTO NORTH VIETNAM FROM CHINA AND PERSECUTION OF CATHOLICS BY VIET MINH.

MENDES THEN PROCEEDED TO QUESTION ABOUT CAMBODIA STATING THAT FRENCH HAD 500 OFFICERS IN CAMBODIA AS TRAINING MISSION AND INTENDED TO KEEP THEM THERE. HE ASKED SECRETARY TO LOOK INTO MATTER AND TO GIVE FRENCH US VIEWS ON SUBJECT. MENDES ADDED THAT FRENCH CONSIDERED PRESENCE OF THEIR MILITARY MISSION THERE AS CONSISTENT
TOP SECRET

-5- FROM PARIS, 2001 DECEMBER 19, 4PM SECTION TWO OF TWO

AS CONSISTENT WITH FRENCH DEFENSE POLICY.

MEETING THEN PROCEEDED TO OTHER SUBJECTS COVERED IN SEPARATE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELS. AT END THERE WAS A PROLONGED DISCUSSION ABOUT COMMUNIQUE AND IT WAS FINALLY DECIDED NOT RPT NOT TO ISSUE ANY.

MENDES ASKED AT END WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT INFORMING ASSOCIATED STATES GOVTS OF OUR DISCUSSIONS IN KEEPING WITH OUR USUAL PRACTICE. IT WAS DECIDED THAT THE HIGH COMMISSIONERS IN PARIS WOULD BE INFORMED BY THREE-MAN GROUP REPRESENTING THREE DELEGATIONS. (SEE SEPARATE TELEGRAM.)

DILLON

ROW/32

Note: Mr. Allen (EUR) notified 3:20 pm 12/19/54 (FMH)
NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on
CURRENT U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE FAR EAST

References:
A. NSC 5429/2, NSC 5429/3, NSC 5429/4
B. NSC 166/1
C. NSC 152/3
D. NSC 146/2
E. NSC Action No. 256
F. NSC 125/2 and NSC 125/6
G. NSC 170/1
H. NSC 171/1
I. NSC 5405
J. NSC 5409
K. NSC 5413/1
L. NSC Action No. 1250
M. NSC Action No. 1148
N. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject, "U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Formosa and the Chinese Nationalist Government", dated September 28 and October 5, 1954, and NSC Action No. 1235
O. NSC Action Nos. 1224 and 1234
P. NSC Action Nos. 1250 and 1259
Q. NSC Action No. 1233
R. NSC Action No. 1275
S. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated November 29 and December 20, 1954
T. NSC Action No. 1292

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, at the 229th meeting of the Council on December 21, 1954, discussed the subject in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of December 20. The Council adopted the changes in the statement of policy contained in NSC 5429/4, which are set forth in NSC Action No. 1292-2, and:

NSC 5429/5

TOP SECRET
Deferred action on paragraph 5-g pending further consideration by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, and report at the meeting of the Council to be held January 5, 1955. (NSC Action No. 1292-g)

Deferred action on paragraph 7-e, other than the "Majority Proposal" in 7-e(2), pending further consideration by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, and report at the meeting of the Council to be held January 5, 1955. (NSC Action No. 1292-g)

Requested the Council on Foreign Economic Policy to undertake the study outlined in the "majority proposal" in paragraph 7-e-(2) of NSC 5429/4. (NSC Action No. 1292-g)

The President has this date approved the statement of policy in NSC 5429/4, as amended and adopted by the Council (except paragraphs 5-g and 7-g) and enclosed herewith as NSC 5429/5; directs its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, subject to review in the light of final decisions as to basic national security policy; and designates the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.

Accordingly, the enclosed policy supersedes NSC 5429/2; NSC Action No. 1148-B; NSC Action No. 1224-B and NSC Action No. 1234-b; NSC Action No. 1258-g and NSC Action No. 1259-g; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject, "U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Formosa and the Chinese Nationalist Government", dated September 23, 1954. The enclosed statement of policy is to guide the implementation of all other existing Far Eastern policies (reference B-L) modifying them where inconsistent, pending Planning Board and Council review and revision of these more particular policies.

A Financial Appendix covering the Far East will be prepared for the information of the Council at a later meeting.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
    The Secretary of Commerce
    The Director, Bureau of the Budget
    The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
    The Director of Central Intelligence

NSC 5429/5 836
STATEMENT OF POLICY

by the

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on

CURRENT U.S. POLICY IN THE FAR EAST

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. The primary problem of U.S. policy in the Far East is to cope with the serious threat to U.S. security interests which has resulted from the spread of hostile Communist power on the continent of Asia over all of Mainland China, North Korea and, more recently, over the northern part of Viet Nam.

2. In its five years of power, the regime in Communist China has established and consolidated effective control over the mainland and has maintained and developed close working relations with the Soviet Union. While there is now no reason to anticipate an early collapse of the regime nor any means of seeing when one might occur, inherently such regimes have elements of rigidity and instability which sometimes produce crises. We should be ready to exploit any opportunities which might occur as a result of inherent internal weaknesses.
3. The task of the United States in coping with this situation is further complicated by:
   
   a. The vulnerability of the non-Communist countries in the area militarily, and in varying degrees, politically, economically, and psychologically, to further Communist expansionist efforts.
   
   b. The deep-seated national antagonisms and differing assessments of national interest which divide these countries from each other and severely hamper efforts to combine their collective resources for their own defense and welfare.
   
   c. The intense nationalistic feelings, fed by residual resentments against European colonialism coupled with a widespread feeling of weakness and inadequacy in the face of the worldwide power struggle, which inhibit many of these countries from cooperating closely with the United States.
   
   d. The divergencies on Far Eastern policy with our European allies, principally with respect to our posture toward China, which limit the extent of political and economic pressures which can be maintained against the Asian Communist regimes without divisive effects on the basic United States-led coalition.

OBJECTIVES

4. Pursuant to a policy of being clear and strong in its resolve to defend its vital interests, if necessary at the risk of but without being provocative of war, the principal objectives of the United States in the Far East should be:

   a. Preservation of the territorial and political integrity of the non-Communist countries in the area against further Communist expansion or subversion.

   b. Progressive improvement of the relative political, economic and military position of the non-Communist countries vis-a-vis that of the Asian Communist regimes.

   c. Reduction of Chinese Communist power and prestige, or securing by reorientation a Government on the mainland of China whose objectives do not conflict with the vital interests of the United States.

   d. Disruption of the Sino-Soviet alliance through actions designed to intensify existing and potential areas of conflict or divergence of interest between the USSR and Communist China.

   e. Creation in Asia of political and social forces which will zealously spread the greater values of the Free World and simultaneously expose the falsity of the Communist ideological offensive.

COURSES OF ACTION

5. In order to preserve the territorial and political integrity of the area, the United States should:
a. Maintain the security of the Pacific off-shore island chain (Japan, Ryukyus, Formosa and the Pescadores, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand) as an element essential to U.S. security; assisting in developing such military strength in each area as is required by U.S. security and is consistent with each area's capability and maintenance of domestic stability.

b. In the event of unprovoked attack on the Republic of Korea, employ, in accordance with Constitutional processes, U.S. armed forces against the aggressor. While supporting the unification of Korea by all peaceful means and maintaining appropriate safeguards against ROK offensive action, continue military and economic assistance programs consistent with U.S. security interests and subject to continued ROK cooperation.

c. Ratify the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China covering Formosa and the Pescadores, and jointly agree upon appropriate safeguards against Chinese Nationalist offensive action. Pending the ratification of such a Treaty, continue the existing unilateral arrangement to defend Formosa and the Pescadores (excluding the Nationalist held off-shore islands). For the present, seek to preserve, through United Nations action, the status quo of the Nationalist-held off-shore islands; and, without committing U.S. forces except as militarily desirable in the event of Chinese Communist attack on Formosa and the
Pescadores, provide to the Chinese Nationalist forces military equipment and training to assist them to defend such off-shore islands, using Formosa as a base. However, do not agree to Chinese Nationalist offensive actions against mainland Communist China, except under circumstances approved by the President. Agree to Chinese Nationalist actions against Communist China which are prompt and clear retaliation against a Chinese Communist attack; provided such retaliation is against targets of military significance which meet U. S. criteria as to feasibility and chance of success and which are selected with due consideration for the undesirability of provoking further Chinese Communist reaction against Formosa and the Pescadores.

d. Should overt Communist aggression occur in the South-east Asian treaty area, invoke the UN Charter or the SEATO treaty, or both, and subject to local request for assistance take necessary military and any other action to assist any state or dependent territory in the SEATO area willing to resist Communist resort to force: Provided, that the taking of military action shall be subject to prior submission to and approval by the Congress unless the emergency is deemed by the President to be so great that immediate action is necessary to save a vital interest of the United States.

e. Employ all feasible covert means, and all feasible overt means, including, in accordance with constitutional processes, the use of armed force if necessary and appropriate, to prevent Indonesia or vital parts thereof from falling under
Communist control by overt armed attack, subversion, economic domination, or other means;concerting overt actions with other ANZUS-nations.

1. In the event of Communist overt armed attack or imminent threat of such attack against any other country in the area (not covered by a security treaty to which the United States is a party), this evidence of a renewal of Communist aggressive purposes would constitute such a grave menace to the United States as to justify the President in requesting authority from Congress to take necessary action to deal with the situation, including the use of U.S. armed forces, if appropriate and feasible.
g. (1) Issue a directive to its armed forces that, in the event of unprovoked Communist armed attack against U. S. military or non-military personnel, aircraft, or vessels outside Communist territory, U. S. forces in the area will take against the Communist attacking force during the course of the attack aggressive protective measures, including if necessary and feasible immediate pursuit of the Communist attacking force into hostile airspace or waters.

(2) In addition to the action directed in (1) above, and as constitutionally authorized and specifically approved by the President, take such additional punitive action as may be necessary and appropriate.
h. Encourage the conditions necessary to form as soon as possible and then participate in, a Western Pacific collective defense arrangement including the Philippines, Japan, the Republic of China and the Republic of Korea, eventually linked with the Manila Pact and ANZUS.

i. If requested by a legitimate local government which requires assistance to defeat local Communist subversion or rebellion not constituting armed attack, the United States should view such a situation so gravely that, in addition to giving all possible covert and overt support within the Executive Branch authority, the President should at once consider requesting Congressional authority to take appropriate action, which might if necessary and feasible include the use of U.S. military forces either locally or against the external source of such subversion or rebellion (including Communist China if determined to be the source).

j. Assist where necessary and feasible non-Communist Government and other elements in the Far East to counter Communist subversion and economic domination.

k. Maintain sufficient U.S. forces in the Far East as clear evidence of U.S. intention to contribute its full share of effective collective aid to the nations of the area against the Communist threat, and to provide.
assurance to the people of the Far East of U.S. intent and determination to support them in the event of Communist aggression.

6. In order to enhance the individual and collective strength of the non-Communist countries, the United States should:

   a. Increase efforts to develop the basic stability and strength of non-Communist countries, especially Japan and India, and their capacity and will to resist Communist expansion.

   b. Continue (1) to recognize the Government of the Republic of China as the only government of China and its right to represent China in the United Nations, and (2) to furnish direct support to its defense establishment and its economy.

   c. Encourage the prompt organization of an economic grouping by the maximum number of free Asian states, including Japan and as many of the Colombo Powers as possible based on self-help and mutual aid, and the participation and support (including substantial financial assistance) of the United States and other appropriate Western countries, through which, by united action, those free Asian states will be enabled, more effectively to achieve the economic and social strength needed.
to maintain their independence.

d. Take all feasible measures to increase the opportunities of such countries for trade with each other and with other Free World countries.

e. Provide in South and Southeast Asia, through the economic grouping referred to in e above or otherwise, such economic and technical aid over an extended period as can be used effectively to accelerate the present slow rates of economic growth, and to give to the peoples in these areas a sense of present progress and future hope, which is currently lacking.

f. Develop and make more effective information, cultural, education and exchange programs; and expand the program for training of free Asian leaders.

g. Encourage the countries of the area to use qualified Americans as advisers and develop a program for training such persons.

h. Seek, by intensifying covert and psychological activities, and by utilizing indigenous persons to the greatest extent feasible, to (1) increase the understanding and orientation of Asian peoples toward the Free World and (2) expose the menace of Chinese imperialism and world Communism.
TOP SECRET

1. Encourage and support, more vigorously and effectively, the application of private capital to
the development needs of free Asian countries under
arrangements avoiding "exploitation" yet acceptable
to private interests.

7. In order to weaken or retard the growth of the
power and influence of the Asian Communist regimes,
especially Communist China, the United States should:

   a. Continue to refuse recognition of the
      Chinese Communist regime and other Asian Communist
      regimes, but deal with each on a local basis and
      with regard to specific subjects where the regime is
      a party at interest.

   b. Continue to oppose seating Communist
      China in the Security Council, the General Assembly,
      and other organs of the United Nations.

NSC 5429/5
(1) Maintain the current level of United States export, import, and financial controls on trade with Communist China. Without derogating from the basic principles of these controls, administer them in such a manner so as to endeavor not to lessen the active cooperation in the multilateral control program of other Free World countries.

(2) Urge other Free World countries to maintain the current level of export controls on trade with Communist China. In aid of this effort, the United States should, without frustrating the multilateral embargo program, endeavor to handle questions of routine exceptions in such manner as to preserve and foster the willingness of other countries to retain the present level of controls.

(3) Whenever it may be determined by the Secretary of State that further effort to maintain the current multilaterally agreed level of export controls would be seriously divisive among our allies or lead nations needing trade with Communist China toward an accommodation with the Soviet bloc, the Secretary should report such determination promptly to the Council for consideration of appropriate action.

(4) In the meanwhile, the Council on Foreign Economic Policy should study, on an urgent basis, all aspects of U.S. economic defense policy applicable to trade with the Communist bloc (including Communist China), taking into account in such study, among other things, the matters set forth in Annex B, and should submit to the National Security Council at the
earliest practicable date comprehensive and detailed recommendations for such revisions in such policy as may be required by national security interests, both long and short range.

d. Utilize all feasible overt and covert means, consistent with a policy of not being provocative of war, to create discontent and internal divisions within each of the Communist-dominated areas of the Far East, and to impair their relations with the Soviet Union and with each other, particularly by stimulating Sino-Soviet estrangement. However, do not agree to Chinese Nationalist offensive actions against mainland Communist China, except under circumstances approved by the President. Agree to Chinese Nationalist actions against Communist China which are prompt and clear retaliation against a Chinese Communist attack; provided such retaliation is against targets of military significance which meet U.S. criteria as to feasibility and chance of success and which are selected with due consideration for the undesirability of provoking further Chinese Communist reaction against Formosa and the Pescadores.

g. Continue the policy towards Indochina and Thailand stated in Annex A.

8. a. The United States should attempt to convince the other Free World countries of the soundness of U.S. policies toward Communist China and toward the Republic of China and of the advisability of their adopting similar policies, without, however, imposing such pressures as would be seriously divisive.
b. In its Pacific role, the United States should be less influenced by its European allies than in respect to Atlantic affairs.

9. The United States should keep an open mind on the possibility of negotiating with the USSR and Communist China acceptable and enforceable agreements, whether limited to individual issues now outstanding or involving a general settlement of major issues.
10. Indochina: Political and Covert Action.
   a. Make every possible effort, not openly inconsistent with the U. S. position as to the armistice agreements, to defeat Communist subversion and influence, to maintain and support friendly non-Communist governments in Cambodia and Laos, to maintain a friendly non-Communist South Vietnam, and to prevent a Communist victory through all-Vietnam elections.
   b. Urge that the French promptly recognize and deal with Cambodia, Laos and free Vietnam as independent sovereign nations.
   c. Strengthen U. S. representation and deal directly, wherever advantageous to the U. S., with the governments of Cambodia, Laos and free Vietnam.
   d. Working through the French only insofar as necessary, assist Cambodia, Laos and free Vietnam to maintain (1) military forces necessary for internal security and (2) economic conditions conducive to the maintenance and strength of non-Communist regimes and comparing favorably with those in adjacent Communist areas.
   e. Aid emigration from North Vietnam and resettlement of peoples unwilling to remain under communist rule.
   f. Exploit available means to make more difficult the control by the Viet Minh of North Vietnam.
g. Exploit available means to prevent North Vietnam from becoming permanently incorporated in the Soviet bloc, using as feasible and desirable consular relations and non-strategic trade.

h. Expose Communist violations of the Armistice in Indochina.

i. Conduct covert operations on the maximum feasible and productive scale in support of the foregoing policies.

11. Thailand

a. Provide military assistance sufficient to increase the strength of indigenous forces, thereby helping to control local subversion, and to make easier clear identification of instances of overt aggression.

b. Provide economic assistance conducive to the maintenance and strength of a non-Communist regime.

c. Concentrate efforts on developing Thailand as a support of U. S. objectives in the area and as the focal point of U. S. covert and psychological operations in Southeast Asia.
Pursuant my talks concerning Viet-Nam with Mendes-France and Eden Paris (Paris 2601 repeated Saigon 380) I feel it good occasion for us all review basic factors Viet-Nam problems and spell out some guide lines our actions in near future.

1. Although there many complex and difficult factors confronting Free Viet-Nam, there no reason admit defeat. During past five months since Geneva, situation has not disintegrated. People fundamentally anti-Communist. They have major resources in south. Hinh problem solved and resettlement proceeding reasonably well. In some ways, developments better than we predicted. Collins and Ely have contributed greatly this situation and their cooperation is major asset. Direct aid, reduction FEC and provisions Manila Pact all positive factors which will affect developments. Pace may not please us but major changes such stage of transition as Viet-Nam going through comes more slowly than in West. We must not overlook fact Communists also face formidable problems and if we create situation such that they can only take over by internal violence, we will have faced them with serious dilemma because of unfavorable effect.
effect such action on Asian countries like India. Their recent increase anti-Diem and anti-American propaganda may well be result realization magnitude that they face and chances ultimate Free World success.

2. Withdrawal our support would hasten Communist takeover Viet-Nam and have adverse repercussions all Southeast Asia. Consequently, investment Viet-Nam justified even if only to buy time build up strength elsewhere in area. We are going in have maintain flexible policy and proceed carefully by stages. Viet-Nam. Simultaneously we are thinking of ways and means strengthen Cambodia, Laos and Thailand against contingencies. But we basically and immediately faced with problem strengthening Free Viet-Nam and must devote best efforts that task.

3. Under present circumstances and unless situation in Free Viet-Nam clearly appears hopeless and rapidly disintegrating, we have no choice but continue our aid Viet-Nam and support of Diem. There no other suitable leader known to us. Can any successor make up for Diem’s deficiencies without also lacking Diem’s virtues? Could we anticipate stable process of succession and not worse confusion and weakness than now exists. These tough questions and would appreciate your views.

4. I agreed with Mendez-France at Paris four items concerning problem of Diem. (reference telegram) While study of alternate leaders among these points I did not agree Generals Collins and Ely should establish deadline for replacement Diem by another man. It agreed that Collins and Ely would report late January on overall situation.

5. I do not consider Di’s return Viet-Nam would really solve our
basic problems there. Neither do Mendes-France or Eden. Nor do I see merit in French suggestion of viceroy, which had Mendes-France did not press it after suggestion was analyzed. I see little point taking huge create such machinery when no successor in sight and which would only add to intrigues.

6. Early approval of France and then Viet-Nam of Collins-Ely memorandum understanding regarding training is basic need. We should make every effort ensure discussions with Viet-Nam proceed rapidly and effectively. Only when we have taken steps reorganize and revitalize National Army can we hope for improved security condition and lessening Communist influence Free Viet-Nam. This will also require very best native leadership available and I hope either General Ty or Vy is up to that task.

7. There also extremely delicate problem our influencing Diem along right lines. I know how frustrating Collins’ experience now and Heath’s in past have been. Land reform has powerful propaganda value, which Communists already not failed exploit. Something should be done on our side, with our help, put this emotional and basic element to work for us.

8. Although there many other factors consider I am sure if we concentrate on solving problems listed above we will make headway. I would appreciate your comments.

DULLES

TOP SECRET
Classification
Following comments submitted for information State and Defense, all paragraph references are to reference telegram unless otherwise indicated:

1. First paragraph statement that "only suggestion which has been accepted by Diem was appointment Minh as Minister of Defense" is not correct. See paragraph 2A, Part II, my telegram 2250. Most of actions listed there were taken upon my recommendations of which Ely had been informed.

2. Mendez statement in paragraph two likewise points unduly black picture. Fact is that when Ely departed Saigon our staffs were still working on details of six programs outlined my telegram 2284. Ely and I had reached general agreement on each of those programs but until details were further developed, we were not prepared to present them to Diem government. Subsequent to Ely's departure we have discussed with Diem detailed suggestions for National Assembly. Generally these were received favorably by Diem. US staff officers are now actively studying proposals with small committee appointed by Diem. While not conclusive, fairly satisfactory progress is being made. Similarly, statement attributed to Ely in paragraph 6 that "both were now virtually convinced that it was hopeless to expect anything of Diem" is an overstatement. I made no such statement to Ely though he might have deduced this from our discussions, reported in paragraphs 4 and 5 my telegram 2285. Reference paragraphs 6 and 8, we have not submitted any ultimatum to Diem although I have tried to make clear to him that no decision has been reached by the United States with...
-2- 2455, December 25, 8 p.m., from Saigon, CORRECTED COPY

States with respect to assumption of training responsibility or direct military aid and have indicated that my final recommendations will be dependent upon the progress actually achieved by his government during the remainder of my stay here. I am in full accord with position taken by Secretary outlined in paragraph 8.

3. I thoroughly disagree with the suggestion made by Mendes in paragraph 9 and by Eden in paragraph 11. As I view situation there are only four acceptable solutions with respect to Bao Dai: either (a) he should return to Saigon and use his full authority and influence to force sects and all other elements of country to support progressive program of Diem, or some other Premier if Diem is replaced; or (b) he should personally assume active direction of the government as Chief of State and Premier; or (c) he should cease pulling any strings from France or asserting any influence, except as specifically requested by French and Americans pending establishment of constitutional monarchy; or (d) he should renounce his authority as Chief of State. I assume that these and perhaps other alternatives will be examined thoroughly in Washington as indicated in Embassy telegram 2477 and Department telegram 2599, repeated Saigon 386.

4. Quite frankly I was disturbed over the attitude assumed by Mendes as indicated in paragraphs 21 through 24. Inference in paragraph 23 that Vietnamese Government had been breaking Geneva agreements with respect to public utility services in Haiphong is not factual to our best information. I told Ely that I had issued positive instructions to our MAAG and USOM representatives in Haiphong to cooperate fully with French in preventing violations of the Geneva Accord in Haiphong enclave. No single report of violations has been made to date. I wonder whether Mendes' reference is possibly a removal of US financed mining equipment which French commercial firms and Sainteny Mission may be concerned with. Ely has promised to have more valuable and better conditioned equipment of this character removed. However, Daridan only yesterday said there may be some question as to whether this equipment could be interpreted under the Geneva Accord as pertaining to public utilities.

5. Statement in paragraph 24 by Mendes that Collins-Ely agreement reference military training would have to be studied carefully from legal point of view again raises question authority delegated Ely and extent to which he will be supported by Mendes government in agreements made as indicated by Mendes in last Washington conference. If our conduct of training is to be hedged about with legal interpretations of the character in paragraph 24, then I would recommend that we not assume this responsibility. As indicated in an earlier message, Ely had agreed with me that if necessary, strength of
TOP SECRET

-3- 2455, December 25, 8 p.m., from Saigon, CORRECTED COPY

our MAAG training personnel could be increased beyond the 342 figure, if it were done quietly and over a period of months. While I am not a lawyer, I have carefully studied Article 16 of the Geneva agreement with respect to Vietnam and can find nowhere in this Article any basis for interpretations which Mendes appears to place on introductions of US training personnel. Fact is the 342 US total comprised Air Force technicians and MAAG Logistical personnel. These must be converted largely to personnel competent to train the Vietnamese Army.

6. After discussing with Radford above details and other factors concerning situation here, we were in accord that if NSC is to re-evaluate our policies in late January, to be followed perhaps by US, British-French consultations, it would be desirable for me to be present Washington during these discussions. Even the best modern communications lack the personal touch and give-and-take exchange of ideas which I would think would be essential if we are to make sound re-evaluation of our policies with respect to Vietnam.

KIDDER

LMS:JAK-6
Mr. Robertson and I went to see the Secretary this morning about beginning direct aid to Viet-Nam in January and moving ahead with MAAG negotiations in Cambodia.

1. The Secretary decided we should proceed as scheduled and "take the plunge" on January 1. Mr. Robertson and I stated the pros and cons. Mr. Robertson pointed out our prestige would be considerably more committed in the three Associated States and our ability to disengage made more difficult by this step. On the other hand, I pointed out it would give us more leverage, put our missions on a direct footing and carry out the understanding reached with the French and the three Associated States last September and October. I explained to the Secretary that Governor Stassen had set up an operational mechanism which would keep our direct aid fluid and flexible so that it could be tapered up or down quickly depending on developing circumstances. Mr. Robertson stressed that no amount of aid would be announced at this time or conveyed to the governments concerned. The Secretary indicated his approval of this general line or approach and that the program would be subject to discontinuance at any time, as at present.

2. With respect to the JCS prerequisite on elimination of the French in Cambodia, the Secretary stated that it was much too legalistic and unrealistic. It is the kind of thing that could get us into a great deal of complication without sufficient compensating advantages. He felt that this was the sort of problem which could be only handled in time and by various methods. To attack it so directly would only create much more of a problem.

Kenneth T. Young, Jr.

Approved

Disapproved
MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of U. S. Military Programs in Southeast Asia

Jan 5 1955

1. In a recent cable (DA IN 105690) General J. Lawton Collins indicated that Premier Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam does not have the capacity to unify the divided factions in Vietnam and that unless action is taken to achieve such unity the country will be lost to Communism. He further stated that if measures to strengthen the government were unacceptable to the U. S., or were unsuccessful, the U. S. should re-evaluate its plans for assisting Southeast Asia. In addition, it is apparent that if the 1956 Vietnam elections are held, the Communists will probably emerge victorious. The political decision with respect to General Collins' recommendation has not yet been made.

2. In message No. 2585 dated 24 December 1954 to the American Embassies in Paris and Saigon, the Secretary of State was more optimistic and expressed the view that progress had been made in South Vietnam during the past five months.

3. Referenced communications indicate a delicate and unstable situation within South Vietnam. Under these circumstances, it is necessary that the Department of Defense be prepared for any eventuality; hence it is prudent that all the implications of possible courses of action be examined. Accordingly, it is requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit their views and recommendations on the following points as well as any other which they deem appropriate.

a. Assuming aid is cut off, the effect of this action upon the ability of the armed forces and the Government of Vietnam to maintain internal security in South Vietnam.

b. Assuming minimal aid is to be given, the nature and extent of the military aid required, and the period for which it should be granted.

c. Force levels for the FEC which would enable them, in conjunction with available Vietnamese forces, to safeguard the evacuation from Vietnam of U. S. equipment.

SecDef Cont. No. TS-0786
d. Types and levels of equipment to be retained by the FEC and the Vietnamese armed forces.

e. Procedures for the rapid evacuation and disposition of excess U. S. equipment.

f. The military implications of the possible loss of South Vietnam to the Communists.

g. The type and level of assistance to be given to other countries in the area (Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Burma) in the light of the above.

h. The extent to which these changed circumstances and revised programs will affect the discharge of U. S. obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.

i. It is further requested that this information be forwarded to me not later than 20 January 1955.

Signed -

C. E. Wilson

Distr: 1, 2, 3 - JCS
4 - R/C
5 - OSD Plans Comeback
6 - OSD

Prepd. by JT Coffey/2E845
Rewritten by: HSHensel/JP/30 Dec 54
I-17,117
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Reconsideration of U.S. Military Programs in Southeast Asia.

1. In response to your memorandum, dated 5 January 1955, subject as above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit the following views and recommendations.

2. In answer to the eight specific points raised in the above memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it appropriate, in view of the complexity of the problem and the difficulty of considering any of the questions in isolation, to forward a discussion of the points raised. This discussion is attached as the Appendix hereto.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the eight points mentioned involve only a portion of the over-all problem in an examination of the implications of possible courses of action. Accordingly, in response to your request to submit views and recommendations on any other points considered appropriate, the following courses of action are considered available to the United States in the light of the current situation in South Vietnam:

   a. To continue aid to South Vietnam as currently being developed with the cooperation of the French and Vietnamese.

   b. To institute a unilateral program of direct guidance to the Vietnamese government through an "advisory" system. Under this course of action, the amount of U.S. aid should be dependent upon Vietnamese adherence to U.S. direction.

   c. In the event the courses of action in subparagraphs a and b above, are not sufficient to insure retention of South Vietnam to the Free World, to deploy self-sustaining U.S. forces to South Vietnam, either unilaterally, or as a part of a Manila Pact force.
d. To withdraw all U.S. support from South Vietnam and concentrate on saving the remainder of Southeast Asia.

Included in the discussion attached hereto are some of the advantages and disadvantages of each course.

4. Although national policy prescribes making every possible effort to prevent South Vietnam falling to the Communists, the degree to which the United States is willing to support this policy in men, money, materials, and acceptance of additional war risks is not readily apparent. Prior to consideration of military courses of action with respect to this area, a firm decision at national level as to implementation of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia is mandatory. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended previously against a "static" defense for this area and therefore reiterate the previously recommended adoption of a concept of offensive actions against the "military power of the aggressor".

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/
ARTHUR RADFORD,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Enclosure
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Report on Vietnam for the National Security Council

REFERENCES: A. Annex A to NSC 5429/5
B. NSC Action No. 1253-2

The enclosed report on the subject, prepared by General J. Lawton Collins, Special Representative in Vietnam, is transmitted herewith for discussion by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, January 27, 1955.

In the light of the nature of the report, distribution is being kept to an absolute minimum, and it is requested that any distribution beyond the addressess should be on a "need to know" basis.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
Top Secret

January 20, 1955

To: The Secretary of State

From: J. Lawton Collins, Special Representative in Vietnam

Subject: Report on Vietnam for the National Security Council

1. The situation in Vietnam is most complex and difficult toathom. My judgments are conditioned by the fact that I have been in Vietnam only two months. However, during this period I have studied intensively the major factors which will affect the outcome of our efforts to save Free Vietnam from Communism. These major factors are:

a) The Strength and Intentions of the Viet Minh: Free Vietnam cannot match the military power of the Viet Minh who have, and will retain, the capability to overrun Free Vietnam if they wish. Free Vietnam's ultimate security lies in the military and moral support it may receive under the Manila Pact. Strong affirmation by the signatories to the Manila Pact of their determination to react if hostilities were renewed in Indochina may be an essential factor in deterring the Viet Minh from launching an open attack. Moreover such a declaration would greatly strengthen the Diem Government's position. The Viet Minh have left elements throughout South Vietnam which constitute a continuing threat to the nation's security. On the other hand the Viet Minh have serious economic problems in the North, where semi-confiscatory taxation and other acts of repression have created much dissatisfaction. Knowledge of these adverse conditions of life in the North, as it reaches Free Vietnam, is beginning to have a salutary effect on the attitudes of people in the South and may have considerable bearing on the elections if they are held in 1956.

b) The Attitude and Intentions of France: There is considerable doubt in my mind as to the real intentions and objectives of France in Indochina. There is strong evidence that the French favor a new Vietnamese Government which will offer no serious resistance to the Viet Minh or to French direction. Without French support, and that support is far from assured, the survival of Free Vietnam is problematical.

c) Attitude and Intentions of the Sects: The politico-religious armed groups called the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen are anti-Communist in orientation, but feudalistic and regressive in all other respects. At present they have an
effective veto power over government action. This power they use to block reforms which might threaten their preferred military, economic and political status. They will retain their power to threaten and harass the government until the National Army is strong enough to neutralize their forces.

d) Loyalty and Effectiveness of the Vietnamese Armed Forces: When I arrived in Vietnam the Government was terrorized by a rebellious Chief of Staff, General Hinh. Hinh's departure and dismissal shortly thereafter cleared the way for steps to render the Army subordinate to the Government. Diem now has a fair measure of control over the armed forces. The Army is being deployed throughout the country to carry out a so-called 'National Security Action' program designed to combat Viet Minh infiltration and restore civil government throughout the country. The Army's degree of effectiveness in executing this program will have a decisive bearing on the success or failure of the Diem Government. It is too soon to predict whether or not the National Security Action program will succeed but agreement by the United States to assume training responsibility and to grant financial aid to a reorganized and revitalized national army should have significant stabilizing effects.

e) Economic Aspects of Free Vietnam: Free Vietnam is capable of maintaining a viable economy, at modest levels. The territory is now self-sufficient in food and formerly produced a substantial rice export surplus. Rice and rubber are traditionally the principal sources of Vietnamese foreign exchange. As security improves, export availability of these products should increase, thus contributing toward stabilization of the economy.

f) Ability of Diem to Secure Broad Popular Support: There is still a serious question in my mind as to whether Diem will be able to establish broad popular confidence in, and support for, his Government. However, he has enjoyed some recent successes in his dealings with the sects. This and his retention of active U.S. support have tended to enhance his prestige. However, Diem has much yet to learn about practical politics and public relations. While at times he conveys the impression of being well over his depth, recently he has evidenced greater flexibility in handling people and increased self-confidence in dealing with his ministers and public issues. On balance I believe that Diem's integrity, strong nationalism, tenacity, and spiritual qualities render him the best available Prime Minister to lead Vietnam in its struggle against Communism.

2. In order to assist the Diem Government to capitalize
on its advantages and to overcome the obstacles to its success, I have directed the principal efforts of the United States in Vietnam, in cooperation with the French, toward aiding the Vietnamese to develop and execute a series of emergency programs covering the military establishment, agrarian reform, refugee resettlement, fiscal management, and the establishment of a national assembly. Some progress, of increasing momentum is being made in all these fields, with corresponding increase in the stability of the Government. The least successful aspect of my mission has been my failure thus far to induce Diem to broaden his Government by including other able, experienced leaders, such as Dr. Phan Huy Quat, former Defense Minister.

3. Considering all factors, although the situation in Vietnam is not bright, I believe that if Diem has firm U.S. support and guidance and active French cooperation, or at least acquiescence, his Government has a reasonable prospect of success. While the atmosphere in Saigon has improved demonstrably since November, owing to the departure of General Minh and the backing which the United States Government has given to Diem, I have been unable to determine the extent of improvement in the countryside and villages of free Vietnam. There the Viet Minh will maintain a significant degree of control until the National Security Action program is well advanced. Moreover, the sects, although displaying some uneasiness that their days of political and financial independence may be numbered, remain devoid of any sense of national conscience and still have the capacity to do great harm. Likewise the prospect of national elections in 1956 hangs as a threat over free Vietnam. This threat may reach the stage of crisis by July 1955, the period when under the Geneva accord the two sides are to begin discussions leading to elections. Nevertheless, in my judgment, there is at least an even chance that Vietnam can be saved from Communism if the present programs of its Government are fully implemented.

4. a. Best available estimate of the costs for CY 55 of financing programs of military and non-military aid that I recommend are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CY 55</th>
<th>1st Half</th>
<th>2nd Half</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>$152.3</td>
<td>$130.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-military</td>
<td>$54.2</td>
<td>$58.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Costs</td>
<td>$206.5</td>
<td>$189.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Vietnamese Contribution</td>
<td>$34.2</td>
<td>$34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remaining Requirement for U.S. Funds</td>
<td>$172.3</td>
<td>$155.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. In practice, because of delays in making new
U.S. appropriations available in Vietnam, Vietnamese calendar year expenses have normally been paid from funds appropriated for the U.S. fiscal year.

c. However, if it is necessary to reduce Vietnam's share of the $700,000,000 currently appropriated for Southeast Asia, it would be possible to limit the amount made available to Vietnam to $372,300,000 (required for 1st half of CY 1955) if we could be assured of $155,000,000 (required for 2nd half of CY 1955) from new FY 1956 appropriations.

d. Estimated costs for CY 1956 are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CY 1956</th>
<th>1st Half</th>
<th>2nd Half</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>$91.4</td>
<td>$81.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Military</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Vietnamese Contribution</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remaining Requirement for U.S. Funds</td>
<td>$103.2</td>
<td>$93.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. The requirement for U.S. funds for the second half of CY 1956, $155.0 million, added to the requirement for U.S. funds for the first half of CY 1956, $103.2 million, or a total of $258.2 million, would be the total requirement for U.S. FY 1956 appropriations. A contingency fund of $20 million may be required for FY 1956 as indicated in Enclosure "B".

5. In view of the importance of Vietnam to all of Southeast Asia, I am convinced that the United States should expend the funds, material, and effort required to strengthen the country and help it retain its independence. I cannot guarantee that Vietnam will remain free, even with our aid. But I know that without our aid Vietnam will surely be lost to Communism. If the chances of success are difficult to calculate, the results of a withdrawal of American aid are only too certain, not only in Vietnam but throughout Southeast Asia. Such a withdrawal would hasten the rate of Communist advances in the Far East as a whole and could result in the loss of Southeast Asia to Communism. In my opinion, the chance of success is not only worth the gamble; we cannot afford to let free Vietnam go by default.

J. Easton Collins
Special Representative of the United States in Vietnam
1. POST-GENEVA CRISIS IN VIETNAM.  

a. Origin of the Crisis. The immediate cause of the crisis in Vietnam which reached an acute phase in the fall of 1954 was the Geneva Accord. This agreement ended seven years of war by dividing the country at the 17th parallel and awarded administration of Tonkin and northern Annam to a victorious Communist army and regime. Under French leadership Vietnam had participated in the war under conditions which tended to perpetuate the essential features of colonial rule. These conditions discouraged the growth of institutions which might have constituted a bulwark against the Viet Minh in the South even after the enemy had prevailed militarily in the North. Vietnam emerged from the war with nominal independence, but this exerted less popular appeal than the anti-colonial slogans of the Viet Minh. Its so-called National Army at the moment of defeat was neither national nor an army. Its civil administration was demoralized. Its government lacked effective control and was faced with the prospect of national elections in 1956 which could reunite the country under Communist control. However, this government, headed by Ngo Dinh Diem since June 1954, was the first nationalist government of Vietnam and with its moral force resolutely opposed the Viet Minh.

b. Diem and his Opposition. (1) Because of its anti-Viet Minh and nationalist character, the Diem Government was unpopular with nearly the entire range of French officialdom. Some French elements hoped for an accommodation between North and South which would permit the French to continue to do business with the entire country. Others nourished the illusion that a quasi-colonial regime could be established and perpetuated in Cochinchina. Under pressure from both sides, the French Government through its representatives in Paris, Washington and Saigon, made repeated representations to the U.S. Government, which had publicly stated its support of the Diem Government, to the effect that Diem had had his chance, had failed, and should be replaced. The negative reply to these overtures was based on the U.S. contention that Diem, owing to circumstances beyond his control, had not had a real chance to prove himself; that to replace him without removing the impediments to his success would only lead to another failure; and that the men suggested by the French to
replace Diem were unacceptable for being either French puppets or crypto-Viet Minh.

(2) The opposition to Diem, in addition to the Communists and a large element of the French, included the Chief of the Vietnamese General Staff and the sectarian religious groups. These sects have long been more concerned with maintaining their private armies and domains than with working for the common national good. The sects finally joined the Diem Government, to protect their own interests. However, General Minh, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, with some tacit support from the sects, precipitated a prolonged crisis by threatening for about two months to overthrow the Government by force. Although this officer was a French citizen and a lieutenant colonel in the French Air Force, no effective French pressure was brought to bear on him to desist from threatening the Government. On the contrary, it appeared that a Vietnamese Reguib (or Nasser) would not have been unwelcome to the French if he had been able to establish a military dictatorship responsive to French direction.

c. Situation as of November 1954. (1) As of the date my mission arrived in Saigon, General Minh, the Chief of Staff, continued to threaten the Government, even though he had been ordered by the Chief of State to proceed to France. The sects, although represented in the Government, were openly working toward their own objectives, without thought of the consequences of their action upon the nation. The Viet Minh were in effective control of most of the rural areas and villages under nominal authority of the National Government. French representatives were pressing for the early removal of Diem and his replacement by one of their own stooges or else by a Viet Minh sympathizer who might reach some kind of understanding, perhaps tacit, with the Viet Minh. The latter course, they felt, would facilitate the work of Sainteny, then negotiating in Hanoi with the Viet Minh to the end that French businesses might continue to operate under "normal" conditions in Viet Minh territory. At the same time the Government was faced with the crushing problem of moving, caring for and relocating anti-Communist refugees from the North who now number nearly one-half million and may in the end total one million. This undertaking, which could never have succeeded without the devoted service of the French Army and the American Navy and the financial support of the U.S. Government, will long tax the resources of the nation, involving as it does one of the most significant population movements of modern times.
(2) From nearly every point of view, "Free" Vietnam appeared headed toward absorption by the Viet Minh, whether through a French-managed accommodation with the Communists or through the restoration of a scarcely-veiled colonial system in South Vietnam which could have been sustained against the Viet Minh only by the weight of arms which, paradoxically, the French had made clear they had no intention of using.

2. PURPOSE OF COLLINS MISSION. In his letter of November 1, 1954, instructing me to undertake a special mission to Vietnam, the President said he was ordering me to Saigon for a limited period to coordinate and direct U.S. activities in Vietnam in support of U.S. policy objectives. To that end, he gave me broad authority to direct, utilize and control all agencies of the U.S. Government in that country. My immediate task was to attempt to check a rapidly deteriorating situation in Vietnam and to help Diem's Government establish internal security and political stability throughout its territories. The emergency, rather than the long-range, aspects of U.S. policy in Vietnam were designated the principal task of my mission.

3. SEVEN-POINT PROGRAM. a. I was soon impressed with the fact that the National Army was the key to success or failure in Vietnam. The Army was under the command of an avowed enemy of the Diem Government. So long as the Government could not rely on the Army, it was powerless not only against the General Staff but also against the sects, each with its private army and special interests, and even more importantly against the Viet Minh who stood in a fair way to win Vietnam south of the 17th parallel through subversion. Accordingly, my initial efforts were directed toward preparing recommendations on the National Army which had to be dealt with before any of the other urgent problems of Vietnam could be solved. Fortunately, shortly after my arrival, General Minh obeyed the orders Sao Dai had been prevailed upon to issue, and left Vietnam for France, as I had urged him to do. Minh's departure removed some of the aspects of crisis from the National Army program but did not rob it of its importance as the nation's most urgent problem.

b. In accord with the French Commissioner General Ely, I proceeded thereafter to draw up a seven-point program of action to which I proposed to devote the limited period of my mission in Vietnam. I had consulted Ely in detail as this program was being drawn up, and had obtained his concurrence and the cooperation of his staff members who worked
closely with mine. Our close collaboration was confirmed in December by the Secretary of State and the French Premier after their meeting in Washington.

q. The seven-point program we evolved was as follows:

(1) Vietnamese Armed Forces

(a) Agreement to be reached with French and Vietnamese on the size, composition and mission of the forces.

(b) Assumption by HAAG of full responsibility for training Vietnamese Armed Forces.

(c) Full autonomy to be granted to Vietnamese Armed Forces.

(d) National Army support, and subordination to Vietnamese Government to be assured.

(e) Employment of National Army in National Security Action (pacification and anti-subversion program).

(2) Strengthening and broadening of Diem Government.

(3) Relocation of refugees and their absorption into the national economy.

(4) Agrarian reform, particularly those phases designed to get refugees onto the land and restore all untilled lands to cultivation.

(5) Establishment of a National Assembly.

(6) Financial and economic measures designed to strengthen the economy, meet U.S. requirements for receiving direct American aid and to support other points of the program.

(7) Education and training, particularly in the field of public administration.

d. It was agreed that as progress was achieved in each field a calculated effort would be made to give major credit to President Diem for such progress. Diem would make the public announcements through an improved and expanded Vietnamese Public Information Service. I charged the chief of our USIS with the implementation of this most important aspect of our program.
4. PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING SEVEN-POINT PROGRAM. a. Vietnamese Armed Forces. (1) On December 13 General Ely and I agreed on a force structure for the Vietnamese Armed Forces and on the assumption by MAAG of full responsibility for training these forces under the overall authority of the Commander-in-Chief in Indochina. Delay by the French Government in approving our agreement on this subject has held up implementation of this aspect of the program.

(2) The same agreement referred to above provides that the Vietnamese Armed Forces will be fully autonomous, that is staffed and commanded solely by Vietnamese officers, by July 1, 1955.

(3) Additionally, on January 19, I reached agreement with President Diem and the Vietnamese Minister of National Defense on a slightly modified force structure and on a program for reorganization of the Vietnamese Armed Forces, in which General Ely concurred. This agreement is contained in an exchange of letters between the Vietnamese Government and me.

(4) The structure of the Vietnamese Armed Forces (shown in Enclosure A) is designed to accomplish a two-fold mission: the establishment and maintenance of internal security; and the capability of providing sufficient initial resistance to external attack to prevent the country from being rapidly overrun before outside assistance can be brought to bear. To accomplish these missions the Army is to be organized into six divisions: three territorial divisions, essentially existing regional commands; and three field divisions to constitute a mobile battle corps to reinforce provincial units and provide a delaying shield in event of aggression.

(5) This structure is based on the concept that a relatively small force, properly trained, equipped and led, can perform the above missions more effectively and at less cost than a larger force which would be disproportionate to the economic and manpower capacities of the country. In any case, the Viet Minh enemy, backed by its Communist Chinese ally, could always maintain the capability of matching and exceeding whatever number of divisions free Vietnam could put into the field.

(6) Thus the Vietnamese Armed Forces described above, and the concept upon which their structure is based, do not in themselves insure the security of free Vietnam in the event of external attack. Such security must depend ultimately on the Manila Pact Powers and the action they would
be prepared to take, to which Vietnamese forces themselves would make a vital contribution.

(7) Significant progress has been made in attaining National Army support of, and subordination to, the Vietnamese Government following the departure of General Minh. While it may be too early to say that the National Army is now in all senses the military arm of the government, I believe that this aspect of the program is on the right path and with patient application will be fully realized.

(8) The deployment of the territorial force of the national Army to the provinces has already begun. The objectives and methods of the National Security Action Program have been explained to military and civil authorities having responsibilities throughout the country. This program too is of long range character and will take some months to execute. A good start has been made.

b. Strengthening and Broadening of Diem Government. Little progress has been made toward strengthening and broadening the Diem Government. This failure is attributable to the fact that more than half of the present cabinet ministers represent the sectors and are opposed to accepting into the cabinet any man who might threaten their position there or the place of their respective sect in the society. Prime Minister Diem contends that he wishes to broaden his Government but dares not do so until the National Army has been rendered capable of neutralizing the private military forces of the sectors. The failure of Diem to accept Dr. Phan Huu Quat in the Government was a major set-back. There is still an urgent need for an effective Minister of the Interior, and the Ministries of Information and agriculture particularly need strengthening. Considerable improvement has resulted from the appointment of Ho Thong Minh as Defense Minister and Diem's relinquishment to him of authority to direct and control the Defense Ministry. The new Commissioner of Refugees, Pham Van Huyen, also represents an improvement. I fear that no further progress on this front, however, will be made for some time to come.

c. Relocation of Refugees. This is likewise a long range and complex problem. It has been under urgent study by members of USOM and the appropriate ministries of the Government. Some progress has been made in developing plans to absorb the hundreds of thousands of refugees into the productive life of the nation, particularly in the field of agriculture.

d. Agrarian Reform. President Diem intends to announce in his New Year's message (January 24) an agrarian reform program
covering landlord-tenant relationships, conditions of land tenure, and an emergency program whereby refugees and military personnel demobilized as a result of the reduction in the Armed Forces can be placed upon land abandoned by its owners or not now in use. The program will provide that after three years, if certain conditions are met, the refugees can obtain permanent possession of the land on which they are placed.

c. Establishment of a National Assembly. Vietnamese experts have drafted, and with the close cooperation of members of the Embassy staff, revised a decree establishing a national assembly. This assembly will be provisional, will have some elective character, and will have only limited powers. This assembly will prepare for the later establishment of a constituent assembly but will itself have no constituent powers. This point is important since to establish the permanent form of the government necessarily involves defining the role of the present Chief of State Bao Dai. The inclination of the present government is to throw over Bao Dai, but I feel that as long as the national government is unable to cope with the sects and other splinter groups without his aid, it would be both premature and dangerous to remove Bao Dai from his position as Chief of State.

d. Financial and Economic Measures to Strengthen the Economy. (1) Vietnam now has its own national bank and is independent of the previous quadripartite system. American experts of the USOM and Embassy staffs are working with Vietnamese Government officials to establish procedures acceptable to the United States with regard to foreign exchange, import, controls, and related matters. Each time has been consumed in explaining American requirements but the Vietnamese officials have displayed good will and I believe that they will meet our objectives in this regard.

(2) During CY 1955, tax receipts of the national government of Vietnam will be approximately $139 million, of which $116 million will have to be used for ordinary civilian expenditures of the government. This surplus on the civilian side of the budget, plus borrowing and other extraordinary receipts of the national government, will permit the Vietnamese Government to contribute approximately $68 million to the extraordinary expenditures of the Government, including military, refugees, and economic aid. The balance of necessary expenditures of approximately $327 million will have to be met by United States aid. For FY 1956 it is estimated that receipts will increase and expenditures decline, so that aid needed will decline to approximately $258 million.
(3) Requirements for United States economic aid are expected to increase from approximately $34 million in FY 1955 to $50 million in FY 1955, and to $66 million in FY 1956, or an approximate doubling from FY 1955 to FY 1956. The major increase is in transportation and communications, with smaller increases in agriculture, education and public administration, and public health.

(4) As shown by the above figures, during 1955 and 1956, economic aid requirements will increase and military aid requirements will decrease. Enclosure "B" shows graphically the magnitude of Vietnamese Government extraordinary expenses, the expected Vietnamese contribution, and the amount of United States aid recommended for military and non-military aid programs during 1955 and 1956.

E. Education and Training in Public Administration.

The Vietnamese Government is about to sign a contract with Michigan State College, under the sponsorship of FOA, which will provide a much-needed school of public administration and specialized training in police methods.

5. PROBLEM OF THE SECTS. The normal problems of a divided country are enormously complicated by the existence in free Vietnam of two religious sects (Cao Dai and Hoa Hao) and a powerful band of "nationalistic" free-booters (Binh Xuyen).

Each of these groups is rendered dangerous by its possession of armed forces and its control of a considerable portion of the national territory. The sects and the Binh Xuyen, although they have at various times played an anti-French role, are vestiges of the colonial policy of divide and rule. While no reliable statistics are available, these groups claim to embrace about one-tenth of the population of free Vietnam and to have forces variously armed totalling 40,000. The French have incorporated some thousands of these armed forces into their Expeditionary Corps and have provided the financial means for the perpetuation of the sects as semi-independent principalities. French subsidies to the sects, however, which have steadily diminished over recent months, will, according to General Mly, be entirely suspended as of January 31. This development, while dangerous in the immediate future, is of long range advantage to the Vietnamese Government in that it offers the opportunity, if properly exploited, to end once and for all the acute threat of the sects to an orderly central government. Lacking French support the sects will be obliged to turn to the national government. If the government handles them skillfully, they can be brought into line and shorn of their power to create serious trouble. However, if the government does not proceed cautiously in this matter, there is a possibility that the sects, or fragments of them, may resort to open banditry at a time when the national government and army are not prepared to meet this new menace.
6. U.S. RELATIONS WITH FRENCH IN VIETNAM. One of the crucial requirements of U.S. policy and operations in Vietnam is to determine precisely what French intentions toward the country are. It is clear that the French in Vietnam do not speak with a single voice. I have entire confidence in the integrity of General Ely and have no doubt that he believes what he has said to me during the course of our association in Saigon. However, the presence in Hanoi of the Sainteny mission, the conversation I had with Sainteny in Ely's presence, and excellent analyses made by our Embassy in Paris, lead me to believe that General Ely is not the sole representative in Vietnam of the French Government. This view is reinforced by a continuing and undisguised French desire to remove Prime Minister Diem in favor of one of their own candidates. I believe that the French are preparing two possible courses of action:

a. If free Vietnam should be taken over by the Communists, the French wish to be prepared to make a deal with Ho Chi Minh in order to continue trade and cultural relations with no under some form of "co-existence".

b. If, on the other hand, free Vietnam, largely through U.S. aid and support of the Manila Pact, can be saved as an independent state, the French still wish to retain their special economic and cultural status, claim a large measure of credit for such success, and thus, perhaps, hold free Vietnam in the French Union. The French Government, however, is still undecided as to the outcome, and so teeters back and forth between these two policies. I feel that our government should have this matter out with the French Government once and for all. With full and faithful support from the French, Diem has a fair chance of success. Without such support, particularly if instead there should be covert obstructionism from the French in the form of support of rival leaders, perhaps with Bao Dai's connivance, Diem's chances will be materially lessened.

7. PRIME MINISTER DIEM. a. Diem's virtues lie in his widely acknowledged probity and nationalism. His disadvantages as a head of government are his lack of executive experience, his conspiratorial past which tends to make him suspicious of those who do not openly support him, his naive trust in those willing to flatter his ego, his lack of "know how" in selling himself to his people, his narrowness of view, his tendency to exaggerate his insight into the problems of Vietnam, and his great stubbornness. Moreover Diem has surrounded himself with members of his family whose defects tend to intensify rather than offset his own.
b. However, since my arrival in Saigon I have observed some improvement in Diem's conduct of public affairs, and I believe that with continued staunch American support he may be able to succeed. It should be noted that the problems he faces would daunt the most experienced statesman. No one else is in sight at the present time who could usefully replace Diem. However, as a last resort, it may become necessary to call upon the personal presence and support of Bao Dai to enable Diem to solve the complex problem of his relations with the sects and the ultimate position of these groups in the national society. This would have to be done, however, under certain guarantees, firmly agreed to in advance by Bao Dai, as indicated in pertinent telegrams I have sent the Department.

[Signature]

[Page number] 878
**PROPOSED FORCE BASIS FOR FREE VIET-NAM FOR CY 1956**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>MILITARY</th>
<th>CIVILIAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARMY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces Headquarters</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Divisions (3)</td>
<td>21,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Div:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Div Hq &amp; Sp Trps at 800</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Split among 3 Div:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Security Regt Hq at 200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39 Security Ens at 500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Divisions (3 at 8,150)</td>
<td>25,350</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airborne RCT (1)</td>
<td>3,700</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Troops</td>
<td>13,950</td>
<td>l,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Con2 Troops</td>
<td>l,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools and Camps</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pipeline</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduced Ray Trainees</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL ARMY</strong></td>
<td>92,000</td>
<td>l,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AIR FORCE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq and Svc Elements</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating Units (1)</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 In Sqn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Trans Sqn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL AIR FORCE</strong></td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NAVY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq Staffs and Services</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training School</td>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ships Crews</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL NAVY</strong></td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL ARMED FORCES</strong></td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>l,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

(1) During second year add
1 Ftr Sqn, 1 Trans Sqn, 1,000 men.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese Government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>extraordinary Expenses/1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Expenses</td>
<td>192.2</td>
<td>152.3</td>
<td>130.9</td>
<td>91.4</td>
<td>88.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demobilization Allowance</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee Settlement/2/</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Aid Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation,</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry &amp; Mining</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Development</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Health</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education &amp; Public</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY Extraordinary Expenses (Half Yrs.)</td>
<td>229.4</td>
<td>206.5</td>
<td>189.2</td>
<td>131.7</td>
<td>121.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY Basis</td>
<td>395.7</td>
<td>320.9</td>
<td>253.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY Vietnamese Contribution (Half Yrs.)</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY Basis</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY Contribution (residual) (Half Yrs.)</td>
<td>193.7</td>
<td>172.3</td>
<td>155.0</td>
<td>103.2</td>
<td>93.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY Basis</td>
<td>366.0</td>
<td>327.3</td>
<td>258.2</td>
<td>196.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Budget Surplus</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-recurring resources</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borrowing from Central Bank</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures shown are on budget rather than expenditure basis.

In view of the unexpected influx of refugees, the $45 million presently programmed for FY '55 may fall short by $15 million of anticipated needs.

No program has been drawn up for July-December '56; figures here are continuation of FY '56 program.

Comprised of $45.6 million to be reimbursed by the French for expenditures already made by the Vietnamese Treasury, if Embassy and French recommendations for settlement of 1954 military expenditures are accepted. This money will be available to be spent in CY '55 and CY '56.
Certain additional costs not reflected in the above cost estimate will probably require larger Vietnamese governmental expenditures than presently estimated. These additional costs will be:

(1) The financial support given by the Vietnamese Government to the sects, which will increase when the French cease their financial support of the sects on 31 January 1955. Dien will probably have to continue the subsidies he now gives the sects and assume at least part of the support now provided by the French for the time being, and until he is in a position politically and militarily to cut off their subsidies. It is difficult to estimate the amount of support the Vietnamese Government will feel required to furnish. However, based on present Vietnamese and French payment figures a total of approximately $5,000,000 may be required in FY 1956. Expenditure of this sum would reduce the Vietnamese contribution to its own military and economic aid programs and increase the requirement for U.S. funds accordingly for FY 1956.

(2) Another incalculable cost will arise if the refugee evacuation toward the end of the 300-day period (May, 1955) exceeds expectations. There may be a requirement for an additional $15,000,000 in this field. I therefore recommend that the cost estimates cited as requirements for U.S. funds be considered as minimum figures, and that sufficient additional funds on the order of $20,000,000 be made available for FY 1956 to permit flexibility in coping with the above contingencies, if necessary.
ITEM A (For Discussion)

REPORT ON VIETNAM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL BY GENERAL COLLINS

BACKGROUND AND SITUATION

1. General Collins will be present to discuss his written report of 20 January 1955 (see TIA A). The principal points in this report are:

a. Because Free Vietnam security lies in the military and moral support it may receive under the Khmer Pact, the determination to react in the event of a renewal of hostilities in Indochina should be strongly affirmed by the signatories at the forthcoming Bangkok conference.

b. There is a real doubt as to French intentions and objectives in Indochina. Although General Vlo is cooperative in Free Vietnam, the Southern mission in North Vietnam appears eager to "coexist" with the Communists. The U. S. Government should have this matter out with the French Government once and for all.

c. Diem is the best available Prime Minister.

d. The principal efforts of the U. S. at present are to aid the Vietnamese to develop and execute a series of emergency programs covering the military establishment, agrarian reform, refugee resettlement, fiscal management, and the establishment of a national assembly. Agreement by the U. S. to assume training responsibility and to grant financial aid to a recognized and revitalized national army should have a stabilizing effect.

2. The prospect of national elections in 1956 hangs as a threat over Free Vietnam.

3. The U. S. should expand the military, material, and effort required to strengthen the country and help it retain its independence. Without our aid, Vietnam will surely be lost to Communism. If Diem has firm U. S. support and guidance, and French cooperation, he has a reasonable prospect for success. This chance of success is well worth the gamble.

COMMEND

2. The Planning Board has discussed the report, and the following are its comments:

a. It considers the desirability of a strong affirmation at Bangkok of allied determination to implement the Khmer Pact, should the need arise.

b. The State Department contends that we have had "this matter out with the French" at various high-level conferences and that the French have agreed in principle to our position in writing. The Planning Board believes we should
now insist that the French implement this agreement, in practice as well as in principle, in all respects. For example, we should insist that they remove the expensive FCU-financed machinery from the coal mine north of Hanoi. This mine plays a large role in the economy of the area, providing power for the region, and at present is being worked by the Communists for their benefit. Despite French assurances, nothing is being done to remove the machinery.

2. It concerns that Diem is probably the best available Prime Minister.

3. It concerns in detail by the departments and agencies concerned.

4. It concerns that guidance regarding the 1956 elections is necessary and that this should be developed and sent to General Collins within the next month or six weeks.

5. It concerns in the order of magnitude of the cost to the U.S. of the military and non-military programs for FY 55 ($327.3 million) and FY 56 ($193.6 million). There appears to be no insurmountable obstacles to the financing of these programs. The force goals for the Vietnamese armed forces have already been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

RECOMMENDATIONS

3. It is recommended that:

a. You approve the report of General Collins and express the appreciation of the DOD for his work in Indochina.

b. You support the Fleming Board positions regarding the above major points in the event the Council is asked to act on them.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Concept and Plans for the Implementation, if Necessary, of Article IV, 1, of the Manila Pact.

1. This is in response to a memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 6 January 1955, subject as above, in which it was requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend a concept and broad outline plans for the application of U.S. military power under the Manila Pact with a primary objective being the deterrence of "... overt aggression by China or other Communist nations."

2. There are three basic forms in which aggression in Southeast Asia can occur:
   a. Overt armed attack from outside of the area.
   b. Overt armed attack from within the area of each of the sovereign states.
   c. Aggression other than armed, i.e., political warfare, or Subversion.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that their views previously expressed in a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, dated 8 October 1954, subject: "Military Consultation Under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty," in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that "U.S. commitments to Formosa, Japan and Korea, which nations have been excluded from the treaty, make it imperative that the United States not be restricted by force commitments in the subject treaty area" remain valid.

4. In order to retain this freedom of action it is considered that the United States should not enter into combined military planning for the defense of the treaty area with the other Manila Pact powers nor should details of United States unilateral plans for military action in the event of Communist aggression in Southeast Asia be disclosed to the other powers.
5. Based on the above considerations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend the following as a concept and broad outline plan for the application of U.S. military power under the Manila Pact:

a. Continued development of combat effective indigenous forces, with their structure and training mutually coordinated to develop local leadership and prestige, and with improved capabilities to create a cohesive fighting force through integration of their operations with adjacent indigenous forces and with support by operations of forces of other Manila Pact members.

b. Readiness to retaliate promptly with attacks by the most effective combination of U.S. armed forces against the military power of the aggressor.

c. Encouragement of other Manila Pact countries to maintain forces in readiness to counter aggression.

d. Discussion, in general terms, of unilateral military plans by the Military Representatives to the Council to the extent necessary to insure maximum participation and cooperation by other member nations but not to the extent that U.S. strategic plans or the availability of U.S. forces for implementing such plans might be revealed.

e. Periodic visits by U.S. forces into the area as demonstrations of intent, and for joint and combined training exercises.

f. Availability of appropriate mechanism for the employment of U.S. forces in support of friendly indigenous forces in the general area.

6. The concept of prompt retaliatory attacks does not envisage attacks on targets within the aggressor country other than on military targets involved in the direct support of the aggressor action. If authorized, atomic weapons would be used, even in a local situation, if such use will bring the aggression to a swift and positive cessation, and if, on a balance of political and military consideration, such use will best advance U.S. security interests. Under the alternative assumption that authority to use atomic weapons cannot be assured, the above concept would not require change, but this assumption would not permit the most effective employment of U.S. armed forces, and consequently might require greater forces than the U.S. would be justified in providing from the over-all point of view.
7. In the event general war should develop, U.S. forces will be deployed as indicated in emergency war plans, and with the principal effort devoted to strategic areas considered more vital than Southeast Asia. However, should an aggression result in a prolonged localized conflict of limited objectives, additional U.S. forces could be deployed to the area if required. The application of this additional U.S. military power, in conjunction with the military power of other member nations of the Manila Pact, would involve the movement, deployment, and support of U.S. forces not within presently approved force levels, and the mobilization of the defense effort of the Manila Pact nations. In order for the United States to support this additional effort, the military budget and personnel ceilings would require considerable increases.

8. The above considerations are based on currently planned U.S. military capabilities and on the assumption that the United States will not enter into specific agreements with other Manila Pact countries in regard to commitment or earmarking of U.S. forces for employment in the Southeast Asia area or Western Pacific. Such a position will permit the United States, in the event of further Communist aggression in Southeast Asia, freedom of action in determining the type of U.S. forces to be employed and the method of their employment, and can be so implemented as to retain the support of member nations of the Manila Pact and other friendly or neutral countries in the general area. It must be fully understood that the United States cannot guarantee the territorial integrity of any member nation, but at most can help secure the independence of those countries whose peoples desire it and who are willing to undertake the responsibilities of self-government.

9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that success in implementing the above concept will be dependent on the resolution with which future U.S. decisions concerning the Manila Pact are made and carried out. However, frequent pronouncements by high government officials to assure better public understanding of our objectives and necessary courses of action will materially assist in obtaining success.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Arthur Radford,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRIBUTION TO
AND PARTICIPATION IN THE BANGKOK CONFERENCE

Department of Defense contribution to and participation in the
Bangkok Conference consisted of two phases of activity - the prelimi-

nary phase and the conference phase.

During the preliminary phase the Department of Defense provided
membership on the International Working Group which met in Washington
during the period 30 November 1954 - 7 February 1955. In addition to
representatives of the U.S. Departments of Defense and State, the
membership of the International Working Group consisted of the Ambas-
sadors of the seven other signatory countries who, in turn, were
supported by their political and military advisers.

The primary function of the International Working Group was to
develop and give consideration to the problems which would be discus-
sed at the Bangkok Conference, and to agree upon an agenda to be sub-
mitted for the approval of the Council. The report of the Working
Group in the form of a proposed agenda was completed on 7 February
and submitted to the Council for consideration at the first closed
session of the Council Conference, at Bangkok, on 23 February 1955.
(TAB A)

During this period, the Department of Defense drafted, and obtained
agreement of the International Working Group to the position paper on
the organization of the Military Advisers to the Council Members which
was adopted by the Council at Bangkok. (TAB B)

Further, during this preliminary phase, the Department of Defense
prepared nine position papers for the U.S. Delegation on matters
considered of primary Department of Defense interest. (TABS C-K).
These were as follows:

- Security measures for the Manila Pact Military Advisers
- Further Status of the ANZUS Military Representatives
- Possible discussion with the British and/or Australians on the defense of the Kra Isthmus
- U.S. Position on the Establishment of a Combined Staff
- Initial Meeting of the SEACED Military Advisers
- Intelligence Agreements in SEACED

SECR E T
U.S. position on the Use of Military Forces to Suppress Subversive Activities

Combined Commands for Forces of the SEACDE Countries

Military Advisers to the Council of the Manila Pact

The positions outlined in the above papers with the exception of that pertaining to the initial meeting of the SEACDE Council Military Advisers (Tab C), provided adequate guidance to the U.S. Delegation. As a question of tactics, and in order to offset pressures by the Asian signatories for a NATO-type organization, the Defense Representative proposed to the Secretary of State, prior to the first closed session, that the U.S. take the initiative and recommend a meeting of the Military Advisers during the Bangkok Conference. This proposal was accepted by the Secretary of State.

During the second or conference phase, it became obvious that the Asian nations signatory to the Treaty would strive for a U.S. commitment of forces for the defense of the Treaty area. Again as a question of tactics, and in order to provide the assurance that these countries were seeking with respect to U.S. intentions regarding the defense of the Treaty area against Communist aggression, the Defense Representative proposed to the Secretary of State that he clearly outline such U.S. intentions and provide information as to U.S. forces currently stationed in the Far East as a deterrent to Communist aggression. The Secretary of State accepted this proposal and in his remarks at the first closed session of the Conference on 23 February, stated the U.S. intentions so specifically that the anticipated forcing tactics on the part of the Asian nations in relation to this matter did not develop.

All of the Council members, with the exception of Mr. Bonnet of France accepted the Military Adviser's paper with minor revisions. However, the French Delegation took exception to certain terminology used in outlining the functions and responsibilities of the Military Advisers on the basis that this terminology was not easily translatable into French. It subsequently became obvious that the question of semantics was not the primary cause for concern on the part of the French but that they were disturbed over what might be construed by the French Government as a French delegation agreement to force commitments within the scope of the planning responsibilities of the Military Advisers. During the period between the morning and afternoon session, the French and U.S. Delegations, on an ad hoc basis and with Defense representatives of both countries participating, revised the language of the Military Advisers' paper in order to overcome French apprehension. The revised paper was later accepted by all members of the Council and the Military Advisers immediately convened in a separate closed session.
The Military Adviser to the host country, General Jira Vichitsonggram, presided but after opening the meeting proposed that he vacate the chair in favor of the Military Adviser of the United Kingdom delegation, Field Marshal Sir John Harding, the senior officer present. With the concurrence of the other Military Advisers, Field Marshall Harding accepted.

As a matter of tactics it had been agreed within the U.S. Delegation that Admiral Stump would, in his opening remarks, demonstrate U.S. sincerity in aiding in the determination of methods for the implementation of the SEACDF by taking the initiative in arranging for an early conference of the Military Adviser's Staff Planners to be followed by an early meeting of the Military Advisers. A copy of Admiral Stump's opening remarks is attached as TAB L.

During this initial meeting of the Military Advisers, agreement was reached on the following matters:

- Dates and locations of the first meetings of the Military Advisers and Staff Planners
- Agenda for first meetings of Staff Planners and Military Advisers
- Responsibility for preparation of position papers
- Procedural arrangements

Communique

The Philippine Military Adviser during this initial meeting proposed that a military organization similar to that of NATO be established for coordination of military action within the Treaty Area. However, the Philippine Military Adviser acceded to the unanimous request of the other Military Advisers that this matter be included on the agenda as a matter appropriate for consideration by the Staff Planners at their first meeting.

The second and final meeting of the Military Advisers was held on 25 February and was notable for the same degree of unanimity which existed at the first meeting. A record of decisions reached at this meeting is attached as TAB M.

In conclusion, it is considered that U.S. military objectives were attained during the conference. However, it is further considered that there will be two major factors, with military implications, to contend with in future meetings of the Military Advisers or Staff Planners. They are:
The obvious desire of the Asian nations to establish a NATO-type SEACUT organization with everything that it implies in the nature of force commitments.

The obvious anxiety on the part of the French pertaining to commitments of any type in support of the SEACUT yet their desire to participate in all policy and planning activities.

The Military Staff Planners are scheduled to meet on 25 April 1955 in Manila, and the Military Advisers will meet in the latter part of May in Bangkok.
FYI. We have been working on problem of elections in Viet-Nam, in great detail over last several weeks. NSC has asked Department submit policy for consideration by mid-April and we sure that elections will be discussed during proposed U.S.-French talks Washington April 20. The British have offered give us their views on elections prior these talks.

We feel best solution is for us be in position inform French British our views prior talks and believe it best we can put such forward as support of policy of Free Viet-Nam rather than as unilateral U.S. recommendations.

Our proposal is based on Eden's plan put forward at Berlin-Conference for all German elections and has already been approved by France for use Germany and rejected by the Communists. The basic principle is that Free Viet-Nam will insist to the Viet Minh that unless agreement is first reached by the latter's acceptance of the safeguards spelled out, that no repeat no further discussions are possible regarding the type of elections, the issues to be voted on or any other factors.

After we have Diem's general acceptance we can proceed inform UK and France of this plan which we think only formula which ensures both satisfactory response to Geneva Agreement and at same time plan which is unassailable in intent but probably unacceptable to Communists because of provisions for strict compliance to ensure genuinely free elections.

END FYI.
You should speak to Diem privately regarding elections, without showing him formula outlined next telegram. We are not now attempting secure his approval as such to our position but to assure he understands our viewpoint and accepts it to degree we can proceed with French British on broad assumption Free Viet-Nam's position similar our own.

Believe best way accomplish this is to remind him of his and foreign ministers conversations with Secretary on this subject and to continue that in specific cases of elections in Korea and Germany Free World has stood firm on issue of guarantees of genuine free elections, supervised by body having authority guarantee elements free elections PAREH outlined last paragraph following telegram UNPAREN. In each case Communists have refused accept these safeguards which we think basic and fundamental. We believe unless such guarantees previously agreed upon would be dangerous for Free Viet-Nam be drawn into further discussions of other issues of election. Ask Diem if we can assume our thinking is alike on this point.

Since time exceedingly important, hope we can have affirmative answer soonest.

DULLES

COPY
INCOMING TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION COPY

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

FROM: SAIGON

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 4448, APRIL 9, 10 P.M. (SECTION ONE OF FIVE)

FACT

FOR SECRETARY FROM COLLINS.

DEPARTMENT TELEGRAMS 4411 and 4412.

THIS MESSAGE IN TWO PARTS. PART I FOLLOWS.

PART I. SUCCESSIVE STEPS RECOMMENDED AS FOLLOWS:

1. TRANSFER NATIONAL POLICE AND SURETE FROM BINH XUYEN. TWO POSSIBLE METHODS OF DOING THIS DEPENDING ON WHETHER OBJECTIVE IS TO SAVE FACE FOR DIEM OR BINH XUYEN, POINT ABOUT LATTER BEING TO SECURE THEIR PEACEFUL COOPERATION WITH NEW GOVERNMENT.

A. TO MAKE IT EASIER FOR DIEM TO RESIGN AND PREVENT BINH XUYEN FROM CLAIMING VICTORY IN PRESENT CRISIS, WE WOULD INSIST AS PRIOR CONDITION ON TRANSFER OF POLICE TO GOVERNMENT BY ORDINANCE ISSUED BY DIEM, BUT OPENLY SUPPORTED BY BAO DAI AND POSSIBLY FRENCH AND U.S. PUBLIC SUPPORT BY BAO DAI PROBABLY ESSENTIAL TO AVOID FURTHER BLOODSHED. IN THIS CASE BINH XUYEN MIGHT BE FORCED TO BOW BUT MIGHT TRY TO SABOTAGE NEW GOVERNMENT IN VARIETY OF WAYS. (I SHOULD NOTE THAT FRENCH WILL OPPOSE THIS STEP. ALTHOUGH HE ONCE FAVORED IT, ELY HAS NOW SAID HE COULD NOT AGREE TO IT. FRENCH FEAR BLOODSHED IF BINH XUYEN LOSE CONTROL OF POLICE UNDER DIEM AND BELIEVE NEW PRIME MINISTER SHOULD HAVE POLITICAL ADVANTAGE OF REGAINING CONTROL OF POLICE FOR GOVERNMENT).

B. IN ORDER INDUCE COOPERATION OF BINH XUYEN WITH NEW GOVERNMENT, IT MIGHT BE ADVISABLE TO OFFER BINH XUYEN A CHANCE TO SAVE FACE BY HIS "VOLUNTARILY" PROPOSING THAT CONTROL OF POLICE BE TRANSFERRED TO NEW GOVERNMENT. I HAVE JUST HAD CONVERSATION WITH FOREIGN MINISTER DO. WITHOUT INDICATING
OUR POSSIBLE THINKING, I ASKED DO IF HE THOUGHT BAY VIEN MIGHT
RELINQUISH POLICE CONTROLS TO ANY NEW GOVERNMENT. DO SAID
HE FELT THAT WITH PROPER APPROACH, THIS MIGHT WELL BE POSSIBLE.
HE INSISTS IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR DIEM TO ACHIEVE THIS.
DO FULLY AGREES THAT ANY NEW GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO TAKE
OVER POLICE CONTROLS, BUT FEELS STRONGLY THAT EVERYTHING
POSSIBLE SHOULD BE DONE TO SECURE COOPERATION OF BINH XUYEN
WITH NEW GOVERNMENT. I BELIEVE THAT IF BAY VIEN WERE CONVINCED
AHEAD OF TIME THAT U.S., FRANCE, BAO DAI AND ANY NEW PREMIER
WULD INSIST ON GOVERNMENT TAKING OVER POLICE, HE MIGHT WELL
AGREE TO MAKE THIS OFFER HIMSELF. I BELIEVE THIS METHOD
PREFERABLE TO 1A ABOVE UNLESS WASHINGTON FEELS DIEM'S PRESTIGE
AND PERHAPS OUR OWN MUST BE PROTECTED BY FOLLOWING METHOD
1A.

2. PERSUADE DIEM TO RESIGN, OR IF HE REFUSES, HAVE BAO DAI
RELIEVE HIM.

A. BETTER SOLUTION WOULD BE RESIGNATION BY DIEM. IF METHOD
1A ABOVE IS FOLLOWED, DIEM COULD BOW OUT SOMEWHAT GRACEFULLY
"IN ORDER TO HEAL THE WOUNDS" CAUSED BY RECENT EVENTS. WE
COULD POSSIBLY DRAFT A STATEMENT FOR HIM.

B. DISTASTEFUL AS IT WOULD BE TO USE BAO DAI IF DIEM WILL
NOT RESIGN, I SEE NO OTHER LEGAL METHOD OF REPLACING HIM.

C. FOR TIMING AS TO NOTIFICATION OF DIEM, SEE PARAGRAPH
3F BELOW.

3. CHOOSE SUCCESSOR TO DIEM AS PRESIDENT OF COUNCIL.

A. I BELIEVE IT IS MOST IMPORTANT TO PLACE ON FRENCH THE
ONUS AND RESPONSIBILITY OF DESIGNATING DIEM'S SUCCESSOR.
FRENCH ARE ALL TO READY TO PLACE OUNUS DIEM'S LACK OF SUCCESS
ON U.S. IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE THEREFORE FOR THE HEAD OF
NEW GOVERNMENT TO BE PROPOSED BY FRENCH AND CONCURRED IN
BY THE U.S. ELY INDICATED THAT HE WOULD FAVOR QUAT, DO OR
PERHAPS EVEN EX-DEFENSE MINISTER MINH. HE STIPULATED AS
PRIMARY REQUISITE THAT ANY NEW GOVERNMENT MUST AVOID TAINT
OF COLONIALISM. HENCE I BELIEVE THAT IF ELY'S ADVICE WERE

FOLLOWED
FOLLOWED FRENCH GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT PROPOSE BUU HOI, TAM OR HUU. OUR OPPOSITION TO THESE MEN HAS BEEN MADE CLEAR TO FRENCH.

B. SEE MY TELEGRAM 4263 FOR DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS. OF COURSE, WE WOULD HAVE TO COME TO AGREEMENT WITH THE FRENCH ON A SUCCESSOR AND I WOULD NOW RECOMMEND EITHER DO OR QUAT.

KIDDER

LFS/32
FROM: SAIGON
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 4448, APRIL 9, 10 P.M. (SECTION TWO OF FIVE)

NIACT
FOR SECRETARY FROM COLLINS.

DEPARTMENT TELEGRAMS 4411 AND 4412.

C. AFTER FRANCE AND U.S. HAVE AGREED ON A MAN, BAO DAI'S CONSENT MUST THEN BE OBTAINED. THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE DONE THROUGH PARIS.

D. BAO DAI WOULD THEN SUMMON THE NOMINEE TO PARIS FOR CONSULTATION. IF POSSIBLE, THIS SHOULD BE DONE SECURELY. IF QUAT WERE THE CHOICE, IT MIGHT BE DONE WITHOUT A LEAK SINCE HE HAS MADE A COUPLE OF TRIPS TO PARIS WITHIN THE PAST YEAR.

E. ASSUMING NOMINEE WOULD ACCEPT TASK OF FORMING GOVERNMENT, HE WOULD HAVE TO RETURN AT ONCE TO SAIGON FOR CONSULTATIONS. THESE CONSULTATIONS SHOULD COMMENCE WITH DISCUSSIONS WITH ELY AND ME, WHO WOULD INFORM HIM AS TO NATURE OF PROGRAMS WHICH U.S. AND FRANCE WOULD SUPPORT. ARMED WITH THIS KNOWLEDGE, HE COULD THEN PROCEED WITH CONVERSATIONS WITH PROSPECTIVE MINISTERS, REPRESENTATIVES OF VARIOUS POLITICAL PARTIES, AND LEADERS OF THE SECTS.

F. I FEEL THAT AS SOON AS NOMINEE HAS ACCEPTED, DIEM SHOULD BE INVITED BY BAO DAI TO RESIGN OR ELSE BE RELIEVED. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD DIEM BE TOLD OF PLAN BEFORE FRENCH AND U.S. HAVE APPROACHED BAO DAI AND GAINED HIS ASSENT: TO INFORM HIM COULD GIVE HIM DAMAGING MATERIAL FOR HIS "WHITE PAPER". EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE BY BAO DAI TO HAVE DIEM REMAIN IN OFFICE UNTIL HIS SUCCESSOR IS PREPARED TO TAKE OVER. IF HE SHOULD REFUSE TO DO THIS, WHICH IS WHOLLY POSSIBLE, BAO DAI WOULD THEN HAVE TO DESIGNATE, PREFERABLY FROM PRESENT CABINET, SOMEONE TO ACT AS INTERIM PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL. UNQUESTIONABLY, AS SOON AS DIEM RECEIVES SUCH NOTIFICATION,
SUCH NOTIFICATION, HE WILL CALL ON ME TO FIND OUT WHAT INFORMATION I HAVE AND PERHAPS TO ASK FOR ADVICE. I WOULD PROPOSE REPLYING THAT I HAD BEEN NOTIFIED BY MY GOVERNMENT OF DECISION OF BAO DAI, AND WOULD SEEK TO PERSUADE HIM TO REMAIN IN OFFICE UNTIL HIS SUCCESSOR COULD TAKE OVER. WE SHOULD BE WILLING TO ASSIST HIM IN PREPARING A STATEMENT WHICH HE MIGHT ISSUE AS INDICATED IN PARAGRAPH 2A ABOVE.

4. REACH AGREEMENT BETWEEN U.S., FRANCE, AND NEW PRESIDENT ON PROGRAM FOR SOLUTION OF SECT POLITICAL AND MILITARY PROBLEMS. IT IS BELIEVED THAT AN AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE REACHED BETWEEN ELY, THE NEW PRESIDENT, AND MYSELF, ON A PROGRAM FOR SOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY PROBLEMS OF THE SECTS. THIS WOULD REQUIRE A PRIOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN FRENCH AND U.S. GOVERNMENTS ALONG THE LINES OF OUR PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN EMBASSY TELEGRAM 4373. THESE PROPOSALS ARE BEING ACTIVELY STUDIED NOW BY GENERAL ELY'S STAFF. WE EXPECT TO COME TO AGREEMENT HERE WITHIN 48 HOURS. APPROVAL WILL STILL BE REQUIRED FROM WASHINGTON, PARTICULARLY AS TO ADDED COSTS WHICH ARE INVOLVED IN THE INDUCTION OF MORE SECT PERSONNEL THAN ORIGINALLY CONTEMPLATED, SEVERANCE PAY FOR SECT PERSONNEL TO BE DEMOBILIZED, AND LARGER AVERAGE STRENGTH OF ARMED FORCES FOR FY 1955, CAUSED BY SLOW-DOWN IN DISCHARGE OF VIETNAMESE ARMY PERSONNEL AS A RESULT OF PRESENT SECT CRISIS.

5. OBTAIN AGREEMENT OF SECTS TO PROPOSED SOLUTION OF THEIR PROBLEMS.

A. NEXT STEP WOULD PROBABLY BE FOR NEW PRESIDENT TO MEET WITH LEADERS OF SECTS AND OBTAIN THEIR AGREEMENT TO SOLUTION ARRIVED AT UNDER PARAGRAPH 4 ABOVE. HE WOULD HAVE TO MAKE CLEAR TO SECTS THAT THIS WAS BEST PROGRAM THEY COULD POSSIBLY OBTAIN AND THAT IT WAS ONLY WAY TO CONTINUE AMERICAN AND FRENCH FINANCIAL AND MORAL SUPPORT, WITHOUT WHICH THE COUNTRY COULD NOT POSSIBLY BE SAVED FROM VIET MINH AND COMMUNISM WHICH SECTS PROFESS TO DETEST.

B. IT IS OUR THOUGHT THAT SECTS WOULD NOT BE INVITED TO PARTICIPATE IN CABINET, EXCEPT FOR POSSIBLY ONE OR TWO MEN, WHO MIGHT BE CHOSEN BECAUSE OF THEIR ABILITY RATHER THAN AS REPRESENTATIVES.
3. By 4:48 April 9, 10 P.M. (SECTION TWO OF FIVE), FROM SAIGON

REPRESENTATIVES OF SECTS. IN LIEU OF CABINET PARTICIPATION, SECTS WOULD BE OFFERED POSITIONS OF HONOR IN THE HIGH COUNCIL, WHICH WOULD BE ADVISORY TO THE PRESIDENT. SEE PARAGRAPH 7D BELOW.

C. SOME QUID PRO QUO WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO BE OFFERED SECT LEADERS, PARTICULARLY BAY VIEN, IF LATTER IS TO AGREE "WILLINGLY" TO SURRENDER POLICE POWERS. I UNDERSTAND THAT IN THE PAST BAY VIEN HAS INDICATED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO BE MINISTER OF INTERIOR OR HAVE ONE OF HIS HENCHMEN IN THIS POSITION. SUCH AN APPOINTMENT WOULD BE FATAL AND IT MUST BE MADE CLEAR TO NEW PRESIDENT THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD WE AGREE TO THIS. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT KINH XUYEN WOULD SETTLE FOR SOME ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FROM THE GOVERNMENT IN THEIR COMMERCIAL VENTURES. BAY VIEN AND PERHAPS GENERAL SOAI MIGHT CONSENT TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY ON SOME OFFICIAL MISSION IF THEY WERE PERMITTED TO TAKE OUT BULK OF FORTUNES THEY HAVE ACQUIRED.

KIDDER

LFS/39
FROM: SAIGON
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 4448, APRIL 9, 10 P.M. (SECTION THREE OF FIVE)

NIACT

FOR SECRETARY FROM COLLINS.

DEPARTMENT TELEGRAMS 4411 and 4412.

6. FORM NEW CABINET. DURING THIS PERIOD, THE NEW PRESIDENT WILL HAVE BEEN CONSULTING WITH POSSIBLE NEW CABINET MEMBERS. AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, HE SHOULD FORM HIS NEW GOVERNMENT AND ANNOUNCE IT.

7. REORGANIZE GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE.

A. OUR TENTATIVE THINKING ON THIS POINT HAS BEEN COVERED IN SOME DETAIL IN RECENT TELEGRAMS.

B. WE FEEL IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE UNDER CURRENT CONDITIONS FOR PRESIDENT, AFTER CONSULTATION WITH HIS CABINET AND SEPARATELY WITH BLY AND ME, TO APPOINT A "HIGH COUNCIL", CONSISTING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF VARIOUS INTELLECTUAL GROUPS, LABOR, SECTS AND OTHER RELIGIOUS GROUPS, REFUGEES, AND DISTINGUISHED PERSONALITIES SUCH AS FORMER PRESIDENT LONG. MY PERSONAL JUDGMENT IS THAT THIS COUNCIL SHOULD NOT INCLUDE PEOPLE LIKE GENERAL HINH, BUT HON, TAN OR HUU, THOUGH FRENCH MIGHT INSIST UPON INCLUSION OF SOME SUCH PEOPLE.

C. DIEM HAS INDICATED THAT HE WOULD FAVOR APPOINTMENT OF AN ECONOMIC ADVISORY COUNCIL, INCLUDING SOME FOREIGN EXPERTS. CERTAINLY TECHNICALLY COMPETENT PEOPLE WILL BE NEEDED IN ECONOMIC FIELD, THOUGH THEY COULD BE SUPPLIED TO GOVERNMENT THROUGH FRENCH AND AMERICAN ECONOMIC AID PROGRAMS. HOWEVER, IT MIGHT BE WELL TO HAVE THEM CARRIED OFFICIALLY IN AN ADVISORY COUNCIL.

D. BASED ON OUR EXPERIENCE HERE, I FEEL THAT THERE SHOULD BE A VICE
-2  4448, APRIL 9, 10 P.M. (SECTION THREE OF FIVE), FROM SAIGON

BE A VICE PRESIDENT WHO CAN BE USED BY THE PRESIDENT AS A GENERAL EXECUTIVE AND TROUBLE SHOOTER TO HANDLE SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AS THEY ARISE. IT MIGHT BE ADVISABLE TO HAVE A SECOND VICE PRESIDENT IN CHARGE OF TWO MINISTRIES OF DEFENSE AND INTERIOR, SINCE FOR THE COMING YEAR THESE MINISTRIES WILL HAVE TO WORK VERY CLOSELY TOGETHER IN PACIFICATION OF COUNTRY AND FERRETTING OUT OF VIET MINH AGENTS AND INFLUENCE.

8. ANNOUNCE COMPLETE PROGRAM OF NEW GOVERNMENT. THIS ANNOUNCEMENT SHOULD INCLUDE:

A. THE PLAN OF REORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT.


9. ELECT AND CONVOKE PROVISIONAL NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.

A. THE NECESSARY ORDINANCES TO ESTABLISH THE PROVISIONAL NATIONAL ASSEMBLY HAVE ALREADY BEEN PUBLISHED AND MAY 15 HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED AS DATE FOR ELECTION OF THOSE MEMBERS WHO ARE TO BE ELECTED BY VILLAGE AND OTHER COUNCILS.

B. THE ASSEMBLY SHOULD MEET AS PROMPTLY THEREAFTER AS POSSIBLE. ITS TWO MOST IMPORTANT TASKS SHOULD BE REVIEW OF NATIONAL BUDGET AND DESIGNATION OF A SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO DRAFT PLANS FOR A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY.

PART II.

PARAGRAPHS ARE NUMBERED AS IN DEPARTMENT TELEGRAM 4412

1. I BELIEVE FRENCH WOULD DO ALL POSSIBLE REMAIN ALOOF FROM ANY MILITARY ACTION DIEM MIGHT UNDERTAKE AGAINST BINH XUYEN

BUT WOULD

901
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

-3- 4448, APRIL 9, 10 P.M. (SECTION THREE OF FIVE), FROM SAIGON

BUT WOULD OFFER GOOD OFFICES TO END OR MINIMIZE ANY CONFLICT. FRENCH WOULD CERTAINLY DO ALL POSSIBLE IN SAIGON TO PROTECT OWN NATIONALS AND FOREIGNERS AND PROPERTY OF BOTH FROM HARM, INCLUDING PUBLIC UTILITIES.

KIDDER

LFS/32
INCOMING TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

Control: 5013
Red: APRIL 9, 1955

FROM: SAIGON
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 4448, APRIL 9, 10 PM (SECTION FOUR OF FIVE)

NIAC T

FOR SECRETARY FROM COLLINS.

DEPARTMENT TELEGRAMS 4411 and 4412.

2. OWING HIS SPECIAL SENSE OF MISSION, DIEM WILL PROBABLY PUT UP WHATEVER RESISTANCE HE CAN TO BEING REMOVED, BUT I DOUBT HE WILL FIND SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT IN ANY QUARTER. IN END HE WILL PROBABLY RETIRE IN OUTRAGE FROM SCENE AND VOICE HIS PROTESTS AGAINST BAO DAI, FRANCE AND U.S. IN SOME KIND OF "WHITE PAPER".

A. CERTAIN VIETNAMESE NATIONALISTS WOULD SEIZE ON DIEM'S REMOVAL TO FAN ANTI-FRENCH SENTIMENT, BUT I DO NOT BELIEVE DIEM'S REMOVAL WOULD RESULT IN POPULAR VIOLENCE AGAINST FRENCH EXCEPT POSSIBLY SPORADIC INDIVIDUAL INCIDENTS.

B. I BELIEVE DIEM WOULD ULTIMATELY ACCEPT REMOVAL AS STATED PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE. I THINK HE IS TRUE PATRIOT AND WOULD NOT TRY SABOTAGE CONSTRUCTIVE PROGRAM OF NEW GOVERNMENT. I DO NOT AGREE THAT HE STILL HAS "CONSIDERABLE POWER" EXCEPT SUPPORT OF FRANCE AND U.S. I HAVE TRIED TO CONVEY TO DEPARTMENT HOW SLENDER BASIS OF DIEM'S PRESENT SUPPORT NOW IS. IF FRENCH AND U.S. SUPPORT IS WITHDRAWN, DIEM WILL BE HARD PRESSSED TO MUSTER ANY ALLIES, AND FEW IF ANY OF THESE ARE LIKELY TO RESORT TO VIOLENCE IN HIS SUPPORT.

3. NATIONAL ARMY LOYALTY, WHICH DIEM DOES NOT FULLY COMMAND, IS NOT COMPLETELY TRANSFERRABLE TO ANY INDIVIDUAL. I BELIEVE, HOWEVER, ARMY LOYALTY COULD BE SECURED BY NEW GOVERNMENT MORE BROADLY BASED, NOT DIVIDED BY POLITICAL JEALOUSIES AND CRISIS LIKE DIEM REGIME, AND FULLY RACKED BY FRANCE AND U.S. HOWEVER, THERE MAY BE INDIVIDUAL BATTALION COMMANDERS IN CENTER VIET NAM WHO MIGHT LEAD GROUPS OF MEN TO DEFEAT.
2- 4448, APRIL 9, 10 P.M. (SECTION 4 OF 5) FROM SAIGON

TO DEFECT. SUCH INCIDENTS WOULD HAVE VERY LIMITED EFFECT ON BULK OF ARMY. IT SHOULD BE SAID HERE THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD GENERAL MINH BE ALLOWED RETURN TO VIET NAM NOW. HE RETAINS CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE IN ARMY AND COULD BECOME ONCE AGAIN MAJOR DISRUPTIVE INFLUENCE.

4. COMPILATION OF ASSETS OF STRENGTH DIEM MAY HAVE IS DIFFICULT TO MAKE. WITH RESPECT TO POLITICAL FOLLOWING IN CENTER VIET NAM, THIS HAS BEEN FALLING OFF PARTLY AS RESULT OF POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF DIEM'S BROTHER NGO DINH CAN, AND OPPOSITION HAS TAKEN FORM FOR EXAMPLE OF RECENT INCIDENTS AT BA LANG. THERE IS NO PROPER GRASS ROOTS SUPPORT OF ANY LEADER IN VIET NAM, LEAVING ASIDE HO CHI MINH. DIEM'S VIRTUES AS ANTI-FRENCH LEADER HAVE BEEN TARNISHED BY HIS DEPENDENCE ON HIS BROTHERS WHICH HAS LED TO QUITE GENERAL FEELING THAT A NGO FAMILY DICTATORSHIP IS IN EFFECT BEING ESTABLISHED. FEW NATIONALISTS OUTSIDE HIS FAMILY AND IMMEDIATE ENTourage WOULD LIFT A FINGER IN DIEM'S DEFENSE. HOW GREAT HIS FOLLOWING IS IN CATHOLIC COMMUNITY IS HARD TO SAY. DIEM HIMSELF CLAIMS HIS SUPPORT IN CENTER, FOR EXAMPLE, COMES LARGELY FROM NON-CATHOLICS. IN ANY EVENT CATHOLIC COMMUNITY IS NOT POLITICALLY ORGANIZED AND REPRESENTS LESS THAN 10 PERCENT OF POPULATION. CERTAINLY MANY REFUGEES FROM NORTH WERE ATTRACTION BY FACT CATHOLIC HEADS GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH, BUT POLITICAL AND PHYSICAL STRENGTH OF REFUGEES IS ONLY A POTENTIAL FOR EXPLOITATION AT A LATER DATE. IN NATIONAL ARMY, SCARCELY ANY LEADERS ARE ENTIRELY PRO-DIEM, EVEN CHIEF OF STAFF TY; SOME ARE HOSTILE, AND THE MAJORITY ARE PROBABLY NO MORE THAN LUKWARM. I BELIEVE THERE IS NO REASON TO ANTICIPATE SERIOUS ADVERSE REACTION IN ARMY AT LARGE IF DIEM IS REMOVED THROUGH ORDERLY PROCESSES.

5. VIET MINH REACTION TO DIEM'S REMOVAL WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE TO EFFECT THAT FREE WORLD HAD SUFFERED DAMAGING SETBACK. APART FROM STEPPED-UP PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AND PUBLIC GLOATING OVER DEFEAT OF AN ENEMY, I DO NOT BELIEVE VIET MINH REACTION WOULD BE DANGEROUS. IN OTHER WORDS, I DO NOT ANTICIPATE VIET MINH WOULD ATTEMPT TAKE MILITARY ADVANTAGE OF DIEM'S REMOVAL. HOWEVER, VIET MINH, PLAYING MANY ANGLES AS USUAL, MIGHT ATTEMPT BUILD UP ANTI-FRENCH AND ANTI-U.S. SENTIMENT, CHARGING OVERTHROW OF NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT TO FRENCH AND U.S. "IMPERIALISTS."

KIDDER
INCOMING TELEGRAM  DEPARTMENT OF STATE  ACTION COPY

TOP SECRET  SENSITIVE

FROM: SAIGON  
TO: Secretary of State

NO: 4448, APRIL 9, 10 P.M. (SECTION FIVE OF FIVE)

NIACT

FOR SECRETARY FROM COLLINS.

DEPARTMENT TELEGRAMS 4411 and 4412.

6. IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO MAKE CHANGE AFTER BANDUNG IN ORDER AVOID GIVING VIET MINH PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE FOR EXPLOITATION AT CONFERENCE. HOWEVER, SINCE DIEM IS STILL THREATENING TO TAKE INDEPENDENT ACTION TO REMOVE SANG AFTER EASTER WEEKEND, OVER STRONG FRENCH OBJECTIONS, IT MAY BE DESIRABLE EFFECT CHANGE AS SOON AS U.S. AND FRENCH HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT ON CASE TO BE PRESENTED TO BAO DAI. WHILE I RECOGNIZE DIFFICULTIES THIS CRISIS CREATE FOR U.S. IN VIEW OF OUR WELL-KNOWN ASSOCIATION WITH DIEM, I FEAR CONTINUED DELAY WILL LEAD TO EVEN GRAVER PROBLEMS OF DETERIORATING FRENCH-U.S. COOPERATION IN VIET NAM, INTENSIFICATION OF CIVIL DISORDERS CULMINATING, POSSIBLY, IN CIVIL WAR, AND NOT IMPROBABLE ULTIMATE LOSS OF ALL VIET-NAM TO VIET MINH. THIS EVENTUALITY WOULD BE DAMAGING NOT ONLY TO U.S. PRESTIGE BUT, MORE IMPORTANTLY I AM CONVINCED, TO U.S. SECURITY. MECHANICS OF POSSIBLE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT ARE DISCUSSED IN PART I ABOVE.

7. OUR AGREEMENT TO REPLACEMENT OF DIEM ADMITTEDLY WILL BE DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN TO AMERICAN AND WORLD PRESS. I WOULD SUGGEST SOMETHING ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:

A. DIEM HAD MADE A GREAT CONTRIBUTION TO HIS COUNTRY AT A TIME WHEN HIS PARTICULAR QUALITIES WERE MOST VALUABLE. HE MAINTAINED CALM AFTER GENEVA, CONTRIBUTED TO EXODUS OF REFUGEES FROM NORTH WITH ITS GREAT PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT, SUCCESSFULLY MUSTERED WORLD OPINION IN SUPPORT OF AID TO THESE REFUGEES AND WITH SUPPORT OF FRANCE AND U.S. DEVELOPED SOUND AND PROGRESSIVE SOCIAL, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY

PERMANENT RECORD COPY

TOP SECRET  SENSITIVE
-2- 4448, APRIL 9, 10P.M. (SECTION FIVE OF FIVE), FROM SAIGON

REFORMS FOR HIS COUNTRY.

B. PERHAPS IT WAS INEVITABLE THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE PROGRAMS WOULD DEVELOP DEVISIVE INFLUENCES AMONG THE PEOPLE OF VIETNAM, WHO HAVE ONLY RECENTLY GAINED THEIR INDEPENDENCE. THEY HAVE HAD LITTLE EXPERIENCE IN MEETING THE COMPLEX PROBLEMS WHICH THEY FACE, SUCH AS RECONCILING DIFFERENT INTERESTS OF SECTS AND VARIOUS REGIONS OF THE COUNTRY. THIS HAS RESULTED IN CLASHES OF PERSONALITY, WHICH HAD MUCH TO DO WITH THE CURRENT CRISIS, INVOLVING THE "UNIFIED FRONT" ORGANIZATION. RESULTANT BLOODSHED, EVEN THOUGH NOT EXTENSIVE, HAS CREATED DEEP WOUNDS WHICH WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR PRESENT GOVERNMENT TO HEAL.

C. DIEM WAS UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO TAKE INTO HIS GOVERNMENT MEMBERS OF VARIOUS OPPOSITION PARTIES. ONLY WITH BROAD SUPPORT CAN THE PROGRESSIVE PROGRAMS DEVELOPED BY DIEM BE MADE EFFECTIVE. THE NEW GOVERNMENT IS HEADED BY A MAN WHO HAS HAD EXPERIENCE IN GOVERNMENT AND WHOSE PERSONALITY IS SUCH THAT HE SHOULD BE ABLE TO GET OTHER STRONG MEN TO WORK WITH HIM. HE HAS ADOPTED THE SAME BASIC PROGRAMS WHICH DIEM INITIATED AND WHICH HAVE THE FULL SUPPORT OF BOTH U.S. AND FRANCE. DECISION AS TO WHO SHOULD HEAD GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM IS, OF COURSE, ONE TO BE MADE BY THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE UNDER THEIR OWN SYSTEM. WHILE CHANGE IN PRESIDENCY INVOLVES TEMPORARY LOSS TO VIETNAM OF A GREAT NATIONALIST LEADER, IT DOES NOT IN ANY SENSE MEAN A CHANGE IN THE POLICIES OF HIS GOVERNMENT WHICH HAVE DRAWN U.S. SUPPORT. WITH THIS SUPPORT AND THE COOPERATION OF ALL ELEMENTS OF VIETNAM, THE COUNTRY CAN BE SAVED FROM COMMUNISM.

KIDDER

LFS/32

Note: Read by Mr. Yound (PSA) 2:30 p.m. 4/9/55 FMH
HEPATDEPARTMENT OF STATE

SENT TO: Embassy SAIGON NIACT 4438 Apr 9 1955

EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

Have this morning discussed situation with highest authority. We are disposed to back whatever your final decision is but before you actually finalize we want to be sure you have weighed all of the factors which concern us here.

We feel that what has happened does not reveal anything new about Diem but rather a basic and dangerous misunderstanding as between France and the U.S.

We have always known the qualities which Diem possesses and those which he lacks. Nevertheless our two countries agreed to support him in default of anyone possessing better qualifications. The only alternatives now suggested are the same persons who were regarded as unacceptable substitutes some months ago.

What has happened is that whereas the United States has been proceeding on the assumption that Diem would be backed as against any who might challenge him assuming that he had the capability, apparently the French have given their support only on the assumption that the Binh Xuyen would also be supported on an autonomous authority and that when they challenged Diem he would not be allowed to use force to assert his authority over it.

We can appreciate the reluctance of the French to see force used but if it cannot be used then what is the point of our supporting at great cost the national army which I thought it had been agreed was primarily to be an army for domestic security rather than an army to fight external aggression.
U.S. recognizes that Cao Dai and even the Hoa Hao are genuine sects with cultural, religious, and political roots which cannot be forcibly torn up without grave consequences which should be avoided but we do not believe that any central government can exist as more than a figurehead if it does not have control over the national police and if this control is farmed out to a gang which exploits its privileges to protect vice on a vastly profitable scale and which exists by virtue of the backing of the self-exiled Bao Dai and the French.

We cannot see that replacement of Diem by any persons you mentioned will of itself correct this situation and indeed we have had the impression that Quat was less acceptable to the sects than is Diem.

There are two other factors to be borne in mind.

One is that it is widely known that Diem has so far existed by reason of U.S. support despite French reluctance. If, however, when the showdown comes the French view prevails then that will gravely weaken our influence for the future both in Vietnam and elsewhere. Removal of Diem under these circumstances may well be interpreted in Vietnam and Asia as example of U.S. paying lip service to nationalist cause and then forsaking true nationalist leader when QUOTE colonial interests UNQUOTE put enough pressure on us. The French constantly assert that the U.S. has a primary responsibility in this part of the world but it is difficult to have responsibility without authority. In essence, will not the ouster of Diem on the present conditions mean that from now on we will be merely paying the bill and the French will be calling the tune. Any successor of Diem will clearly know where the real authority lies.
The second factor is that there will be very strong opposition in the Congress to supporting the situation in Indochina generally and Vietnam in particular if Diem is replaced under existing circumstances. We do not say that this opposition may not in the last instance be overcome, particularly if you personally can make a case before the Congressional committees but Mansfield who is looked upon with great respect by his colleagues with reference to this matter, is adamantly opposed to abandonment of Diem under present conditions. I wonder whether there is not some intermediate solution between the present extremes now discussed and that Diem can be allowed to regain his damaged prestige by an assertion of authority over the Binh Xuyen and at the same time other elements be brought into the government under conditions which will assure a real delegation of authority.

I feel that as with most Orientals Diem must be highly suspicious of what is going on about him and that this suspicion exaggerates his natural disposition to be secretive and untrustful. If he ever really felt that the French and ourselves were solidly behind him might he not really broaden his government? We must I think have some sympathy for his predicament as he is constantly called QUOTE the Diem experiment UNQUOTE.

In conclusion I want to reaffirm the very great confidence which we all have in you and in your judgment. You have done and are doing a wonderful job in the face of tremendous difficulties.

Your 4448 has just arrived in Department but is not yet decoded. We will comment on it in subsequent telegram.

DULLES
INCOMING TELEGRAM  DEPARTMENT OF STATE  ACTION COPY

TOP SECRET  SENSITIVE

Control:  5026  Rec'd:  APRIL 9, 1955  3:52 PM

FROM: PARIS  

TO: Secretary of State  

NO: 4396, APRIL 9, 5 PM (SECTION THREE OF FOUR)  

PRIORITY

DIEM'S FAULTY HANDLING OF THE PROBLEM HAS NOW RESULTED IN THE BINH XUYEN BECOMING A MAJOR FORCE, THE HANDLING OF WHICH IS OUT OF HAND, RATHER THAN A MINOR ONE WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN USED IN THE COMMON EFFORT IF DIEM HAD NOT BUNGLED MATTERS. BAO DAI NOW BELIEVES THAT THE BINH XUYEN MUST GO EVENTUALLY BUT THAT THERE IS NO POSSIBLE MEANS OF REMOVING THEM FROM THE SCENE UNDER THE STRESS OF THE PRESENT CRISIS BY SIMPLY ISSUING A DECREES TO THAT EFFECT. THE DECREES WOULD BE IGNORED AND BAO DAI'S AUTHORITY LOST. DIEM HAD BEGGED FOR FULL POWERS AND HAD TOLD BAO DAI THAT IT WAS WHAT THE UNITED STATES WANTED HIM TO HAVE. BAO DAI HAD GRANTED THEM AGAINST HIS ADVISORS. NOW DIEM IS INCAPABLE OF GOVERNING EVEN WITH THESE POWERS AND WISHES BAO DAI TO DO SO FOR HIM BY DECREES. IF BAO DAI WERE TO DO SO, HE WOULD BE EXPENDING HIS AUTHORITY FOR A CAUSE WHICH IS ALREADY LOST, WHICH HE IS UNWILLING TO DO. DIEM HAS NOT THE MILITARY OR POLITICAL STRENGTH TO CARRY OUT HIS ORDERS BY FORCE, AND IF HE ATTEMPTS TO SUPPRESS THE BINH XUYEN IN THAT MANNER, IT WILL LEAD TO CIVIL WAR WHICH WOULD IN BAO DAI'S OPINION RESULT IN FREE VIETNAM PASSING UNDER VIET MINH CONTROL IN SHORT ORDER. EVEN IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO BACK THE GOVERNMENT TO THE EXTENT OF FORCING THE BINH XUYEN OUT OF THE SAIGON POLICE (PRESUMABLY WITH OUTSIDE AID FROM THE FRENCH OR THE UNITED STATES), IT WOULD RESULT IN DIEM BECOMING "EMPEROR OF SAIGON" AND WITH THE REST OF THE COUNTRY UNDER CONTROL OF LOCAL SECT TROOPS AND, EVENTUALLY, OF THE VIET MINH. DE QUOTED BAO DAI'S SOURCES IN SAIGON AS REPORTING DIEM'S STRENGTH AS A "MOCKERY".

AFTER THIS PROLONGED EXPOSE, WE ASKED DE WHAT BAO DAI THOUGHT SHOULD BE DONE. HE REPLIED THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SHOULD ARRIVE AT AN IMMEDIATE AGREEMENT WITH THE FRENCH TO CREATE SOME FORM OF GOVERNING BODY WHICH COULD TAKE OVER
THE EXECUTIVE ROLE OF GOVERNING THE COUNTRY BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE. WE ASKED HIM TO BE MORE PRECISE AND HE STATED THAT HE HAD IN MIND A FORM OF "SUPREME COUNCIL" OR "COUNCIL OF ELDERS" WHICH WOULD SERVE AS A GOVERNING BODY. IT WOULD FUNCTION UNDER BAO DAI'S OVERALL DIRECTION AS CHIEF OF STATE, BUT WOULD ENJOY THE SAME POWERS NOW ENJOYED BY DIEM. BAO DAI'S CHIEF FUNCTION WOULD BE THAT OF "SUPREME ARBITRATOR". THE COUNCIL WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE, IF IT WERE TO BE EFFECTIVE, REPRESENTATION OF ALL (ALL) Factions IN VIETNAM INCLUDING THE CATHOLICS WHO MIGHT DECIDE THAT DIEM IS THE BEST QUALIFIED MAN TO REPRESENT THEM. WE ASKED WHETHER IT WAS THOUGHT THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD REPLACE THE GOVERNMENT OR SIMPLY ACT IN CONJUNCTION WITH IT AND HE SAID THAT FOR THE MOMENT HE THOUGHT THAT BAO DAI'S THOUGHTS WERE ALONG THE LATTER LINES BUT THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT. THE ONE RESTRICTION OF MEMBERSHIP IN THE COUNCIL SHOULD BE THAT ALL ITS MEMBERS BE ANTI-COMMUNIST.

WE ASKED WHETHER BAO DAI HAD ANY VIEWS ON RETURNING TO VIETNAM AND WERE TOLD THAT HE HAD NO VIEWS FOR THE MOMENT BUT WAS PREPARED TO DO ANYTHING THAT WE AND THE FRENCH FELT WOULD HELP TOWARD A SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS. HE STATED THAT BAO DAI HAD WANTED TO RETURN MANY TIMES DURING RECENT MONTHS WHEN IT BECAME MORE AND MORE CLEAR THAT DIEM WAS INCAPABLE OF GOVERNING BUT THAT HE HAD BEEN PREVENTED FROM DOING SO BY DIEM HIMSELF WHO ARGUED THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS OPPOSED TO BAO DAI'S RETURN AND THAT IT WOULD BE INADVISABLE FOR HIM TO COME BACK FOR THERE WAS GREAT OPPOSITION TO HIM IN VIETNAM AND THAT HE, DIEM, WAS "PRESERVING BAO DAI'S INTEREST". BAO DAI WAS NOT IMPRESSED BY ANY OF THESE ARGUMENTS EXCEPT THAT THE UNITED STATES DID NOT WISH HIM TO RETURN, WHICH WAS CONFIRMED TO HIM BY LA CHAMBRE. HE HAD NOT PRESSURED THE ISSUE BECAUSE HE FELT THAT, AS IN THE HINH CASE, HE MIGHT ACTUALLY WEAR MORE INFLUENCE FROM AFAR WHERE HE WAS REMOVED FROM PETTY LOCAL SQUABBLES AND COULD EXERCISE HIS AUTHORITY FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AS HE HAD IN THE HINH CASE.
INCOMING TELEGRAM

FROM: SAIGON

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 4661, APRIL 19, 11 PM (SECTION TWO OF THREE)

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 4661, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY PARIS 1207

FOR SECRETARY FROM COLLINS

PARIS FOR AMBASSADOR

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION.

6. ELY REPEATED HIS BELIEF THAT PAST SUPPORT FOR DIEM HAD NOT BEEN AN ERROR. HE SAID THAT WE MUST NOW ENVISAGE CHANGING PRIME MINISTER BUT NOT REPEAT NOT POLICY. THIS, HE SAID, CORRESPONDS TO WISHES OF VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. I ASKED ELY HOW HE COULD PROVE SUCH IS WILL OF VIETNAMESE PEOPLE IN ABSENCE OF ANY ASSEMBLY. STATEMENT CAN ONLY REPRESENT ELY'S ESTIMATE. HE REPLIED IT IS OBVIOUS THAT PEOPLE WISH TO BE RID OF DIEM. I REPLIED DIEM COULD CHALLENGE STATEMENT AND, IN ANY CASE, NO ONE WAS IN POSITION TO PROVE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WISHED TO BE RID OF DIEM. ELY SAID PRESENT CRISIS ITSELF WAS EVIDENCE. I REPLIED THAT CRISIS HAD BEEN CAUSED BY SECT MINORITY LOOKING AFTER OWN SELFISH INTERESTS. SAME GOVERNMENTAL PROGRAM UNDER ANOTHER PRIME MINISTER WOULD INEVITABLY HAVE LED TO OPPOSITION FROM SECTS. ELY SAID THAT IF SUCH OTHER PRIME MINISTER HAD BEEN SIMILAR TO DIEM HE WOULD AGREE, BUT DIEM HAD HANDLED SITUATION VERY BADLY, AND EVEN HIS OWN RELATIVES, DO AND THOAI, NO LONGER BELIEVED IN HIM.

7. I TOLD ELY HE AND I WERE FOREIGNERS HERE AND EVEN BAO DAI WAS TO SOME EXTENT FOREIGN. NONE OF US COULD SAY WHETHER VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WERE UNITED AS TO CHOICE OF ANY SUCCESSOR TO DIEM. WITHOUT PARLIAMENT, IT CANNOT BE PROVED TO U.S. PUBLIC AND PRESS OPINION THAT DIEM IS NO LONGER WANTED. IF DIEM WAS REMOVED IN ABSENCE OF SOME REPRESENTATIVE BODY, I COULD NOT PREDICT U.S. CONGRESSIONAL REACTION. THEREFORE,
TOP SECRET
SENSITIVE

-2- 4661, APRIL 19, 11 PM (SECTION TWO OF THREE) FROM SAIGON.

I urged Ely not discount solution unless Vietnamese themselves reject it. Ely repeated that Diem remains in power only by our intervention. I said if his analysis was correct, an assembly would vote Diem out, and if an assembly did so, I believed U.S. would accept decision. Ely said he knew he could not prove his statement, but he believed that to maintain Diem against popular will would be to diminish validity of expression of popular will when elections become possible. I said that, on contrary, modified Thoai proposal would work only if accepted by considerable body of Vietnamese opinion. (#) Bao Dai is Franco-U.S. choice. I said I did not know whether proposal would work, that I intended to have further consultations today and only asked Ely not to prejudge outcome. Ely said that, in his view, no solution could appear to be more marked as Franco-U.S. solution than maintenance of Diem. I said I could not agree with this since plan would not work unless good many Vietnamese agreed to it.

8. Ely said that he must mark this as a point of disagreement between us since if plan did work it would be because of my putting pressure on Vietnamese. I agreed that Thoai proposal, as modified, would work only if U.S. and France backed it, and if the basic elements were agreed to by Diem, Do, Quat et al and by Binh Xuyen. I reminded him Washington had not yet agreed to withdraw support from Diem, and that if it did agree to withdraw support, such withdrawal would be very hard for Secretary and me to explain to American people. Ely said he was unable to see how anyone was justified in maintaining Diem in office against best judgment of people on the spot. With respect to possible working out of proposal, I told Ely my guess would be that provisional assembly would vote Diem out of office unless he had been brought to change his methods of operation. Ely said this was a difference of point of view between us, explained by fact that he has special responsibilities with respect to crisis which he feels cannot be solved as long as Diem is in office. He said situation is getting worse daily, and he attributes this wholly to Diem's influence. Situation is worsening in the center, and underground is growing. Only by surgery, that is removal of Diem, can country be saved. I said I did not believe.
TOP SECRET.

-2- 4661, APRIL 19, 11 P.M. (SECTION THREE OF THREE) FROM SAIGON

HAD NO CONNECTION WITH OUR PROBLEM HERE. I SAID THAT, ON
CONTRARY, IN WASHINGTON VIEW THERE IS INTIMATE CONNECTION.
VAN LAETHAM SAID FRENCH UNDERSTAND OUR PROBLEM WITH RESPECT
TO PUBLIC OPINION, BUT THEY HAVE THEIR OWN PUBLIC OPINION
PROBLEM, AND FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD TO ATTEMPT TO PRESERVE
SOMETHING IN NORTH. THAT DID NOT MEAN, HOWEVER, THAT
GOVERNMENT WAS PLAYING DOUBLE GAME. I AGAIN SUGGESTED THAT
SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR TO WASHINGTON.

12. ELY SAID THAT IF DIEM MUST BE RETAINED AS PRIME MINISTER,
HE FELT HE COULD NOT CONTINUE TO BE RESPONSIBLE FRENCH
REPRESENTATIVE IN VIETNAM.

13. TO SUMMARIZE ELY'S POSITION, I SAID WITH RESPECT TO
MODIFIED THOAI PROPOSAL HE MADE THREE MAJOR POINTS:

(A) ELY SAID HE THOUGHT IT WOULD NOT WORK AND WOULD BE
INTERPRETED AS A SOLUTION IMPOSED FROM WITHOUT.

(B) ELY DOES NOT BELIEVE SITUATION COULD BE HELD IN BALANCE
FOR SIX WEEKS.

(C) IT APPEARED ELY FELT THAT IF CONDITIONS PREREQUISITE
TO IMPLEMENTING MODIFIED THOAI PROPOSAL HERE MET, HE WOULD
STILL FEEL HE COULD NOT REPEAT NOT REMAIN HERE OR CONTINUE
TO ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY DURING NEXT SIX WEEKS. I HAD
UNDERSTOOD ELY TO SAY HE COULD NOT REMAIN IF DIEM REMAINED
PERMANENTLY IN POWER. I WISHED TO KNOW WHETHER THAT STRUCTURE
APPLIED ALSO TO PROVISIONAL SOLUTION.

14. ELY SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE IN SOLUTION, THAT HE DID
NOT THINK IT VALID, THAT HE FELT THAT NEW CRISIS WOULD BE
UPON US IN THREE WEEKS, AND THAT WE WOULD LOSE OUR LAST
CHANCE TO SAVE VIETNAM. I SAID IT APPEARED CLEAR ELY WOULD
NOT ACCEPT SOLUTION. IN THAT CASE, IT COULD OBVIOUSLY NOT
WORK, ESPECIALLY SINCE THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF REPLACING
ELY AT THIS POINT.

15. I SUGGESTED THAT I REPORT LATER APRIL 19 MY CONSULTATIONS
WITH DO, QUAT, ET AL, AND WITH DIEM. I SAID TO ELY I DID
NOT KNOW WHAT WOULD BE OUTCOME OF MY TRIP TO WASHINGTON.

\$14\$ I BELIEVED
FROM: SAIGON
TO: Secretary of State
APR 26 1955

PRIORITY
SENT DEPARTMENT 4662; REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY PARIS 1296
PARIS FOR AMBASSADOR
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM COLLINS
LIMIT DISTRIBUTION.

1. I MET WITH DO, QUAT, MINH AND TRAN VAN VAN 1500 APRIL
19 TO REVIEW WITH THEM THEIR REACTIONS TO MODIFIED THOAI
PROPOSAL. I WENT OVER EACH STEP CAREFULLY, SO THAT THERE
WOULD BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING AS TO MY MEANING.

2. MINH'S REACTION WAS THAT SITUATION WAS NOT MUCH WORSE
THAN IN PERIOD BEFORE HIS RESIGNATION AND CRISIS WOULD BE
MUCH MORE EASILY RESOLVED WITHOUT DIEM THAN WITH HIM. MINH
SAID HE TENDED TO FAVOR EARLY GENERAL ELECTIONS TO SET UP
A CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY IN 3 OR 4 MONTHS. MEANWHILE,
A COALITION GOVERNMENT WOULD BE NECESSARY, BUT IT WOULD BE
DIFFICULT TO FORM WITH DIEM AS PRIME MINISTER.

3. QUAT SAID HE HAD NO SPECIFIC COMMENTARY TO MAKE ON THE
PROPOSAL BUT WISHED TO CONTRIBUTE AN ANALYSIS OF CRISIS.
THE TWO MAIN ELEMENTS, HE SAID, ARE DIEM'S GOVERNMENT AND
SECT'S POSITION. A THIRD AND LESS CRUCIAL FACTOR IS POLITICAL
OPINION OF OPPOSITION OTHER THAN SECTS. DIEM'S OBVIOUS
ERRORS AND FAULTY METHODS HAVE CREATED HOAT BETWEEN HIM AND
ALL OTHER ELEMENTS IN THE SOCIETY WHICH IS BECOMING BROADER
AND DEEPER, AND CONTACTS BETWEEN DIEM AND OTHERS ARE BECOMING
MORE REMOTE. WITH REGARD TO SECTS, THESE GROUPS KNOW THE
PROBLEM THEY CREATE MUST BE RESOLVED. HE FEELS ONLY WAY TO
RESOLVE PROBLEM IS PROGRESSIVELY THROUGH MOBILIZING PUBLIC

APRIL 19, 11 P.M.
-2- 4662, APRIL 19, 11 P.M., FROM SAIGON

TOP SECRET

OPINION AND CREATING AN ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH SECTS CAN BE INDUCED ACCEPT PEACEFUL SOLUTION. PROBLEM COULD HAVE BEEN RESOLVED MORE EASILY AT AN EARLIER TIME. QUAT SAID HE DID NOT THINK DIEM AND ANY TEAM HE MIGHT GATHER COULD RESUME EFFECTIVE CONTACT WITH SECTS.

4. QUAT DISCUSSED IN A GENERALLY UNFAVORABLE SENSE DO'S IDEA OF HAVING BAO DAI CONVOKES A CONGRESS. HE SAID THE CONGRESS WOULD BE MORE QUICKLY SET UP THAN A PROVISIONAL ASSEMBLY AND WOULD BE MORE MANAGEABLE. HOWEVER, Owing TO BAO DAI'S ABSENCE IN FRANCE, PRESENT POLITICAL ROLES OF SECTS AND ATTITUDE OF OTHER POLITICAL GROUPS, HE BELIEVED CONGRESS NOT PRACTICABLE. QUAT SAID HE THOUGHT THE BEST SOLUTION WOULD BE PROVIDED BY A PROVISIONAL ASSEMBLY, BUT POLITICAL GROUPS ARE FEARFUL OF ANY ASSEMBLY CONSTITUTED UNDER DIEM AS PRIME MINISTER.

5. DO SAID THAT IN HIS VIEW MEANS SHOULD BE FOUND TO ALLOW VIETNAMESE PUBLIC OPINION TO BE HEARD. HE HAD SUGGESTED CONGRESS AS A MEANS TO THAT END. IF THERE WERE AN ASSEMBLY PRESENT, CRISIS COULD BE MORE EASILY RESOLVED. A CONGRESS, OPERATING UNDER BINH XUYEN MENCACE, MIGHT REMOVE DIEM AND THIS COULD BE INTERPRETED AS VICTORY FOR SECTS WITH UNFORTUNATE EFFECTS IN U.S. DO SUGGESTED AS POSSIBLITY THAT CONGRESS BE REPRESENTATIVE ONLY OF POLITICAL GROUPS AND NOT REPEAT NOT OF SECTS. IF PROVISIONAL ASSEMBLY SOLUTION WERE ADOPTED, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FIND INTERIM GOVERNMENT TO FUNCTION FOR PERIOD OF PERHAPS SIX WEEKS AND THE PROBLEM REMAINS OF CREATING A NEW GOVERNMENT. DIEM IS A BARRIER TO SOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM. DO REFERRED TO FACT THAT DURING NINE YEARS OF WAR NO GOVERNMENT COULD OBTAIN POPULAR SUPPORT FOR STRUGGLE AGAINST COMMUNISM BECAUSE THEY WERE ALL FRENCH PUPPET GOVERNMENTS. PROBLEM NOW IS TO GAIN POPULAR SUPPORT TO CONTINUE RESISTANCE TO VIET MINH. DIEM'S GOVERNMENT HAS NOT SUCCEEDED IN CONVINCING PEOPLE OR POLITICAL GROUPS OF NECESSITY TO CARRY ON ANTI-VIET MINH STRUGGLE. ONLY A GOVERNMENT FULLY SUPPORTED BY PEOPLE CAN DO THAT, AND SUCH A GOVERNMENT MUST COME FROM SOME KIND OF POPULAR BODY; EITHER AN ASSEMBLY OR A CONGRESS. AS A PRACTICAL TEST OF WHETHER PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT FOLLOWED BY PROVISIONAL ASSEMBLY WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION, DO SUGGESTED ASKING SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALS, SUCH AS QUAT AND MINH, WHETHER THEY WOULD...

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
TOP SECRET

-3- A662, April 19, 11 P.M., From Saigon

Would agree to enter such provisional government. Ninh said that he would agree to enter a provisional government if political groups represented by Quat and others accepted, but he felt this solution had been overtaken by events. Quat said that if an immediate answer from him was required, it would have to be negative. He added that, in his opinion, Diem cannot now organize an interim government.

6. Van said that he felt Diem might accept the proposal but that proposed members of new team, thinking Diem incapable of change, would not agree to participate. He said that Diem does not have support in the country, and while his group would risk almost anything for a good solution, they would not take the chance of participating in interim Diem cabinet.

7. I said that if Vietnamese leaders were unable to find solution, and Diem was removed under circumstances which pointed to sect victory, it would be very difficult to obtain popular support in U.S. for continuation of U.S. aid. I therefore urged participants to consider matter further and to find some other solution if that which we discussed seemed impracticable to them.

8. More follows.

Kidd

S4D/32
INCOMING TELEGRAM            DEPARTMENT OF STATE            ACTION COPY

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

FROM: SAIGON

TO: Secretary of State

RE: 4663, APRIL 19, 11 P.M. (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

RICHARD

SENT DEPARTMENT 4663, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY PARIS 1209
FOR SECRETARY FROM COLLINS. PARIS FOR AMBASSADOR.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION.

1. I CALLED ON DIEM 1800 APRIL 19 AND ASKED WHETHER HE HAD CONSIDERED FURTHER MODIFIED THOSE PROPOSALS. DIEM HANDED ME THE FOLLOWING NOTE (IN ENGLISH):

BEGIN VERBATIM TEST.

1) I AGREE WITH IDEA OF COALITION IF IT IS TRULY TO OBTAIN REPRESENTATION FOR THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE:

2) THIS IS IN ACCORD WITH MY BELIEF IN GOVERNMENT WHICH REPRESENTS THE PEOPLE -- AND TOWARD WHICH I HAVE BEEN TRYING TO HARD TO BRING VIETNAM AGAINST SO MANY DIFFICULTIES;

3) I DO NOT FEEL THAT THE NAMES GIVEN TO ME AS SUGGESTIONS FOR MEMBERS OF MY CABINET -- MEN FROM SMALL OPPOSITION PARTIES WHO ACTUALLY REPRESENT ONLY A HANDFUL OF PEOPLE -- ARE IN ACCORD WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF HAVING THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE REPRESENTED IN THE GOVERNMENT -- WHICH I UNDERSTAND IS OUR MUTUAL DESIRE. CERTAINLY THIS IS THE POLITICAL PRINCIPLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN ITS OWN GOVERNMENT:

4) I AGREE THAT NO ONE MAN SHOULD MANIPULATE THE ELECTION OF A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SO THAT HE DOMINATES IT FALSELY, THIS IS THE VERY REASON WHY I HAVE PROPOSED THAT WE HOLD A GENERAL ELECTION -- IN A MANNER WHICH WILL BE MOST FAMILIAR TO MY PEOPLE -- TO ELECT A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY;

PERMANENT RECORD COPY

5) WITH
TOP SECRET

2. 4663, APRIL 19, 11 P.M. (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM SAIGON

5) WITH A GENERAL ELECTION, THERE IS EVERY REASON TO EXPECT THAT THE PEOPLE WILL BE REPRESENTED BY PEOPLE OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING -- AND NOT BY SELF-APPOINTED SPOKESMEN FOR THE PEOPLE;

6) I DO NOT BELIEVE ANY FREEDOM-LOVING VIETNAMESE -- AND WE ALL KNOW THAT WE ARE FACING A CLEAR DECISION BETWEEN FREEDOM AND COMMUNISM -- IS FEARFUL OF COMMUNISTS BEING ELECTED TO HIGH POSITION THROUGH THE MEANS OF A GENERAL ELECTION;

7) I WOULD PREFER TO LET AN ASSEMBLY CHOOSEN BY ALL THE PEOPLE IN A GENERAL ELECTION BE THE DECIDING FACTOR IN THE CONTINUED LIFE OF THIS GOVERNMENT -- THAN TO HAVE A COMPLEX SYSTEM OF CONTRIVED REPRESENTATION DO SO, NO MATTER HOW WISELY THIS SYSTEM WAS DEVISED BY A GROUP OF MEN. THE PEOPLE ARE THE ONES WHOSE LIVES ARE AT STAKE. THEY SHOULD BE GIVEN A VOICE IN THEIR OWN FUTURE;

8) ON THE BASIS OF THESE PRINCIPLES DEAR TO ME, AND TO FREE MEN THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, I AM WILLING TO ACCEPT COALITION.

APRIL 19, 1955

END VERBATIM TEXT.

2. WITH REFERENCE TO LAST PARAGRAPH OF NOTE, I ASKED DIEM IN: WHICH THE NOTE DOES NOT REPEAT NOT MAKE CLEAR THAT THE COALITION HE ENVISAGED WOULD BE FORMED AFTER GENERAL ELECTIONS TO BE HELD IN 3 OR 4 MONTHS. DIEM SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT MUST FIGHT COMMUNISM, FEUDALISM, AND COLONIALISM. IF IT HAD 5 OR 10 YEARS IT COULD USE VARIOUS PEACEFUL MEASURES. HOWEVER, Owing TO EXIGENCIES OF SITUATION, MILITARY PRESSURE MUST BE USED. HE SAID HE BELIEVED THE PEOPLE WERE IN ACCORD WITH THAT PRINCIPLE:

KIDDER

SMD/32
3. I reminded Diem that there is no election law and no election machinery. I said all those I had consulted agreed that general elections were not now practicable. I added that in my view his government could not continue for three months as it is now. Diem replied that he believed when people knew elections would take place in three months they would change their attitude. I asked what he proposed to do in the meantime. He said he would carry out reforms and programs with which I was familiar, and to do this he proposed to choose only additional cabinet members having same political concepts as himself. He said the struggle is very hard and there can be no compromise.

4. I asked if he thought Quat was in favor of colonialism, feudalism and communism. He said that Quat favors compromise methods. I asked the same about Do. Diem said Do avoids difficulties and has no plan. I asked same about Thoai. Diem said that Thoai is anxious only to return to his chemical laboratory.

5. I told Diem that I did not know what would happen to his government and country if he continued on present course since I believed his solution must lead to civil war. Diem replied that he realized risks were involved, and that he never ceased to reflect on nation's problems. He said compromise had lost the war against Viet Minh. I said that in my opinion Vietnamese people did not want civil war.

920 Diem replied
-2- 4663, APRIL 19, 11 P.M., FROM SAIGON (SET TWO OF TWO).

DIEM REPLIED THAT NEITHER DID HE WISH CIVIL WAR, BUT ADDED THAT "FEUDALISTS" ARE UNSCRUPULOUS. I SAID THAT I MUST REPORT TO MY GOVERNMENT THAT I BELIEVED DIEM'S COURSE OF ACTION MUST LEAD TO CIVIL WAR.

6. I TOLD DIEM THAT ALL VIETNAMESE WITH WHOM I HAD TALKED WERE LIKewise OPPOSED TO COLONIALISM, FEUDALISM AND COMMUNISM. HOWEVER, THEY DIFFER AS TO METHODS OF TACKLING THESE PROBLEMS AND DO NOT APPROVE OF DIEM'S WAY OF WORKING. DIEM SAID THAT ON THE CONTRARY THEY DID NOT OPPOSE HIS METHODS, BUT HIS POLITICAL CONCEPTS. HE ADDED THAT EVERY TIME A COMPROMISE IS MADE THE PROBLEM RETURNS IN MORE ACUTE FORM. THE PEOPLE DO NOT LIKE THIS.

7. I ASKED WHAT DIEM WOULD DO IF BAO DAI DECIDED TO MAKE A CHANGE OF PRIME MINISTER. DIEM SAID BAO DAI HAS POWER TO DO SO AND WILL DECIDE. HOWEVER, EXPERIENCE IN VIETNAM DURING THE WAR HAD PROVED COMPROMISE TO BE INEFFECTUAL. IT WILL BE UNFORTUNATE IF BAO DAI DOES NOT ACCEPT HIS COURSE OF ACTION. I TOLD DIEM THAT I BELIEVED THAT IF NO COALITION WERE EFFECTED PRIOR TO ELECTIONS, BAO DAI WOULD MAKE A CHANGE. I HAD TRIED TO ASSIST VIETNAMESE TO AVOID DRAMATIC SOLUTION OF THIS SORT, BUT UNLESS GOVERNMENT IS EFFECTIVELY BROADENED, I BELIEVE THERE WILL BE A CHANGE. DIEM SAID HE WAS CONTINUING HIS POLITICAL CONVERSATIONS TO TEST ACCEPTABILITY OF HIS IDEAS. I SAID I HOPE HE WOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO AVOID OPEN CONFLICT DURING MY ABSENCE. DIEM SAID THAT IF HE HAD REMOVED SANG AS CHIEF OF POLICE IN BEGINNING, HE WOULD NOW HAVE SAIGON WELL IN HAND.

8. I ASKED IF HE HAD HAD ANY REPORTS FROM LUYEN. DIEM REPLIED THAT BAO DAI WAS ABSENT WHEN LUYEN ARRIVED. HE SAID THAT LUYEN HAD REPORTED THAT PEOPLE IN PARIS HAD NO UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT WAS GOING ON IN VIETNAM.

9. ON TAKING MY DEPARTURE I SAID THAT IN MY OPINION BAO DAI WOULD REMOVE DIEM IF HE CONTINUED AS AT PRESENT. I HAD DONE MY BEST TO HELP. I ADMIREDI HIS ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND HIS CHARACTER, BUT NOT HIS METHOD OF WORKING AND ONLY REGRETTED THAT I HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO DO MORE FOR HIM AND HIS COUNTRY.

10. I SEE NO
TOP SECRET

-3- 4663, April 19, 11 p.m., from Saigon (SET TWO OF TWO).

16. I see no repeat no alternative to the early replacement of Dick.

KIDDER

NND/32
Dear Walter:

I refer to the current situation in South Vietnam and the probable necessity for review of the basic policy in that area.

An analysis of the problems has been made by my staff in the attached staff study. I think it is an excellent study and I highly recommend you and your staff read it.

While I realize these problems have no easy solution, to me the basic issues are quite clear. I believe there are three major areas of weakness in South Vietnam as follows:

a. The need for a solution of the problem of how we can achieve our ends in South Vietnam and yet live with the French.

b. The need for a solution of how we can achieve internal order with particular reference to the sects, the lack of internal communications, and the lack of strength in the central government. (During my recent trip I conferred with Diem at which time he stated that if his government could become strong he felt the people would rally to it, and that at present Ho Chi Minh offered the only strong rallying point to the people of South Vietnam.)

c. The need for a solution of how we can achieve a suitable government of South Vietnam, with particular reference to its relationship to Bao Dai, the broadening of its base, and the participation of capable people within the government.

(I feel that in the past we have made a mistake in building the government upon one man.)

In view of the probable nature of the problems to be discussed with General Collins during his visit, I consider that this information may be of value to you.

Sincerely yours,

(SIGNED)

H. Struve Hensel

Prepd. by Col. Queenin
Rewrttn by Col. Silver

Jcp

Mr. Walter S. Robertson
Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Department of State

Copy 3 of 5 Copies

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ISA)

SUBJECT: Programs for the Implementation of U.S. Policy Towards South Viet-Nam

I refer to the attached study, subject as above, and the conclusions and recommendations based thereon.

It is considered that these conclusions and recommendations should be used as a basis for the establishment of future Department of Defense positions on the subject of South Viet-Nam.

A. C. DAVIS
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

Inclusions 1
w/Job

Copies 8/16 ASO/ISA

Lt. Col. Queenin/agg/ofna
2E357 79258 12 April 1955
I-12691/5

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS THIS
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED
Programs for the Implementation of U.S. Policy Towards South Viet-Nam

Problem: To re-examine current implementation of U.S. policy pertaining to South Viet-Nam in light of current events related to that area.

Discussion: TBD A.

Conclusions:

1. Interim or delaying actions in South Viet-Nam should be accompanied by development of a favorable situation in the remainder of the Far East in general and in Southeast Asia in particular as pertains to Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand.

2. The successful accomplishment of U.S. programs for South Viet-Nam cannot be assured through French implementation of such programs as the French will only accept the concept of these programs insofar as they further French policy in the area.

3. The influence of Truong Chinh in his position as Chief of State is a constant menace to the successful implementation of U.S. programs in South Viet-Nam.

4. Alternatives to the Diem Government should be given adequate consideration in the event the U.S. cannot longer reasonably support Diem.

5. A strong, stable, viable government cannot be developed in South Viet-Nam until a reasonable solution to the problem of the Saecis has been determined.

6. The Viet-Minh are capable, even without resorting to overt aggression, of preventing the total accomplishment of U.S. objectives in South Viet-Nam.

7. The military defense of Viet-Nam would be extremely difficult if not impossible should the U.S. withdraw from South Viet-Nam and no other forces be immediately available to fill the vacuum; the Viet-Minh then overtly intervene; and no U.S. ground forces be included in "other" forces ultimately used to fill the vacuum.

8. The loss of Viet-Nam and subsequent political developments would render the military defense of the remainder of Southeast Asia extremely difficult, if not impossible.

9. It is questionable that South Viet-Nam could at this time win an election pertaining to the unification of Viet-Nam.
Recommendations:

1. Direct U.S. military aid and support programs at the rapid and efficient development of indigenous forces, particularly Thailand and Cambodia. Any U.S. military aid program in the latter should be contingent upon U.S. control of the organization and training of Cambodian forces.

2. Obtain a firm statement of French policy relating to Viet-Nam; inform the French that the U.S. will expect complete French support in the implementation of U.S. programs in South Viet-Nam.

3. Obtain from the Department of State, an immediate and practical solution to the problem of Feo Dai. (From a defense point of view, he should be a figurehead only, with a minimum amount of control over the Viet-Nam Government).

4. Accept General Collins' recommendations on alternatives to the current Vietnamese Government but make certain that the problem of the Sects is also considered concurrently.

5. Regardless of whether Bien or alternative government is in power, it should be understood that the Bien Xuyen will immediately be stripped of all power and subjugated to the National Government; that the government will include representation from the other Sects; and that these other Sects will eventually be completely subjugated to the National Government.


7. Determine U.S. military action within the scope of the SEACDE in order to prevent the loss of the remainder of Southeast Asia as a result of the loss of South Viet-Nam.

8. Make every effort to abolish or postpone indefinitely the elections proposed for Viet-Nam, under the Geneva Accords, for July 1956.
DISCUSSION:

1. The difficulties inherent in developing, implementing, and sustaining a program designed to produce a stable, viable government in South Viet-Nam, under the limitations imposed by current U.S. national policy, are recognized. However, recent recommendations from the field for revision of such programs must be considered in the nature of delaying or interim actions which can be justified only if they are undertaken with a positive objective, i.e., to gain time for consolidation or development of a favorable situation in the same area or elsewhere. Although proposed interim notions in Viet-Nam may be justifiable from the point of view of minimizing the psychological impact of the eventual loss of the remainder of Viet-Nam to the Communist Bloc, it is considered that ultimate failure of U.S. policy in Viet-Nam, even though limited by the extent of the U.S. commitment, would have the effect of furthering the loss of U.S. prestige in Asia.

SUBCONCLUSION: Interim or delaying actions in South Viet-Nam should be accompanied by development of a favorable situation in the remainder of the Far East in general and in Southeast Asia in particular as pertains to Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand.

2. The implementation of current U.S. policy and programs in South Viet-Nam and to a great extent in Cambodia and Laos is affected by the ability of the French to negate within these countries the accomplishment of U.S. objectives. The complex and flexible policies currently being followed by the French will not insure the continued cooperation and support necessary for the successful accomplishment of U.S. programs. France is pledged to and is supporting a policy of internal sovereignty for the
Associated States, with full independence within the French Union. The French Union is an ultra-national, commonwealth-type arrangement, as yet loosely defined and subject to further legal development. The statements of French leaders to the effect that "France intends to maintain its presence in the Far East" allude to the concept of the French Union. Further, the French are capable of negating U.S. programs by: (a) working to bring about the downfall of the Diem Government through an internal coup or through influencing Bao Dai to dismiss Diem; (b) refusing to cooperate in the training of the Vietnamese Army; (c) withdrawing completely from Indochina, thus forcing the U.S. to increase substantially its political, financial and military commitments in the area; (d) unilaterally reaching a rapprochement with the Viet-Minh; and (e) insisting on executing their obligations under the Geneva Agreement by working towards holding the elections now scheduled for July, 1956.

The basic factors on French policy with regard to Indochina are as follows:

(a) The French desire to maintain a maximum of influence in Indochina.
(b) The French believe, because of their financial investment and their historical position in Indochina, that their interests should be the determining factor in political developments in Indochina and they are jealous of what they regard as U.S. intervention.
(c) French acceptance of the Geneva Accords recognized their military inability to defeat the Viet-Minh, and the consequent need for a political settlement of the Indochina problem on a basis which would minimize French political, commercial, and prestige losses resulting from such a settlement.

Copy of copies.
(d) The French desire to avoid a resumption of hostilities at all cost, since past developments have led them to believe that their ground forces would bear the brunt of renewed fighting.

(e) Because of their dependence on U.S. financial support to maintain their presence in Indochina, they are inclined to go along with the U.S. policy in South Viet-Nam as one means of maintaining some influence in the area, although certain groups (colonialists) are actively undermining the U.S. program locally in South Viet-Nam.

(f) The French doubt that the U.S. program will succeed, and as such insurance are endeavoring to establish an understanding with the Viet-Minh which might be expanded to include a political settlement for all of Viet-Nam in the event that U.S. programs fail, thus retaining some degree of influence.

(g) They are becoming apprehensive lest U.S. policy should completely fail, and lest their attempts to gain a settlement with the Viet-Minh will also fail, and are thus beginning to contemplate the possible necessity of a complete withdrawal from Viet-Nam before the elections are held.

(h) They would be willing to stay as long as U.S. financial support continues and the U.S. gives them a major voice in determining policy.

(i) Their primary motivations are (a) financial, and (b) prestige. They are reluctant to withdraw from Indochina because they would then weaken their position as a "world power", as a member of the "Big Four", or "Big Five", and would lose what prestige they hold as a "Far Eastern" power.
(j) In the final analysis, they will retain a position of flexibility in order to follow whichever course of action appears most likely to assure them the most advantageous position, whether that should be to continue to support U.S. policy, to seek a rapprochement with the Viet-Minh, or to withdraw completely from Viet-Nam.

**SUBCONCLUSION:** The successful accomplishment of U.S. programs for South Viet-Nam cannot be assured through French implementation of such programs as the French will only accept the concept of these programs insofar as they further French policy in the area.

3. Bao Dai, in his position as Chief of State, has the authority to appoint or dismiss the Cabinet in Viet-Nam at any time. His attitude has recently been favorable to the U.S. but his vulnerability to the influence and intrigue of the French and anti-Diem Vietnamese could sway him at any time to dismiss Diem and eliminate the Government on whose existence the U.S. predicates its policies. This factor tends to weaken the basis on which current U.S. programs are established.

**SUBCONCLUSION:** The influence of Bao Dai in his position of Chief of State is a constant menace to the successful implementation of U.S. programs in South Viet-Nam.

4. Diem has proven to be an individual who, in addition to being guilty of nepotism in his government and of being reluctant to utilize the capabilities of some of the more dynamic Vietnamese personalities available to him, has demonstrated a marked inability to understand the political, economic and military problems associated with Viet-Nam. The concept of making U.S. support dependent exclusively on Diem's continuance in power is not valid.
and tends to portray him as being indispensable, which should not be the case.

Should Bien fall, U.S. programs might conceivably be continued under a
successor government, particularly if a more dynamic, capable leader (albeit
with less initial prestige) were placed in control. Former Foreign Minister
Do or Dr. Quat, as recommended by General Collins, should be given adequate
consideration.

The alternative of withdrawing U.S. support should not be stated as a
of or cut negative course of action. If the Bien experiment fails, and
the U.S. does not consider continued support to South Viet-Nam as being
warranted, there is a wide scale of courses of action which would be adopted
by the United States to minimize the effects of a Communist take over in
South Viet-Nam. These include: (a) support of French efforts to create a
South Vietnamese Government which would work out a settlement with the
Viet-Minh; (b) clandestine operations to hinder the consolidation of Com-


ist control; (c) augmentation of programs to develop anti-Communist
positions of strength in Cambodia, Laos and Thailand; and (d) other political,
economic and psychological measures designed to gain the sympathy of, and
to develop support from the "neutral" nations of Southeast Asia. These
measures might include continuation of U.S. "humanitarian" programs of
economic and social assistance in South Viet-Nam pending the assumption of
complete control of this area by a Communist government.

SUMMARY: Alternatives to the Bien Government should be given adequate
consideration in the event the U.S. cannot longer reasonably support Bien.

5. The problem of the sects has been commented on in recent correspondence
from the field and in analyzing the courses of action available in
relation to these dissident factions it is obvious that their only consideration in relation to the National Government is a retention of power and maintenance of a "sphere of influence" in their own areas. The Cao Dai and Hao Noi are supposedly religious groups with ethnic ties to specific areas of South Viet-Nam. However, their religious backgrounds are in reality used as a basis for the development of their political and power aspirations. The Minh Huyen Sect has no specific ethnic tie but is considered to have originated in the area south of Saigon and to have been principally engaged in the past in river piracy activities. Recently, they have controlled the gambling and other vice activities in Saigon and nearby Cholon, and have been Hao Noi's chief source of income.

It is considered that the problem of the Sects is one of the major factors retarding the establishment of a stable, viable government in Viet-Nam and any plan for the replacement of the Diem Government must also give adequate consideration to this problem. Action to reduce the power of the Minh Huyen should be immediate and would probably result in this Sect going underground and initiating guerrilla activities. However, paramilitary and subversive activities are so prevalent in South Viet-Nam at present that it is not believed this would seriously aggravate the situation.

A major effort should be made concurrently to strengthen the National Army and, as soon as possible, the other Sects should be subjugated to the will of the National Government.

SUBCONCLUSION: A strong, stable, viable government cannot be developed in South Viet-Nam until a reasonable solution to the problem of the Sects has been determined.
6. The accomplishment of U.S. objectives in South Viet-Nam will depend largely upon the activities of the Viet-Minh. The Dien Government is not operating in a vacuum; it is effectively opposed by a strong, well-organized and efficient Communist political organization south of the 17th parallel, supported locally by a covert paramilitary organization capable of wide-scale guerrilla action, and overtly above the 17th parallel by a numerically large, relatively better equipped regular army of 250,000 troops. The Viet-Minh can be expected to oppose efforts by the Dien Government to pacify and gain control over all territory south of the 17th parallel, particularly when and if such efforts pose a significant threat to the Viet-Minh activities in that area. Such opposition could take the form of: (a) psychological warfare and subversive penetration; (b) sabotage and local terrorist actions; (c) initiation of wide-scale guerrilla operations; (d) reinforcement of this guerrilla action by infiltration of limited numbers of regular troops from the north; and finally (e) overt full-scale invasion of South Viet-Nam. The Vietnamese Government currently is incapable alone of successfully countering any of these courses of action. Optimistically, if the current U.S. program should be successful in all fields, the Dien Government probably could counter course (a), and possibly could keep course (b) under control. The force level programmed for the Vietnamese Army would preclude countering successfully courses (c), (d), and (e).

SUBCONCLUSION: The Viet-Minh are capable, in the absence of a strong, popularly supported government in South Viet-Nam, even without resorting to overt aggression, of preventing the total accomplishment of U.S. objectives in South Viet-Nam.
7. In the event of a split between the U.S. and French resulting in the withdrawal of all French political and military support to South Vietnam, the vacuum created by the withdrawal of the French Expeditionary Corp would have to be filled by other external forces pending the development of comparable strength in the Vietnamese Army. Without replacing the FEO by comparable forces, South Viet-Men would be militarily impotent, and a demoralization of the Vietnamese Army and people could result.

In connection with the above, any thought of U.S. intervention under the SEATO should be considered in the light of possible limitations of the Geneva Accords with respect to intervention by U.S. ground forces. A legalistic interpretation of the accords by the Viet-Minh and the ICC would consider such U.S. intervention as a major violation. The U.S., while not a signatory to the Geneva Accords, has publicly declared it would not contravene its provisions.

Assistance for intervention in South Viet-Men probably cannot be expected from Australia, New Zealand, the U.K. or Pakistan. Thailand or the Philippines cannot provide sufficient troops to reinforce adequately the Vietnamese forces to the extent required. If, under these circumstances, Viet-Minh regular forces were to be committed against SEATO forces, and no U.S. ground forces were employed, the Viet-Minh would be capable of defeating SEATO forces subsequent to the withdrawal of the FEO. U.S. air and naval forces would hinder the Viet-Minh advance but it is unlikely that they would significantly reduce the Viet-Minh capability to overrun Viet-Nam.

The paramilitary operations of the Viet-Minh in South Viet-Men cannot be suppressed by those measures applicable in other countries, i.e. the Philippine suppression of the HUKS. The HUKS never had the degree of popular sympathy and support which the Viet-Minh currently enjoy.
S U B C O N C L U S I O N:

a. If the FOC should withdraw from South Viet-Nam, other forces
   would be needed to fill the vacuum.

b. If other forces are used to fill the vacuum, the Viet-Minh will
   overtly intervene.

c. If U.S. ground forces are not included in these "other" forces,
   the Viet-Minh will emerge victorious.

d. Viet-Minh paramilitary activities in South Viet-Nam cannot be over-
   come by using these methods which have proven successful in other areas,
   i.e., the Philippines.

8. In considering the acceptability of the loss of Viet-Nam from
   the U.S. viewpoint, U.S. policy objectives related to the entire Far East,
   Southeast and South Asia would have to be reviewed. The military
   implications of the loss of South Viet-Nam have to take into account the probably
   ensuing political developments, i.e., a Communist takeover in Laos and Cambodia
   with resultant weakening of Thailand's will to resist Communism, and at a
   minimum the strengthening of the neutralist tendencies in the other countries
   of the area.

S U B C O N C L U S I O N: The loss of Viet-Nam and subsequent political developments would
render the military defense of the remainder of Southeast Asia extremely diffi-
cult, if not impossible.

9. In considering the question of elections, the assumption that
   the Viet-Minh would not agree to free elections could well be erroneous
   despite the consistent Communist rejection of election proposals for the
   unification of Germany, Austria and Korea. In other countries, the Communist
   control only a minority of the population, whereas in Viet-Nam they control
   the majority. In addition, they have residual popular support in areas outside.
their control and they may feel that their agreement to elections held under conditions which might be termed "free" would inevitably rebound to their advantage. Furthermore, nationalist appeal in Viet-Nam is so closely identified with Ho Chi Minh and the Viet-Minh movement that, even in areas outside of Communist control, candidates and issues connected with "nationalism and supported by the Viet-Minh would probably be supported by the majority of the people. Thus, the Communists might be so confident of success that they would be willing to permit "free" elections under international supervision albeit continuing to utilize all the standard communist processes and tactics in an attempt to assure the outcome they would desire. Should they do so, there is no reason to doubt at this time that they would win easily in the 1956 elections.

In connection with the above, the issue of unification would be a popular one in Viet-Nam, despite the probable consequences of Communist domination. It would be dangerous to assume that South Viet-Nam would reject unification with the North. The South Vietnamese Government will not be operating in a propaganda vacuum in the South; Viet-Minh propaganda is still more intensive and successful than that of the Diem Government. Further, there is no guarantee that the people of the South will reject unification, particularly if the referendum is relatively free and supervised by an international commission. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the people of the North would approve unification under any circumstances which will provide them with the opportunity to take over the territory of the South, politically, economically and militarily.

SUBCONCLUSION: It is questionable that South Viet-Nam could at this time win an election pertaining to the unification of Viet-Nam.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ESA)

SUBJECT: Department of State Briefing of General Collins

25 April 1955

General Collins was briefed by Department of State representatives, commencing at 1000 Friday, 22 April. Also present at this briefing were representatives of Defense, CIA, CIA, and Treasury.

The problems discussed were primarily political in nature and the objective of the discussion was to arrive at a solution to the current governmental situation in South Viet-Nam. However, the problems of interest to the Department of Defense - financial support of the French Expeditionary Corps (FEC) and integration of Viet Forces into the Viet-Nam National Army - were also discussed.

In the political phase of the discussion, the various proposals which have been made during recent weeks were analyzed and the following points are considered to be of interest:

a. General Collins stated that:

1. In his opinion it would be a major error in judgment to continue to support a man (Biem) who has demonstrated such a marked inability to understand the political, economic and military problems associated with Viet-Nam.

2. Biem is currently governing by himself, based on the advice of his brothers and a few close friends (Ministers of Justice, Finance, and Information.)

3. Biem simply cannot get along with other capable men.

4. Biem, in five months, has not had one original constructive suggestion, idea, or plan. Generals Collins and Bly have been responsible for any of those which appeared to originate with Biem.

5. Doctor Cunt and former Foreign Minister Do are the next able men available in South Viet-Nam.

6. General elections in South Viet-Nam are not possible and the best form of government for this country would be a constitutional monarchy. The Vietnamese are not, and will not be in the immediate future, ready for a republican form of government.

TOP SECRET

937
TOP SECRET

(7) Various plans which have been proposed for internal Some of governments, such as provisional or constituent coalition, and including the plan of Hoa (Minister for Planning and Reconstruction) which was considered worthy of further study, are deemed to defeat as Dien will not accept such recommendations.

(8) "Men has been informed by me that I don't see how anyone can save his government and that I think that the Dai will remove him."

b. In elaborating further on the situation in South Vietnam, General Collins stated that the Dai plan (NMIEM Report 494/3) attached as 282 A is worthy of consideration and recommends that the U.S. consider its implementation. Based on this statement, Mr. Murphy, State, commented that for a time it appeared that Dien was developing successfully according to General Collins' reports but that General Collins had not reversed his position. In response, General Collins stated that he had never indicated that Dien was indispensable. General Collins further stated that this was the best we could hope to obtain as pertains to a Vietnamese-conceived plan and that practically any plan was going to be diluted, propaganda-wise, with the stigma of French or U.S. conception.

c. In a further discussion between Mr. Murphy and General Collins, the problem of the fighting between the Viet Cong and the National Army was developed and General Collins stated:

(1) The U.S. is just now beginning to train the Vietnamese National Army and a senior Vietnamese Army officer stated that they had no desire to fight other Vietnamese (Viet Cong).

(2) By (Army Chief of Staff) told General Kii he would not order an attack on the Viet Cong.

(3) The French will not, except to protect their own people, use French troops against the Viet Cong. Their primary mission is one of external security.

(4) The bitter feud between Phuoc Van and Dien originated in Dien's closing of the "Orme Hotel".

(5) Practically all Vietnamese now disagree with Dien.

(6) Some compromise will be necessary on the part of Dien's replacement.

(7) The Viet Cong are not in a strong military position.

(8) Phuoc Van and the Viet Cong will accept the concept of the Dai's plan.

(9) Phuoc Van will surrender the control of the police if ordered to do so by the Dai and if Dien is replaced.
(10) Although an effort must be made to give Hay Viet an opportunity to save face, the Binh Gyun must be stripped of their power.

(11) Based on the above, General Collins considered that there were only two solutions to this problem - acceptance of the proposal of Bo Di, or for Bo Di to return and assume the Premiership. General Collins did not consider the latter as a desirable solution.

d. In response to a question, General Collins stated that the current situation in South Viet-Kim was definitely not engineered by the French. He further stated that General Lly has given Binh unequivocal support. However, he could not speak for French support from Paris. General Collins explained that civil war could break out at any moment and that either side could be responsible.

e. General Collins stated that the U.S. has a moral obligation in relation to the 50,000 Vietnamese refugees and that it would be difficult for the U.S. to withdraw from Viet-Kim.

f. In reference to the Saigon mission, General Collins stated that General Lly has threatened to resign over this issue. He indicated that the French business people have not adjusted to the concept of a Free Viet-Kim. He thought that the French would just as soon see an indefinite postponement of Viet-Kim but that the U.S. should force the issue of French support for a legally constituted Vietnamese Government.

With reference to the two problems primarily of military interest, General Collins stated that:

a. We should not provide one picket more than the 100 million dollars currently available for support of the FVC. They might reduce their forces but would not withdraw.

b. The current dispositions of the FVC are sound.

c. The FVC is a strong, stabilizing influence in South Viet-Kim.

d. Implementation of Article IV of the Saigon Pact would require ground forces to stabilize the front and give the U.S. Air and Navy forces something to shoot at.

e. Air and Naval forces will not alone result in a victory in this area in the event of overt aggression.

2. Integration of Viet forces as he has proposed (DA HR 130577) (2AB 2) has now been agreed to by the French.

3. This integration will now cost approximately 40 million dollars rather than the 26 million as previously stated.
This plan for integration will eventually provide for a reduction in past power.

In summary, General Collins is firmly convinced that it will be to the detriment of U.S. interests to continue to support FNM. However, the State is reluctant to face the fact that they have failed in U.S. policy and obviously will attempt to retain FNM in the Government in some capacity.

S-12

Col. Kinnin/Js/of Air safe
22017 79252 25 Apr 55

1-12353/3

Dist. ASD/ISA 14/2

Lt Col. Kinnin/Js/of Air safe

1. FM
2. 465 SABE/GNA
3. Col. Stevens - Army
4. Col. Reiber - G-3 Army
5. Col. Frink
6. Col. McGuillen
7. Col. McGuillen
8. Col. Boyle AF
9. Col. Cofer JCS
10. Col. Coffey Plans
11. Col. Critz CIAP
12. Mr. Sandri MAP

Copy of Copies

S:0 Page of Pages
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TOP SECRET

Classification

SENT TO:  Amembassy SAIGON ACT 4757
          Amembassy PARIS PRIORITY 3727

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

If the French agree to para. 7 DELET E 4757 then you may give them orally the following views on procedures and a new government. Our views are based on consultations with General Collins, a careful study of the French aide-memoire of April 17, 1955, Bao Dai's proposals, and the views of various Vietnamese in Saigon.

A. Our tentative proposals on procedures are as follows:

1) The US will have to maintain position of full support for Diem until and unless Vietnamese leaders develop alternate proposal which Bao Dai would support.

2) Bao Dai should be informed by both governments that before we would consider support for any change he must guarantee that he will confirm Prime Minister's authority over police officials, the Binh Xuyen will be removed from police functions, and sure, and that the sects will agree to a broad program of their integration into the national war life of Vietnam on the basis of GTE a single nation, a single state, a single army, and a single administration UNITE. Such decree by Bao Dai must be in process before Diem

48589
leaves and now Prime Minister installed, to prevent clear Dinh Xuyet GTE victory
UNLIE over Diem which would rise to plague successor.

3) If Bao Dai gives adequate assurances, Collins and Ely should
immediately help the Vietnamese work out the new alignment, urge Diem to serve
in a new capacity, if he will, and provide full support for the new government.
If Diem refuses, the program should nevertheless be carried out anyway.

4) While the Vietnamese in Saigon should oppose be the framers of
a new government, Collins and Ely will probably have to be in practice the
catalysts. This may result in stories regarding a new Collins-Ely GTE formula
UNLIE but we should make every attempt to keep the Vietnamese label.

5) General Collins and Ely should inform Diem that as a result of his
inability to create a broadly based coalition government, and because of
Vietnamese resistance to him, their governments are no longer in positions to
attempt to prevent his removal from office. Diem’s patriotic qualities are of
great potential value to Vietnam and it is hoped he will lend his services to
any new government which might be appointed.

6) Collins and Ely together speaking for their governments may be able
to outline sub-para 4 above
to elicit from formula some Vietnamese political leaders behind the scenes.
If those leaders, including Diem if practicable, adopt such a formula, they
could ask Bao Dai to countersign it. If the Vietnamese consulted cannot agree
among themselves on a candidate, then Ely and Collins will have to recommend a
him name for Bao Dai to designate to form a new government under the proper
terms and conditions.
B. Our tentative proposals on a new government are as follows:

1) Cabinet: The executive authority of full powers with No or Quat as president and vice president, respectively, composed of small nucleus of most able nationalist leaders. It would be highly desirable if the cabinet itself could include some from Dien's cabinet and some new faces. It would operate as an interim coalition government until a fully elected National Assembly is constituted. The immediate tasks of the new cabinet would be (a) resolution of sect problem, (b) completion of reform of the armed forces and police, (c) satisfactory resettlement of present and future refugees, (d) energetic political program in provinces, (e) more active international policy in Southeast Asia, and (f) consultation with the Viet Minh on Geneva elections in 1956 and preparations for elections and a constituent assembly in Free Viet-Nam at some later time.

2) Consultative Council: An advisory body of 25-35 leading personalities and group representatives, including the sects. Dien should be persuaded if possible to accept the chairmanship of this council. Its principal function would be to generate spirit of unity and cooperation among the people and groups throughout Free Vietnam. At the request of the president or the cabinet, it would advise the president and cabinet on major matters of state. It should have no executive or administrative functions. It should continue until the constitution of a permanent structure of government by a constituent assembly.

3) Provisional National Assembly: This quasi-legislative body of elected and appointed candidates already envisaged and scheduled to be set up
should be formed and convoked as soon as possible once a new cabinet is in
office. It would review the budget and designate a special committee to
draft plans for a constituent assembly.

Dulles
OFFICE MEMORANDUM
United States Government

TO: FE - Mr. Robertson.
FROM: PSA - Kenneth T. Young, Jr.

DATE: April 30, 1955

SUBJECT: Report on Collins Visit and Viet-Nam Situation

1. Collins arrived Thursday, April 21, and left early Friday morning, April 22. He had lunch with the President-April 22, saw the Secretary for the first time at a long luncheon meeting April 25. We also met with the Secretary Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday. We spent all day Friday, April 22, meeting with Collins with Defense and CIA represented. He reiterated even more vigorously and firmly his view, strongly backed by Sturm, that Diem must be replaced and that a plan of action should go into effect immediately. They both favored Quat. None of the questions or alternate considerations expressed by any of us at that or any subsequent meetings changed Collins' view. Monday morning, April 25, we had a working meeting with him at which I proposed basic question, do we or do we not support some political change in Saigon, and (b) a specific plan of change. The reports at that time from Saigon showed Diem was steadily slipping. In the face of the adamant view of Collins and Sturm most of us reluctantly accepted the need for a change, but we all insisted that we stay with Diem at least for the first innings. Collins and particularly Sturm, rejected our proposition in any shape or form. The basic shift in our approach was taken at a long luncheon meeting with the Secretary. Unfortunately neither Bob Hoyt nor I were invited to attend. Bill Seabold can fill you in on this. The Secretary took the position we would support Diem until and unless genuinely Vietnamese elements turned up with another acceptable solution. Collins and Sturm later told the working group this was an impossible condition.

2. The rest of Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday we spent working up two long and complicated telegrams to Paris and Saigon. At a full meeting with the Secretary, Mr. Hoover and Allen Dulles late Tuesday afternoon they were approved. Collins fully endorsed these telegrams after he and Sturm had eliminated our proposal to try again to keep Diem as head of a coalition government. These telegrams envisaged a gradual and rather complicated shift of our position in carefully worked out stages. As we suspected at the time, they were immediately overtaken by events. None of us really believed in them but we were faced with Collins' strong recommendations and the fact that he had been to the White House the first day after his arrival. In any event, this shift has never been carried out. Although the telegrams were sent to Paris and Saigon, we have put out a stop order holding up action on them indefinitely.

3. Wednesday, April 27, Diem changed the police chiefs and Thursday the Binh Xuyen began military action against the government. Ely and the French have been putting the full blame for this situation on Diem, as they tried to do for the March 29-30 incident. Events have moved very
rapidly since then. The national army has seemed to be winning, groups are rallying to Diem, Bao Dai is getting set to fire Diem, and the French have in effect withdrawn their support from Diem. All reports from Saigon indicate there is a revolutionary feeling developing against Bao Dai and the French. Some of this is instigated by the Diem group but some of it may be spontaneous. As of this writing we may be faced with a choice between Diem and Bao Dai. In view of the fighting, we have felt in State it was best to continue support for the government under Diem and see what happens. But as this crisis develops we are being forced to take a more and more unequivocal and strong stand for Diem.

4. Senator Mansfield issued a long statement in support of Diem on April 29. If Diem is forced out, Mansfield would have us stop all aid to Viet-Nam except of a humanitarian nature. Senators Knowland and Humphrey have also backed Diem. A large number of members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee after hearing Collins have informed the Department through Congresswoman Kelly that they would not favor the State Department withdrawing support from Diem. Collins met with the Far East Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, separately with Senator Mansfield and with about a dozen of the House Committee. While he and Sturm felt these legislators would give no trouble, Sturm informing us after seeing Senator Mansfield that there was nothing to it, Bob Hoey and the rest of us here were much less sanguine about legislative feeling. In fact there is going to be real difficulties on the Hill if Diem is forced out by what appears to be French-Bao Dai action.

5. During the past ten days the French have been quiet with us, but working behind the scene. Kidder reports Ely as almost hysterical. Bao Dai has been active, as he has submitted one plan to us and has also taken another action publicly. Both of these are almost identical with plans or ideas which French officials had submitted to us several weeks ago. If there were any notion that Bao Dai acts independently of the French and Ely, that should now be dispelled. However, Prime Minister Faure has indicated to Dillon that he does have no stomach for going off independently of the US in Free Viet-Nam. They will follow our lead even though they don't like the idea, providing the situation is not so bad in Saigon that they have to move out French military and civilian personnel. We have asked for pretty fundamental reassurances on basic French intentions in Viet-Nam, we got them orally for whatever they may be worth.

6. We are in a bewildering, fluid situation. I believe more strongly than ever that we should stick with Diem now. Collins says he is a terrible administrator and it will wreck Free Viet-Nam if we leave him in. That may be true but that is not the issue at present. If Diem can lead the nationalist forces to a conclusive settlement, even to the point of rendering Bao Dai ineffective or annulled, we should continue to support him. The key questions are:
a) Will the Vietnamese National Army as a group stick with Diem?

b) Will the Binh Xuyen be broken up into isolated remnants?

c) Will enough nationalist groups including sect leaders rally to the government even against Bao Dai?

d) Will Bao Dai fire Diem, even if the answers to the above three questions are clearly enough in the affirmative.

What I am afraid of is that the combination of continuing forces coalesced around Diem on the one hand and Bao Dai on the other may not enjoy preponderant strength.

7. There are possibly serious anti-French overtones in the Vietnamese political situation. These also include anti-Bao Dai feelings. We must not take any action which would tar us with the same accusations. General O'Daniel, our three Attaches, and Lansdale informed us on April 30th that "any change in leadership or command at this time could result in chaos".

8. There are some personal aspects that I would like to take up with you privately.
FOR YOUNG FROM GIBSON

FOLLOWING IS SECOND MESSAGE DRAFTED IN NICE APRIL 29 AFTER SECOND INTERVIEW WITH NGUYEN DE AND BAO DAI, RESUME OF WHICH TELEPHONED TO YOUNG EVENING APRIL 29.

1. AFTER RECEIPT DEPTEL 27 TO NICE AND WORD RECEIVED BY TELEPHONE FROM PARIS THAT AMB DILLON HAD CALLED ON FAURE PURSUANT TO DEPTEL 3849 (RESULTS REPORTED EMBTEL 4740, SAIGON 687), GIBSON CALLED ON FILT NGUYEN DE AND THEN IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING ON BAO DAI.

2. WE INFORMED DE THAT AMBASSADOR HAD SEEN FAURE AND REVIEWED WITH HIM IMPORTANT ASPECTS FRANCE-U.S. POLICY VIETNAM. WE REFERRED TO NECESSITY THAT BAO DAI, AS WELL AS FRENCH, GIVE FULL SUPPORT TO LEGALLY CONSTITUTED GOVT., VIETNAM.

3. WE THEN HAD GENERAL REVIEW WITH DE IN COURSE OF WHICH WE MADE POINTS TO HIM GIVEN TO US OVER TELEPHONE FROM WASHINGTON. WE EMPHASIZED THAT ANY FURTHER STEPS TOWARD SOLUTION VIETNAM CRISIS MUST BE MADE ON INITIATIVE VIETNAMESE NATIONALISTS THEMSELVES. WE EMPHASIZED U.S. VIEW THAT PRESENT GOVT. AS LEGALLY CONSTITUTED GOVT. MUST BE SUPPORTED AS LONG AS IT REMAINS SUCH AND THAT URGENT PROBLEM IS TO DEAL WITH PRESENT CIVIL WAR AND NOT QUESTION OF FORM OF ANY NEW GOVT.

4. DE AGREED FULLY WITH OUR REMARKS POINTING OUT THAT BAO DAI'S DECISIONS OF PREVIOUS DAY WERE IN KEEPING WITH THESE PRINCIPLES. HE HAD MADE CLEAR TO DIEM IN SUMMONING HIM TO CANNES BEFORE OTHER VIETNAMESE AND IN SENDING PERSONAL PLANE GIBSON TO FETCH
TOP SECRET

-2- 4746, APRIL 30, 8 PM, FROM PARIS (SECTION 1 OF 2)

TO FETCH HIM THAT HIS STATUS AS PRIME MINISTER REMAINED UNALTERED.
BAO DAI REGARDED PRESENT CRISIS AS BEING IN TWO PHASES:
FIRST, TO BRING ABOUT END OF PRESENT CIVIL WAR AND SECOND,
TO DEAL WITH QUESTION OF GOVERNMENTAL REFORM. FIRST WOULD HAVE
TO BE SETTLED NOW, SECOND COULD BE DEALT WITH LATER.

5. THENCEFORTH, AND IN CONVERSATION IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING
WITH BAO DAI INTERVIEW CONCERNED WITH BAO DAI'S OBSERVATIONS
ON HOW TO PUT END CIVIL WAR RATHER THAN ANY QUESTIONS ALTERNATE
GOVT. OR OTHER ASPECTS BAO DAI "PLAN".

6. BAO DAI STATED IN STRONG TERMS HE WISHED U.S. TO TAKE
IMMEDIATE STEPS PERSUADE DIEM TO COME TO FRANCE TO RECEIVE
VIETNAMESE LEADERS WITH HIM AND DISCUSS MEANS ENDING PRESENT
CRISIS. HE STATED THAT CORRECTLY OR INCORRECTLY DIEM HAS
CLAIMED THAT HE HAS HAD U.S. SUPPORT IN STEPS HE HAS TAKEN
DURING LAST FEW WEEKS WHICH HAVELED TO PRESENT BLOODSHED.
HE VIOLATED TRUCE AND AT LEAST HIS BROTHERS IF NOT HE HIMSELF
CLAIMED THAT HE DID SO WITH AT LEAST PASSIVE U.S. SUPPORT.
IT HAS ALREADY BEEN SAID, BAO DAI CLAIMED, THAT U.S. HAD
"BY ITS REFUSAL TO COUNTERACT ANY ACTION BUT BLIND SUPPORT
FOR DIEM ALLOWED PRESENT ABUSES TO FESTER UNTIL IT HAD BURST
IN FORM PRESENT CIVIL WAR AND THAT U.S. HAD PURPOSELY DONE
THIS IN HOPE DIEM WOULD TAKE ARMED ACTION. THIS ACTION HAD
RESULTED IN DEATHS OF HUNDREDS OF INNOCENT PEOPLE AND WASTE
OF NATIONAL FORCE NEEDED TO FIGHT COMMUNISM. U.S. IN ACTION
COULD NO LONGER BE ADMITTED".

7. ALL OF THIS WE DENIED, POINTING OUT AGAIN THAT GENERAL COLLINS
AND EMBASSY SAIGON HAS CONSISTENTLY URGED RESTRAINT ON GOVT.
BAO DAI CONTINUED, STATING THAT U.S. RESPONSIBILITY IN PRESENT
SITUATION WAS HEAVY. HE HAD PUT OFF TAKING ACTION HE HAD
WISHED TO TAKE WHICH MIGHT HAVE SERVED TO AVOID PRESENT
BLOODSHED AT U.S. REQUEST. ON TWO SUCCESSIVE DAYS U.S. HAD
ASKED HIM TO REFRAIN FROM TAKING DECISIVE ACTION ON EXCUSE
WASHINGTON WAS STUDYING PROBLEM WITH GENERAL COLLINS THERE
AND WOULD HAVE SOMETHING TO SAY SHORTLY. ON APRIL 26 AND 27
BAO DAI HAD AGREED TO OUR REQUESTS AND HAD NOT TAKEN ACTION

TO END BLOODESHEHD
WHICH HIS JUDGMENT INDICATED WAS NECESSARY. ON APRIL 23 HE WAS FORCED TO TAKE MATTERS INTO HIS OWN HANDS DESPITE THIRD SUCCESSIVE REQUEST DELIVERED IN CANNES ON APRIL 22 AFTER SHOOTING HAD ALREADY STARTED. IN HIS OPINION IF HE HAD ACTED LAST WEEK HUNDREDS OF LIVES WOULD HAVE BEEN SAVED. IF U.S. WAS REALLY NEUTRAL IN MATTER IT MUST TAKE STEPS TO AVOID GIVING OPPOSITE IMPRESSION HE ADDED. MOREOVER, IF U.S. DID NOT WISH TO STAND BY AND WATCH STATE OF CIVIL WAR ESTABLISHED IN VIETNAM, WHICH WOULD LAST UNTIL VIETMINH WON COMPLETE CONTROL, HE MUST HELP IN BRINGING AN END TO THAT CIVIL WAR. WAY TO DO THIS IS TO INFLUENCE DIEM TO LAY DOWN ARMS AND COME TO FRANCE TO CONSULT WITH OTHER VIETNAMESE ANTI-COMMUNIST NATIONALISTS. MOMENT HE DOES, OPPOSITE SIDE WILL LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS, HE CLAIMED.

8. BAO DAI ALLEGED THAT RESISTANCE TO DIEM IS SO UNIVERSAL IN VIETNAM THAT SUPPORT OF DIEM WAS SERVING DISCREDIT U.S. IN EYES OF VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. DIEM WILL UNDOUBTEDLY SUCCER IN DRIVING SECTS OUT OF SAIGON OR AT LEAST IN SUPPRESSING MILITARY FORCES THERE BUT THEY WILL SIMPLY GO TO PROVINCES WHERE DIEM HAS NO CONTROL.

9. IN BAO DAI'S OPINION DIEM HAS NOW BECOME A PSYCHOPATH WHO WISHES TO MARTYRIZE HIMSELF EVEN AT PRICE OF THOUSANDS OF LIVES AND NATIONAL TREASURY. HE ENJOYS THOUGHT THAT HIS LIFE IS IN DANGER AND WOULD WELCOME MARTYRDOM WHICH IS INDEED WHAT HE WILL GET, SAID BAO DAI, FOR FEELING IS SO INTENSE AGAINST HIM THAT SOMEONE IS BOUND TO ASSASSINATE HIM IN NEAR FUTURE IF HE PERSISTS IN TRYING TO ESTABLISH HIS RULE BY FORCE "WITH THE SUPPORT OF NO ONE BUT HIS OWN FAMILY AND THE U.S.", BAO DAI SAID.

10. BAO DAI SPOKE OF DIEM'S ROLE AS A CATHOLIC, STATING THAT LATTER REGARDED HIS TASK AS LEADING A HOLY WAR. INSTEAD OF DOING THAT, HE HAD TURNED VIETNAMESE AGAINST CATHOLICISM. BAO DAI SAID HIS WIFE'S OWN FAMILY HAD BEEN CATHOLIC FOR GENERATIONS AND NOW REPORTED IT WAS UNSAFE TO GO OUTSIDE SAIGON.
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

-4- 4746, APRIL 30, 8 PM, FROM PARIS (SECTION 1 of 2)

IF YOU WERE KNOWN TO BE A CATHOLIC BECAUSE OF THE EMMITY AGAINST DIEM.

DILLON

PAF/32

NOTE: MR. HOEY (PSA) INFORMED 8:30 PM, 4/30/55 - CWO/FED.
11. WE REFERRED TO DIEM'S REFUSAL TO OBEY BAO DAI'S SUMMONS. BAO DAI STATED THAT IT DID NOT SURPRISE HIM. HE HAD EXPECTED IT AND, IN A SENSE, WELCOME IT AS IT MIGHT SERVE TO CLEAR THE AIR AND PROVE TO PEOPLE THAT DIEM IS NOT ACTING AS SERVANT OF THE STATE AS HE CLAIMED BUT RATHER AS A SELF-SEEKING WAR LORD WHO WISHED TO ERADICATE ALL OPPOSITION AND HOLD TOTAL POWER WITHIN HIS OWN HANDS AND THAT OF HIS FAMILY. BAO DAI WOULD STAKE HIS INFLUENCE WITH PEOPLE AND VIETNAMESE NATIONALISTS AGAINST DIEM'S.

12. WE ASKED WHAT BAO DAI INTENDED TO DO IF DIEM CONTINUES TO DISOBEY HIS ORDERS. BAO DAI STATED HE WOULD TAKE LEGAL STEPS TO HAVE HIM DECLARED A REBEL AND WOULD THEN PROCEED TO UNITE THE COUNTRY AGAINST HIM UNTIL HE WAS REMOVED FROM POSITION HE HAS USURPED. WE ASKED BAO DAI IF HE INTENDED TO DO THIS IN PERSON AND IF SO, WOULD IT MEAN A PROMPT RETURN TO SAIGON. WE ANSWERED THAT IT MEANT THAT HE MIGHT RETURN TO SAIGON IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO LEAD THE FIGHT BUT THAT WOULD BE DEPENDENT ON THE ALLEGIANCE OF THE NATIONAL ARMY. HOWEVER, HE WOULD TAKE NO SUCH STEP WITHOUT CONSULTING VIETNAMESE LEADERS, WHICH HE HAD SUMMONED TO FRANCE NEXT WEEK IN ADVANCE.

13. WE ASKED WHAT EFFECT DIEM'S REFUSAL TO OBEY HIS ORDERS WOULD HAVE ON ARRIVAL IN FRANCE OF OTHER VIETNAMESE PERSONALITIES, BAO DAI SAID HE HOPED THAT THEY WOULD ALL COME AS IT WAS NOW MORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER THAT THEY BE CONSULTED IN ORDER THAT COUNTRY COULD NOW ACHIEVE THE UNITY DIEM HAD FAILED TO ACHIEVE. WE ASKED FOR A LIST OF THOSE INVITED AND IT WAS SUPPLIED (BEING CABLED SEPARATELY). IT IS NOTED THAT CONTRARY TO BAO DAI'S FIRST STATEMENT APRIL 28 SECTS HAVE NOT BEEN INVITED AND ALL FORMER PRIME MINISTERS EXCEPT TAM ARE INCLUDED. QUAT AND DO AS WELL. BISHOP LE'NUU TUU HAS BEEN INVITED BUT IT IS NOT CERTAIN HE CAN COME. THE LIST INCLUDES BUDDHISTS, CATHOLICS, ARMY REPS., TRADE UNIONISTS.

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY - This copy must be returned to O/C R central files with notation of date received.

TOP SECRET
-2- 4746, APRIL 30, 3 PM, FROM PARIS (SECTION 2 OF 2)

TRADE UNIONISTS, PEASANTS, ETC. BAO DAI SAID IT WAS HIS INTENTION TO MAKE REPRESENTATION BROAD AS POSSIBLE.

14. BAO DAI STATED THAT HE HAD DECIDED ON HINH AS SPECIAL EMISSARY TO SECTS. WE POINTED OUT THAT THIS DECISION WOULD COME AS GREAT SHOCK TO AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION WHO LOOKED UPON HINH AS REBEL AGAINST GOVERNMENT. HE HAD HAD TO BE REMOVED FROM SAIGON FOR THAT REASON. IT WOULD BE INTERPRETED AS A SIGN THAT BAO DAI WAS SENDING HINH AS MEANS UPSETTLING NATIONAL ARMY’S LOYALTY TO GOVERNMENT. BAO DAI SAID THESE WERE INTERPRETATIONS HE COULD NOT HELP AND THAT CIRCUMSTANCES NO LONGER PERMITTED HIM TO BE INFLUENCED BY THEM. FACT WAS, HE SAID, THAT HINH ENJOYED MOST SUPPORT IN VIETNAM MILITARY CIRCLES OF ANY VIETNAMESE GENERAL. HE HAD BEEN REMOVED FROM VIETNAM BY BAO DAI AT OUR REQUEST IN ORDER GIVE DIEM FREE HAND IN ESTABLISHING HIS AUTHORITY OVER THE ARMY AND IN REESTABLISHING LAW AND ORDER AND A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNION. BAO DAI REMOVAL OF HIM WAS BEST EXAMPLE OF EXTENT OF EFFORT TO GIVE DIEM EVERY CHANCE. DIEM HAD CONSISTENTLY FAILED. NOW IT WAS BAO DAI’S PURPOSE TO END PRESENT BLOODSHED BY REMOVING DIEM FROM SCENE AND THUS PREVENTING NATIONAL ARMY FROM TAKING FURTHER ARMED ACTION. AT SAME TIME, HE MUST MAKE CERTAIN THAT SECTS WOULD OBEDIENT FROM SIMILAR ARMED ACTION. HE HAD ALREADY TAKE STEPS TO ACCOMPLISH FORDER BY DECREES. ONLY WAY HE COULD ASSURE LATTER WAS BY FORCE HIS OWN AUTHORITY BACKED UP BY THAT OF MAN WHO HAD GREATEST INFLUENCE. MAN WAS HINH. HINH WILL CARRY BAO DAI’S ORDERS FOR INTEGRATION OF SECT FORCES INTO NATIONAL ARMY AND BAO DAI GUARANTEES SECTS WILL OBEY HIM AND MESSAGE HINH CARRIES IF DIEM IS REMOVED FROM SCENE.

15. AT THIS STAGE OF INTERVIEW, BAO DAI BECAME SO EXCITED THAT AT TIMES HE COULD BARELY TALK. HE SAID THAT NO MAN HAD EVER ENJOYED THE POWER WHICH DIEM HAD HAD FROM VERY BEGINNING. BAO DAI HAD TRANSFERRED ALL HIS POWERS TO HIM. HE WAS FULLY BACKED BY BOTH FRANCE AND U.S. HE WAS GIVEN LARGE SUMS OF MONEY AND HIS MILITARY FORCES WERE CLOTHED, FED AND EQUIPPED BY FOREIGNERS. HE WAS CONSTANTLY HELPED BY FOREIGNERS TO DO THINGS HE WAS INCAPABLE OF DOING HIMSELF. GENERAL COLLINGS AND ELY AND BAO DAI HAD ALL BEEN IN HIS SERVICE. EVEN CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE VIETNAM ARMY WAS REMOVED FROM SCENE BECAUSE DIEM DIDN’T.
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

-3- 4746, APRIL 30, 8 PM, FROM PARIS (SECTION 2 OF 2)

16. WE ASKED WHAT BROTHER LUYEN WAS STILL DOING IN CANNES AND WHETHER HE WAS SERVING AS INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN BAO DAI AND DIEM. AT THIS POINT BAO DAI REALLY EXPLODED AND STATED THAT BROTHER LUYEN HAD COME TO CANNES NOT FOR ANY PATRIOTIC PURPOSE AS "DIEM UNDOUBTEDLY HAD TOLD AMERICANS IN SAIGON," BUT RATHER ON SECRET MISSION FROM DIEM TO ATTEMPT TO BUY BAO DAI. SOME DAYS AGO BEFORE ANY ACTION HAD BEEN TAKEN TO SUMMON DIEM TO FRANCE OR OTHERWISE BAO DAI SAID LUYEN ARRIVED UNINVITED IN CANNES, BAO DAI KEPT HIM WAITING AND WHEN HE FINALLY RECEIVED HIM, LUYEN OFFERED BAO DAI THE SUM OF THREE HUNDRED MILLION FRANCS IF HE WOULD AGREE NOT TO TAKE ANY ACTION WHICH WOULD AFFECT STATUS OF DIEM OR PREVENT HIM FROM ESTABLISHING HIS AUTHORITY BY FORCE. BAO DAI COMMENTED WITH INDIGNATION THAT, OF COURSE HE HAD REFUSED AND "THROWN LUYEN OUT OF THE HOUSE" BUT HE WAS STILL "GROVELLING" AROUND. HE STATED THAT LUYEN HAD MADE VARIOUS ALLEGATIONS OF HIS CLOSE RELATIONS WITH "AMERICANS" IN SAIGON.

17. AT END OF INTERVIEW BAO DAI ASKED IF WE COULD GIVE HIM ANY FURTHER WORD ON WASHINGTON'S REACTION TO PLAN SUBMITTED WEEK AGO. WE EXPLAINED ONCE MORE THAT GENERAL COLLINS WAS LEAVING WASHINGTON THAT DAY FOR SAIGON WHICH WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF WASHINGTON'S RECOGNITION OF EMERGENCY NATURE OF SITUATION THERE IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT NO DECISIONS WOULD NOW BE REACHED UNTIL GENERAL COLLINS HAD ARRIVED IN SAIGON AND COULD CONFER THERE WITH EMBASSY AND ELY. IN MEANWHILE WE INFORMED BAO DAI THAT HIS OBSERVATIONS WOULD BE PASSED TO DEPT IN THEIR ENTIRETY.

18. BAO DAI SAID HE WOULD SEND DE BACK TO PARIS MONDAY IN ORDER TO REMAIN IN TOUCH WITH US AND TO RECEIVE ANY OBSERVATIONS WASHINGTON CARED TO MAKE TO HIM. AT SAME TIME HE WOULD INSTRUCT DE TO KEEP US AU COURANTE.

DILLON

PAF/32
NOTE: MR. HOEY (PSC) INFORMED 6:30 PM 4/30/55 -- CGO/FED

954

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
SECRET

SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 63.1-2/1-55

THE CURRENT SIAMON CRISIS

Submitted by the
DEPARTMENT OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Department of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

Concurring in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

on 2 May 1955. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intel-
ligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelli-
gence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy
Commission Representative to the IAC, and the Assistant to
the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the
subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

AFCS2003

COPY NO. 5
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE
U.S. AIR FORCE
THE CURRENT SAIGON CRISIS

THE PROBLEM

To assess the implications of recent developments in Saigon and to estimate the probable actions of interested parties in the current crisis.

THE ESTIMATE

IMPLIEDATIONS OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SAIGON

1. The success of Premier Diem in operations against Binh Xuyen, and in his stand against Bao Dai, the French, and General Vy, has created a new and potentially revolutionary situation in Vietnam. While the situation in Vietnam is extremely fluid, Diem appears to hold the initiative in the phase that is about to begin. In this phase, the interested parties—particularly the French and Bao Dai—will have to adapt themselves to a radically new political situation dominated by Diem or by more extreme nationalist elements. If they do not adapt and if there are any substantial efforts by Bao Dai or the French to frustrate Diem's government, the chances of anti-French violence and the disposal of Bao Dai would be greatly increased.

2. Diem's relations with the Revolutionary Council which has been actively injecting itself into this situation have not yet been clarified. This council, designated by a self-appointed assembly, takes a more extreme position than Diem, particularly in regard to the withdrawal of French forces and the immediate disposal of Bao Dai. It is dominated by Cao Dai generals Trinh Minh The and Nguyen Thanh Phuong and by Hoa Hao General Ngo and includes a number of extreme nationalist politicians. General Ely now charges that the Council is Communist infiltrated but so far has not produced evidence to substantiate this charge. We have no significant evidence to indicate that any of the members of the Council are Communist. In a proclamation the Council announced a broad program couched in social revolutionary terms but including a denunciation of "red colonialism" in North Vietnam. Its activities have been denounced by the Communist radio in Hanoi as those of Premier Diem.

PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION OF INTERESTED PARTIES

3. Premier Diem. The virtual expulsion of the Binh Xuyen from Saigon-Cholon has increased Diem's prestige throughout Vietnam. The confidence of Diem and his supporters in their own strength, judgment, and popular appeal has been considerably enhanced. In this situation, Diem will almost certainly continue to resist any efforts to remove him from office.

4. His actions and those of his followers have taken on an increasingly nationalistic, anti-French tone over the past few days and Diem may now be convinced that a continuation of this anti-French policy is essential to the rallying of popular support. Nevertheless, he has exercised a moderating influence on the anti-French and anti-Bao Dai position of the Revolutionary Council. However, if he believed the French were continuing their efforts to depose him, he would almost certainly permit intensified anti-French manifestations. Such a course would carry grave dangers of anti-French violence, particularly in Saigon.
5. So far, Diem and his principal Vietnamese National Army (VNA) leaders have appeared desirous of maintaining good relations with the French. Diem’s attitude toward Bao Dai has been less clear and there have been indications of what he has been considering the suggestions of the Council that Bao Dai be deposed. He may be using ultranationalism to bring pressure against Bao Dai and the French. If he is thwarted in his objectives by the French or by Bao Dai, he will become more susceptible to pressures toward extreme action.

6. Diem has rallied additional support during the current military phase, and from this position of strength, Diem will almost certainly continue to gain adherents, including defectors from among the Binh Xuyen and the sects.

7. The Vietnamese National Army. Aside from the French Army, only the VNA presently has the capability to enforce Bao Dai’s authority in Saigon or to back Diem in defiance of Bao Dai. There are some VNA officers who dislike Diem and who are concerned by the developing rift between Diem and Bao Dai. On the other hand, there is considerable pro-Diem, nationalist sentiment in the army; Diem has gained additional support as a result of clearing the Binh Xuyen from Saigon; and most importantly, the VNA units in the Saigon area appear to be loyal to Diem.

8. If Diem should move precipitously to depose Bao Dai, or if Bao Dai attempted to oust Diem, some elements of the army might remain loyal to Bao Dai and attempt to overthrow Diem. We believe such efforts would be unsuccessful, however, even if General Hinh had entered the country to rally support for Bao Dai.

9. Bao Dai. As a result of Diem’s stand against Bao Dai and because of the latter’s involvement in what many Vietnamese nationalists consider to be a French-inspired political maneuver, Bao Dai’s prestige has been greatly reduced, whatever the outcome of the present crisis. Bao Dai’s authority can only be enforced at this juncture by the force of French arms and any such action would almost completely discredit him in Vietnam.

10. There appears to be considerable sentiment for the deposition of Bao Dai, and if Diem gives his consent such action may be taken at any time. For the present, Bao Dai apparently feels that the tide is running with Diem, and is attempting to preserve the institution of the monarchy by accepting the continuation of the Diem government.

11. The French Government. The French will find it difficult to accept Diem’s success which came despite their strong and well-publicized opposition. We believe that fear of large-scale violence and of adverse domestic and world reactions will cause the French to refrain from overt action in Saigon to restrain the VNA or to remove Diem, unless the situation should threaten serious loss of French lives. However, the extent to which the French permit the VNA freedom of action and the nature of their dealings with the Binh Xuyen and Bao Dai can still have an influence on the outcome of the immediate situation. Furthermore, we believe that the French will continue pressures for Diem’s removal; some French elements in Vietnam are likely to continue their covert assistance to Diem’s enemies. If the French believe that Diem will succeed in consolidating his position, they may decide that they have no choice except to repair their position with Diem as best they can while making plans for accelerated withdrawal of their forces.

12. The Binh Xuyen. The military potential of the Binh Xuyen will depend on the extent of support they receive, directly or indirectly, from the French and the Hao Hao. It appears that the morale of the Binh Xuyen troops is low, a number have already defected, and that many of the troops may be susceptible to peace

The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State, believes that the last sentence of this paragraph understates the difficulty the French would have in accommodating to a strong, anti-French government in South Vietnam, and therefore believes the sentence should read: “If these efforts are unsuccessful and Diem appeared to be consolidating his position, the French in the end may decide that they have no choice except to step up the withdrawal of their forces from Vietnam.”
offers from the government. We believe that a considerable number of the Binh Xuyen may attempt to resume their life of piracy and extortion. The VNA should be able to reduce the Binh Xuyen to the level of a local nuisance.

13. The Sects. We believe that for the immediate future the Cao Dai military forces under Generals Thi and Phuong will continue actively to support Diem against the Binh Xuyen and Bao Dai. The Hoa Hao are unlikely to play an important role in the immediate situation, although the Ba Cut forces may continue their terrorist operations.

14. The Viet Minh. The Viet Minh probably fear that Diem’s continuation in office would limit the prospects of a peaceful unification of Vietnam under terms favorable to the Communists. They will probably continue covert efforts in South Vietnam to keep the situation agitated. The Communists almost certainly will not invade South Vietnam in the near future.

GENERAL OUTLOOK
15. In present circumstances, we do not believe that Diem could be persuaded voluntarily to resign. If he were forced from office, many of Diem’s followers would probably undertake revolutionary opposition, including maquis resistance, to the successor regime. Some VNA elements in Saigon and in central Vietnam would probably join these elements in resisting the new government.

16. Assuming that the US continues to support Diem, and that the French acquiesce, we believe the situation will stabilize in Saigon under Diem’s control. Diem’s talents as an administrator are unlikely to improve. His success, achieved largely on his own initiative and with his own resources, is likely to make him more independent and less amenable to policy guidance. Diem’s government will still be confronted with manifold internal problems—e.g., integration of the sects, resettlement of refugees, land reform, extension of government authority in the provinces, and training of the army. Although Diem has improved his position, we believe that it will still be extremely difficult, at best, for Diem or any Vietnamese government to build sufficient strength to meet the long-range challenge of the Communists.
INCOMING TELEGRAM DEPARTMENT OF STATE ACTION COPY

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

FROM: PARIS
TO: Secretary of State
NO: SECTO 8, MAY 8, 5 PM (SECTION ONE OF THREE)

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 8, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY SAIGON 716.

FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY CONVERSATIONS ON INDOCHINA HELD WITH BRITISH AND FRENCH THIS AFTERNOON. FRENCH DELEGATION HEADED BY PRIME MINISTER FAURE, BRITISH BY FONNIN MACMILLAN AND US BY SECRETARY. DURING FIRST PART OF CONVERSATIONS BRITISH WERE ABSENT, JOINING LATER AS NOTED.

FAURE OPENED CONVERSATIONS BY REFERRING TO RATIFICATION PARIS AGREEMENTS AND DIFFICULTIES FRENCH GOVT HAD ENCOUNTERED IN PROCESS. HE OBSERVED THAT PUBLIC OPINION MUST NOW BE SATISFIED WITH EARLY FOUR-POWER TALKS. HE AGREED THAT WE WOULD NOW BE TALKING FROM STRENGTH AND THAT PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS WERE THEREBY INCREASED. HE REFERRED TO CHINA AND TO FACT THAT FRANCE WAS NOW IGNORING GOVT WHICH HAD IN HANDS FATE OF HUNDREDS OF MILLION OF PEOPLE BECAUSE OF HER RECOGNITION OF FACT THAT US VIEWS MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. HE REMARKED THERE ARE NOW TWO AREAS OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO FRANCE. THEY ARE NORTH AFIRCA AND VIETNAM. HE WOULD CALL UPON LAFOREST, MINISTER OF ASSOCIATED STATES, TO GIVE OUTLINE FRENCH POSITION ON LATTER.

SECRETARY REPLIED BY STATING THAT US RECOGNIZED COURAGEOUS STEP FRANCE HAD TAKEN IN RATIFYING PARIS AGREEMENTS. BOTH HE AND PRESIDENT APPRECIATED MAGNITUDE OF POLITICAL TASK. THEY FELT STEP, HOWEVER, WAS IN FRANCE'S OWN INTEREST AS WELL. SECRETARY EXPRESSED OPINION THAT IN RATIFYING FRANCE HAD REAFFIRMED HER POSITION AS "ONE OF GREAT NATIONS OF WORLD".

LAFOREST THEN OPENED INDOCHINA DISCUSSION. HE STATED THAT GENEVA ACCORDS HAD POSED SEVERAL QUESTIONS INCLUDING THAT OF

HOW TO

PERMANENT RECORD COPY 959

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
SECTO 8, MAY 8, 5 PM (SECTION 1 OF 3) FROM PARIS

HOW TO DEAL WITH FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS. DIVISION OF COUNTRY HAD GIVEN SOUTH VIETNAM DISADVANTAGE IN COMPETING WITH NORTH BUT WHAT SOUTH LACKED IN AREA AND POPULATION WAS COUNTER-BALANCED BY HER ECONOMIC SUPERIORITY. FRANCE BELIEVED THAT SOUTH COULD WIN OVER NORTH IN ELECTIONS IF SHE COULD PRESENT MORE ATTRACTIVE REGIME TO PEOPLE. THIS COULD BE DONE ONLY WITH NATIONALIST, STABLE AND BROADLY BASED GOVT. TIME WAS OF ESSENCE FOR DISCUSSIONS PRIOR TO ELECTIONS WHICH WOULD OPEN NEXT JULY AND ELECTIONS THEMSELVES IN JULY 1956. THERE WAS NO AMBIGUITY IN FRENCH POLICY BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM. PRESENCE OF FRANCE IN NORTH COULD NOT BE ERASED BY STROKE OF PAPER. IT IS FRENCH DUTY TO PROTECT HER CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC PRESENCE THERE. SAINTENY MISSION IS DESIGNED FOR ONLY THAT PURPOSE. FRANCE HAD GIVEN UP THOUGHTS OF MIXED COMPANIES AS RESULT OUR OBJECTIONS AND HAD NOW SURRENDERED COAL MINES. SAINTENY MISSION WOULD BE MAINTAINED ON ITS PRESENT TERMS. IT WOULD BE NEITHER ENLARGED NOR CHANGED.

LAFOREST CONTINUED TO SAY THAT FRANCE HAD LOYALLY SUPPORTED GOVT OF DIEM FROM BEGINNING. ANY ALLEGATION TO CONTRARY IS UNTRUE. FRENCH CONSTANTLY TRIED TO REINFORCE DIEM GOVT. FRANCE REACHED AGREEMENT WITH US LAST DECEMBER TO PERSUADE "OR COMPEL" DIEM TO ENLARGE GOVT. IT WAS AGREED TO GIVE HIM UNTIL JANUARY AT WHICH TIME, IF HE HAD FAILED, WE WOULD LOOK INTO MATTER OF ALTERNATE DISCREETLY. THIS WAS NOT DONE.

LAST MARCH PRESENT GOVT BROKE INTO OPEN CONFLICT WITH SECTS. UNITED FRONT OF SECTS WAS FORMED AGAINST DIEM. BOTH DECEMBER AGREEMENT AND COMMON SENSE TOLD US AT THAT TIME THAT SOMETHING TO BE DONE TO AVOID CIVIL WAR. FRANCE WARNED THAT ARMED CONFLICT - FIRST CIVIL WAR, THEN GUERRILLA WARFARE, THEN TERRORISM - WOULD RESULT IF WE FAILED TO TAKE ACTION. FRANCE HAS ALWAYS DESIRED PEACEFUL SOLUTION. FOR THIS REASON JOINT ELY-COLLINGS APPROACH WAS TRIED. IT WAS HOPED THEY WOULD ARRIVE AT JOINT PLAN FOR SOLUTION. WASHINGTON APPEARED FIRST TO WELCOME THIS CONCEPT THEN CHANGED ITS MIND. COLLINS LEFT SAIGON WHEN CIVIL WAR WAS ABOUT TO BREAK OUT. UNTENABLE TRUCES WERE DECLARED. WHEN THEY WERE ABOUT TO EXPIRE BAO DAI SUBMITTED HIS OWN PLAN ON APRIL 19 IN ORDER TO TRY TO RECONCILE US AND FRENCH.
-3- SECTO 8, MAY 8, 5 PM (SECTION ONE OF THREE), FROM PARIS

AND FRENCH FAILURE TO ACT. US FAILED TO REPLY TO BAO DAI.
IN ABSENCE OF COLLINS FROM SAIGON BAO DAI ACTED.

LAFOREST CONTINUED TO SAY THAT NEW REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE
APPEARED TO HAVE CONTROL. COMMITTEE IS STRONGLY UNDER VIET MINH
INFLUENCE. A MAN NAMED HOM PAN SON, STAFF OFFICER IN VIET-
NAMESE ARMY, EDUCATED IN CHINA WAS VICE-PRESIDENT OF REVOLU-
TIONARY COMMITTEE. NH LANG WAS ONE OF VICE-PRESIDENTS OF
VIET MINH GOVT. DOAN TRUNG CON IS NOTORIOUS VIET MINH AGENT.
VIET MINH INFLUENCE OF "REVOLUTIONARY" GROUPS IS RECOGNIZABLE
THROUGHOUT AND THEIR INFLUENCE IS SPREADING TO COUNTRY. BAO
DAI'S DEPOSITION IS DEManded. THERE IS VIOLENT CAMPAIGN
AGAINST FRENCH AND FRENCH EXPEDITIONARY CORPS. VIET MINH
AGENTS MAKE GOOD USE OF IT AND CERTAIN AMERICANS DO NOT SEEM
SUFFICIENTLY AWARE OF THIS. FRENCH GOVT DOES NOT WISH TO HAVE
ITS ARMY ACT AS PLATFORM FOR VIET MINH PROPAGANDA. ARMY WILL NOT
BE MAINTAINED IN VIETNAM AT ANY COST. LAFOREST CLOSED BY
REFERRING TO GOVT CENSORSHIP AND SHOWED COPY OF SAIGON NEWSPAPER, HALF OF WHICH HAD BEEN CENSORED, AS EXAMPLE OF EXTENT
OF GOVT CENSORSHIP.

SECRETARY REPLIED REFERRING TO SERIOUSNESS OF SITUATION AND
NECESSITY THAT FRENCH AND US AS GOOD FRIENDS WORK CLOSELY
TOGETHER. IT WOULD NOT BE PROFITABLE TO GO INTO DETAILED
CHARGES MADE AGAINST EACH OTHER IN TWO COUNTRIES. QUESTION IS
WHAT TO

DULLES

JNA: AB/32
FROM: Paris.

TO: Secretary of State

NO. SECTO 8, May 8, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF THREE)

PRIORITY

SECRET DEPARTMENT SECTO 8; REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY SAIGON 716.

what to do in face of present situation. He summarized present situation as follows:

(1) There is a revolutionary movement under way in Vietnam,

(2) We believe that Diem has the best chance of anyone of staying on top of revolution and keeping it within "tolerable" limits. Diem is only means US sees to save South Vietnam and counteract revolution. US sees no one else who can. Whatever US view has been in past, today US must support Diem wholeheartedly. US must not permit Diem to become another Karensky.

Regarding Bao Dai, Secretary said in his view he had irretrievably lost capacity to be anything but titular head of government if even that position could be saved for him and that this was solution Secretary preferred until election (of National Assembly). Bao Dai should support Diem and not take away his power. Cao Dai and Hoa Hao could be used but no Binh Xuyen. Secretary expressed opinion that with support two governments Diem could sit on top of revolution. Diem is only force of moderation. FEC a certain stabilizing influence. US was giving funds to support Vietnamese Army and could not see anyone else to give funds to but Diem for that purpose. Concluded by stating that support of Diem was only way he could see to deal with common problem pointing out that time was running against us and no successful results could be achieved unless two countries worked together.

Meeting was then joined by British for whom Secretary resumed US position as summarized above adding that in US view present revolution is not yet dominated or influenced by Communists to any appreciable degree. He remarked that prior association with Communists was not in itself sufficient reason to believe that man was a Communist now, citing that Bao Dai himself could be considered a Communist on this reasoning. Support of Diem did not indicate US non-recognition of his weaknesses. US had not taken part in his original selection and had been and remained ready to support any other man who might be presented by orderly process of law. He remarked that just before outbreak of fighting US was prepared to consider alternatives but he was not sure now that it would have been practical. Secretary remarked he was told last March by Collins that we had already reached point of no return on Diem.
There was no practical way of getting rid of him. Secretary wished to do everything to get Diem to enlarge government. It might be possible to change government at the time of forthcoming elections but question remains "who is better than Diem." If there is a better man US is ready to consider him but re-submits no one has been suggested. Although Collins had reached agreement with Ely in early April to change Diem he now believes we must support him.

Faure replied that he thought it best that he speak himself. He wished to state that France is not in agreement with US views. In the past we have concealed this fact from each other but now it is time to speak frankly. Diem is not a good solution. Joint efforts to prove he is have resulted in failure. France is convinced that Diem is leading to catastrophes. Diem took advantage of Collins' absence to effect a "coup de force" which won primary victory but which has not contributed to any lasting solution. His anti-French sentiments are extreme. France does not object to his being anti-French if he is capable but being anti-French is not a sufficient quality in itself. Faure will not continue with him for, one way or another, he will bring on a Viet Minh victory. He is surrounded by Vietnam elements and there is not time to lose. Diem is not only incapable but mad (fou). He ruined our chances for a possible solution just when it was in the offing. France can no longer take risks with him. He could yield to the revolutionary groups. Continuing with Diem would have three disastrous results:

(1) It would bring on a Viet Minh victory,

(2) It would focus the hostility of everyone on French, and

(3) It will begin on a France-US breach. Everyone believes that the US is backing Diem and encouraging him in his anti-French sentiments even if the French Government knows US is not.

Faure continued that much of France-US difficulty grows out of fact that we have never admitted our true thoughts from beginning. Last September we might have had an agreed solution if we had expressed our doubts but we did not. Bao Dai is a "bad card" but by means of him something is possible but with Diem failure is certain. We might have been able to save situation on eve of coup de force if we had had three-sided agreement (US, France, Bao Dai) but again we failed. Bao Dai has faults but he can serve a useful purpose and should be used for that. He cannot be excluded as a possibility for bringing about a more productive solution but as long as Diem is there the view is obstructed and no situation is possible. To resume, Faure said, Diem is impossible and there is no chance for him to succeed or to improve the situation. Another man might not be able to improve the situation either and, in fact, there is no one specifically in mind but at least with another man there is a chance.

DULLES
INCOMING TELEGRAM

FROM: PARIS
TO: Secretary of State
NO: SECTO 8, MAY 8, 5 PM (SECTION THREE OF THREE)

PRIORITY
SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 8, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY
SAIGON 716

IS A CHANCE BUT WITH DIEM THERE IS NONE.

FAURE THEN CONCLUDED WITH THE FOLLOWING SIGNIFICANT STATEMENT: "DIEM IS A BAD CHOICE, IMPOSSIBLE SOLUTION, WITH NO CHANCE TO SUCCEED AND NO CHANCE TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION. WITHOUT HIM SOME SOLUTION MIGHT BE POSSIBLE, BUT WITH HIM THERE IS NONE. HOWEVER, I CANNOT GUARANTEE ANY OTHER SOLUTION WOULD WORK NOR IS IT POSSIBLE TO CLARIFY THE SITUATION. THERE SEEMS TO BE FUNDAMENTAL DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN US. I COULD HAVE CLAIMED THAT SINCE FRENCH POSITION IS PREDOMINANT IN VIETNAM, YOU SHOULD ACCOMMODATE YOUR VIEWS MORE TO OURS, BUT I HAVE REJECTED THIS. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES? WHAT WOULD YOU SAY IF WE WERE TO RETIRE ENTIRELY FROM INDOCHINA AND CALL BACK THE FEC AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. I FULLY REALIZE THIS WOULD BE A GRAVE SOLUTION, AS IT WOULD LEAVE FRENCH CIVILIANS AND FRENCH INTERESTS IN A DIFFICULT POSITION. THERE IS ALSO THE QUESTION OF THE REFUGEES' FATE. IF YOU THINK THIS MIGHT BE A POSSIBLE SOLUTION, I THINK I MIGHT BE ABLE TO ORIENT MYSELF TOWARDS IT IF YOU SAY SO. IT WOULD HAVE ADVANTAGE OF AVOIDING ALL FURTHER REPROACH TO FRANCE OF "COLONIALISM" WHILE AT THE SAME TIME GIVING RESPONSE TO DIEM'S REQUEST THAT FRANCE SHOULD GO. SINCE IT CONTEMPLATES THE LIQUIDATION OF THE SITUATION AND THE REPATRIATION OF THE FEC, WOULD THE UNITED STATES BE DISPOSED TO HELP PROTECT FRENCH CIVILIANS AND THE REFUGEES? IF YOU DO NOT AGREE TO THIS SOLUTION AND BELIEVE IT WOULD HAMPER YOU, THEN WE CAN HAVE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON THE VIETNAMESE SITUATION.

SECRETARY
SECRETARY REPLIED THAT HE APPRECIATED FRANKNESS. IT IS ONLY WAY FRIENDS SHOULD SPEAK TO EACH OTHER. THERE IS A FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FRANCE AND US. US HAS HIGHER REGARD OF DIEM'S CAPABILITIES THAN FRANCE. US INFORMED "COUP DE FORCE" WAS ENGINEERED BY BINH XUYEN WHILE FRENCH SAY OTHERWISE. SECRETARY HIMSELF HAD HAD DOUBTS THAT DIEM COULD SURVIVE. IT WAS QUESTIONABLE WHETHER ARMY WAS LOYAL TO HIM AND HE DID NOT CONTROL THE NATIONAL POLICE. LOYALTY OF FRENCH GOVT ITSELF IN SUPPORT OF DIEM WAS NOT QUESTIONED BUT THERE WERE DIFFICULTIES FROM OTHER SOURCES SUCH AS RADIO FRANCAISE-ASIE. US DOES NOT AGREE WITH FRENCH OPINION OF DIEM. IF HE HAD BEEN A NON-ENTITY HE WOULD HAVE COLLAPSED BUT HE DID NOT. HE SHOWED SO MUCH ABILITY THAT US FAILS TO SEE HOW HE CAN BE GOT RID OF NOW. IT IS ASSUMED THAT FRANCE WOULD NOT WISH TO DO SO BY FORCE.

DIEM IS STRONGER NOW THAN WHEN BAO DAI FIRST WITHDREW HIS POWERS. WORST ASPECT IS THAT PROBLEM INVOLVES DIFFERENCE OF OPINION BETWEEN FRANCE AND US. VIETNAM IS NOT WORTH QUARREL WITH FRANCE. COMMON INTERESTS ARE TOO GREAT TO BE JEOPARDIZED BY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION ON VIETNAM. SECRETARY AGREED WITH FRENCH STATEMENT THAT IT MUST NOT AFFECT FRANCO-US RELATIONS IN OTHER AREAS. IF IT WOULD SOLVE PROBLEM, US WOULD WITHDRAW AND DROP ITS SUPPORT OF VIETNAM. FRANCO-US DIFFERENCES MUST BE RESOLVED NOW FOR SECRETARY DID NOT BELIEVE THAT US CONGRESS WOULD CONTINUE WITH ITS PRESENT AID PROGRAM OTHERWISE. SUBSTANTIAL SUMS OF 4 TO 5 HUNDRED MILLION DOLLARS ARE INVOLVED.

CHOICE OPEN TO US IS TO HAVE DIEM SUPPORTED OR TO WITHDRAW. IT IS GRAVE PROBLEM WHICH THE SECRETARY WOULD LIKE TO THINK ABOUT OVERNIGHT. FRENCH SUGGESTIONS ARE SERIOUS AND MUST BE WEIGHED CAREFULLY. ADVICE AND COUNSEL ARE NEEDED. US INTEREST IN VIETNAM IS SIMPLY TO WITHHOLD AREA FROM COMMUNISTS. US WILL GIVE CONSIDERATION TO ANY SUGGESTION FRENCH MAKE BUT MUST WARN THAT US FINANCIAL SUPPORT MAY NOT BE EXPECTED TO ANY SOLUTION WHICH SECRETARY CAN THINK OF AS ALTERNATIVE TO DIEM. QUESTION MUST BE TAKEN UP AGAIN TOMORROW.

MACMILLAN STATED THAT BRITISH INTERESTS IN VIETNAM WERE MORE INDIRECT BUT NONETHELESS VITAL BECAUSE (1) INTEREST IN AREA ITSELF AND (2) INTEREST IN COMMUNIST THREAT FROM ANY AREA IN WORLD. IT WOULD BE GRAVE ERROR TO REACH DECISION THAT EVENING. FOREIGN MINISTERS ARE TO BE IN PARIS SEVERAL DAYS AND SHOULD LOOK INTO MATTER AGAIN. EVENTS MIGHT OVERTAKE OUR DECISIONS. ACCURATE REVIEW OF
-3- SECTO 8, MAY 8, 5 PM, (SECTION THREE OF THREE), FROM PARIS

WHAT HAS BEEN SAID SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN AND EFFORT TO ASCERTAIN FACTS SHOULD BE MADE BY ALL SIDES. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT NOTHING BE RELEASED OF WHAT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED DURING MEETING AS LEAK WOULD BE CALAMITOUS. BELIEVE EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE BY ALL TO THINK SERIOUSLY OF WHAT HAS BEEN SAID AND KEEP CONTENTS ABSOLUTELY SECRET.

FAURE AGREED WITH MACMILLAN, STATING THAT HE HAD NEVER EXPECTED DECISION THAT EVENING. EXPERTS SHOULD GET DOWN TO WORK IMMEDIATELY AND PREPARE FOR DECISIONS AS EVENTS ARE CHANGING HOURLY.

MEETING CLOSED WITH GENERAL DISCUSSION CONCERNING SCHEDULE FOR FURTHER TALKS ON INDOCHINA AND FORTHCOMING VISIT OF FOREIGN MINISTERS TO VIENNA.

A DISCUSSION ENSUED CONCERNING TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE. SECRETARY REJECTED PROPOSAL OF MEETING OF EXPERTS BEFORE NEXT DISCUSSIONS ON INDOCHINA BY FOREIGN MINISTERS NOW SCHEDULED FOR MAY 10.

DULLES

AB/32
FROM: Saigon
TO: Secretary of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NIACT

ST. DEPARTMENT 5074, REPEATED INFORMATION NIACT PARIS 1305.

7. French position.

A. French position determined by two factors:

(1) Ely's responsibility for safety FEC and for French lives and property; and as signatory of Geneva Accords;

(2) French desire retain cultural and economic presence and to retain Vietnam as part French Union.

B. Friction between French and Vietnamese has reached serious proportions. It springs from two major sources:

(1) Ely, to meet his responsibility for the safety of French lives and property, has established a French controlled security zone which includes large portion residential and business zone of Saigon proper. He has introduced new French battalions to protect this zone. Presence these forces, reported refusals to permit USA units to move through French Zone, and sanctuary provided to three Binh Xuyen posts located within security zone are constant irritants to Vietnamese nationalists.

(2) Anti-Diem propaganda such as broadcast by Radio France-Asia and allegations of French support of sects, particularly Binh Xuyen, which widely credited by Vietnamese, have added oil to fire.

C. Ely and French authorities here have finally concluded Diem must go. Increasing French bitterness toward Diem and their sensitivity to "anti-colonialist" propaganda has to some extent been extended to US whom they blame for not joining with them in pressing Diem to seek cease-fire. French likewise tend blame US for recent bloodshed because we did not agree with them in finding political solution to governmental crisis some three weeks ago.

D. Strong anti-French aspect of Revolutionary Committee has great appeal to large segments of population which beneath surface has long nourished hatred and contempt for French.
E. Quite regardless of future developments, episodes of last week, featured
by increasing strain in French-Vietnamese relations, cannot help but severely
jeopardize France's long range interests in Vietnam. Of late one hears less
and less mention of maintenance cultural and economic interests and
influence and more and more of threats that France will drop responsibilities
and withdraw FEC. We believe this to be passing phase, however.

F. Reference the activities of Revolutionary Committee and States General
local French have same fears that we do. French are convinced that Revolu-
tionary Committee is penetrated by Viet Minh agents, but have so far been
unable to give us any conclusive proof. They are also skeptical about the
States General being able to modify radical resolutions of the Revolutionary
Committee.

G. I think it is fair to say that French are convinced that Diem desires
overthrow Bao Dai and will continue efforts to do so irrespective of current
activities of Revolutionary Committee.

H. As indicated in recent telegrams, General Ely and the Commissariat General
in Saigon have become so emotional in their bitter opposition to Diem and
his entourage, that I fear they have lost some of their objectivity as to
popular reaction to Diem's recent moves, his hold on the Army, and his ability
to deal with the Binh Xuyen. They are quite convinced that serious warfare
will be initiated by the Binh Xuyen, and that anti-French sentiment fomented
by Diem and perhaps Viet Minh may still cause serious outbreaks in foreign
sections of Saigon.

KIDDER
FROM: Saigon

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 5074, May 5, 9 p.m. (SECTION FOUR OF FOUR)

NIACCT

SENT DEPARTMENT 5074, REPEATED INFORMATION NIACCT PARIS 1305

8. Conclusions:

A. It would appear to me that the essential steps in reconstitution of joint American-French approach to situation in Vietnam should be as follows:

(1) Diem government should be fully supported in bringing to a final and quick solution its conflict with the Binh Xuyen.

(A) This will require on part of French, not only in Paris but more importantly in Saigon, that genuine assistance rather than passive self-obstruction be offered to Vietnamese Government and armed forces.

(B) Specifically, General Ely should be directed to take active steps to persuade Binh Xuyen to withdraw their forces from three police posts remaining within French security zone in Saigon, or if Binh Xuyen refuse, then to permit Vietnam armed forces to reduce these posts with minimum of casualties.

(C) All echelons of French bureaucracy, including armed forces, should be instructed to desist from agitating against Diem government.

(D) Official pressure, both in Paris and Saigon, should be brought upon Radio France-Asia, a semi-governmental institution, to cease its attacks on Diem government.

(E) Such steps as may be possible should be taken to persuade French pressmen to cease their attacks, particularly in Saigon.

(F) French garrison in Saigon-Cholon should be reduced without delay.

(G) There should be a public announcement by appropriate French authorities of their full support of Diem government in present conflict with Binh Xuyen, possible to assist organization and training of essential logistical services of Vietnamese armed forces so as to make them as independent as possible of FEC. This is under way in accordance with my instructions to MAAG.
(2) As soon as current crisis is over, decisive effort must be made to persuade or otherwise force Diem to reorganize his government and to establish a cabinet competent to implement broad programs of reform covered by the Collins-Ely seven-point program, plus a program for integration of sects into normal life of Vietnam.

(3) If, after reasonable further period of trial, Diem is unable to constitute a government capable of implementing these programs, US should join with France and Bao Dai in assisting liberal Vietnamese nationalists to establish a competent government.

B. I recognize that General Ely may irrevocably be opposed to supporting any Diem government. If this should prove to be true, I would suggest we urge Paure government to replace him, preferably with man of caliber of Divnat, or perhaps Georges-Niac. At same time, it would probably be necessary to replace General Jacquat (who has incurred violent animosity of Vietnamese during Binh Xuyen affairs) with man like General Cogny.

C. Reference step (3) above, I recognize also that it may be politically difficult to withdraw US support from Diem even if trial proves is capable of establishing an effective government. I still feel that even if Diem manages suppress Binh Xuyen, this will not change his own basic incapacity to manage the affairs of government. His present successes may even make it harder for us to persuade Diem to take competent men into government, to decentralize authority to his ministers, and to establish sound procedures for the implementation of reform programs. I am still convinced Diem does not have knack of handling men nor the executive capacity truly to unify the country and establish an effective government. If this should become evident, we should either withdraw from Vietnam because our money will be wasted, or we should take such steps as can legitimately be taken to secure an effective new Premier.

D. Throughout all this I feel we must keep our eyes clearly on our main objective in Vietnam, i.e., to assist in saving this country from Communism. No matter who heads the government here, free Vietnam will not be saved unless sound political, economic and military programs are promptly and effectively put into action. This will require wholehearted agreement and coordination between Vietnamese, Americans and French. Difficult as this may be to achieve, it is possible, in my judgment. If this tripartite approach is not secure, we should withdraw from Vietnam.

KIDDER
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Indochina (Vietnam).

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their views regarding the military aspects of the problem presented in the attached excerpt from a telegram from Mr. Dulles to the Department of State.

2. The situation as depicted in the telegram from Mr. Dulles appears to present the United States with a choice between:

   a. Continuing to support the Diem Government in Vietnam -- which would result in the withdrawal of French forces from that country; or

   b. Withdrawing United States support from Vietnam -- allowing the French to deal with the situation as they deem fit.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the question as to whether the United States should or should not continue to support the Diem Government, or any other particular Vietnamese regime, is one for resolution at the governmental level. Their comments relative to the alternatives set forth above are, therefore, limited to their military implications.

4. It is considered doubtful that the Vietnam National Army (VNA), in its present state of development and unassisted by other forces, can continue to maintain internal security under the conditions of near-civil war now prevailing in Vietnam. There is even less likelihood that the VNA could offer more than a token resistance to external aggression. Further, it is open to question whether the VNA would be loyal to the Diem Government under all circumstances. The presence and cooperation of an outside military force is therefore essential at this time if Vietnamese security and integrity are to be assured. The United States is deterred by the provisions of the Geneva Agreement from providing such forces, and could therefore give no assurances regarding the protection of lives and property of French or any other foreign nationals. While the withdrawal
of the French Expeditionary Corps is ultimately to be desired, it is considered that a precipitate withdrawal now would be likely to result in an increasingly unstable and precarious situation. This situation would undoubtedly be exploited to Communist advantage, with the probable eventuality that South Vietnam would be lost to communism.

5. In the face of the strong anti-French sentiment which has developed in Vietnam, there now seems little prospect that France alone can provide either the leadership or the resources required to establish a stable Vietnamese government. Without United States moral and material support it cannot be expected that the VNA would develop into a cohesive military force or maintain even its present limited effectiveness. Without effective indigenous forces and without a Vietnam government which can command the loyalty and support of its people, the French Expeditionary Corps (FEC), judged by past performances, would be incapable of preserving the security and integrity of Vietnam. It can therefore be expected that, following the pattern which led to the loss in the North, South Vietnam would, in due course, fall to the Communists.

6. For the foregoing reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that neither of the alternatives suggested represent acceptable solutions to the problem of Vietnam at this time. They feel it to be in the best interest of France as well as of the United States that every reasonable effort be exerted to preserve South Vietnam from communism. It is their opinion that the present situation, involving armed resistance against the established governmental authority and the dangers inherent in the role assumed by the Revolutionary Committee, requires the utmost in cooperation and energetic action by the Vietnamese, United States, and French Governments toward the restoration of internal order and governmental control in Vietnam. It is considered that this should constitute the immediate joint objective. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that Mr. Dulles be advised that from the military point of view:

a. The government of Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem shows the greatest promise of achieving the internal stability essential for the future security of Vietnam.

b. The United States could not guarantee the security of the French nationals should the French Expeditionary Corps be withdrawn.
c. Possible United States actions under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty could ultimately afford security to South Vietnam equal to that provided by the continued presence of the French Expeditionary Corps.

7. The above comments are submitted without benefit of the specific views of Ambassador Collins, which have been requested by the Secretary of State. They should, therefore, be considered as tentative and subject to possible revision in the light of his reply.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

ARTHUR RADFORD,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Enclosure
EXCERPT FROM TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY DULLES:

"We met alone with the French, being joined after a time by the British for discussion of Indochina. Faure proposed that in view of the sharp differences of opinion which existed between our two Governments with reference to policy in Vietnam and in view of his Government's total inability to support Diem, who had now become violently anti-French, he proposed that the French should withdraw their forces from Vietnam. He raised the question as to whether in this event we would be able to give any assurances regarding protection of lives and property of remaining nationals.

"I replied that this was too serious a matter to settle without deliberation, and that I agreed that Vietnam was not worth a quarrel between France and the United States. If we could not agree, then one or the other should withdraw from the scene, as we could not afford to oppose each other in this area and adopt rival and competitive policies. I said that the United States would be willing to withdraw, and indeed I could not have any good hope that Congress would appropriate the necessary funds for us to support the situation if we withdrew support from Diem and sought an alternative which Faure himself said he could not now define. My guess is that the French are not bluffing and that his proposal may be the agreed solution."
MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Possible French Withdrawal from Vietnam

M. Feure's proposal to Mr. Dulles that the French withdraw their forces from Vietnam may, if properly played, permit a real reversal of the trend toward Communism in Southeast Asia.

If the U. S. can and will make a deal with Diem, in which he pledges to protect French civilians remaining after French troops leave, in return for our assurances of increased aid and the rapid and effective training of his army, we should be happy to see the French leave.

A move of this sort would clearly disengage us from the taint of Colonialism derived from our support of the French and Bao Dai which has plagued us throughout Asia. It would put us clearly in our traditional role of supporting the "independence and legitimate national aspirations" of peoples. The repercussions of this throughout Asia and the meinem world will be great and beneficial. A clear stand against French colonialism may greatly free our hands at some later date with regard to French North Africa where an explosion like Indo China seems inevitable.

French withdrawal will also effectively stop the potential double-dealing we have suspected of the Sainstay mission in Viet Minh, where it appears the French have been insuring against the loss of Free Vietnam to the Viet Minh by compromising with the Communists so as to retain commercial and other advantages after a takeover. At one time it was rumored the French might even accept a Communist Indo China in the French Union.

A tacit assurance by the U. S. of the support of Free Viet Nam might, of course, eventually involve us in a substantial commitment. However, this is by no means certain, and there is a real likelihood training, technical assistance and moderate aid will be all that is required. We should not forget that we are already committed under SEATO to defend Viet Nam against overt attack. The new situation would permit, in psychological terms, the all-out use of "Militant Liberty" to help build Free Viet Nam resolve.

As a final point to remember, the French declared at Geneva that they would withdraw their forces at any time if requested by the Free Viet Nam Government.

C. F. RUTHERFORD, III

975 dier General, United States Army

Defense Member, NSC Planning Board
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Report of Military Staff Planners
Conference, Southeast Asia Collective
Defense Treaty, Baguio, Philippines,
April-May 1955.

1. The Staff Planners to the Military Advisors of the
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEACDT) Council
held their first conference in Baguio, Philippines during
the period 25 April to 5 May 1955. The report of that con-
ference, attached as Appendix "C" hereeto, will be considered
by the Military Advisors at their next meeting in Bangkok.
A summary of the recommendations made in that report, the
proposed actions of CINCPAC and the recommended actions of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon are outlined in Appendix "A"
hereunto.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the report of
the Staff Planners, and, subject to the comment and/or in-
structions outlined in paragraph 2 of Appendix "B" hereeto,
consider the report generally satisfactory as a basis for
further planning activities of the military machinery under
the SEACDT organization.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Secretary
of Defense concur in the content of the proposed message to
the Commander in Chief, Pacific, in Appendix "B" hereeto, and
authorize its transmission by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

[Signature]
ARTHUR RADFORD,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Enclosures

Copy / 1 Copy each

Reproduction or republication in whole
or in part in any form without

976
APPENDIX "A"

SUMMARY ON RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MILITARY STAFF PLANNERS, CINCPAC’S PROPOSED ACTIONS THEREON AND RECOMMENDED JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ACTION

(Reference: Report of Military Staff Planners Conference, SEACOM, Baguio, Philippines, April-May 1955)

1. Enclosures 1, 2, and 4 - No action required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. Enclosure 3 - (Military participation in combating Communist subversion)
   a. Staff Planners recommendation: None.
   b. CINCPAC’s proposed action: * "Subject to the results of the subversion Subcommittee meeting held in Bangkok 3 May, and guidance of higher authority, to participate fully in giving the necessary direction to the Staff Planners while insuring the proper division of responsibilities between military and non-military aspects."
   c. Recommended Joint Chiefs of Staff action: Concur in the action proposed by CINCPAC.
3. Enclosure 5 - (Terms of Reference and Rules of Procedure)
   a. Staff Planners recommendation: Approve.
   b. CINCPAC's proposed action: To approve or concur.
   c. Recommended Joint Chiefs of Staff action: Concur with
      the addition that CINCPAC will not make any commitment of U.S.
      forces and will support or furnish to the Council those
      recommendations which have received approval of the Joint
      Chiefs of Staff.

4. Enclosure 6 - (Measures to Increase Security of Classified
   Information).
   a. Staff Planners recommendation: Approve.
   b. CINCPAC's proposed action: Approve or concur.
   c. Recommended Joint Chiefs of Staff action: Concur, but
      inform CINCPAC that subparagraph 3 d should be changed to read:
      'All places, buildings, industrial and military installa-
      tions, ships and aircraft, where classified matter of any
      sort is located, should, through appropriate procedures be
      made secure against access by unauthorized persons.'

5. Enclosure 7 - (Intelligence Survey of Selected Areas).
   a. Staff Planners recommendation: Approve as a basis for
      further planning.
   b. CINCPAC's proposed action: Approve or concur.
   c. Recommended Joint Chiefs of Staff action: Concur, except
      inform CINCPAC that the last sentence of subparagraph 3 a should
      be deleted.
6. Enclosure 8 - (Priority Listing of Courses of Action or Measures).
   a. Staff Planners recommendation: Approve as a guide to the order in which further coordinated planning studies should be prepared.
   b. CINCPAC's proposed action: Approve or concur.
   c. Recommended Joint Chiefs of Staff action: Concur, but inform CINCPAC that it would be more acceptable to delete the exception stated in subparagraph 9 b in the case of West Pakistan.

7. Enclosure 9 - (Methods for Improving defensive effectiveness in the treaty area).
   a. Staff Planners recommendations:
      (1) Adopt the recommendations concerning the approach to the Council.
      (2) Approve as a basis for further planning studies and preparatory measures.
   b. CINCPAC's proposed action: To approve or concur.
   c. Recommended Joint Chiefs of Staff action: Concur, but inform CINCPAC that in subparagraph 24 d, the word "common" should be substituted for "combined".

8. Enclosure 10 - (Study of signal communication systems within the treaty area).
   a. Staff Planners recommendation: Approve as a basis for further planning studies and preparatory measures.
   b. CINCPAC's proposed action: To approve or concur.
   c. Recommended Joint Chiefs of Staff action: Concur.
9. Enclosure 11 - (Examination into methods of creating a possible future organizational structure).

a. Staff Planners recommendation: approve the findings as an interim measure pending further experience.

b. CINCPAC's proposed action: To approve or concur. However, CINCPAC has commented that, "An item of major interest lies in the proposed creation of a small permanent secretariat. From the U.S. delegation viewpoint, as well as that of certain other delegations, this was recognized as not immediately a valid requirement and it was further realized that the necessary coordination and continuity of effort could be maintained by correspondence and through the military liaison group in Bangkok. It became apparent however, that it was vitally necessary to lend substance to the Military Advisers endeavours try (by) a form of some type permanent group. Without this recognition it was evident from the start that a serious split would have developed, thereby militating against the desired development of the military aspects of SEACDT. This step, i.e., the recognition of the requirement for a small permanent secretariat has definitely forestalled for the foreseeable future any determined insistence for either a permanent Staff Planners organization, a standing group, or a combined staff."

CINCPAC msg to CHQ, DIA 15001Z May 1955

Appendix "A"

TOP SECRET
c. Recommended Joint Chiefs of Staff action: To inform CINCPAC that, subject to the results of the study indicated in subparagraph 11 b, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have no objection to the establishment of a small permanent secretariat, which would be an instrument of the Military Advisers and subordinate planning committees. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would not agree to the possible evolution of such a secretariat into an organization of a standing nature as indicated in subparagraph 11 c.

10. Enclosure 12 - (Future agenda).

a. Staff Planners recommendations:
   (1) Approve Part II - Agenda for Military Advisers meeting (6 June 1955).
   (2) Approve Part III - Programme of studies to be completed at the next meeting of the Staff Planners.
   (3) Approve Part IV - Preparation of position papers.
   (4) Approve Part V - Times and places of meetings.
   (5) Approve Part VI - Initiation of additional studies.

b. CINCPAC's proposed action: * To approve Staff Planners Recommendations.

c. Recommended Joint Chiefs of Staff action: Concur in action proposed by CINCPAC.
APPENDIX "B"

MESSAGE FOR COMMANDER IN CHIEF, PACIFIC

1. The Report of the Military Staff Planners Conference, SEACDT, April-May 1955, has been reviewed. JCS consider the report generally satisfactory as a basis for further planning activities of the military machinery under SEACDT.

2. The actions on that report proposed in Part III of CINCPAC 1500C-Z May are concurred in subject to the following comment and/or instructions in reference to the Staff Planners report:

a. Enclosure 5 - Concur in terms of references and activities of the Military Advisers Group with the addition that CINCPAC will not make any commitment of U.S. forces and will support or furnish to the Council those recommendations which have received approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Enclosure 6 - Subparagraph 3 d should be changed to read:

"All places, buildings, industrial and military installations, ships and aircraft, where classified matter of any sort is located, should through appropriate procedures be made secure against access by unauthorized persons."

c. Enclosure 7 - In subparagraph 3 a the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the last sentence should be deleted.

d. Enclosure 8 - The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider this Enclosure suitable as a guide for the preparation of further planning studies. However, it would be more acceptable to delete the exception in subparagraph 9 b in the case of West Pakistan.
e. Enclosure 9 - In subparagraph 24 d substitute "common" for "combined".

f. Enclosure 11 - Subject to the results of the study indicated in subparagraph 11 b, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have no objection to the establishment of a small permanent secretariat which would be an instrument of the Military Advisors and subordinate planning committees. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would not agree to the possible evolution of such a secretariat into an organization of a standing nature as indicated in subparagraph 11 c.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy on All-Vietnam Elections

REFERENCES:
A. NSC 5429/5
B. NSC 5519
C. NSC Actions Nos. 1316-d and 1415
D. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 2, 1955

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, at the 251st Council meeting on June 9, 1955 (NSC Action No. 1415):

a. Noted the draft statement of policy contained in the reference report (NSC 5519) and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 2.

b. Agreed that Council recommendations as to U.S. policy on all-Vietnam elections are not required at this time.

c. Noted that U.S. policy in the event of a renewal of hostilities by the Communists in Vietnam would be governed by the provisions of paragraph 5-d of NSC 5429/5, pending a review of that paragraph by the NSC Planning Board.

Accordingly the actions in b and c above, as approved this date by the President, are transmitted herewith for information.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
    The Director, Bureau of the Budget
    The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
    The Director of Central Intelligence
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1 July 1955

CM-171-55

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Summary of Report of Military Staff Planners Conference, Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, Baguio, Philippines, April - May 1955, for Information of Secretary of State.

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 2 June 1955, subject: "Report of Military Staff Planners Conference, Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, Baguio, Philippines, April - May 1955."

2. Attached hereto is a summary of those portions of the Report of the Staff Planners Conference which may have political significance. I recommend that you inform the Secretary of State of this conference and provide him with copies of the attached summary.

3. It is further recommended that the Secretary of State be informed that the studies prepared by the Staff Planners are not final until approved by the Military Advisers.

ARTHUR RADFORD
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Forwarded to Secretary of State
11 July 1955, ISA I-13984/5, M.C. Davis
SUMMARY OF THOSE PORTIONS OF REPORT OF MILITARY STAFF PLANNERS CONFERENCE, SECUDT, BAGUIO, PHILIPPINES, APRIL - MAY 1955, OF POSSIBLE INTEREST TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PART I


Terms of Reference

1. Military Advisers Group. In the furtherance of peace and collective security within the Treaty area, it is the responsibility of the Military Advisers Group to provide general policy guidance to such subordinate groups as may be established under the aegis of the Council and to make appropriate military recommendations to the council for its decision.


a. The Military Advisers Group should:

   (1) Constantly review the military measures by which Communist subversion and aggression directly affecting the Treaty area can best be countered.

   (2) Meet as required after consultation among themselves or as directed by the Council. In addition, they will be prepared to attend meetings of the Council.

   (3) Designate such planning assistants as might be required.
(4) Ensure that military planning activities take into account various contingencies that might arise in connection with the implementation of the Treaty through close coordination of planning and appropriate exchange of information between the Military Advisers, their planning assistants and other representatives which may meet under the aegis of the Council.

(5) Designate military liaison officers in Bangkok whose functions are as stated in paragraph 6, below.

b. The activities of the Military Advisers Group should include among other things:

(1) Consideration of measures to be taken in each country to increase the security of classified information with a view to augmenting the effectiveness of an exchange of intelligence data.

(2) Initiation of and maintenance of an Intelligence survey of Southeast Asia.

(3) Continued exchange of planning information.

(4) Determination of possible courses of action to meet the current Communist threat in Southeast Asia and in the event of further Communist aggression directly affecting the Treaty area.

(5) Preparation of planning studies on likely Allied courses of action developed in subparagraph (4), above, to be used as a basis for further planning.

(6) Maintenance of a strategic estimate for Southeast Asia.
TOP SECRET

(7) Consideration of ways and means for increasing the effectiveness in the Treaty area of the collective defense effort of the member nations.

   a. A Military Liaison Group consisting of one officer from each of the member countries will be established in Bangkok. These officers may be members of the staffs of Council Representatives in Bangkok.
   b. The Military Liaison Officers will provide normal points of contact between Military Advisers, as well as with other interested individuals and agencies as appropriate.
   c. Formal meetings of the Military Liaison Group will be convened, when so requested by any of its members, by an officer to be nominated by the Chief of the Defense General Staff of Thailand.

4. Frequency of Meetings.

   The Military Advisers Group will meet not less than twice a year.

5. Place of Meetings. Meetings will usually be held in the Treaty area at places to be agreed upon by the Military Advisers. Normally the place of meeting for both the Military Advisers Group and the Staff Planners will be rotated among the member nations. The sites for meetings of the Staff Planners will be recommended by them.
6. **Participants at Meetings of the Military Advisers Group.**

The accredited Military Advisers or properly designated alternates will attend meetings of the Military Advisers Group. Staff Officers and technical advisers may attend meetings of the Military Advisers as the latter may individually require. These officers may form working committees as required by the Military Advisers Group.

7. **Observers.** Provided a record is kept of their names and appropriate security measures are taken, properly accredited military observers may be allowed to attend meetings of the Staff Planners. As a general rule the number of observers will be kept to a minimum.

8. **Communications.**

   a. Communications between Military Advisers will be prefixed by the work "SEAMIL".

   b. When a Military Liaison Officer is an information addressee of a communication exchanged between any two (2) or more Military Advisers, he will provide copies to the Military Liaison Officers of the countries whose Military Advisers are information or action addressees of the basic communication.

9. **Communique.** Communique should be prepared under the direction of the Chairman and issued upon the agreement of all the Chiefs of Delegations, normally one at the beginning and end of each meeting.
Suggested Measures for Improving Defensive Effectiveness in Treaty Area through Self-Help and Mutual Aid.

1. Each nation individually should now strive to improve its defensive effectiveness by the following means:
   a. Improving its intelligence organization.
   b. Improving the quality and training of its armed forces.
   c. Maintaining and developing the logistic facilities to support its armed forces.

2. Member nations should act collectively to augment their individual efforts, by the following cooperative measures:
   a. The initiation and maintenance of intelligence and operational appreciations.
   b. The exchange of observers, students, advisers, training experts and training facilities.
   c. Standardization of techniques and equipment, as necessary and practicable.
   d. Provision for the combined use of military facilities and services.
   e. The planning and development of logistic facilities in the area.
   f. The holding of combined naval and air exercises.
   g. The holding of exercises without forces at a later stage.
3. In addition the Staff Planners, in this study, recommended that the SEACDT Council take note of the military need to make immediately available, for operational use in case of emergency, the combined use of the military facilities and services of the member nations.

NOTE: The position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is that "common" should be substituted for "combined" in paragraph 3 above.*

PART III
Study of Signal Communications Systems Within the Treaty Area.

The Military Staff Planners concluded that the present international systems of communication such as Port, Ship-Shore, Ground-Air, Radio aids to navigation, and systems of search and rescue operations are available and adequate for use by participating nations. They noted, however, that some method should be established by which area agreement can be reached for the combined use of frequencies.

PART IV
Conclusions and Recommendations of the Staff Planners in their study on the subject: "Examination into Methods of Creating a Possible Future Organizational Structure".

1. It was concluded that:

   a. To carry out the requirements of the immediate tasks to be undertaken by the military machinery of SEACDT, staff

* J.C.S. 1997/64
planners and their sub-committees meeting on an ad hoc basis and supported by a small permanent Secretariat is the best means of ensuring immediate action;

b. A study should be made of the composition, function, and location of the permanent Secretariat;

c. The establishment of such an ad hoc arrangement should not prejudice the eventual creation or evolution of a standing group, or certain sections of a standing nature to augment the ad hoc system, should the need become necessary because of inadequacies revealed by experience.

2. It was recommended that the Military Advisers Group approve the conclusions of this paper and make arrangements accordingly.

3. The French Delegation did not accept the recommendation made in this report. It questioned the usefulness at the present time of the creation of a permanent secretariat and held the view that coordination of studies can be satisfactorily carried out by the Staff Planners at their meetings. If it was agreed in the future that closer coordination was required it could best be achieved through the military liaison group without setting up a new body however small. It also suggested that as a rule ad hoc committees meet in a few places, centrally located in the Treaty Area.

NOTE: The Joint Chiefs of Staff have no objection to the establishment of a small permanent secretariat, which would be an instrument of the Military Advisers and subordinate planning committees. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would not agree to the possible evolution of such a secretariat into an organization of a standing nature as indicated in subparagraph 1 c above.*
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 63.1-55

(Supersedes Portions of NIE 63-7-54 on North Vietnam)

PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN
NORTH VIETNAM TO JULY 1956

Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

Concurring in the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

on 19 July 1956. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intel-
ligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelli-
gence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; The Atomic Energy
Commission Representative to the IAC, and the Assistant to
the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, obtained, the
subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

SECRET

COPY NO. 131
FOR THE DIRECTOR
OF INTELLIGENCE, U.S. AIR FORCE
SECRET

PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
TO JULY 1955

(Supersedes Portions of NIE 63-7-54 on North Vietnam)

THE PROBLEM

To analyze the present strengths and weaknesses of North Vietnam and to estimate probable future developments and trends to July 1955.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The immediate concern of the "Democratic Republic of Vietnam" (DRV) is to consolidate its control in the area north of the 17th Parallel and to gain control of South Vietnam. (Para. 14)

2. We believe that the DRV will experience no great difficulty in maintaining effective control of North Vietnam during the period of this estimate and will probably retain a considerable measure of prestige and general acceptance. However, passive resistance and discontent resulting from harsh control measures and poor economic conditions may increase toward the end of the period. If the situation in the South does not deteriorate, the nationalist appeal of Ho Chi Minh and the DRV will probably be reduced throughout Vietnam. (Para. 23)

3. The DRV is confronted by serious economic problems of which the current rice shortage is the most critical. Its present export potential falls far short of providing sufficient funds to pay for necessary imports. However, the Sin-Soviet Bloc will almost certainly provide sufficient economic and technical assistance to meet minimum requirements for stability and control. With such assistance the DRV will probably make gradual progress in gaining control of the economy and in rehabilitating transportation, irrigation, and industrial facilities. (Paras. 24-30)

4. Since the Geneva Conference, the strength of the DRV regular army has been increased substantially by drawing on regional forces to form new units and by the receipt of new and heavier military equipment from Communist China. DRV forces are capable of defeating all military forces, including the French, now located in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. (Paras. 31-35)

5. The present DRV tactic with respect to South Vietnam is to pose as the champion of Vietnamese independence and unification, and as the defender of
the provisions of the Geneva Agreement. The DRV probably still believes that it could emerge from free nationwide elections with control of all Vietnam. It will attempt to appear reasonable in any negotiations concerning procedures for elections. While the Communists almost certainly would not agree to complex and elaborate safeguards and guarantees, they probably would agree to some form of "neutral" (but not UN) supervision. They would probably estimate that such election controls would work to their advantage in the South and, as manipulated, would not adversely affect their position in the North. (Paras. 44-45)

6. In the meantime, the DRV will continue its efforts, through subversion, intimidation, and propaganda, to weaken the Diem government, and to bring to power in the South men prepared to accept a coalition with the DRV. (Para. 46)

7. The Communists in their propaganda have revealed sensitivity to the implication of the Manila Pact which incorporated Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in its area of protection. We believe that concern for Western, and particularly US reaction, together with general considerations arising from over-all Bloc policy, will prevent the DRV from openly invading the South during the period of this estimate. Similarly, the resumption of widespread guerrilla activities appears unlikely prior to the election deadline, unless the DRV should come to the conclusion that South Vietnam can be won only by force. Such a conclusion would become more likely should the Diem government persist in refusing to enter the election discussions, should election discussions not proceed favorably for the DRV, or should the Diem government succeed, with US assistance, in consolidating its strength to the point of becoming a nationalist alternative to the Ho regime. Moreover, if during the period of this estimate little progress is made towards relaxing tensions, Peiping and Moscow might permit the DRV greater freedom of action. Should the DRV decide to use force short of open invasion, it would probably attempt to undermine the Saigon government by initiating a campaign of sabotage and terror, seeking formation of a new government more amenable to demands for a national coalition. These tactics are likely to include the activation of DRV guerrilla units now in South Vietnam and their reinforcement by the infiltration in small units of regulars from the North. (Para. 47)

8. The DRV will probably refrain from launching an attack with its own forces to seize Laos during the period of this estimate. It will probably continue efforts to convince the Royal Laotian government of the propriety of the DRV attitude toward Laos, while covertly strengthening the rebel Pathet Lao movement. The DRV would probably infiltrate armed units into Laos to assist the Pathet Lao if Royal government military action should seriously threaten the

---

*For an estimate of probable developments in Laos, see NIE 63.3-55, "Probable Developments in Laos Through July 1955," to be published in August 1955."
Pathet Lao position in the northern provinces. (Paras. 48-49)

9. The Communists now have few assets in Cambodia and will probably be unable to develop a significant internal threat in that country until their position is greatly strengthened in Laos or South Vietnam. In the meantime, the DRV will probably continue its efforts to promote friendly relations and to secure Cambodian neutrality. (Para. 50)

10. We believe the DRV will be willing to continue political and economic contacts with the French. However, it almost certainly will be unwilling to make any agreement which in fact would permit the French to retain an economic and cultural position in North Vietnam. (Paras. 51-56)

I. INTRODUCTION

11. Under the terms of the Geneva Accords, and with the final withdrawal of French forces from the Hanoi area on 19 May 1955, a Communist regime known as the "Democratic Republic of Vietnam" (DRV) has assumed full responsibility for the administration of the territory of Vietnam north of the 17th Parallel, pending a political settlement and the unification of the country.

12. The DRV, known also as the Viet Minh, was established at the end of the Second World War when a coalition of Vietnamese of all political leanings drew together under the leadership of the veteran Communist, Ho Chi Minh, and proclaimed Vietnamese independence. The DRV openly and frequently professed its solidarity with the Sino-Soviet Bloc after 1949. Since then any loss by the DRV of its Vietnamese support has been offset by a considerable increase in organizational and material strength and by the prestige of victories over French forces.

13. Although the recent assumption of responsibility over 13 million people and several large cities has confronted the DRV with major problems, these problems are not entirely new or unrelated to previous DRV experience. During its years of resistance, which was conducted until 1950 with little or no external assistance and under conditions of severe physical hardship and austerity, the DRV leadership was able to weed out the weak and timid, build an effective army, train a substantial number of experienced cadres and local administrators, and obtain considerable experience in the techniques of political control. Thus, when the DRV assumed control of all North Vietnam in 1954, it possessed considerable advantages over the Diem government in terms of military strength and experience, organization and sense of unity and purpose.

14. While the immediate concern of the DRV is to consolidate its control in the North and to gain control of South Vietnam, its longer run objectives almost certainly are to build a strong Communist state in all Vietnam and to assist in the extension of Communist control throughout Southeast Asia.

II. INTERNAL SITUATION AND TRENDS

Stability and Effectiveness of the Regime

15. The DRV is organized on the normal pattern of all Communist "peoples democracies." Although the government of the DRV ostensibly represents all elements in a "united front" grouping (the Lien Viet), actual power resides in the Communist party (the Lao Dong or Workers Party). Out of a total population in North Vietnam of some 13 million, the Lien Viet is estimated to have approximately 3 million members, including the Lao Dong, which

"For an estimate of probable developments in Cambodia, see NIE 63-2-55, "Probable Developments in Cambodia Through July 1956," to be published in August 1955.
CONSEQUENCES OF POSSIBLE US COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO VIETNAM

Submitted by the
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 13 September 1955. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the I.A.C., and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, obtained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
CONSEQUENCES OF POSSIBLE US COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO VIETNAM

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the deterrent effect on the Viet Minh of certain US courses of action; to assess the consequences of a US failure to counter overt Viet Minh aggression and to assess the political repercussions of US armed intervention against Viet Minh aggression.

THE ESTIMATE

I. INTRODUCTORY NOTE

1. We continue to regard as valid the estimate made in NIE 63.1-55, namely that during the period of the estimate (to July 1958) "concern for Western and particularly US reactions, together with general considerations arising from over-all Bloc policy, will prevent the DRV from openly invading the South." We also believe that the present Communist policy of reducing international tension makes unlikely the resort to overt aggression.

II. DETERRENT EFFECTS ON THE VIET MINH OF THE US UNDERTAKING SUFFICIENT MILITARY, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC STEPS TO CLEARLY CONVINCE THE COMMUNISTS THAT OVERT AGGRESSION BY THE VIET MINH AGAINST SOUTH VIETNAM WILL BE MET BY SWIFT AND DETERMINED US ARMED INTERVENTION

2. This assumed US course of action would render even less likely than at present any overt aggression by the Viet Minh against South Vietnam. The Communists would probably estimate that: (a) Viet Minh forces alone would not be able to capture South Vietnam in the face of swift and determined US armed intervention; (b) Chinese Communist assistance would have to be on such a scale as to seriously risk spreading the war beyond Vietnam; and (c) acquisition of South Vietnam would not be worth such a risk. These considerations would lead the Communists to refrain from overt aggression even if they could see no prospect of winning South Vietnam by other means and believed they enjoyed a marked superiority in forces locally available.

3. The assumed US course of action would not in itself preclude either a Communist decision to initiate large-scale guerrilla action in South Vietnam or the clandestine support of such actions by the Viet Minh.

4. The deterrent effect on the Communists of the assumed course of action would be increased if the US made it clear that nuclear weapons would be used. If the US made it clear that nuclear weapons would not be used the deterrent effect would be reduced. However, the Communists would probably estimate that the US would not maintain such a position if faced with a deteriorating military situation. In the absence of any clear indication, the Communists would almost certainly base their plans on the possibility that nuclear weapons would be used.
III. CONSEQUENCES OF A US FAILURE TO INTERVENE AGAINST AN OPEN VIET MINH ATTACK AFTER HAVING TAKEN THE PREPARATORY STEPS ASSUMED IN II ABOVE

5. The Communists would vigorously exploit the opportunities in Asia created by the failure of the US to intervene in Vietnam. Although Communist China and the Viet Minh would probably not launch early overt aggression against other countries, Chinese Communist diplomacy would probably become openly threatening, possibly supplemented by intimidating troop movements near the Chinese Communist border with Burma and Laos or within Communist-held Vietnam. Communist policy would also be furthered by greatly increased support from overseas Chinese communities.

6. The Chinese Communists would probably apply strong pressure against those countries whose determination to resist Communist inroads had been most weakened. They would demand an accommodation to the Bloc going beyond the benevolent neutralism that is the current goal of Communist strategy in much of the area. Where more forceful action appeared necessary, Peiping would almost certainly encourage local Communist groups to resume and enlarge guerrilla operations and would support those operations more directly than in the recent past. In some cases units of Chinese Communist troops, possibly of minority origin, might be assigned to reinforce local guerrilla units. Communist operations against the offshore islands might be stepped up, but a full-scale attack against Taiwan would probably not be initiated.

7. The consequences of a US failure to intervene to save South Vietnam would be most serious in Asia. US prestige and influence would be drastically lowered, and the Manila Pact as an effective instrument against Communist aggression would almost certainly be destroyed. Even immediate and forceful subsequent US action elsewhere in Southeast Asia might not persuade any state in the area that further Communist pressure could be resisted. These countries would be reluctant to accept US offers of assistance from fear that closer alignment with the US would merely invite the Communists to further acts of aggression and that in such an event US assistance would not be forthcoming. They would become increasingly inclined to attempt to maintain their independence through negotiated understandings with Peiping.

8. Both Laos and Cambodia would probably initially proclaim a neutralist position but would shortly enter into cultural and economic agreements with Communist China as the first steps toward political accommodation. Thai apprehensions for their own security would greatly increase. Successive government changes might bring to power a leadership amenable to an accommodation with Communist China. Burma would probably not consider such Communist action as a direct threat and would seek to remain neutral. Should the Thai government reach an accommodation with the Communists, Burma would become concerned and would probably seek a closer alignment with India. The British would be gravely concerned over the security of Malaya and would almost certainly press for the commitment of US forces to the defense of Malaya. Although the Philippines, South Korea, and Nationalist China would remain allied with the US, they would have grave doubts concerning the future. They would almost certainly press the US for a more concrete demonstration of its determination to defend them. In Japan, neutralist sentiment would increase. Indonesia would attempt to maintain a neutral orientation but would be drawn toward an accommodation with the Communist Bloc as Communist influence spread through mainland Southeast Asia.

9. The reactions of the Western European allies of the US would be mixed. On the one hand, they would be concerned about the implications of US withdrawal in the face of an open Communist attack, and there would probably be an increase in defeatist and neutralist sentiment. On the other hand, we believe that these concerns would tend to be offset by their relief that a crisis in the Far East had not led to a renewal of armed con-
filet which might embroil them in a general war. In any event, the Europeans would not necessarily conclude that the US would fail to resist Communist aggression in Western Europe. Middle East defense arrangements might become more difficult because of a loss of confidence in US commitments.

IV. CONSEQUENCES OF A FAILURE OF THE US TO INTERVENE AGAINST AN OPEN VIET MINH ATTACK WITHOUT HAVING PREVIOUSLY MADE INTENTIONS CLEARER THAN THEY ARE AT PRESENT

10. The local reactions to the US failure to intervene under these conditions would be virtually the same in Southeast Asia as they would be under the conditions discussed in Section III above. It is widely believed in Southeast Asia that the US is already committed through the Manila Pact to the defense of South Vietnam and that it has strong moral obligations to the Diem government. However, if the US had made its intentions no clearer than at present, the Communists would be less inclined to believe that the US failure to intervene indicated that the US would not resist Communist aggression elsewhere. The Communists might therefore proceed more cautiously in their efforts to exploit the situation created by the fall of South Vietnam. Outside Southeast Asia, the damage to US prestige and the decline in the will to resist Communist pressure would be less than under the conditions discussed in Section III above.

V. CONSEQUENCES OF US ARMED INTERVENTION IF THE US (a) STATED ITS OBJECTIVE WAS LIMITED TO RESTORING THE STATUS-QUO AT THE 17th PARALLEL, OR (b) STATED ITS OBJECTIVE WAS TO DESTROY THE VIET MINH REGIME AND EXTEND NON-COMMUNIST CONTROL TO ALL VIETNAM

11. Asian and European approval of US armed intervention against clearly recognizable Communist aggression would be tempered in varying degrees by the fear that the fighting could not be limited to Vietnam. Our NATO allies and Japan would exert pressure on the US to limit its objective to restoring the status-quo and to keep its military actions clearly consonant with that objective. They would be deeply concerned if the US declared its objective to be the destruction of the Viet Minh regime, or carried the fighting beyond Vietnam. India and other neutrals would exert every effort to bring the fighting to an end.

12. The other nations of mainland Southeast Asia would be encouraged in their efforts to resist Communist pressure by US intervention. They too, however, would fear that the fighting could not be limited to Vietnam, and that they would become embroiled in general war in the Far East. Only Nationalist China, the ROK, India, and possibly Thailand and the Philippines, would give unqualified support to a US declaration that its objective was to destroy the Viet Minh regime and extend non-Communist control to all Vietnam.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy in the Event of a Renewal of Hostilities in Vietnam

1. I transmit herewith for the information of the National Security Council a memorandum by the Joint Chief's of Staff on the above subject, which was prepared in response to a request deriving from NSC Action No. 1415-1. I believe the Joint Chiefs of Staff analysis to be generally sound. We may wish to make some further comments on certain of the logistic implications outlined in Appendix "B", but in order to expedite NSC consideration of the problem, I am transmitting the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum at this time, with the understanding that we will be prepared, if necessary, to discuss it in greater detail in the Planning Board. I trust that this material will prove of substantial assistance in the Council's work on the policy question under consideration.

2. There are attached for information the two earlier memoranda (dated 21 February and 15 August 1955) to which reference is made in the basic JCS memorandum. There are also furnished copies of the two cables discussed in the latter of these memoranda.

3. Because of the sensitivity of the documents attached it is requested that they be distributed on a strictly limited, need-to-know basis. Extra copies of the cables are furnished so that they may be appended to the papers you distribute without the need for your office to reproduce them.

/s/ REUBEN B. ROBERTSON, JR.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: U.S. Policy in the Event of a
Removal of Aggression in
Vietnam.

1. This memorandum is in response to a memorandum
by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated
19 August 1955, subject as above, in which he requested
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to determine the implications
and requirements of U.S. military operations, with and
without atomic weapons, (2) to repulse and punish overt
Viet Minh aggression, or (2) to destroy Viet Minh forces
and take control of North Vietnam.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that for the
near future, unassisted South Vietnamese forces will be
capable of only limited resistance against determined
overt aggression by Viet Minh forces. Without a warning
period in which U.S. preparatory actions were taken, a
portion of South Vietnam would probably be overrun, and
the integrity of elements of the defending forces would
be impaired or lost.

3. Under the foregoing probable conditions, the
first task operations to repulse and punish overt Viet Minh
aggression would include:

a. Immediate U.S. naval and air attack against
Viet Minh forces.

b. Initial reliance upon Vietnamese ground
forces supported by U.S. naval and air operations
to oppose the aggression.

c. Early movement forward of mobile U.S. forces,
for the purpose of conducting joint operations for
tasks beyond the capabilities of South Vietnamese
forces.

d. The provision of direct and increased
logistical support to Vietnamese forces.
4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the second task, to destroy Vietminh forces and take control of North Vietnam would require an extension of the operations listed in paragraph 3 above, with the ultimate objective of creating conditions under which the forces of South Vietnam, the Associated States or SEATO could assume responsibility for accomplishment of the second task. This would require a major campaign of pacification, accompanied by the development of additional indigenous forces for an enlarged mission. Such a campaign would be initiated by joint and combined operations in the Tonkin Delta area to seize bases and other important objectives and to cut supply lines from Communist China.

5. The success of intervention by U.S. forces in a swift and decisive action is believed dependent on the military energy and solidarity of the Vietnamese, the extent of warning and preparations made before an attack, the restriction imposed on U.S. military operations, and the season of the year. It is estimated that operations to carry out the first task would be terminated in a few months to one year to check aggression, but a longer time might be required to clear out all the Vietminh back to the 17th parallel. The time needed for carrying out the second task cannot be accurately estimated. Should employment of atomic weapons not be authorized a longer time would be required. Additionally, although the concepts would not require change, this restriction on the use of atomic weapons would not permit the most effective employment of U.S. armed forces and consequently might require greater forces than the U.S. would be justified in providing from the over-all point of view.

6. With reference to U.S. force requirements:

a. Naval forces currently assigned to the Pacific Fleet are ready to accomplish initial naval missions. For the first task one carrier task force, a bombardment force, an appropriate amphibious force, Marine detachments, and logistical resupply forces would be required. For the second task some augmentation in U.S. naval forces would be required.

b. Assuming the use of atomic weapons, Air Force requirements for either task would be two to three tactical Air Force wings and SAC forces as necessary. Assuming no use of atomic weapons, there would be an increase of tactical air requirements, particularly for the second task; however, sufficient air bases
are not available to position these larger forces. For both tasks, in addition to the forces above, tactical airlift for one airborne ACF and strategic airlift for one division would be required.

c. For the first task, ground forces in the magnitude of two to four U.S. divisions should be available for operations listed in paragraph 5 above. For the second listed task, it is estimated that a total strength of up to eight U.S. divisions would be required. Requirements for U.S. ground forces would be subject to reduction to the extent that effective forces were provided by other Manila Pact countries or by other Allies.

d. Forces available are as shown in Appendix "A".

e. Logistic requirements and implications are summarized in Appendix "B".

7. The effects upon other U.S. military commitments as a result of these operations by U.S. armed forces in Southeast Asia would be significant and in proportion to the amount of diversion of forces to this area and the speed with which these diverted forces are returned or replaced. However, the Fleet Marine Forces and certain Army forces in the Pacific could be deployed to the area temporarily without serious effects on other military commitments and without necessitating partial mobilization or substantial increases in force levels and budgetary support.

8. The strongest deterrent to Vietminh aggression, and, at the same time, the most effective preparatory military step would be the stationing of U.S. forces in South Vietnam. However, this course of action is prohibited, prior to an act of aggression, by the terms of the Geneva agreements. The next most effective deterrent would be to add to the deterrent effect of the forces presently deployed in the Far East by deploying mobile ground forces of approximately corps strength together with naval and air forces into the Southeast Asia area prepared for rapid commitment to South Vietnam. Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that at this time the major threat to South Vietnam continues to be that of subversion, and until there are more conclusive indications of overt aggression, it is not considered that additional forces should be deployed to the Southeast Asia area.
9. Preparatory military steps which might be taken are:

a. Continued efforts to increase the effectiveness of the South Vietnamese armed forces for countering external aggression as well as maintaining internal security. In this connection, reference is made to memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, dated 19 August 1955, subject: "Revised Force Plan for Vietnam".

b. Continued improvement of bases in Thailand and Cambodia for use in support of Vietnamese forces.

c. Special training for selected Vietnamese personnel, outside of Vietnam if necessary, in U.S. methods of exploiting air and naval support in ground operations. Instruction might also be provided in the special tactics and techniques of employing atomic weapons support.

d. Accelerated progress in the military aspects of the Manila Pact including combined training. Exercises could be timed to obtain optimum psychological and political impact; for example, joint and combined maneuver-type exercises in the Philippines or Thailand could be scheduled immediately prior to the Vietnam elections to indicate progress made by non-Communist nations toward collective security, and readiness on the part of Manila Pact nations to carry out their commitments.

e. Aside from the foregoing, preparations can be made for the rapid movement of tactical air control parties and some ground liaison, logistic and communications personnel to Vietnam, in advance of major U.S. formations, to insure an early capability for U.S. supporting operations. Similarly, preparations can be made for early deployment of special U.S. forces to provide a capability for ground delivery of atomic weapons.

10. In the early stages, Vietminh aggression would probably be characterized by a fluid situation with dispersed clashes between opposing forces. In such operations, the opportunities for employing atomic weapons would not justify significant reductions in early force requirements. During later stages, however, suitable targets could be expected to develop as a result of friendly efforts to force concentrations or particularly if the Chinese Communists should intervene overtly. Use of atomic
TOP SECRET

weapons should result in a considerable reduction in friendly casualties and in more rapid cessation of hostilities. In any event, no prohibitions should be imposed on the use of atomic weapons, or on other military operations, to the extent of precluding effective military reaction as the situation develops. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that if atomic weapons were not used, greater forces than the U.S. would be justified in providing would probably be needed.

11. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterate the view expressed in their memorandum, dated 11 February 1957, subject: "Concept and Plans for the Implementation, if Necessary, of Article IV, 1, of the Manila Pact," that the United States cannot guarantee the territorial integrity of any member nation (of the Manila Pact), but at most can help secure the independence of those countries whose peoples desire it and who are willing to undertake the responsibilities of self government. This appears to be particularly applicable to protected, non-member countries.

12. The foregoing is a rough estimate of the requirements. A more definitive answer cannot be made until the Commander in Chief, Pacific, provides a plan which he is presently developing.

13. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, did not participate in the action of the Joint Chiefs of Staff outlined in this memorandum.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(SIGNED)

K. F. THURING,
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force.
APPENDIX "A"

AVAILABILITY OF U.S. ARMED FORCES

Annex "A" - Army Forces
Annex "B" - Naval Forces
Annex "C" - Air Force Forces
### ANNEX "A" TO APPENDIX "A"

#### ARMY FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Column 1</th>
<th>Column 2</th>
<th>Column 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Corps Headquarters 3/6</td>
<td>D-Day</td>
<td>D/4:30</td>
<td>D/4:30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Abn Div 2/5</td>
<td>D-Day</td>
<td>D/4:5</td>
<td>D/4:5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Inf Div 2/5</td>
<td>D-Day</td>
<td>D/4:5</td>
<td>D/4:5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Abn Div 1/6</td>
<td>D/75</td>
<td>D/2:20</td>
<td>D/2:20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Inf Div 3/4</td>
<td>D/180</td>
<td>D/4:25</td>
<td>D/4:25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Inf Div 3</td>
<td>D/210</td>
<td>D/2:25</td>
<td>D/2:25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Inf Div 3</td>
<td>D/240</td>
<td>D/2:35</td>
<td>D/2:35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Abn RCT 3/6</td>
<td>D/4:5</td>
<td>D/4:50</td>
<td>D/4:50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Arm Cav Regt 3/6</td>
<td>D/75</td>
<td>D/4:50</td>
<td>D/4:50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Arm Cav Regt 3/6</td>
<td>D/75</td>
<td>D/4:20</td>
<td>D/4:20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Inf Div 4</td>
<td>D/3:20</td>
<td>D/4:3</td>
<td>D/4:3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Abn RCT 3/6</td>
<td>D/4:5</td>
<td>D/4:50</td>
<td>D/4:50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Inf Div 2/5</td>
<td>D/4:5</td>
<td>D/4:50</td>
<td>D/4:50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1/ Western Hemisphere Reserve
2/ Committed to NATO
3/ General Reserve
4/ Located in Area of CINCPAC
5/ Located in Area of CINCFE
6/ Designated as Augmentation Forces for Contingency Planning of CINCFE and CINCPAC

**NOTE:** Column 1 is based on readiness or availability of units. Column 2 indicates the time units could be available in the area based on surface shipping. Column 3 indicates the time the assault echelons of specified units could be available in the area based on air movement, and provided combat and service support can be provided by the force commander until the non-air transportable portion of the units have arrived by surface shipping.

The above schedule does not take into consideration the availability of lift, nor other requirements for lift, including possible deployments of other Services.
ANNEX "B" TO APPENDIX "A"

NAVY AND MARINE CORPS FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FAR EAST</th>
<th>PACIFIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S. NAVY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack Carriers</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW Support Carriers</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escort Carriers</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battleships</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruisers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>1 3/4</td>
<td>1-1/4 2/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Lift (Div)</td>
<td>1/4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol Squadrons (VP)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airship Squadrons (ZP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S. MARINE CORPS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division</td>
<td>(2/3) 2/</td>
<td>2 2/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Wings</td>
<td>(2/3) 2/</td>
<td>1-2/3 2/</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FOOTNOTES:**

1/ CINCPACFLT maintains under a fleet commander in the Western Pacific, using bases in Japan, Korea, the Ryukyus, Philippines and Marianas a fleet composed of:

a. A combat-ready task group consisting of attack carriers with supporting combat ships. (Currently approximately 3-1/4 attack carriers, 1 ASW support carrier, 2 cruisers, 32 destroyers.)

b. Anti-submarine warfare units including escorts and patrol aircraft.

c. Appropriate submarine and mine warfare units.

d. Requisite number of auxiliaries including an underway replenishment group. This fleet is in addition to those forces shown located under "Far East". Additional PACFLT forces may be considered available for operations short of general war, subject to specific determination in the light of conditions prevailing at the time, as follows:
1 Attack Carrier and 1 Escort Carrier with supporting combat ships and 3 Patrol Squadrons.
1-1/3 Marine, 1 Marine Wing, and Amphibious Troop Hqtrs and 2/3 Amphibious Lift (Div).

Both CINCPAC (and CINCPAC) should plan for use of the forces available in the Far East-Western Pacific area plus the augmentation shown above for contingency planning.

2/ 2/3 Marine Divisions and 2/3 Marine Air Wings included under forces located in the Pacific area based in Far East and temporarily assigned CINCPAC.

3/ From submarines maintained by CINCPACFLT in Western Pacific.

4/ An amphibious task group from PACFLT is temporarily assigned to the operational control of COMINWPAC in connection with the current situation in the Far East Command.
### AIR FORCE FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Column 1</th>
<th>Column 2</th>
<th>Column 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Ftr Bomb Wing</td>
<td>D-Day</td>
<td>D/7-5</td>
<td>D/5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Ftr Bomb Wing</td>
<td>D-Day</td>
<td>D/4-5</td>
<td>D/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Ftr Int Sq's</td>
<td>D-Day</td>
<td>D/4-5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Hvy Troop Carrier Wg</td>
<td>D-Day</td>
<td></td>
<td>D/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Med Troop Carr Wg</td>
<td>D-Day</td>
<td></td>
<td>D/10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SAC support and such support from CINCPAC as is directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**NOTE:** Column 1 above indicates the day on which units will be ready for deployment from their own base. Column 2 indicates the time the units could be available in the theater based upon surface shipping. Column 3 indicates the time the units would be available in the theater if the air transportable elements of the units were airlifted. The above schedule does not take into consideration the availability of lift; nor other requirements for lift, including possible deployments of other Services.
APPENDIX "H"

LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS

1. Logistic Force Requirements

   a. Approximately 15,000 Army technical service troops will be required in support of each U. S. Army combat division deployed. Approximately 7,000 Marine Corps and Navy Service Troops will be required to support each Marine Division - Marine Aircraft Wing. Task Force while operating independently against opposition in this area. For sustained operations with the U. S. Army, the Marine Air Ground Task Forces will require appropriate logistic service support backup at the field Army level.

   b. Naval mobile logistic support forces would be based in Philippines.

   c. Water transport for up to four divisions for the First task, and up to eight divisions for the second task would be required.

   d. Water transport for resupply to all combat and forward area supporting forces would be required.

   e. Augmentation of Air Force support forces in Philippines would be needed.

   f. Augmentation of Pacific Division, MACS, to increase capability up to an additional 300 tons/month would be required.

   g. Unless jet air bases are made available in Vietnam prior to the outbreak of hostilities, an aviation engineer effort of up to 25 aviation engineer battalion months per air field may be required to provide air bases for those jet air units to be deployed to Vietnam.

2. Logistic Force Availability

   a. The majority of the required Army technical troops are available in General Reserve. The remainder are available only in Reserve components or in the Army of the United States. Some deficiencies would
exist up to D/45 months, if more than three Army divisions are deployed. Of the required Marine Corps logistic support forces, an adequate nucleus is available to support up to two Marine Air Ground Task Forces. Prolonged independent operations would require additional logistic support forces to sustain such operations.

b. Units to constitute mobile logistic support forces are available in the active fleet. However, in the event of a prolonged emergency, additional logistic support units would be required to support sustained operations.

c. Water transport for up to four divisions (administratively loaded), to include initial equipment and supplies within a period of 60 days, and for up to four additional divisions during the initial stages of the second task are available. In connection with the above, the following shipping capability is estimated to be available:

Notional Transport Capability - Pacific

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ships Type</th>
<th>Notional Ships</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MSTS (active &amp; ROS)</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial (active)</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve (by D/10 days)</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve (by D/40 days)</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total by D/40</strong></td>
<td><strong>63.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notional Cargo Capability - Pacific

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ships Type</th>
<th>Notional Cargo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MSTS (active)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSTS Active Heavy lift C4s</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial (active)</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve (VCG's) (by D/40 days)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total by D/40</strong></td>
<td><strong>224</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The reserve vessels can be activated as indicated on an emergency basis if highest priority is given for men, materials, and facilities. In view of the above capability existing shipping capacity can meet a requirement of approximately three divisions and supporting equipment after positioning of shipping is effected (approximately D/20 days). By D/60 days
a fourth division can be transported by reserve ships using activated. Capacity meets the volume requirements for the first phase; however, a fourth division cannot be transported to be available within the area by D-35 but can reach the area by D-60 days. Existing cargo ships can meet cargo requirements. Shipping requirements for the second phase can be met by the above capability.

d. Personnel for augmentation of Air Force support forces in the Philippines are available from indigenous sources and in U. S. reserve forces.

e. Additional airlift available in existing KUNS and/or from commercial contract to meet Trans Pacific lift requirements.

f. There are 7 aviation engineer battalions in the Far East and 11 in the United States.

3. Implications as to Other Commitments

a. Use of existing forces and materials for this operation would generally be at the direct expense of other commitments and would constitute a serious misdeployment of logistic forces and material in a general war should occur. Personnel and material requirements to support the operation would necessitate partial mobilization.

b. Support of this operation would probably curtail NDAF deliveries to the Title I, II and IV countries.

4. Personnel Implications

a. Reconstitution of the Army General Reserve would require a minimum of 12 months.

b. Personnel ceilings for Services must be raised to permit 100 per cent manning of ships, units and support installations required in support of both tasks.

5. Construction Implications

a. Additional and/or augmentation of existing facilities in the Philippines will be required. In this connection, some additional base rights may be required.

b. Extensive construction will be required in Vietnam, to include, but not limited to: air base facilities, storage facilities, roads and port facilities.
6. Supply Implications

   a. Expenditure limitations must be raised and production facilities expanded in order to permit increased production.

   b. Until production is expanded, mobilization reserve stocks must be utilized. Some items of reserve stocks require a lead time of one to two years. Even so, shortages will exist because of non-availability of critical items.

   c. Navy and Air Force stocks in Philippines must be built up.

   d. In light of the shortage of adequate port facilities, extensive over-the-beach offloading of personnel and materiel will be required. Such offloading will be limited during the first year of operation because of the nature of the beach terrain and due to shortage of over-the-beach equipment and ships capable of offloading heavy equipment.

   e. Limited air terminal facilities in Vietnam will restrict air transport of personnel and materiel until current facilities are augmented and additional facilities constructed.

   f. Transportation to interior points will be restricted by lack of adequate inland transportation, and by the difficult terrain.

   g. Logistic support for up to 150,000 Vietnamese troops will be required.

7. Implications Which Would Result From Deterrrent Action Covered by Paragraph 5 of Enclosure "A"

   The employment of ground forces as a deterrent will have considerable logistics implications, the determination of which is largely dependent upon the extent and nature of the deployments required.
STATE DRAFT STUDY

October 6, 1955

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MEASURES IN EVENT OF A RENEWAL OF AGGRESSION IN VIET-NAM

The following study is submitted in response to the Planning Board Memorandum of August 16 which called for a State Department "study of political and economic measures which would be required in support of the operations" which are described in the JCS Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense dated 9 September* "including preparatory steps which might have a deterrent effect."

A. POLITICAL:

Deterrent

1. The most important political action which the US could take to deter overt Viet Minh aggression would be a clear reaffirmation in official public statements of US intention to take vigorous action under the protocol to the Manila Pact in the event of such aggression.

2. Similar statements from other members of the Manila Pact would also provide a useful deterrent.

3. Possibilities of securing such statements would be affected by the degree to which the Government of Viet Nam could make it clear that the onus for any such aggression

would lie with the Viet Minh. Similarly, demonstration by the Government of Viet Nam of its determination and intent to maintain itself as an independent anti-communist country will assist in securing for it international support and will serve as a deterrent to Viet Minh aggression. Accordingly, the US should continue to prevail upon the Government of Free Viet Nam to follow courses of action which will assist in such developments. In particular it should attempt to persuade the Government of Free Viet Nam to establish a National Assembly as soon as possible which would be endowed with authority, to draw up a constitution to determine the relationship of Viet Nam with France and other countries, and declare the official position of Free Viet Nam with respect to the pre-election consultations with the Viet Minh and the elections called for under the Geneva agreement.

4. The US could also undertake political action to assist in establishing military deterrents to aggression such as arranging facilities for introduction of US mobile ground forces into the Southeast Asian area should such commitment of forces be decided upon. US political action would also be helpful if improvement of bases in Thailand or other areas in Southeast Asia were required.

Action in the Event of Aggression

5. In the event of Viet Minh overt aggression, the US should stimulate an official Viet-Namese request to the Manila Pact signatories for assistance under the protocol.
to the Pact and Article IV of the treaty. The US should strongly support the Viet Name request and use its influence to secure action by the members of the Pact under their treaty obligation.

6. The US should stimulate and assist a Viet Nam initiative to bring the issue to the Security Council of the United Nations in an effort to secure condemnation of the Viet Minh and a UN resolution calling for a cessation of aggression. The US should consider in the light of the circumstances at the time whether or not it should seek designation as United Nations Commander in an organized UN action.

7. The US would undoubtedly have to insist that a supreme command of any forces contributed either under the Manila Pact or under the United Nations should be vested in the US. The US would have to arrange for such command in a way to avoid derogation of the sovereignty of Free Viet Nam. It should emphasize that Free Viet Nam had formerly called upon its Manila Pact protectors to deploy troops within its territory to repel Viet Minh aggression. It should emphasize the fact that US exercise of supreme command and the presence of foreign forces in Viet Nam were strictly temporary phenomena and should allay any suspicion that the US intended to establish a colonial regime.

TOP SECRET
B. ECONOMIC

3. Viet Minh aggression and consequent introduction of foreign troops into Free Viet Nam would seriously upset the Viet Namese economic pattern. The production of paddy and rubber would be further reduced. Support of forces would necessarily come from abroad. Viet Nam would become even more dependent upon foreign aid. Military necessity would require Viet Nam to accept increased foreign control of its economic affairs. Matters such as foreign exchange, and international trade would have to be delegated to the Supreme Military Command. The US would have to be prepared to extend substantial economic assistance to Viet Nam and to exercise a considerable degree of economic authority.
TOP SECRET

From: The Staff Planners
To: The Military Advisers


Ref: (a) Bangkok Report of 6-8 July 1955 (TOP SECRET)

I. GENERAL: In accordance with the provisions of reference (a), the Staff Planners held their second conference at Pearl Harbor, T.H. during the period 1-16 November 1955. In addition to examining their agenda, they attended to other matters raised at the meeting and also prepared a comprehensive program of future work of the Military Advisers Organization.

II. EXAMINATION OF THE AGENDA: (APPENDIX A).

A. Agenda Item A:

1. Intelligence Study: The Ad Hoc Committee on Intelligence reviewed and amended the intelligence assessments made in July 1955. These amendments have been circulated by the Secretariat and have been incorporated in the Intelligence report which the Military Advisers are recommended to approve under Agenda Item I.

B. Agenda Items B, C, and D: (NOTE: These Agenda Items were consolidated for the purpose of this Planning Study)

1. Problem: To determine the extent of military support for the defense of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in the event of overt Communist aggression.

2. Discussion: The concept of operations requires that the indigenous forces of three states resist Communist aggression to the full extent of their capabilities prior to and after the introduction of SEATO forces. The initial operations will be to delay the advance of the Communist Armies into friendly areas. SEATO forces must be deployed to the theater of operations as early as practicable after the start of aggression and not later than 30 days in order to secure holding, as an absolute minimum, the Saigon area. At a later stage a counter-offensive will be mounted to drive the enemy from the three states.

3. Force Requirements:

a. The force requirements for this action will be on the order of:

TOP SECRET

[Handwritten notation: Recommend 1]
(1) Naval - Carrier Striking force, including its supporting and logistic elements, AEW Hunter-Killer Group, Minesweeping force and necessary Amphibious lift.

(2) Ground - Up to 8 Divisions plus supporting forces.

(3) Air - 2 to 3 Tactical Wings, 1 Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, 1 Troop Carrier Wing, Bomber force or long-range fighter bombers as available from bases outside the theater of operation.

b. It should be noted that these forces are those required when the defense of the three states is considered collectively and on the assumption that nuclear weapons will not be used.

c. The forces depicted above are in addition to indigenous forces available.

4. Conclusions:

a. The successful defense of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia is wholly dependent on the timely deployment of SEATO forces into the Theater, in addition to operations by the indigenous forces.

b. On the assumption that nuclear weapons are not used, the forces required for the successful defense of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are unlikely to be available, for the time being, in the numbers indicated and within the time by which they must be deployed.

c. It is possible that the use of nuclear weapons would reduce force requirements to a point within the capability of SEATO nations to provide them. (NOTE: The validity of this conclusion is dependent upon a further study of the effects of nuclear weapons within the area under consideration.)

5. Recommendations: It is recommended that the Military Advisers:

a. Note the conclusions in paragraph 4 above.

b. Approve this study.

C. Agenda Item E:

1. Problem: To determine the extent of the Military Support necessary for the defense of Thailand in the event of overt Communist aggression.

2. Discussion: The concept of operations for the defense of Thailand requires that Thai armed forces be deployed by 90 day near the frontier to delay the advance of the Communist armies into their country. As these forces fall back, they will be reinforced by SEATO forces, and
a final defensive position on the Moc Lean Road (Thailand) - Drachai -
Baupek - (Narath) - Pakchum - Pakching - Pakpho - (Phalen - Kathlan -
Chantaburi will be established, on which the enemy will be finally held.
At a later stage a counter-offensive will be mounted to drive the enemy
from Thailand.

3. Force Requirements:

a. The total force requirements for the delaying and holding
phases are on the order of:

(1) Ground - 10 divisions

(2) Air - 650 aircraft

(3) Naval - A carrier task force, an ASI Hunter-Killer
group logistic support forces, reconnaissance and patrol forces and mine
warfare forces.

b. It should be noted that these force assessments repre-
sent the forces required when the defense of Thailand is considered in
isolation and then no account is taken of nuclear warfare.

4. Force Deficiencies: Of the forces shown in paragraph 3 above,
Thailand can produce only a small proportion. The deficiencies which would
have to be made up from outside sources, are therefore, large.

5. Conclusions: It is concluded that:

a. Should the forces assessed in this study be provided by
the troops shown, the security of Thailand could be ensured.

b. The force deficiencies for the defense of Thailand,
considered in isolation, are considerable.

c. These deficiencies are likely to become more reasonable
when the defense of Thailand is considered in relation to other possible
courses of action pertaining to Southeast Asia.

6. Recommendations: That the provision of military support for
the defense of Thailand be studied in conclusion with the provision of
military support for the defense of Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam and
with other supporting courses of action including attack on selected
targets on the Chinese mainland using both nuclear and conventional
weapon.

7. Annex II:

1. Problems: To determine the extent of military support necessary
for the defense of Thailand in the event of overt Communist aggression.

TOP SECRET
2. Concept of Operations: The concept of operations requires that Pakistani forces, augmented by additional SEATO forces, resist a joint attack by Russian, Communist China and Afghanistan. Unlike other studies so far considered by the Staff Planners, this study has been made in the context of Global War. Provided that the essential additional military support were made available, such an attack could be checked and destroyed by holding either of the following three lines:

a. The Hindukush line: (Paigha and Shiber Passes North of Kabul - Herat - Khetm.)

b. The Kabul - Kandahar - Zhidin line.

c. The Khyber Pass - Khojak Pass - Zhidin line.

3. Force Requirements: In addition to the forces already available in Pakistan, the following military support will be required:

a. Naval Support:

- Aircraft carrier: One
- Cruiser (CL): One
- Destroyers (DD): Four
- AE/SE-escort vessels: Twelve
- Submarines (SS): Six
- Ocean Minesweepers (AM): Three
- Coastal Minesweepers (AMS): Twelve
- Inshore Minesweepers: Twelve
- MHB and Harbor Defense Boats (SDBs): Twelve
- Tanker: One
- Maritime shore based aircraft: One squadron
- Base and repair ship: One

b. Army Support:

(1) Armour: One Armoured division and one Armoured reconnaissance regiment.

(2) Infantry: Five more infantry divisions and non-divisional supporting units for eleven divisions.

(3) Airborne: One Para/Brigade Group

c. Air Support:

- Fighter Bomber squadrons (jets): Fifteen
- Fighter Squadrons (jets): Nine (two night fighter squadrons)
Long range transport squadrons
Light bomber squadrons (jets)

The above are worked out at the scale of 25 aircraft in a squadron.

Logistics: Logistic facilities such as communication, medical, transportation, dockyard and air bases would have to be considerably improved commensurate with any increase that may be effected in SEATO forces in Pakistan.

4. Conclusions:

a. On the assumption such an attack would be jointly undertaken with AFGHANISTAN and Communist China, operating from bases in Central Asia and SHIKHAN, and that in such an eventuality INDIA might remain neutral or commit an act of aggression against PAKISTAN, in the early stages of global war RUSSIA would attack PAKISTAN separately or simultaneously as part of their objective of securing the Middle East and gaining access to warmer waters.

b. The initial Russian attack against PAKISTAN would be of eight divisions including one - two armored/mechanized divisions, one airborne division, with tactical and transport air support. This Russian offensive would develop in three separate columns along the historical well known routes leading from Central Asia across AFGHANISTAN and Eastern IRAN into PAKISTAN. A subsidiary offensive of one division strength would be launched by Communist Chinese on PAKISTAN's Northern areas. Afghan action against WEST PAKISTAN would take the form of attacks on posts, cutting of lines of communications and would be preparatory to the main Communist invasion.

c. With the exception of armour, where near parity may be claimed in the opening phases of the campaign, the Communists have an overwhelming superiority in the air and on land. The present strength and logistic backing of the PAKISTAN Armed Forces is inadequate for the defense of PAKISTAN against the Communist threat.

d. Providing that the essential additional military support is made available, the Communist invasion of WEST PAKISTAN could be checked and destroyed by holding either of the following three lines:

(1) The HINDUKUSH line; (PAIGHA and SHIBAR Passes North of KABUL -- HERAT -- HESCO).

(2) The KABUL - KANDAHAR - ZAHIDAN line.

(3) The KHYBER PASS -- KHOSA PASS -- ZAHIDAN line.
5. Recommendations: It is recommended that the Military Advisers:
Take note of and approve the conclusions reached in paragraph 4 above.

(NOTE: It was felt by the representatives of the United Kingdom, France, 
New Zealand and Australia that in the present situation the threat and 
the force requirements set out in this paper might have been over-estimated. 
They propose to examine them in more detail before the Military Advisers 
meeting.)

B. Agenda Item G:

1. Problem: To conduct a planning study on the aerial attack of 
selected targets on the Chinese mainland and North Vietnam as the major 
military course of action in support of military operations in the event 
of overt aggression by Communist China against the SEATO nations.

2. Discussion:

a. Based upon accepted SEATO intelligence surveys, the 
SEATO nations are faced with a potential enemy of considerable military 
power. Communist China’s aerial power, coupled with her enormous manpower, 
and/or can provide the two most potent forces constituting a threat to 
the SEATO nations.

b. The general concept of air operations is one of employing 
friendly air in offensive operations as a primary means of defense upon 
the outbreak of war. This action is necessary in order to neutralize and 
reduce the immediate threat to the SEATO nation(s) under attack and to 
provide the opportunity of effectively employing SEATO forces. Control 
of the air must be held or gained by the SEATO nations if they are to 
survive as effective fighting units. In addition, friendly air must be 
capable of neutralizing or reducing the threat posed by enemy ground forces. 
It has been found that in view of the magnitude of the task and the urgency 
of reducing the threat, atomic as well as non-atomic munitions will be 
required. If non-atomic weapons only are employed, the force requirements 
to implement this course of action will be prohibitive.

c. Because of the importance of target selection in the 
adopted concept of operations, a targeting study has been carried out. 
Using this information as a basis, an estimate of force requirements 
has been made and included in this paper.

3. Conclusions: It is concluded that in the event of overt 
aggression by Communist China.

a. The course of action which will most effectively, and 
with the least delay, in time, reduce the threat to the Treaty Area. 
is attack by the SEATO air forces upon selected targets on the Chinese 
Mainland and North Vietnam. This reduction would probably be sufficient 
to ensure that the defense of the Treaty Area would be practicable.
b. The SEATO Nations should adopt a concept of air operations employing atomic and non-atomic munitions.

4. Recommendations: It is recommended that:

a. The Military Advisers approve the conclusions in paragraph 3 above.

b. The Staff Planners conduct a study for the Military Advisers to determine the exact dimensions of the reduced threat.

F. Agenda Item B:

1. Problem: To develop measures for improving the military aspects of combating subversion.

2. Discussion:

a. The reports of the Combined Meeting have been considered under Agenda Item I (a) (Enc1 (x) to App 9). The Combined Meeting agreed, as to the Military Staff Planners, that a unified civil and military effort against Communist subversion is essential, and that the Committee to Combat Communist Subversion should be the agency to make the unified effort. Therefore, the paper prepared by Thailand should be made available to the Committee to Combat Communist Subversion, for their information.

b. There will be a continuing requirement for the Military Staff Planners to consider estimates and studies prepared by the Committee to Combat Communist Subversion as those estimates and studies have a bearing on military plans and programs. Therefore, the matter of improving military effectiveness in combating subversion should be kept continuously before the Military Advisers.

3. Recommendations: It is recommended that: The Military Advisers note the Thailand paper on "Measures of Improving Military Aspects of Combating Communist Subversion" and commend it to the Committee to Combat Communist Subversion that it should be kept continuously before them.

C. Agenda Item I:

1. Problem: To review the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee reports listed below:

a. Intelligence - Singapore - July 1955

b. Logistics - Melbourne - August 1955

c. Communications - Auckland - September 1955
TOP SECRET

2. Discussion:

a. The Staff Planners have reviewed, and in some cases amended, the reports of these Ad Hoc Sub-Committees. These reviews, which are enclosed at Appendix (9), show that the reports fall into three categories:

(1) Working documents for the use of Staff Planners.

(2) Intelligence assessments which form the basis for the development of planning studies.

(3) Reports on military activities which require coordination with civil activities undertaken under the aegis of the Council.

b. Those reports which fall under the category in (1) above have been approved by the Staff Planners, who have directed the Conference Secretary to refer the amendments to the Chairman of the Military Secretariat for distribution to all holders of the appropriate reports. (Volume 2)

(NOTE: The Australian Representative pointed out that he had not been delegated the authority by the Australian Military Advisor to approve any document for future action. He advised, however, he would arrange for such an approval to be signaled from Australia as soon as possible. The New Zealand Representative expressed a similar viewpoint.)

3. Action by Military Advisers: As a result of their reviews the Staff Planners invite the Military Advisers to take note of the points, and where appropriate approve the recommendations arising out of each report as set out in the following subparagraphs:

a. Intelligence:

(1) The Intelligence Ad Hoc Sub-Committee drew up two documents:

(a) A report, dated July 1955, containing an assessment of the threat to Laos, Cambodia, South Vietnam, Thailand and West Pakistan.

(b) A paper entitled Security Policy and Procedures.
(2) These two documents, as amended by the Intelligence Ad Hoc Sub-Committee meeting in November 1955, contain respectively:

(a) The basic intelligence data on which the operational planning studies in this report were based.

(b) The security measures recommended for adoption within the SEATO military organization and which have already been provisionally approved by the Military Advisers.

(3) The Staff Planners consider that, in order to provide for adequate coordination in the implementation of the proposals proposed in the Security Policy and Procedures Document, a Security Coordinator is required. Proposed terms of reference for this coordinator are at Appendix (g) Enclosure (a) Tab (1).

(4) Recommendations: It is recommended that Military Advisers:

(a) Agree to the appointment of a Security Coordinator with terms of reference as set out at Appendix (g) Enclosure (a) Tab (1).

(b) Agree that the post should be filled by an officer appointed by an appropriate Military Adviser.

(c) Approve the Security Policy and Procedures paper and, subject to prior agreement having been reached under paragraph 4 above, instruct the Secretariat to incorporate into this document the terms of reference of the Security Coordinator.

(d) Approve the amended report of the July 1955 Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on Intelligence as a basis for the development of operational planning studies.

b. Logistics:

(1) The report of the Logistics Ad Hoc Sub-Committee has been approved by the Staff Planners as a working document for use at staff level. It contains a broad review of existing logistic facilities of member nations in the Treaty Area and provides for the exchange of more detailed logistic data as may be required for the further development of operational planning studies.

(2) The report also draws attention to the fact that in view of the financial and economic implications it will, at some future date, probably be necessary for representatives of the Military Advisers to meet with the Economic Committee of the SEATO Council with a view to formulating an overall plan for the development of logistic facilities in the Treaty Area.
c. Communications:

(1) The report of the Communications Ad Hoc Sub-Committee has
been amended and approved by the Staff Planners as a basis for future staff
action.

(2) The report emphasizes that absence of a definite command
structure and operational plans has precluded development of a communi-
cations plan. This report, as amended, provides a basis for establishing
basic communications techniques, and procedures for SEMO nations. It
further provides for establishing minimum communications facilities in
areas where deficiencies now exist, and establishing basic actions and
exchange of data necessary to future preparation of a communications plan.
It should be noted that even when all relevant actions required in the
report have been taken, the communications procedures and techniques in
the SEMO area will have only reached a primary stage and that progres-
sive development will be necessary.

d. Psychological Warfare:

(1) The report of the Psychological Warfare Ad Hoc Sub-
Committee has been amended and approved by the Staff Planners as a
working document for use at staff level. (However, the Australian delegation
wishes it to be recorded that, in their view, the authenticity of the documents
attached to the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee report as Annex 1 and Annex 2 has not
yet been established and should merely be used as an example of the type of
policy which the Russian and Chinese Communists might be expected to adopt.)

(2) It provides the necessary terms of reference for future
planning studies to support military courses of action as may be developed
under the aegis of the Military Advisers. Consideration has been given in
the report to providing necessary exchange of training experience.

(3) The Continuing action by the Military Advisers organiza-
tion in providing basic data and exchange of training experience is important
to eventual formulation of Psychological Warfare supporting plans to the
military courses of action.

(4) In order to clarify the responsibility of the Military
Advisers in the field of Psychological Warfare, the report sets out the
following definitions:

(a) Psychological Action: This is the planned use in
conditions short of war, of psychological measures including propaganda,
information and other related actions directed at unfriendly, neutral
and friendly groups for the purpose of supporting the accomplishment of
national aims and objectives.
(b) Psychological Warfare: This is the planned use in time of war or declared emergency, of psychological measures including propaganda, information, and other related actions directed at enemy, neutral, friendly foreign groups for the purpose of supporting the accomplishment of national aims and objectives.

(5) Activities under the aegis of the Military Advisers should be confined to the field of Psychological Warfare as defined above. Primary responsibility in the field of Psychological Action is outside the sphere of the Military Advisers. In order to ensure continuity of planning and coordination of effort there should be coordination between the committees set up by the Military Advisers and those set up by the Council Representatives. This should include the exchange of observers on an invitational basis.

(6) Recommendations: It is recommended that the Military Advisers:

(a) Agree that activities under their aegis should be confined to psychological warfare as defined in paragraph 4(b) above.

(b) Instruct the Secretariat to advise the Council Representatives of the field in which the Military Advisers are confining their activity with respect to Psychological Warfare, and to invite their attention to the need for coordination between the Military Advisers organization and the Council Representatives organization to ensure continuity of planning and effort in this field.

c. Unconventional Warfare:

(1) The report has been approved by the Staff Planner as a working document for use at staff level.

(2) It essentially provides basis for development of SEATO Unconventional Warfare plans to support planning studies of the Military Advisers organization in that:

(a) Pertinent aspects of Unconventional Warfare are stated;

(b) There is an agreed definition of Unconventional Warfare;

(c) Means of compiling basic techniques and data are ensured; and

(d) Exchange of training experience is provided for.

(3) The Characteristics of the SEATO area highlight the importance of Unconventional Warfare plans and the importance of keeping the matter of 'hot war' Unconventional Warfare studies continuously before the Military Advisers organization.
f. Counter-Subversion:

(1) The report of the Military Anti-Subversion Ad Hoc Committee, together with the report of the Committee to Combat Communist Subversion, is a policy document which establishes the basis for future work in the field of counter-subversion within SEATO.

(2) These documents reflect the results of the Combined Civil and Military Meeting on Counter-Subversion. Both reports agree, as do the Military Staff Planners, that a unified civil and military effort against Communist subversion is essential, and that the Committee to Combat Communist Subversion, as set up by the Council, should be the agency to make the unified effort.

(3) Proper coverage of all aspects of counter-subversion is to be achieved by each member country sending its appropriate specialists, whether civil, military or both, to meetings of the Committee to Combat Communist Subversion.

(4) Recommendations: It is recommended that:

(a) The Military Advisers accept the report of the Military Anti-Subversion Ad Hoc Committee and approve the recommendations therein.

(b) The Military Advisers note the report of the Committee to Combat Communist Subversion and endorse the recommendation regarding responsibilities and coordination of civilian and military authorities in counter-subversion work in the sense that there should be one unified committee to counter Communist subversion reporting to the Council Representatives, and in the sense consistent with the intent of the military report as it relates to the recommendations concerning member of the two committees, that the organization of such a unified committee has the effect of leaving to each member nation the right to determine its civilian and/or military representation.

(c) Estimates related to those areas where subversive activities may directly affect military planning should be prepared by the Committee to Combat Communist Subversion and the Military Advisers should instruct the Secretariat to invite the Council Representatives to initiate such studies as soon as possible.

(d) The Military Advisers instruct the Secretariat to make known to the Council Representatives the results of their consideration of the reports of the Combined Meeting as indicated in paragraphs 4a, b, and c above.

(e) That the Military Advisers note the reservation made by the French Delegation in refraining from submitting specific estimates on the subversive threat in LAGS, VIETNAM and CAMBODIA.
5. Training:

(1) This report has been approved by the Staff Planners as a working document for use at staff level.

(2) The report notes some action already in progress on SEATO training as result of this report. It points out the existing deficiencies in this field as pertinent to the requirement for the submission of training reports, training schedules, and need for long range forecast of bilateral or multilateral exercises. The report stresses the need, on a priority basis, for standardization of doctrines, procedures, techniques and publications which are considered in the report of the Standardization Ad hoc Sub-Committee. The report provides for existing the deficiencies noted through program of future work and exchange of schedule of training facilities available within the SEATO area.

h. Standardization:

(1) This report has been amended and approved by the Staff Planners as a working document for use at staff level.

(2) The report points out major categories and areas where measurements to effect practicable and necessary standardization procedures should be undertaken as soon as possible. It provides for member nations to undertake such practicable and necessary standardization of techniques and equipment to enable SEATO forces which may participate in combined training or operations to operate collectively in an efficient and effective manner. The report establishes methods and procedures for collective and exchange of data.

(3) Arrangements are provided for the United States to assume responsibility for initiating actions relative to coordinating equipment standardization and to propose an agenda for a meeting of technical representatives. Responsibility for sponsoring standardization in broad fields of staff procedures and techniques, operations and training, and logistics have been assigned to the Philippines, United States, and United Kingdom respectively.

III. OTHER BUSINESS: (ANNEX B)

A. Correlation of Defensive and Supporting Courses of Action:

1. Statement of Problem: To correlate the provision of military support for the defense of the Treaty Area with other supporting courses of action including attack on selected enemy targets using both conventional and nuclear weapons.

2. Conclusions:

a. That the provision of military support for the defense of Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam as a geographical entity in the event of Chinese Communist and/or Viet Minh overt aggression, be accepted as a new course of action and planning studies prepared.
b. That the provision of military support for repelling Communist aggression against the Treaty Area through Burma be accepted as a new course of action and planning studies prepared.

(1) The net capability of the Chinese Communists and Viet Minh following attack on selected targets of the Chinese mainland and North Vietnam, and

(2) The net capability of the Viet Minh following attack on selected targets of North Vietnam, and

(3) That the provision of military support for the defense of Pakistan be further developed to include the attack of selected enemy targets using both conventional and nuclear weapons.

c. That other supporting courses of action, including blockade of Communist coasts, defense of essential sea lines of communication and defense of essential air lines of communication, be developed in correlation with the provision of military support for the defense of Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, South Vietnam and Pakistan and with attack on selected targets of the Chinese mainland and elsewhere as required.

3. Recommendation: That the Military Advisers approve the conclusions above and direct the Military Staff Planners to take the necessary action.

B. Forwarding Correspondence Between Military Advisers:

1. Discussion: In the case of signals addressed to the French Military Advisor, there has been certain difficulties of routing, due to the use of various channels.

2. Recommendation: It is recommended that the Military Advisers take note of the wish of the French Delegate to have the correspondence addressed to the French Military Advisers routed as far as possible through the Military Liaison Group in Bangkok.

C. The Procedures for Developing Agendas for Committee and Sub-Committee Meetings:

1. Discussion:

a. Agendas for Military Advisers and Staff Planners Meetings have been firmly laid-on, have been clear-cut and have been followed in general. No such firm system prevailed for the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee.

b. The following additional significant points are brought to the attention of the Military Advisers.

(1) Agendas frequently do not designate, when though appropriate, responsibility for the preparation of position papers.
TOP SECRET

(2) Position papers often are not circulated in sufficient time to permit study before the convening of meetings.

2. Conclusions:

a. When the Staff Planners recommend or the Military Advisers approve or schedule Ad Hoc Sub-Committee meetings that in addition to specifying the Terms of Reference and time and place of meetings that agendas be developed and there appropriate responsibility for the preparation of position papers be designated.

b. Once agendas are approved by the Military Advisers they will not be modified except as the first item of business at a particular meeting.

c. When position papers are being prepared the country responsible should insure that such papers reach other member countries in sufficient time for study prior to a meeting.

3. Recommendations: It is recommended that the Military Advisers approve the above procedure for developing future agendas for SEATO Ad Hoc Sub-Committees.

D. SEATO Council Progress Report:

1. Discussion:

a. The Staff Planners considered the possibility that there might be required a comprehensive SEATO Council Progress Report which will contain a military chapter. Such report might be required for use by the SEATO Council at their next meeting to be held in late February or early March.

b. Although it was generally agreed that the Military Secretariat would be the proper organ for compiling such a report for approval by the Military Advisers at their next meeting in Melbourne during January, it was recognized that the shortness of time and present embryo status of the Secretariat might not permit the compiling of the comprehensive and accurate report desired.

c. Consequently, it was agreed that the United States would prepare two draft military progress reports, one of an unclassified nature which would be available for public dissemination if required and the other of a classified nature which would be suitable for inclusion in the SEATO Council report. The United States agreed to prepare draft reports and to disseminate same to the other Military Advisers during early December.

d. The respective Military Advisers' comments and recommendations on these reports would then be forwarded to the Military Secretariat which would then have the task of consolidating these comments and recommendations and compiling these reports for submission to the Military Advisers at their next meeting.

TOP SECRET 1034
2. Recommendation: It is recommended that the Military Advisers take note of these preparatory actions.

E. Exchange of Official Records Between the Military and Council Secretariat:

1. Discussion:

a. On 30 September 1955, the Executive Secretary of the SEATO Council Representatives Secretariat advised the Chairman of the SEATO Military Secretariat that the Council Representatives were proceeding to arrange for copies of all approved records of their proceedings to be made available for the use of the Military Advisers as well as copies of other documents likely to be of interest to them. It was also informally conveyed that the Council Representatives Secretariat would like to be in possession of a copy of official records of all SEATO meetings to include the furnishing of a copy of all military reports for retention by the Council Representatives Secretariat.

b. This matter was discussed by the Staff Planners at the instigation of the U.S. delegation and it was generally agreed that an exchange of appropriate documents would be desirable. It was recognized, however, that there may be military security and other restrictions against furnishing all military records and reports to the Council Representatives Secretariat.

2. Recommendation:

a. It is recommended that the Military Advisers adopt the following statement of position as guidance for the Chairman of the Military Secretariat:

"As a general rule, there is no objection to making copies of records or past meetings available to the Council Secretariat; however, this should not mean the automatic distribution of all official records of the Military Advisers organization unless the Council Representatives Secretariat is specifically designated in distribution."

b. It is further recommended that the Military Advisers indicate their acceptance of this position by signal to the Military Secretariat as early as practicable as interim guidance pending any further examination of this subject as may be necessary.

F. Relationships Between Military Advisers and Council Representatives:

1. Discussion:

a. In considering a proposed agenda for the Military Advisers at their forthcoming meeting in Melbourn, the matter of the corporate status relationships between Military Advisers and the Council Representatives was raised. This matter had been discussed briefly at the last Military Advisers' meeting in Bangkok, but was deferred at that time as all Military Advisers were not then in receipt of national guidance.
TOP SECRET

b. It was generally recognized that the individual relationships between the respective Military Advisers, Council Representatives, Council Members, and our defense establishments differ in the various countries and are a matter for national determination. It was agreed, however, that there should be a determination as to the exact relationships between Military Advisers and the Council Representatives. The U.S. Delegation submitted a diagrammatic chart reflecting these relationships from the viewpoint of the U.S. Military Adviser. This is appended hereto as Appendix 10 to Annex A.

2. Recommendation: It is therefore recommended that the Military Advisers consider this relationship at their forthcoming meeting.

G. Possible Threat to Treaty Area by Overt Enemy Invasion Through Burma:

1. Discussion:

a. The Pakistan Delegation raised the matter of the serious threat to the entire Treaty area of overt Communist aggression through Burma.

b. The Staff Planners agreed that a detailed study of the possible threat of Communist Aggression against the Treaty area generally, and Thailand and East Pakistan in particular, through Burma should be prepared, together with a determination of the military support necessary to repel such a threat under conditions of nuclear warfare.

2. Recommendation: It is recommended that the Military Advisers take note of the foregoing proposed study in its relationship with other defensive and supporting courses of action.

H. Summary Report on Communiques and Public Relations:

1. Statement of Problem: To summarize the lessons learned in the public relations field during the second conference of the Staff Planners, and to recommend the manner in which such relations should function at future SEATO military conferences.

2. Introduction: The essential purpose of this report is to serve as a basis for discussion by appropriate authorities in each member nation prior to the next Military Advisers meeting rather than that it should be regarded as a conclusive expression of military opinion on this subject.

3. Conclusion: There is a requirement for pre-planned and closely coordinated public relations programs for all SEATO Military Advisers and Staff Planners conferences.
TOP SECRET

4. **Recommendations:** The Staff Planners recommend:

a. That, at future SEATO Military Advisers and Staff Planners conferences, a Public Relations Committee be established with the sole responsibility of supplying material for all mass communications media.

b. That the Military Advisers instruct their representatives on the Public Relations Committee, prior to the meeting, on the themes and policies which they consider should be emphasized in public relations material.

c. That the Public Relations Committee should convene prior to SEATO Military Advisers and Staff Planners conferences to analyze past performances and formulate a public relations policy for guidance during the conference. (Note: The effectiveness of SEATO public relations cannot be measured until post-conference reports concerning public relations are available in all countries.)

d. That the members of the Public Relations Committee should have no other duties.

e. That the representative of the host nation on the Public Relations should be the channel through which all publicity pertaining to the conference is released locally.

f. That all Military Advisers should, as soon as possible, individually notify the Secretariat of their agreement that the Public Relations Committee should meet in Melbourne on 11 January, 1956 to agree to a communiqué for issue prior to the Military Advisers' meeting on 16th January, 1956.

IV. **Requirements for Future Work:**

A. **Military Advisers' Group:**

1. The Military Advisers' Group is due to meet in Melbourne on 16 January 1956. The Staff Planners suggest that they should consider the following agenda:

a. **Agenda Item A:** Approval of the summary report of the Military Staff Planners Conference at Pearl Harbor in November 1955.

b. **Agenda Item B:** Consideration of the United States paper on the relationship between the Military Advisers' Group and the Council Representatives.

c. **Agenda Item C:** Agreement to the military progress reports, to be submitted by the Secretariat, for submission to the SEATO Council Representatives.

d. **Agenda Item D:** Other business.
2. Recommendation: The Staff Planners recommend that all Military Advisers should, as soon as possible, individually notify the Secretariat of their agreement to the above agenda.

B. Ad Hoc Sub-Committee:

1. The Staff Planners propose that an Ad Hoc Sub-Committee should next consider the agenda as stated below and that position papers should be prepared as indicated:

   a. Agenda Item A:

      (1) Task: An evaluation of the not Communist threat to Southeast Asia, including East Pakistan, in consideration of the threat through Burma, after taking into consideration the effect of Allied aerial attack, with a combination of conventional and nuclear weapons, on South China and North Vietnam. (The scope of the Allied attack to be taken into consideration is as detailed in the study at Annex A, Appendix 7 of this report.)

      (2) Position paper: To be prepared by the United States.

   b. Agenda Item B:

      (1) Task: An evaluation of the not Viet Minh threat to the countries of Southeast Asia after taking into account the effect of Allied aerial attack, with a combination of conventional and nuclear weapons, on North Vietnam.

      (2) Position paper: To be prepared by the United States.

   c. Agenda Item C:

      (1) Task: An evaluation of the not Communist threat to West Pakistan after taking into account the effect of Allied nuclear option against the Communist aggression.

      (2) Position paper: To be prepared by the United States.

2. Recommendation: The Staff Planners recommend that the Military Advisers agree:

   a. To the meeting of the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee proposed above.
   b. To the agenda proposed above.
   c. That position papers should be prepared as proposed above.

C. Staff Planners:

1. The Staff Planners propose that at their next meeting they should consider the following agenda and that position paper should be produced as indicated:

TO THE Secretariat
a. Agenda Item A:

(1) Task: A review of the report by the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on Threat Evaluation and the drawing up of appropriate observations and recommendations to the Military Advisors concerning it.

(2) Position paper: None required.

b. Agenda Item B:

(1) Task: A study of the blockade of the South China and North Vietnamese coast in support of the military operations in defense of Southeast Asia against an attack by Chinese Communist and Viet Minh forces.

(2) Position paper: To be prepared by the United States.

c. Agenda Item C:

(1) Task: The development of the SEATO strategic concept for the defense of Southeast Asia, including the defense of East Pakistan and of essential sea and air lines of communication, against an attack by Chinese Communist and Viet Minh forces on the assumption that the SEATO nations would use nuclear weapons as required. (To be based on the findings under Agenda Item A of the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on Threat Evaluation.)

(2) Position paper: To be prepared by the United Kingdom.

d. Agenda Item D:

(1) Task: The development of a SEATO strategic concept for the defense of Southeast Asia against an attack by Viet Minh forces on the assumption that SEATO nations would use nuclear weapons on targets in North Vietnam as required. (To be based on the findings under Agenda Item B of the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on Threat Evaluation.)

(2) Position paper: To be prepared by France.

e. Agenda Item E:

(1) Task: The development of a SEATO strategic concept for the defense of West Pakistan against an attack by Communist forces on the assumption that SEATO nations would use nuclear weapons as required. (To be based on the findings under Agenda Item C of the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on Threat Evaluation.)

(2) Position paper: To be produced by Pakistan.

f. Agenda Item F:

(1) Task: To examine existing measures and to determine SEATO requirements for the allocation, control and protection of Allied
TOP SECRET

Top Secret

Tender shipping in the South and Southeast Asia areas in the event of overt Communist aggression.

(2) Position paper: To be jointly prepared by the United States, United Kingdom, France and Australia (this subject to confirmation by each nation concerned). The United States will monitor this subject and will arrange for a joint meeting to be held sufficiently in advance of the Staff Planners' meeting to enable the preparation of a joint position paper.

c. Agenda Item 9:

(1) Task: The consideration of material standardization by properly qualified technical representatives. Agenda to be drawn up and circulated by the United States.

(2) Position paper: To be prepared by the United States.

h. Agenda Item 11:

(1) Task: To draw up detailed assessments of areas of potential resistance, facilities for escape and evasion and guerrilla warfare capabilities.

(2) Position paper: None required. Each nation will prepare assessments applicable to their own areas and, in addition, the United States will consider the Chinese mainland, Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam.

i. Agenda Item 10:

(1) Task: The preparation of a combined training exercise schedule covering specific exercises, including the force and support requirements, one (1) year in advance from June 1956. The schedule also to include a general long-range combined training plan.

(2) Position paper: To be prepared by the Military Liaison Group and circulated by the SEATO Military Secretariat. All member nations to forward to the SEATO Military Secretariat, by 1 April 1956 their proposals for combined exercises to meet the requirements set out in paragraph i. (1) above.

J. Agenda Item 12:

(1) Task: Presentation of an evaluation of the overt Communist threat to the Treaty Area, taking into account the geographical proximity of Formosa to the Philippines.

(2) Position paper: None required. This matter to be jointly presented by the United States and the Philippines.
k. Agenda Item K:

(1) Task: Preparation of a program of future work including the preparation of agenda for:

(a) The third meeting of the Military Advisers.
(b) Ad Hoc Sub-Committee as required.
(c) The fourth meeting of the Staff Planners.

(2) Position papers: None required.

2. Recommendation: The Staff Planners recommend that the Military Advisers:

a. Approve the above agenda for the third meeting of the Staff Planners.

b. Agree that position papers should be prepared as indicated.

D. Times and Places of Future Meetings:

1. The Staff Planners propose that, subject to the agreement of the Military Advisers on the recommendations made in paragraphs B and C above, future meetings should be held as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial</th>
<th>Committee</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on Threat</td>
<td>Pearl Harbor</td>
<td>5 February 1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Staff Planners</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>28 May 1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Military Advisers</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>16 July 1956</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Recommendation: The Staff Planners recommend that the Military Advisers approve the above schedule of future meetings.

E. Circulation of Position Papers:

1. Recommendation: The Staff Planners recommend that the Military Advisers agree that nations responsible for the preparation of position papers should circulate those through the Secretariat at least one month before the appropriate meeting.

V. RECOMMENDATION:

A. The Staff Planners recommend that the Military Advisers:

1. Take note of all the points raised in the above summary report.
TOP SECRET

2. Approve the recommendations made in the various sections of the report.

3. Approve the actions taken by the Staff Planners as recorded in the above report.

VI. Speeches

The opening and closing speeches by Chief Delegates and other dignitaries are contained at Annex G.

VII. List of Delegates

The list of delegates is contained at Annex D.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GP. CAPT. C. G. HARTHEIL, CBE</th>
<th>CAPT. A. HORTONET</th>
<th>CAPT. A. HORTENET</th>
<th>CAPT. A. HORTONET</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senior Delegate,</td>
<td>Senior Delegate,</td>
<td>Senior Delegate,</td>
<td>Senior Delegate,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ERIG. SULTAN BOUGHEDDAD</th>
<th>ERIG. GEN. P. A. GENZ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senior Delegate,</td>
<td>Senior Delegate,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MG. GEN. A. S. AGAR, AVG</th>
<th>MAJ. GEN. ROSHAN RAJAHYAT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senior Delegate,</td>
<td>Senior Delegate,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAJ. GEN. R. C. COLVILLE, CH, B50</th>
<th>RAM. A. P. STONE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senior Delegate,</td>
<td>Senior Delegate,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In reply refer to I-16501/5

16 December 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

SUBJECT: Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO) Staff Organization

Reference is made to the forthcoming meeting of the SEATO Council to be held at Karachi, Pakistan, commencing 6 March 1956.

The Department of State has informed this office that pressure is increasing, particularly from the Asian members of SEATO, for a permanent SEATO Council and Military Staff organization. At a recent meeting of the Military Staff Planners held at Pearl Harbor, TH (1-15 November), it was the conclusion of the U.S. representatives that the position of the U.S. relative to avoiding a commitment to the concept of a permanent SEATO military staff organization was fast becoming untenable. CINCPAC reported this in his message to CNO, 230211Z November, when he stated "It has been U.S. policy to oppose formation of a permanent SEATO staff organization. In this connection, formation of some sort of permanent SEATO staff organization may be inevitable and U.S. eventually may find it necessary to yield on this point or find itself in no position to refute 'paper tiger' charges. It may be more realistic to take the initiative in this matter so as to be in a better position to influence the size and shape of the end product."

The attitude of the Asian countries signatory to the Treaty indicates that they are losing faith in SEATO as a means for deterring Communist expansion in Southeast Asia. In this connection, the Asian States consider that the U.S. is not leading sufficient support to SEATO. Further, the recent Russian visits to Southeast Asia and continuing Chinese Communist activities in the area could result in the Asian members of the Treaty leaning more to a neutralist position.

The Department of State is currently re-examining the U.S. position as pertains to a permanent staff organization for the SEATO Council and has indicated that, due to the need for adding "substance" to SEATO, consideration is being given to the desirability of a U.S. proposal at the 6 March Council meeting, for the establishment of a permanent SEATO Council staff.
SECRET

It is requested that the Department of the Navy obtain CINCPAC's detailed views on this matter. Upon receipt of CINCPAC's views they will be presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration in conjunction with other policy factors as a basis for the development of a Department of Defense position regarding a permanent military staff organization.

(Signed)

E. Perkins McGuire
Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

2 cys SecNavy
1 cy SecArmy
1 cy SecAF
1 cy CH. JCS
1 cy OSD
1 cy R&C
1 cy Reading file
2 cys SAFE

Lt. Col. Queenin/j/s/nahme safe
2E837 79258 15 Dec 55
l-16501/5
International Security Affairs

In reply refer to J-12377/6.

25 January 1956

To: The Secretary of Defense

cc: The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

Problem: An Interagency Military Costing Team recently returned from a five-weeks mission to Free Viet-Nam. The proposed letter to the Secretary of State summarizes the Team’s findings and requests his assistance in correcting the serious logistic situation.

Discussion: 1. Finance: Partially as a result of the Costing Team’s efforts, estimates of annual Defense Support and Direct Forces Support dollar requirements have been reduced by $70 million to $90 million a year.

2. Logistics: Tens of millions of dollars of U.S. equipment and supply are now being lost. Only prompt State-Defense action can correct the deficiencies. The Team reported: (a) "Two warehouses were recently found to contain 120 tons of medical supplies of which no one had prior knowledge." (b) 1,000 vehicles and 14,000 major assemblies are sitting in the rain and mud deteriorating rapidly. (c) "... the capability of supply of forces in the field in the event hostilities should be resumed in mid-1956 would be virtually non-existent." (d) "... the MAAG personnel have done their utmost to protect U.S. interests; there are just not enough individuals to go around."

3. Personnel Requirements: 150 to 200 Americans skilled in military supply and logistics are urgently needed in Viet-Nam. Authority to add this number requires State Department concurrence.

4. Collins-Ely Agreement: The Collins-Ely Agreement of 1 Dec 1954 provides that U.S. equipment in the hands of the French in Free Viet-Nam is to be returned to U.S. or Vietnamese control when determined by joint U.S.-French review to be no longer needed for the purposes for which originally made available. This Agreement is not being implemented by the French, with loss of assets to U.S. and loss of Vietnamese logistic capability.

Implementation: If Mr. Dulles can (a) make it possible to bring in the additional Americans (as you requested in your letter to him dated 15 Dec 1955 - see text A) and (b) arrange with the French for implementation of the Collins-Ely Agreement, DoD can proceed with its plans to solve the problem.

Recommendation: That you sign the attached letter.

Concurrence: None.
Dear Mr. Secretary:

Since my letter to you of the 13th of December regarding the Viet-Nam situation, the Interagency Costing Team, sent to Saigon to study military finance and related matters, has returned and submitted its report. The recommendations of the Team will lead to substantial improvements in budgeting, including savings of millions of dollars during the calendar year 1956. Steps have already been initiated to realize these savings.

The Team also studied the logistic situation in Free Viet-Nam and has reported deficiencies which are of greatest concern to me. Only by prompt action at highest departmental levels will it be possible to correct the problems.

Since the recent heavy phasedown in French forces, or adequate logistic capability in Free Viet-Nam no longer exists. The Team reported that "...the capability of supply of forces in the field in the event hostilities should be resumed in mid-1956 would be virtually non-existent." From the standpoint of preservation of U.S. assets, the situation is also most unsatisfactory. Adequate control of MOAP spares and supplies has, in large part, been lost.

We have concluded that not less than $100,000,000 worth of MOAP materiel can be saved if prompt corrective action can be taken. Such action includes the availability in Viet-Nam in the immediate future of 150 to 200 Americans skilled in supply management and logistics.

A further essential factor in achieving effective supply control is the implementation of the Collins-Ely Minute of Understanding of 1 December 1954. This Agreement provides for the return by the French of U.S. equipment no longer required for the purposes for which originally made available. The Agreement further states that decisions on what is to be returned should be made jointly by French and U.S. representatives. Nevertheless, the French are making these decisions unilaterally; it appears that they are carefully sorting out the useful, serviceable items for their own use, and returning the excess and salvage. We know of no valid reason why U.S. personnel should not be allowed to enter French military storage areas to participate in these determinations.
Your assistance in (a) making it somehow possible to bring in additional personnel, and (b) arranging with the French for effective implementation of the Collins-Ely Minute of Understanding is requested on an urgent basis. I recognize that in reaching your conclusions, you must also weight other factors not discussed in this letter. To enable the Department of Defense to carry out its responsibilities in Free Viet-Nam, however, a solution along the lines discussed above is essential.

Sincerely yours,

SIGNED

C.E. WILSON

The Honorable
The Secretary of State
In Intelligence Brief No. 1876 February 7, 1956.

THE GENERAL SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The position of the government of South Vietnam is appreciably stronger than it was a year, or even six months, ago. Within the past several weeks, however, signs of new political stresses have appeared, and the Communists are apparently stepping up their campaign against the South Vietnamese Government.

The coming months are likely to see new crises, in view of: 1) the Chinese Communist request on January 26 for a reconvening of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina; 2) the absence of any real prospect that the nation-wide election, stipulated in the Final Declaration of the 1954 Geneva Conference, will be held by July; and 3) the reported increase in opposition to President Ngo Dinh Diem and the Communist attack on programs strengthening the Diem government, specifically, the March 4 election for a national constituent assembly.

External Security

Since the virtual elimination of the Binh Xuyen as a military force and the neutralization of a major portion of the Cao Dai units, the principal threats to internal security in South Vietnam come from the clandestine Communist apparatus and from the remnants of the Hoa Hao sect. The Communists have estimated 10,000 guerrillas in South Vietnam, scattered in small groups in rural areas but presumably still responsive to control from Hanoi. The principal infested areas are the plateau region of northern South Vietnam, the southern peninsula (Camb), and the canal-woven area southwest of Saigon where the Vietnamese National Army (VNA) is currently engaged in operations against the Hoa Hao. Communist agents reportedly have been
successful in infiltrating remaining Hoa Hao groups --- chiefly Ba Cut's organization. The latter's increasingly effective defensive tactics have made recent VNA operations relatively costly.

In addition to the continuing presence of these guerrilla elements, the Communists have presumably tried to penetrate all branches of the government. The most frequent reports suggest heavy penetration of the Information Ministry. The absence of reliable information does not disprove some probable penetration of police and military services, particularly at lower levels. The Communists have a surviving capability to disrupt governmental operations, and perhaps to immobilize the regime, through a coordinated campaign of terror and assassination -- a capability they have thus far chosen not to exercise.

Political Problems

The March 4 election will, in all probability, produce a national assembly that will overwhelmingly support Diem and approve the constitution that a pro-Diem commission has prepared. The constitution will establish a presidential system with separation of powers. Balloting will not indicate accurately the extent of anti-Diem sentiment, for a number of nationalist leaders, particularly refugees from the north, appear disinclined to risk censure or repression by contesting the election as opposition candidates.

It will be essential, in the immediate future, that Diem have effective control over the administration and the national assembly. He has the support of the National Revolutionary Movement (NRM), which has become, in effect his political party. There is some question, nevertheless, whether at present Diem is unnecessarily antagonizing elements which might add strength to the future government. He remains almost pathologically sensitive to criticism and potential opposition, with the result that the regime is becoming increasingly autocratic despite his democratic principles. In view of Diem's skill in dealing with dissident elements over the past year, it will perhaps be wise to give him the benefit of the doubt during the pre-election period.

Economic Conditions

There has been little recent change in the economic picture in South Vietnam. Rice prices, which rose precipitously during the summer and fall due largely to poor distribution, have now returned to normal. A major program for resettlement in southwest Vietnam of up to 100,000 of the refugees from the north is now developing, with US and other foreign support. If successful, it would simultaneously reduce the problems of 1) the refugees, 2) increased agricultural production, and 3) internal security in rural areas.
International Aspects

The Chinese Communist request for a reconvening of the Geneva Conference broadened to include the International Control Commission members, probably indicates that the Communists will continue to drive for "reunification" of Vietnam by political and diplomatic means rather than by a resort to large-scale violence --- at least until their proposal is definitively rejected. The Indians, as well as the Communist countries, will probably approve the call for a new conference. They apparently wish to see the ICC continue in operation, which would require the Vietnamese to assume some of the functions assigned to the French by the 1954 agreements.

The French are likely to continue the withdrawal of their forces (now reduced to about 15,000) in South Vietnam, to avoid formal termination of its informal mission to the DRV headed by M. Sainteny, and --- despite current opposition --- may come to favor a new conference as a means of relief from their obligations under the 1954 agreements. The British have become increasingly reconciled to an extended partition of Vietnam, now have greater confidence in Diem's strength, and would prefer to avoid or at least postpone a new Geneva Conference. The British, however, still hope that Diem can be brought to accept some form of north-south consultation, even without prospect of success.
NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on
BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

References:

A. NSC 5501
B. NIE 11-3-55; NIE 11-7-55;
  NIE 11-13-55; NIE 11-13/1-55;
  NIE 100-7-55; SMIE 100-8-55

C. NSC 5602
D. Memos for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject,
   dated February 13 and 24, 1956
E. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "U. S. Policy in the
   Event of a Renewal of Aggression in Vietnam", dated September 16,
   1955
F. NSC Action No. 1522

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the
Treasury, the Attorney General, the Special Assistant to
the President for Disarmament, the Chairman, Atomic Energy
Commission, Mr. Ralph Spear for the Federal Civil Defense
Administrator, and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, at
the 277th and 278th meetings of the Council on February 27
and March 1, 1956, discussed the subject on the basis of
the reference report (NSC 5602) in the light of the recommen-
dations of the NSC Planning Board, transmitted by the
reference memorandum of February 13, and the views of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, transmitted by the reference memo-
randum of February 24, 1956. The Council adopted the state-
ment of policy contained in NSC 5602, subject to the changes
set forth in NSC Action No. 1522-b.

The President has this date approved the statement of
policy in NSC 5602, as amended and adopted by the Council
and enclosed herewith as NSC 5602/1, and directs its
implementation by all appropriate executive departments
and agencies of the U. S. Government, with the understanding
that final determination on budget requests based thereon
will be made by the President after normal budgetary review.

NSC 5602/1 is a substitute for NSC 5501 and is the
basic guide in the implementation of all other national
security policies, superseding any provisions in such other
policies as may be in conflict with it. Progress reports to
the National Security Council on other policies should include
specific reference to policies which have been modified by
NSC 5602/1.

NSC 5602/1

1051

TOP SECRET
At the time that the Council adopted the enclosed policy it also took the following actions (NSC Actions 1522-g through -h):

c. Requested the Department of Defense to make a presentation on the capabilities, with or without nuclear weapons, of the U. S. military forces referred to in paragraph 32 and other appropriate paragraphs of NSC 5501, to deal with local aggression in Vietnam, utilizing as appropriate the study transmitted by the reference memorandum of September 16, 1955.

d. Agreed that the Council, after submission to the President of the report on the subject now in preparation by the Chairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy, should give further consideration to basic U. S. policies with respect to the less developed and uncommitted areas.

e. Requested that a presentation to the Council on the problem of technological superiority be made by the Department of Defense, the Office of Defense Mobilization, and the National Science Foundation; with the collaboration of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare on those aspects of the presentation respecting the educational objectives in the United States.

f. Agreed that intensive efforts should be continued on all aspects of the problem of devising a safeguarded system of disarmament.

G. Requested the Operations Coordinating Board, with the participation of the Department of Justice, to prepare a study of the factors involved in implementing paragraph 35 of NSC 5602, dealing with free world-Communist bloc contacts; and directed the NSC Planning Board to review pertinent policies (particularly NSC 5508/1 and NSC 5427) based upon such an OCB study.
h. Noted the President's request that the Department of Defense and the Office of Defense Mobilization, in consultation with the Bureau of the Budget, prepare for Council consideration a definition of the term "mobilization base".

JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
    The Attorney General
    The Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament
    The Director, Bureau of the Budget
    The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
    The Federal Civil Defense Administrator
    The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
    The Chairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy
    The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
    The Director of Central Intelligence
BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

PREAMBLE

1. The spiritual, moral and material posture of the United States of America rests upon established principles which have been asserted and defended throughout the history of the Republic. The genius, strength and promise of America are founded in the dedication of its people and government to the dignity, equality and freedom of the human being under God. These concepts and our institutions which nourish and maintain them with justice are the bulwark of our free society and are the basis of the respect and leadership which have been accorded our nation by the peoples of the world. When they are challenged, our response must be resolute and worthy of our heritage. From this premise must derive our national will and the policies which express it. The continuing full exercise of our individual and collective responsibilities is required to realize the basic objective of our national security policies: maintaining the security of the United States and the vitality of its fundamental values and institutions.
SECTION A

OUTLINE OF U.S. NATIONAL STRATEGY

2. The basic objective of U.S. national security policy is to preserve the security of the United States, and its fundamental values and institutions.

3. The basic threat to U.S. security is posed by the hostile policies and power, including growing nuclear power, of the Soviet-Communist bloc, with its Communist ideology and international apparatus.

4. The basic problem confronting the United States is how, without undermining fundamental U.S. values and institutions or seriously weakening the U.S. economy, to meet and ultimately to reduce to acceptable proportions this threat to U.S. security.

5. The United States and its allies have no foreseeable prospect of stopping the growth of Soviet nuclear capabilities and of reducing Soviet armed strength—the core of Communist power—or of significantly reducing other basic Communist military strength, except by mutually acceptable agreements with the Soviets or by large-scale military action. The initiation by the United States of such military action for this purpose is not an acceptable course either to the United States or its major allies.

6. Hence, U.S. policies must be designed (1) to affect the conduct and policies of the Communist regimes, especially those of the USSR, in ways that further U.S. security interests (including safeguarded disarmament); and (2) to foster tendencies that lead them to abandon expansionist policies. In pursuing this general strategy, our effort should be directed to:

* As used in this paper, the term "nuclear" refers to any military device of any size or purpose which utilizes energy released in the course of nuclear fission or fusion.
TOP SECRET

a. Deterring further Communist aggression, and preventing the occurrence of total war so far as compatible with U. S. security.

b. Maintaining and developing in the free world the mutuality of interest and common purpose, the confidence in the United States, and the will, strength and stability, necessary to face the Soviet-Communist threat and to provide constructive and attractive alternatives to Communism, which sustain the hope and confidence of the free peoples.

c. In addition to a and b above, taking other actions designed to foster changes in the character and policies of the Soviet-Communist bloc regimes:

   (1) By influencing them and their peoples toward the choice of those alternative lines of action which, while in their national interests, do not conflict with the security interests of the United States.

   (2) By exploiting differences between such regimes to disrupt the structure of the Soviet-Communist bloc.

   (3) By exploiting vulnerabilities within the bloc countries in ways consistent with this general strategy.

d. Destroying or neutralizing the international Communist apparatus in the free world.

7. To carry out effectively this general strategy will require a flexible combination of military, political, economic, psychological, and covert actions which enables the full exercise of U. S. initiative. These actions must be so coordinated as to reinforce one another. Programs for carrying out this general strategy should be developed and conducted as a matter of urgency, with special emphasis in the period before the Soviets achieve nuclear parity.

8. Provided that it is resolutely pursued, this general strategy offers the best hope of bringing about at least a prolonged period of armed truce, and ultimately a peaceful resolution of the Soviet bloc-free world conflict and a peaceful and orderly world environment. Failure resolutely to pursue this general strategy could, within a relatively short span of years, place the United States in great jeopardy.